|
The First Committee
Monitor
Week Three: October 20-24
In this Issue:
1. Introduction
2. Missiles
3. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
4. Nuclear Disarmament
5. Fissile Materials
6. Verification and Transparency
7. Disarmament Machinery
8. Nuclear Testing
9. First Committee Reform
10. The New Agenda
11. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
12. Negative Security Assurances
13. Chemical Weapons
14. Biological Weapons
15. A Culture of Peace and Human Security
16. Panel: The Future of Disarmament and Arms Control:
Civil Society's Role
17. Conventional Weapons
1. Introduction
The five days devoted to Thematic Debate in the GA First Committee
have concluded, and the delegations will soon finish their consultations
and will vote on draft resolutions this coming week. As the hot-topic
of “revitalization” and “reform” of the
First Committee has elucidated, this recently concluded phase of
the First Committee’s work is perhaps misnamed. Far from an
actual debate- an event in which ideas are proposed, argued for
or against, and rebutted- the third week delivered predictable resolutions
with minimal changes from last years versions, introduced by yet
more prepared statements, and almost completely devoid of “interactivity”
between Member States, at least not in the open.
The United States has been one of the most vocal proponents of
First Committee reform, issuing both a non-paper
and a resolution, A/C.1/58/L.15. (See
“First Committee Reform” report).
The U.S. efforts at revitalization are another component of its
campaign to situate “terrorism” as the priority of the
international security agenda, a prioritization warned against by
the Indonesian delegation in their statement on Friday, when it
called attention to the danger of disarmament being "overshadowed
by nonproliferation and the terrorist acquisition of WMD."
If the U.S. draft resolution is adopted, the General Assembly would
be: “Expressing grave concern at the emergence of new threats
to international peace and security in the post-September 11 period.”
The urgently relevant question this resolution begs of the First
Committee is: Should these “new threats” eclipse the
“old threats” of nuclear warfare, the abundance of conventional
weapons, and the perpetuation of militarism?
The security of the African continent, for example, is not dependent
upon the eradication of terrorism, a phenomenon which in itself
is most always a symptom of underlying causes, rather than a naturally
occurring condition that can be wiped out with force. For Africa
and much of the global South, security is defined in economic and
social development, in political stability and in a secure, effective,
and empowered civil society. For this reason, then, we applaud the
sponsors of the conventional weapons resolutions, especially draft
resolution A/C.1/58/L.1. (See “Conventional
Weapons” report.)
For South Asia, the greatest threat to peace and security is surely
the nuclear warheads that lie poised in opposite directions, the
usage of which becoming ever more likely with each missile test
fired, each hostile verbal exchange or brash military incursion
in the precarious Kashmir region. This reality necessitates the
implementation of such as draft resolutions A/C.1/58/L.10
and A/C.1/58/L.18, among others.
This critique of the United States’ proposal should not overshadow
some of the very positive and welcomed suggestions put forth in
their non-paper and resolution. Time could certainly be more wisely
managed, and some resolutions could be combined, as suggested in
both the U.S. non-paper as well as in those of Norway
and the European Union.
Yet when all is said and done, it is not time management or collapsing
resolutions that will revitalize the work of this Committee –
it is only actual disarmament itself that will achieve this –
of weapons large and small. The reason the majority of the world’s
governments are required to maintain positions and repeat demands
for nuclear disarmament year after year in resolutions and debates,
is because other governments, in particular the Nuclear Five, have
not fulfilled their solemn obligations and unequivocal undertakings
in disarmament treaties and resolutions. Who then is really to blame
for thrusting inefficient tedium upon the International Community?
The lack of disarmament, despite the commitments, the signing of
treaties, the passing of resolutions, seems to require this remedial
repetition on the part of the majority of the world’s governments
and people.
-Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
2. Missiles
The best legal tool to counter the threat of missile proliferation
is arguably the newly established Hague Code of Conduct against
Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Yet even this widely-accepted multilateral
agreement falls short of meeting disarmament concerns, as it does
not call for the destruction of a single missile or other delivery
system.
Missile reduction does not even appear to be on the radar
of most Member States. In fact, a resolution on missiles was not
even introduced until 2000, when the Islamic Republic of Iran sponsored
A/C.1/55/L.1, which
requested the Secretary General to draft a report, with the assistance
of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to be submitted to the 56th
session of the General Assembly in 2001.
Since that original resolution, the international community has
succeeded in establishing a Code of Conduct, widely regarded as
“a positive step” if not a solution to the threat. (See
previous Monitor reports on missiles: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/wk1.htm#Missiles
and http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/wk2.htm#Missiles.)
The HCOC remains an agreement between States on how they should
“conduct” their trade in missiles. Completely absent
is any commitment to reductions or halting production or stockpiling.
This year’s draft resolution, A/C.1/58/L.4,
minimally updated to acknowledge the report of the Secretary-General,
calls again for another Panel to be established in the coming year,
and for another report from the Secretary-General, who shall consult
again with Member States.
