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**First Committee**  
**Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons**

**Statement by**  
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**on behalf of the European Union**

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1. I am speaking on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.

2. There is broad agreement that the security of the international community continues to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and by the risk that non-state actors could gain access to such weapons. The discovery of clandestine nuclear activities is of particular concern. It is thus of the utmost importance that all existing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements are properly implemented and fully complied with.

3. As we have stated in our General Statement, progress is needed in the field of disarmament and non proliferation in accordance with relevant international instruments and by negotiating new ones, such as a FMCT. A stand-off should be avoided between those who give priority to disarmament and those who give priority to non proliferation.

4. The EU believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are crucial for global peace and security. The NPT is the cornerstone of this regime, based on mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NPT provides the essential multilateral norm and the basis of all our endeavours to address the security challenges in the nuclear field. The EU underlines its continued support for the Decisions and Resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and shall bear in mind the current situation.

5. The NPT today is more important than ever. Its authority and integrity must be preserved and strengthened. We reiterate our support for an effective and universal non-proliferation regime based on the NPT and international safeguards. We fully recognize the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop, research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the relevant provisions of the treaty. But the international community must unequivocally exclude any possibility of the improper use of civilian nuclear programmes for nuclear weapons purposes.

6. The inconclusive outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference should, for all of us, be an additional encouragement to invest in a successful outcome of the 2010 RevCon where it is crucial that we succeed in strengthening the NPT in all its aspects.

7. As a matter of fact, today there is room for some hope, considering the satisfactory conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, made possible by a positive and constructive spirit which clearly showed the commitment to the NPT regime of the overwhelming majority of States Parties, despite the unjustifiable objections raised by Iran that led to a loss of time. The EU and its Member States actively contributed to the deliberations of the session by submitting detailed views and proposals on all three areas of review. We trust that the contributions the EU made and other further contributions will play their part in a successful and substantive conclusion to the current review cycle. The EU is engaged in it on the basis of its Common Position adopted prior to the 2005 Review Conference, by which we stand.

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\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

8. The EU draws attention to the potential implications for international peace and security of withdrawal from the NPT. The contributions and discussions during the last NPT PrepCom have proven to be very useful and we will continue to reiterate the existing principles and urge the adoption of measures to discourage withdrawal from the Treaty. We also continue to work towards universal accession to the NPT and call on those states not yet party to the NPT to join the Treaty as Non Nuclear Weapon States.

9. The EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD and the EU Common Position of 17 November 2003 on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are key elements in the EU's external relations. They commit the EU to act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal, to prevent, deter, halt and, where and when possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern world-wide.

10. As we celebrate its first half century, the EU reaffirms its full support for the work of the IAEA in pursuing the objectives of peaceful nuclear co-operation and nuclear safety. Furthermore, we recognise its indispensable global role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and countering new threats of nuclear terrorism all over the world, in particular through its Nuclear Security Fund, which the European Union continues to support.

11. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol constitute the current IAEA verification standard. The EU considers the Additional Protocol to be an integral part of the IAEA Safeguards System and adherence to it should be considered an essential means of verifying the fulfilment of States Parties' obligations under Article III of the NPT.

We urge all States that have not yet done so, to sign and bring into force their respective Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols.

The EU Member States are also working within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure that the ratification of the Additional Protocol becomes a condition of export of controlled nuclear and nuclear related items and technology.

12. We would also like to welcome the recent Report by the Director General of the IAEA, entitled "Possible New Framework for the Utilisation of Nuclear Energy: Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel". The European Union believes that it is time to take the first concrete steps towards a new approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. A balanced multilateral mechanism would significantly contribute to reducing concerns about proliferation as well as about the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EU welcomes therefore the proposals made so far specially those supported or brought forward by its own Member States. The EU is of the opinion that different proposals are welcome and might bring solutions for different requirements of security of supply defined by States Parties to the NPT.

