



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

8 EAST 65th STREET – NEW YORK, NY 10021 – (212) 879-8600

Please check against delivery

Statement

by

**Ambassador Masood Khan
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations, Geneva**

**in the Thematic discussion
on
Nuclear Weapons
in the First Committee**

New York
18th October, 2007

**Thematic discussion on Nuclear Weapons at the UNGA First Committee - Statement by
Ambassador Masood Khan, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Geneva,
New York;
October 18, 2007**

Mr. Sergio Duarte, the High Representative in his remarks to the First Committee on October 8 gave a terrifying assessment that over half of humanity lives in countries that possess nuclear weapons and that more than 26,000 nuclear weapons exist, though their exact number is not known.

We agree with the High Representative that both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are important to international peace and security. Only through their simultaneous pursuit we can erect effective barriers against risks of proliferation and acquisition of nuclear technology by terrorists. Vertical proliferation, or improvement in nuclear weapon systems, compounds uncertainties and instabilities, and spurs newer strategic competitions.

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in his opening statement to the General Assembly last month, expressed optimism about the renewed interest of the international community in multilateralism and the United Nations to address global issues. Genuine multilateralism should enable nations to take decision in concert.

The principle of equal security for all states, established by the Charter and upheld by the General Assembly's first session on disarmament, should remain paramount in our quest for security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The existing consensus on international arms control and non-proliferation structures has been eroding. We have therefore called for a new consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This new consensus should address contemporary issues related to a) underlying motives and causes that impel states to acquire WMD; b) nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe; c) promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards; e) prevention of acquisition of WMD technology by terrorists; f) missile and anti-ballistic missile systems; and g) security arrangements for sensitive regions such as South Asia, Middle East and North East Asia. We have called on Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to consider convening a Special Conference to build new consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation.

What we need to agree to is to revise the process of disarmament and non-proliferation while evolving a universally agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under globally agreed conditions. Nuclear science, technology and applications contribute to peace and socio-economic human development. It is, therefore, important that we ensure equitable access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This will also enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime.

A FMT should be tied to the twin objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament. Prevention of vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons technology will ensure non-proliferation; cuts into existing stocks will move disarmament forward.

A FMT without verification would amount only to a unilateral moratorium. Nothing more. Similarly, one can only presume that, overtime, fissile material stocks would be transformed into nuclear weapons. A FMT, which freezes or accentuates asymmetries, will accelerate, not arrest proliferation.

It is therefore important that a FMT provides a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use and places these stockpiles under safeguards so that the unsafeguarded stocks are equalized at the lowest possible level. In order to have full effect, it ought also to be accompanied by a mandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states.

Some delegations say that these issues are pre-conditions. We are of the view that insistence on dropping agreed basis for negotiations is a *precondition*. There are agreed principles that underlie the discourse on the FMT, developed by SSO/D-I, the General Assembly resolution in 1993, and NPT Review Conference in 1995 and 2000. The objective has been to draft a FMT that would strengthen security of all states, irrespective of their size and status.

The Shannon Report of 1995 reflected consensus on two basis for a FMT: (a) an agreement to begin negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material treaty; (b) the open, non-limiting scope of negotiations captured in the affirmation that the mandate for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude delegations from raising for consideration the issues of past and future production, as well as management of the fissile material. This is not a precondition, but built-in latitude to raise any issue – cut-off, existing stocks, management, and verifiability.

Some well meaning delegates say that we should raise all these issues when the actual negotiations commence. Of course, we will do that. But one has to be sure what is sacrosanct and what is not. The Shannon mandate was agreed and now there are moves to shelve it. Verification was goal and now non-verification seems to be the objective for some.

It is being posited that overtime global reliance on nuclear power will supplement fossil fuels and gas. If that is the case, it is important that we evolve an agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory basis and under appropriate international safeguards and in accordance with the international obligations of States. Pakistan supports efforts to expand nuclear cooperation for civilian uses, while taking into account safety and security aspects and addressing the proliferation concerns.

Pakistan has a legitimate requirement for nuclear power generation to meet the energy needs of our expanding economy. We will continue to develop nuclear power technology under international safeguards.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is considering new demands for exceptionalism. In the coming months, the NSG states have a heavy responsibility as any endorsement of a selective or discriminatory approach could fatally undermine efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation. We trust the NSG will adopt a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach that will on the one hand arrest horizontal or vertical proliferation and, on the other hand, offer equal opportunities for access to civilian nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards.

We are assessing the full impact of the incipient US-India nuclear deal on fissile material production in our region. This has already influenced our position on the fissile material treaty. The international community and the NSG should build firewalls that should prevent the spill-over of nuclear technology obtained for peaceful purposes into military applications.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.