The resolutions on missiles in the past were adopted, but with
large numbers of abstention. (In 2000, 90 voted in favor, 60 abstained,
and no State voted against. Similarly, in 2001, 88 voted in favor,
57 abstained, and no State voted against.)
If approved, the item will again be included on the agenda for
the 59th session.
To stay updated on the work of the new Panel, be sure to subscribe
to Reaching Critical Will’s General News list by emailing
us at gensubscribe@reachingcriticalwill.org,
or, by checking our missiles information page at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/missiles/missilesindex.html.
-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
3. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Six resolutions on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and one on
a zone of peace, were introduced this week. With the exception of
the resolution introduced by Mexico calling
for a conference of NWFZ States, all were repeats from last year
with only minor text variations.
Nigeria introduced "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Pelindaba)"
(A/C.1/58/L.11) calling on states that
have not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1996 treaty. To date
20 African countries have ratified the treaty. 28 ratifications
are required for the treaty to enter into force.
Uzbekistan introduced a draft decision on ”Establishment
of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central Asia” (A/C.1/58/L.14).
A draft treaty has been agreed in principle by the five central
Asian countries. However, conclusion of the treaty has been delayed
due to incompatibilities between the security relationships of individual
Central Asian States with nuclear weapon States, and the protocols
which the NWS would be required to sign. The draft resolution calls
for no action on the issue this year, but to include it on the agenda
of the 59th session.
Mexico introduced a resolution calling for a conference of States
parties and signatories to nuclear-weapon-free zones (A/C.1/58/L.19).
The objective of the conference would be to promote “…coordination
and convergence in the implementation of the provisions of the treaties
and of strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation.”
The resolution calls for the conference to be held before the NPT
Review Conference in 2005, and also includes plans for two preparatory
meetings for the conference. In this way it is more specific than
previous calls for international conferences on nuclear weapons
issues (such as the proposal for a 4th Special Session on Disarmament,
and the UN Secretary-General’s call for a conference on nuclear
dangers).
The resolution envisages the participation of Nuclear Weapon States
(as signatories to the NWFZ protocols) and non-governmental organizations
in the conference.
Egypt introduced a draft resolution calling for the ”Establishment
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”
(A/C.1/58/L.22). This resolution is
usually adopted by consensus. Egypt also introduced a related resolution
entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East (A/C.1/58/L.2), which calls on
Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US and Israel
usually oppose this resolution, and a small number of other countries
usually abstain.
Malaysia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, introduced draft
resolution (A/C.1/58/L.24) which calls
for ”Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean
as a Zone of Peace”. When this resolution was considered in
2001, the US, UK and France opposed, most European countries abstained
and most of the rest of the world supported. Since the nuclear tests
by Pakistan and India in 1998, Pakistan no longer introduces a resolution
calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Implementation
of the 1971 declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace remains
as a possible confidence and security building measure in the region.
However, little in the way of concrete proposals for developing
the zone have emerged from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,
and thus the resolution merely calls for further consultations and
to report back in 2005.
Brazil introduced a resolution on “Consolidation of the regime
established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco),”
(A/C.1/58/L.6). The resolution highlights
the work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) and supports its work to
promote cooperation with the agencies of other nuclear-weapon-free
zones.
Brazil also introduced a resolution on ”Nuclear-weapon-free
southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/58/L.38).
In previous years, the US and UK have opposed the resolution on
the belief that it sought to restrict the transit of nuclear armed
vessels through international waters included in the zones. On the
other hand, Philippines has explained that they could not co-sponsor
because the resolution does not prohibit such transit, but that
it should in light of the International Court of Justice 1996 decision
on the general illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
The resolution is ambiguous on the matter, referring only to “the
applicable principles and rules of international law relating to
the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime
space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.”
-Wyatt Matthews
Franciscans International
-Alyn Ware
Lawyers’ Committee
on Nuclear Policy
4. Nuclear Disarmament
In its statement introducing the resolution “A path to the
total elimination of nuclear weapons” (L.
53, sponsored by Australia, Côte d’Ivoire, Japan
and Switzerland), Japan stressed that the 13 practical steps for
systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the
NPT, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, retain their relevance
despite the “sea change”since 2000. The draft resolution
itself is virtually identical to last year’s version, focusing
mainly on the 13 steps, with some new preambular language expressing
“deep concern” about the proliferation of WMD and warning
that recent challenges to the Treaty can only be addressed if there
is confidence in compliance by all states parties an apparent reference
to Iran and North Korea. The preamble also adds language endorsing
the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in preventing
terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or related materials and
technologies.