13. With the enactment of various Joint Actions, we support IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security, verification and national implementation of international instruments. This contributes to better control nuclear and other radioactive materials and to improving States' capabilities for detection of, and response to, illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

14. The EU attaches great importance to the fight against terrorism and supports all measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and related materials and their means of delivery and also radiological materials.

15. The Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which entered into force in July, the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, the Additional Protocol and a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) are important means in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism by curbing the possibilities of illegal diversion of fissile material.

16. The EU also calls on all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the Amended Convention as soon as possible.

17. We must be united in a common endeavour to make the non-proliferation regime more effective. The EU places particular emphasis on a policy of reinforcing compliance with the multilateral non-proliferation regime. We are committed to strong national and internationally coordinated export controls to complement our obligations under the NPT.

18. We recognize that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of 2000 NPT Review Conference.

19. UNSC resolution 1540 and 1673 play a crucial role in requiring UN Member States to adopt effective measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery or manufacture from falling into the hands of non-state actors world-wide. UNSCR 1540 also requires rigorous controls over the production, use, storage and transport of such materials. We commend the work of the 1540 Committee and encourage its efforts to build awareness and capacity in and direct assistance to those regions where full implementation of the resolution is most urgent. We urge all states to fully implement the resolution. The EU is ready to continue to provide assistance, in particular in building legal and administrative infrastructure, sharing our experience of implementation and training relevant national authorities.

20. The unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 reflects the international community's profound concerns over Iran's nuclear programme. We deplore Iran's continued failure to comply with the resolutions of the UNSC and of the IAEA Board of Governors and we are greatly concerned by its past lack of co-operation with the IAEA and the Iranian defiance of the International Community by continuing uranium enrichment related activities. Such a step directly contradicts the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors, made mandatory by the Security Council resolutions. We appreciate the IAEA Secretariat's continuous efforts to resolve the long standing issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme.

21. The EU welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all questions concerning Iran's past nuclear activities. The EU notes that full and timely implementation by Iran of the IAEA work plan would constitute a significant step forward. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the IAEA be able to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, through the implementation of the Additional Protocol and required transparency measures. We urge Iran to cooperate fully in implementing the work plan in a complete and swift manner and with a constructive spirit to assist the IAEA in its efforts by providing all access required by its Safeguard Agreement and by implementing the Additional Protocol and open the way for negotiations by complying with the requirements as set out in resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747.

The European Union supports the statement on Iran issued on 28 September 2007 in New York, by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States with the support of the High Representative of the EU which, inter alia, welcomed the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all questions concerning Iran's past nuclear activities. Moreover we note that the Ministers agreed, in view of the fact that Iran has not fulfilled the requirements of SC resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, including the suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities, to finalize a text for a third UNSC Sanctions Resolution under article 41 of the Charter of the UN with the intention of bringing it to a vote in the UNSC, unless the November reports of Dr. Solana and Dr. El Baradei show a positive outcome of their efforts.

The EU remains committed to seeking a negotiated solution that would address the international community's concerns and allow Iran to develop a domestic nuclear industry for peaceful purposes. A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.

We urge Iran to consider the generous and far reaching proposal made to them in June 2006 which would reaffirm Iran's rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry, as well as bringing Iran far reaching political and economic benefits.

The EU will ensure the effective implementation of the measures contained in the UNSC resolutions. We call upon all countries to implement the measures in full and without delay. The EU is united in its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities and to see all aspects of its nuclear programme, in terms of proliferation, resolved.

22. We welcome the news that the DPRK has shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and admitted IAEA inspectors. We also welcome the agreement reached during the last round of the Six-Party talks and we look forward to its early implementation. These are positive moves by the DPRK, and constitute important steps towards the implementation of the agreement reached by the Six Party Talks participants on 13 February this year.