While the resolution centers on the 13 steps, the only real urgency
expressed seems to concern compliance with the nonproliferation
obligation. By comparison, “Towards a nuclear weapon free
world: a new agenda” (L.40, sponsored
by the New Agenda Coalition of Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Ireland,
South Africa, New Zealand, and Egypt), is substantively updated
from last year’s version, expressing a forward-looking sense
of urgency about the need for tangible progress on nuclear disarmament,
and incorporating a much broader agenda. (See “New
Agenda report”.) Unlike the Japanese resolution, the New
Agenda resolution expresses “deep concern at the limited progress
to date” on implementing the 13 steps. In particular, the
Japanese resolution, “recognizes” the recent entry into
force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the
Moscow Treaty”) by the United States and Russia as “progress”
on reduction of their nuclear weapons. In contrast, the New Agenda
resolution “acknowledges” that the reductions in the
numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged under the
Moscow Treaty “represents a positive step” in the relationship
between the United States and Russia, and goes on to call on them
to make the Treaty “a disarmament measure,” by making
it verifiable and irreversible and by addressing non-operational
warheads. Other contrasts between the two resolutions include the
New Agenda provisions regarding non-strategic warheads, its expression
of concern in the preamble regarding the possible effects of development
of missile defenses in causing arms races on earth and in outer
space, and its deep concern “about emerging approaches to
the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies,
including rationalizations for the use of, and the possible development
of new types of, nuclear weapons” these last two in apparent
reference primarily to the United States. It is unfortunate that
Japan and Australia, two important U.S. allies, cannot find a way
to simply support the New Agenda resolution. The result of this
failure is that there continue to be two resolutions addressing
the 13 steps in depth.
On behalf of 46 co-sponsors, Malaysia introduced the resolution,
“Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice” (L.31), adopted annually
by the General Assembly in substantially unchanged form since 1996
(51/45 M). The resolution underlines the Court’s
unanimous conclusion that there exists an obligation to bring
to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and calls for
the immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations leading
to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention providing
for the elimination of nuclear arms. Malaysia stated that the opinion
remains an historic and resolute decision. Further, there is a “crisis
of confidence” in the area of nuclear disarmament fueled among
other things by a disheartening lack of progress. Accordingly, the
co-sponsors felt the need to reiterate the international commitment
to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.
Myanmar on behalf of 50 countries introduced the resolution “Nuclear
disarmament” (A/C.1/58/L.47)
(see the Monitor, week two, for a description).
Speaking in support of the resolution, Algeria called for the creation
of a system of collective security which would enable liberation
from the theories and doctrines of nuclear deterrence.
Underlying the debate on nuclear disarmament this week and earlier
has been a tension concerning the relative priority to be given
non-proliferation and disarmament. During the rather dispirited
thematic discussion this week, in which the nuclear weapon states
did not even see fit to participate, Australia stated that it “is
simply not possible to conceive of a world free of nuclear weapons
in the absence of complete and permanent assurances of nuclear non-proliferation.”
By contrast, the New Agenda resolution reaffirms “that nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing
processes, and that a fundamental pre-requisite for promoting nuclear
nonproliferation is continuous irreversible progress in nuclear
arms reductions.” Indeed, were entirely feasible steps being
taken now to marginalize nuclear weapons, by dealerting nuclear
forces and changing policy and doctrine regarding their use, and
multilateral negotiations commenced on the different aspects of
their reduction and elimination, the world would have an entirely
different environment in which to respond to efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons, should they even occur.
- Jacqueline Cabasso, Western
States Legal Foundation
and John Burroughs,
Lawyers’ Committee
on Nuclear Policy
5. Fissile Materials
While the vast majority of discussion on fissile or radiological
materials the past weeks focused on the highly-anticipated Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the draft resolution on the treaty
(A/C.1/58/L.49) remains substantively
unchanged since from last year's (A/C.1/57/80), which was adopted
without a vote.
Nigeria, acting on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted
a resolution on the "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive
wastes" (A/C.1/58/L.12). Although
this resolution was not submitted last year, the 2003 version remains
relatively unaltered since it was last tabled in the
56th session (56/24) and also adopted without a vote.
Although a relatively short resolution, with 9 operative paragraphs
preceded by 11 preambulatory paragraphs, the prohibition on "dumping"
is broadly defined.
In operative paragraphs 1, 4, and 5, the prohibition on dumping
is reinforced by a "future convention" prohibiting radiological
weapons and waste, to be negotiated in the CD.
The resolution also "takes note" of the Organization
of African Unity's resolutions on the transboundary shipments of
such materials in operative paragraph 6, and "expresses hope"
for the "effective implementation" of the IAEA's Code
of Practice on shipment, as a way to fortify the prohibition.
Perhaps the most contentious definition of "dumping"
can be found in operative paragraph 2, in which the GA "expresses
grave concern regarding any nuclear wastes that would constitute
radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national
security of all States." One nuclear waste that is used in
warfare is the controversial weaponized depleted uranium (DU).
DU munitions are not generally considered radiological weapons because
the purpose
of the DU is to strengthen weapons, not to cause injury or death
from the radiation.
However, there is increasing concern about the radiological impact
of DU as the health effects of its use in Iraq and Bosnia are now
coming to light. The regime change in Iraq since 2002 has meant
that the resolution they usually introduce on the effects of DU
was not introduced this year, leaving little opportunity for this
issue to be raised.
Military spokesmen continue to deny that the DU has any serious
or long-term health or
environmental effects. Studies to determine the true effects of
these weapons continue, by both international organizations and
private scientific and medical groups.
The Nuclear
Policy Research Institute estimates that 12 countries currently
possess DU weapons in their arsenals: the United States, the United
Kingdom, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Israel,
France, China, Jordan, and Taiwan. (see:
http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/Documents/DU_report_final_7_6.pdf)
DU has been used in the Gulf War, the former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan,
and in the most recent Iraq war, reportedly in unprecedented quantities.
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) conducted studies
in the former Yugoslavia, one of the first arenas in which DU was
used in battle. The study found traces of radioactive uranium in
the groundwater of Serbia and Montenegro, and that wind or human
activity can also result in the re-suspension of the radioactive
particles.
The debate over DU is sure to continue with the continuation of
studies on its effects, and draft resolution 58/L.12 might be regarded
as another tool for activists and DU-opponents in the future.
-Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
6. Verification and Transparency
Verification
In its October 23 statement during the thematic debate on verification
and compliance, Canada offered some “reflections and ideas”
to stimulate exchange in the coming year leading up to its submission
next year of the biennial resolution “Verification in all
its aspects” (to be placed on the 2004 agenda by draft decision
L.48). Among Canada’s ideas are
a “review of the role of the Security Council” addressing
questions like: “[S]hould there be a set time frame for responding
to referrals to the Council by treaty organisations? Is there a
need for new ‘rules of the road’ to clarify situations
where treaty-based verification and compliance efforts have been
exhausted and Security Council roles and responsibilities are unclear?
Would it be useful to enhance the practical ability of the Security
Council to deploy its own fact-finding or investigative teams at
short notice?” Canada also addressed the role of the Secretary
General, asking for example, “are there areas of monitoring
or verification of international [non-proliferation, arms control
and disarmament] accords that might be conferred on the Secretary
General?” Canada also asked whether “the specialized
expertise and capabilities that have been built up by UNMOVIC be
retained by the UN as an internal capacity, perhaps in the form
of designated posts within DDA and/or a roster of previously identified
experts on call to support verification or monitoring requirements?”
Sweden similarly commented upon possibilities for use of UNMOVIC,
noting it could be a “permanent resource of the UN Secretariat”
or a “regular subsidiary organ of the Security Council.”
For more re UNMOVIC and a permanent inspectorate, see Disarmament
Machinery and Biological Weapons. Draft decision 48 received support
from South Africa, Belarus, Sweden, Nigeria, EU (Italy), South Korea,
France, and New Zealand.
Transparency
On October 20 and 23, a number of countries including Argentina
(Chair of the group of experts), Japan, Canada, the Netherlands,
the United States, South Africa, and Germany praised the just released
consensus report of the governmental experts on the UN Register
of Conventional Arms. The report recommends broadening the scope
of the Register to include smaller artillery systems (thus introducing
some overlap with the category of small arms and light weapons)
and shoulder-fired missiles known as man-portable air defence systems
(MANPADS). Draft resolution L.45 “Transparency in Armaments,”
introduced by the Netherlands, endorses the recommendations of the
report.
The Netherlands spoke optimistically of progress in transparency,
noting that this year 118 states have submitted reports for 2002,
including four states reporting for this first time. According to
The Netherlands, “[i]ncreased participation by states demonstrates
the growing confidence that transparency can help prevent excessive
accumulation of arms, also by encouraging self-restraint in military
production and transfer of arms.” In the view of The Netherlands,
the “Register has established a ‘de facto’ norm
of transparency in armaments.” Japan stated that “the
Register managed to capture the great bulk of global trade in seven
categories of conventional arms,” by some estimates covering
“more than 95% in monetary value of such trade.” Transparency,
of course, remains far from regulation, a condition perhaps unintentionally
highlighted by Japan in its remark that “success” in
reporting “owes not a little to the United States of America
who exports about a half of such arms and regularly reports to the
Register about such trade.” South Africa commented the group
of experts recognized gaining broader support for the Register requires
“strengthening of the Department for Disarmament Affairs”
which “needs the necessary financial support”.
Other Transparency Resolutions
Draft resolution L.32, “Objective information on military
matters, including transparency of military expenditures”,
co-sponsored by 70 states, was introduced by Germany. Like resolution
56/14 of 2001 (56/L.42),
it calls for the introduction of “a standardized reporting
of military expenditures” to “promote further openness
and transparency in all military matters”.
The Netherlands introduced draft resolution L.16, “National
legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use
goods and technology.” Like last year’s version (A/C.1/57/L.18/Rev.1),
it calls for more effective national control of transfer of arms,
military equipment and dual-use goods and technology and for information
on such control to be provided on voluntary basis to the Secretary-General.