The EU hopes that the inter-Korean Summit held from 2-4 October, will serve to reinforce the growing atmosphere of confidence and trust in the Korean Peninsula, which would also contribute to efforts, within the framework the Six-Party-Talks, to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

However the EU remains concerned about the situation on the Korean Peninsula and by DPRK's self declared possession and testing of nuclear weapons. We urge the DPRK to comply with Security Council Resolution 1718 and to implement its commitments contained in the Joint Statement of September 2005. We urge the DPRK to dismantle its WMD and ballistic programmes in a complete, irreversible and verifiable manner, to observe the obligations under the NPT, to sign and ratify the CTBT, to refrain from any further tests of a nuclear device and to re-establish the moratorium on long-range missile testing. The EU remains committed to the objective of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

23. The EU supports the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and has welcomed the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of Cold War in particular by two EU Member States. We stress the need for an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, in particular by those countries which possess the largest arsenals. In this context we recognise the application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and enforcement of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account. We are pursuing efforts to secure transparency as a voluntary confidence building measure to support further progress in disarmament. The EU also calls on all States concerned to take appropriate practical measures in order to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

24. In this context, the EU notes the importance of the declarations made by the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America in 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons and calls on all States with non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination. The EU stresses the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of the fissile material as part of the G8 Global Partnership.

25. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which reduced US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to 6,000 accountable warheads, is due to expire in 2009. We note that the US-Russia Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which limits each side to no more than 1,700 - 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, will expire on 31 December 2012. While welcoming the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons which START and the Moscow Treaty have brought about, the European Union stresses the need for more progress in structurally reducing these nuclear arsenals through appropriate follow-on processes. In this regard the EU was much encouraged by the announcement in July that the United States and the Russian Federation are discussing the development of a post-START arrangement.

26. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) is as essential to nuclear disarmament as it is to non-proliferation. Last year's 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT reminded us all of the need to redouble our efforts to complete the outstanding ratifications required for the Treaty to enter into force. The EU believes that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions as well as a credible verification regime are vital. The occurrence of nuclear tests after the opening of the CTBT for signature underlines the need for an early entry into force of the Treaty as soon as possible. The EU welcomes the ratification of the CTBT by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Montenegro within the last year, and urges States, particularly the few remaining Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay and without conditions. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we urge all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT.

27. The EU attaches high importance to the substantial work of the CTBT Organisation (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission. We will continue to actively support the work of the Special Representative of the States which have ratified the Treaty in his work promoting universal accession. The CTBTO also has additional and complementary benefits through the potential of the International Monitoring System to support the early detection of potential tsunamis.

The EU is deeply concerned that the financial stability of the Organisation, and the collective investment by the International Community in the CTBT verification regime, is threatened by the failure of some States Signatories to meet their commitments. We therefore urge all States Signatories to meet their financial obligations in full, on time and without conditions.

In addition to fulfilling our financial obligations, the EU has extended its support for the CTBTO in areas such as training, capacity building and enhancing the performance of the global verification system.

28. The EU also attaches a clear priority to the negotiation, without precondition, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), as a means to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation. It constitutes a priority that is ripe for negotiation.

We have been encouraged by the substantive debates conducted in the CD on this issue during the session last year and the progress made this year through the appointment of a coordinator on item 2 of the Agenda and the constructive deliberations on FMCT which took place during the first part of this year's session.

Pending the entry into force of an FMCT, the EU calls on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome the action of those four nuclear weapons States which have decreed such moratoria.

29. The EU recognizes the continuing high value of the existing legally binding security assurances, provided for by the Protocols of the nuclear weapon free zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear weapon states,

noted by UNSC Res. 984/1995 and reaffirmed at the 6<sup>th</sup> NPT RevCon to Non-nuclear Weapon States parties to the NPT on the use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Positive and negative assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime and can serve as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD. We are committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

30. The EU continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) in its 1999 substantive session. Effective nuclear weapon free zones enhance regional and global peace and security and are a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence. The EU welcomes and encourages the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing the nuclear weapon free zones following completion of the necessary consultations. We hope that outstanding issues concerning nuclear weapon free zones can be resolved through full consultations in accordance with UNDC guidelines and with the agreement of all parties involved.

31. The EU remains committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle-East adopted by the United Nations Security Council and by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The EU calls upon the States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.