-Nya Gregor Fleron and
John Burroughs,
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy
7. Disarmament Machinery
Disarmament machinery is still being discussed primarily in regards
to a Fourth SSOD and the stalemate in the CD, this week with resolutions
or other documentation to reinforce the statements of the last weeks.
Additionally, there has been talk floating around the UN about creating
a new body to investigate compliance with WMD and non-proliferation
regimes.
France
said that so far, responses to the proliferation problem are ad
hoc and lacking institutional memory, and it is therefore calling
for a “permanent corps of inspectors” to retain the
knowledge and experience collected through UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and others.
This body, as proposed by France, would be placed under the Security
Council and it would report to both the Security Council and the
Secretary-General. The United Kingdom noted it would support fact-finding
missions on a more ad-hoc basis, keeping resource constraints in
mind. However, he was in favor of maintaining UNMOVIC institutional
memory. Canada also noted with support this new idea of “fact-finding
teams” but in the Department of Disarmament Affairs, not the
Security Council. (For more on UNMOVIC this week, see “Biological
Weapons” report)
Many states reiterated their calls for a Fourth SSOD, including
Nigeria on behalf of the African Group of States. Malaysia on behalf
of the Non-Aligned Movement has tabled Resolution A/C1/58/L.25,
“Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament” (SSOD IV), in which an open-ended
working group, working on the basis of consensus, would be formed.
It calls for a report from this working group to be submitted before
the end of the 60th session. South Africa tabled a similar resolution
last year, A/C1/57/L.8. According to
Malaysia, an SSOD would be a strong reaffirmation of multilateralism
in disarmament and security issues.
Japan, as the current President of the Conference on Disarmament,
discussed the report of the CD (A/58/27) and introduced the draft
resolution on the report of the CD (A/C1/58/L.5).
The report and resolution are similar to previous years, and highlight
the need for cooperation and substantive work. Japan urged Members
to solve the stalemate by “find[ing] a balance between different
priorities in (the CD’s) program of work.” The 7th preambular
paragraph of the L.5 resolution “stressing the urgent need
for the conference to commence on its agreed agenda items at this
juncture” is somewhat more forceful than previously, and Ambassador
Inoguchi (Japan) believes it sends a “clear political message.”
A paragraph requesting Member States to cooperate with the CD President
in order to achieve consensus was also added. Austria
noted that the GA gives the opportunity for non-CD members to express
dissatisfaction with the CD stalemate.
The Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/C1/58/L20)
is very similar to what we saw last year, with 2004’s substantive
agenda yet to be determined.
-Jennifer Nordstrom,
Global
Action to Prevent War
and
Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
8. Nuclear Testing
Throughout the past three weeks of the First Committee, a majority
of States who all agree that a cessation to nuclear testing is critical
to the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime have
voiced the urgency of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’s
Entry into Force (EIF). (See "Nuclear Testing"
report, week 2). The exigency of the EIF is so pressing that
the States Parties convened a Conference
on Facilitating the Entry into Force this past Vienna, on September
3-5 of 2003, under the auspices of Article XIV of the Treaty.
In his speech on Thursday, Finnish
Representative Tom Grönburg, speaking on behalf of the
Presidency of the recent Vienna conference, highlighted some of
the noteworthy recommendations provided in the Final
Declaration, adopted by consensus.
Two of the twelve items designed to accelerate the EIF utilize
the willing cooperation of the ratifying States to attain universalization.
In addition to appointing a Special Representative to promote the
Treaty’s EIF, they will establish a trust fund, “financed
through voluntary contributions, to support an outreach programme.”
Regional seminars will be organized with the purpose to “increase
the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays."
The Preparatory Committee of the CTBT will also continue promoting
an understanding of the Treaty by demonstrating the civil and scientific
benefits of its entry into force.
In addition, the Declaration also acknowledges the importance of
non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society
in helping to raise awareness and support for the CTBT.
However, none of these measures were integrated into the draft resolution
A/C.1/58/L.52. All of the operative
clauses remain unchanged from last year's version of the resolution
(57/100). Since last year, three new States signed onto the CTBT
and nine have ratified, decreasing the amount of Annex II states
still needed for entry-into-force to 32 out of 44, one less than
last year.
Several other draft resolutions introduced this week, including
A/C.1/58/L.40 “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free
world: a new agenda,” A/C.1/58/L.47
“Nuclear Disarmament,” and A/C.1/58/L.53,
“A path to total elimination of nuclear weapons,” all
contain preambular clauses that recognize the importance of obtaining
the signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry-into-force
of the CTBT.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the near universally-accepted
sense of urgency of the CTBT when he stated in Vienna, "The
entry-into-force of the CTBT would be a victory for the cause of
peace. It cannot come too soon. The United Nations remains firmly
committed to helping the world community to achieve that goal."
The Final Declaration of the Vienna conference can be found here:
http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2003/afc2003_report_conference.pdf
For more on the CTBT, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/ctbt/ctbtindex.html
-Marisa Tugultschinow
and Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
9. First Committee Reform
After the closed sessions on the “revitalization” of
the First Committee last week, (see “First
Committee Reform” report week 2), discussions on reform
seemed to have petered out, given way to the introductions of resolutions
during the Thematic Debate. Sierra
Leone joined the United States, the European Union
and Norway and submitted its own non-paper on the subject early
this week. In addition, the United States followed up on its own
proposals and introduced resolution A/C.1/58/L.15,
“Enhancing the contribution of the First Committee to the
maintenance of international peace and security.“ Chairman
Sareva also made good on his promise and provided civil society
with a de-briefing of the closed sessions.
As a self-described Finnish pragmatist, the Chair claimed that
the efforts of these weeks- the consultations, non-papers, and the
first resolution on the subject- are merely “modest steps”
with the immediate purpose, “to get the horse out of the stable,”
as explained by the Vice-Chair.
In order for these formative consultations to be productive in
their small, modest way, the Chair had urged the Member States to
keep the debate as constructive as possible, to strip it of polemics
and cynicism. Although he was pleasantly surprised at the adherence
to these requests, he had been hoping for more concrete proposals
for revitalization.
Among the concrete proposals that were offered, most of which were
already contained in at least one of the four non-papers, was the
inclusion of this item on the 2004 agenda. This was one of the more
controversial proposals among a crowd looking to lessen their agenda,
not add to it. It was also suggested that the Secretariat could
make better use of technology by putting drafts online in a more
timely fashion. (Note to diplomats: all statements and resolutions
actually are up online the day they are available: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html).
Clustering, integration of resolutions into each other, prolonged
thematic discussions, re-organization of time management, and limiting
the number of resolutions allowed were also discussed.
The US draft resolution 58/L.15, if adopted, would re-focus the
international community’s conceptual framework of peace and
security on to the terrorist threat. Indonesia, in its statement
on October 24, called attention to the danger of disarmament being
“overshadowed by nonproliferation and the terrorist acquisition”
of WMD. (See “Introduction”)
It also calls on the Secretary-General “to seek the views
of Member States” to improve the effectiveness of the Committee
and “to prepare a report recommending appropriate options
for consideration”.
Sierra Leone, as the only Member State from the global South to
submit a non-paper on this topic, warned against changing the Rules
of Procedure or “involv(ing) substantive political issues.”
Sierra Leone’s paper is also the only one of the four that
did not mention the need for the forum to reflect the so-called
“new security environment.”
Many of the smaller States, while in favor of time management,
more consultations, and more interactivity in the spirit of GA revitalization,
are fearful that a reframing of the First Committee agenda and of
its working methods may strip them of one of the only global, equitable
fora at which they may broach the issues most important to them.
Follow-up on these efforts may transpire slowly over the course
the next year, or the past few weeks may prove to have been yet
one more “exercise in futility,” as the Chair had hoped
against. To stay updated on these developments, be sure to subscribe
to Reaching Critical Will’s General News list, which follows
all international disarmament news. Send us an email at: gensubscribe@reachingcriticalwill.org.
-Rhianna Tyson
and Julika Erfurt
Reaching Critical Will
10. The New Agenda
Brazil re-introduced, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world:
a new agenda” (A/C.1/58/L.40)
on behalf of The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico,
New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden). The resolution is part of
the efforts of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) to preserve and strengthen
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The 2000 version of this resolution
mirrored the 13 practical steps agreed by NPT States Parties at
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and was adopted with only India,
Israel and Pakistan opposing. The 2002 version expanded on the 13
steps to include practical measures for their implementation –
resulting in opposition also from the US, UK and France and abstentions
by most NATO countries (except Canada which supported).
Since 2002 NAC countries have been holding intensive consultations
with NATO States in Geneva and New York in the hope of securing
support for the 2003 resolution. As a result numerous changes have
been made in the text including:
• removal of criticism of the high number of nuclear weapons
remaining
• stronger focus on non-proliferation including the link between
non-proliferation and disarmament and specific criticism of North
Korea, India, Israel and Pakistan
• referring to the threat of nuclear terrorism
There are indications that these changes might not be enough to
secure support from NATO and thus a revised text including further
changes is expected.
Brazil also re-introduced “Reduction of non-strategic nuclear
weapons.” (A/C.1/58/L.39) on
behalf of the NAC. The resolution has significant changes from the
resolution NAC introduced in 2002, including in particular a call
for centralized storage of tactical weapons as a step towards their
removal and elimination. This addresses the concern from NATO States
that the resolution last year did not adequately reflect their concerns
about the number of Russian tactical weapons (about 4000) and uncertainties
regarding their location and operational status. US tactical weapons
in Europe (about 180) have already been taken off alert and placed
in central storage sites. The resolution also calls on States with
tactical weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons
deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalisations
for their use. This addresses concerns about Russia possibly redeploying
tactical weapons and about the US work on new types of nuclear weapons.
See also "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Strengthening
the Centre: A Middle Powers Initiative Memorandum in support of
the New Agenda Coalition 2003 UN General Assembly Resolutions"
at http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/index.shtml.
For a more complete textual analysis of the NAC resolutions contact
urs@gsinstitute.org.
-Alyn Ware,
Lawyers' Committee
on Nuclear Policy
11. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space
The need to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) is apparent
to many States, which have vocalized their support for a treaty
prohibiting the weaponization of space within- and outside of- the
First Committee these recent weeks. Demonstrating this increasingly
universal awareness to preserve space for peace, the First Committee
draft resolution on PAROS was passed overwhelmingly last year. (159
States voted in favor of resolution 57/57 in the GA and only 3 abstained.
No State voted against it.) Yet despite growing concerns of a new
arms race in space, the draft resolution this year has not diverged
in any substantive way from 57/57.
China, whose compromise in the CD is widely viewed as the first
major step to breaking the Geneva deadlock, expressed this week
that it will continue to work with other countries to prevent the
weaponization of space. The “risk,” said Ambassador
Hu Xiaodi on Tuesday, “is mounting with each passing day”
that a treaty remains unrealized.
Until August of this year, China had rejected the A5 proposal so
long as it did not include “a view to negotiate” a PAROS
treaty. In the closing weeks of the CD, China announced that they
would accept the proposal of the five ambassadors. The proposal,
amended in June by Belgian Ambassador Lint, calls for a PAROS Ad
Hoc Committee “to identify and examine” the issue, rather
than to negotiate a treaty.
Russia, the other leading proponent for a PAROS treaty, pointed
to the many peaceful uses of space technology that must be developed
and benefited by all of humankind, a view held by many. Both China
and Russia reminded the audience of Russia’s
vow on September 25, 2003, that it will not be the first to
deploy weapons in outer space and asked the other space-capable
States to join them in this promise.
Canada
noted that a prohibition on the weaponization of space would be
just one aspect of a PAROS treaty, which would include technology
transfers and access, as well as transparency measures on the part
of space-capable States. Canada also suggested the integration of
CD efforts with the UN Committee on Outer Space “as building
blocks” to the negotiation of a treaty.
In the Fourth Committee on Special Political and Decolonization
Affairs, many States voiced their desire to keep space for peace.
Pakistan, Malaysia, Chile, Ecuador, Japan, and others discussed
the importance of space technology in the modern world and the need
for transparency and universal access to technologies for communications,
weather, disaster management, and others. Pakistan suggested that
the IAEA as the appropriate forum for a new space treaty, as “the
only competent body to address the issue.”
Egypt, while supportive of multilateral action in developing peaceful
uses of outer space, cautioned against ideas that do not yet enjoy
consensus, a view also shared by Croatia last week. (See “PAROS”
report Week 2).
Others in the Fourth Committee session on Thursday noted the importance
of the First Committee draft resolution 58/L.44,
despite its redundancy of resolutions past. Another vote on the
issue would reaffirm the urgency of preventing such an arms race
as well as demonstrate the readiness all States to contribute to
that common objective.
While a PAROS treaty may indeed be far from a reality, this resolution,
in addition to civil society efforts and the continued discussions
in the CD, the GA Committees, and the UN Committee, are all contributing
to the body of norms that constitute the international legal regime.
For more on the PAROS campaign, see: http://www.space4peace.org/
and http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html.
-Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
and
Emma McGregor-Mento
Abolition
2000
12. Negative Security Assurances
A resolution calling for the conclusion of effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons (A.C.1/58/L.8)
is sponsored by Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.
Similar to last year's resolution (A/RES/57/56),
it recommends intensive negotiations in the CD on such arrangements
"taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion
of an international convention" on the security assurances.
Introducing the resolution, Pakistan identified a number of circumstances
it contended make the provision of credible assurances more urgent,
including "new doctrines of possible use of nuclear weapons"
and the failure to comply with the NPT Article VI obligation of
complete nuclear disarmament despite the 2000 "unequivocal
undertaking". Pakistan did not explain its own policies regarding
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states, or whether it considers that it is entitled to assurances
of non-use from the NPT nuclear-weapon states or rather would provide
such assurances.
Last year's resolution drew a large number (55) of abstentions,
perhaps due in part to the complications raised by the fact that
Pakistan, Israel, and India are members of the CD. In a working
paper on security assurances submitted to the 2003 NPT PrepCom (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11),
the New Agenda Coalition contended that legally binding security
assurances should be negotiated within the context of NPT. Such
assurances, according to the paper. "would provide a significant
benefit to the Treaty parties and would be seen as an incentive
to those who remain outside the NPT. Security assurances rightfully
belong to those who have given up the nuclear weapon option as opposed
to those who are still keeping their options open."
- John Burroughs, Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy
13. Chemical Weapons
This week, Poland
put forth a resolution titled “Implementation of the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/58/L.41),
emphasizing the universality of the Convention and underlining that
the Convention and its implementation contribute to enhancing international
peace and security.
As “a crucially and increasingly important element in the
legal framework to strengthen international security,” according
to Ambassador Jakubowski of Poland, the first Review Conference
of the Chemical Weapons Convention was a certain success. There
had been consultations with 140 countries and bilateral meeting
with 57. As Ambassador Jakubowski also concluded, “Nowadays,
as we all know only too well, its effective and full implementation
acquires additional significance as it constitutes in itself an
important contribution to the global fight on terrorism.”
The 2002 resolution on the subject, 57/82, was passed without a
vote. This year’s draft contains decidedly major changes in
six operative paragraphs stressing universality, implementation
and, in operative paragraph 10, the fostering of international cooperation.
Poland hopes that L.41 will also be passed without a vote.
Sweden said the
following in its statement: “Events this past year have demonstrated
that there is a need for enhanced tools at the global level for
verification, inspection, and analysis with regard to weapons of
mass destruction,” mentioning the fact that it is the CWC
that mandates the OPCW to carry out verification and inspection
of chemical weapons.
The Republic of Korea pointed to the need for key countries in
the Middle East and the Korean peninsula to become parties to the
treaty. South Korea also referred to the Secretary-General’s
statement that if the CWC were fully implemented, it would be a
powerful tool against chemical terrorism. Indonesia similarly referred
to the treaty in the context of terrorism.
Canada
expressed its belief that the CWC has strong verification mechanisms
as is.
-Wyatt Matthews
Franciscans International
14. Biological Weapons
As he did last year, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary introduced
the resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and their Destruction, 58/L.37.
L.37 notes that there are 150 States parties to the Convention.
It calls upon those states that have not ratified or signed the
BWC to do so. It calls for the implementation of the recommendations
of the Review Conferences, including the exchange of information
and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review
Conference of the Parties to
the Convention and to provide such information and data in conformity
with the standardized procedure to the Secretary-General annually
no later than 15 April.
It also recalls the decision reached at the Fifth Review Conference
to hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week
duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference
and to hold a two-week meeting of experts to prepare each meeting
of the States
party. The 2003 annual meeting will take place this November. It
asks for continuing assistance from the Secretary-General.
This resolution is likely to be adopted by consensus because there
is nothing in it that any government is likely to object to. Further
discussion on verification will occur in other arenas, such as the
Security Council which will have to come to a decision on a new
mandate
for UNMOVIC. The reason for this is, as mentioned in prior reports,
that Hungary (as well as the other parties to the convention) knows
that there is no political will in the current US administration
to take such steps.
Also on Tuesday, Australia
gave its support to the draft resolution, as did Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea, who underlined the importance of national implementation
of the BWC.
Indonesia also stressed the need for a verification protocol.
On the afternoon of October 23 a panel discussion was held by the
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, in cooperation
with DDA and UNDPI, entitled “Reducing the Risks Posed by
Biological Weapons.” It focused on a potential role for UNMOVIC
which would require a new mandate. Discussion also centered around
strengthening controls on dangerous pathogens. Elisa Harris, a senior
research scholar the University of Maryland who in the
Clinton Administration was Director for Nonproliferation and Export
Controls on the National Security Council, presented the proposal
of the Center for International and Security Studies for a Biological
Research Security System. Also presented was the report of the National
Academy
of Sciences on “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism:
Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma.”
Elisa Harris said that after September 11th 2001, administrations
world wide have made it more difficult for people to get hold of
possible dangerous biological agents. But there have been few legal
restrictions in respect to what kind of research can be done and
none at all on
government research. She said it was essential both nationally and
internationally to change this, giving several examples of the already
existing dangers. New York-based scientists have, for instance,
managed to develop the polio virus "from scratch," mainly
by using DNA.
In other words, it has been proven possible to develop dangerous
biological weapons without access to any of the pathogens.
The capabilities of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC to investigate possible
development of biological weapons were discussed by Terence Taylor,
now President and Executive Director of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies and a former UNSCOM Commissioner, and Barbara
Rosenthal, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Project
of the Federation of American Scientists. Members of UNMOVIC also
answered questions. Other experts, such as Jonathan Tucker from
the Monterrey Institute, and delegates from France and Canada participated
in the
discussion. Canada earlier that day in the First Committee had focused
on the importance of verification.
Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of The
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, gave a speech at
the panel discussion earlier that morning entitled, “The Future
of Disarmament and Arms Control: Civil Society’s Role.”
(See "Panel" Report). She underlined
how extremely dangerous biological weapons are, not only because
of their physical extension - worldwide - but also because
of their extension in time. Some biological agents may be almost
impossible to get rid of, once used in a war or by a terrorist.
Both the panel discussion, as well as Ms. Johnson’s presentation,
will soon be available on the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace
and Security web site: http://disarm.igc.org/.
Ann Lakhdhir and Arild
S. Frick,
NGO Committee on
Disarmament, Peace and Security
15. A Culture of Peace and Human
Security
In 2002 the General Assembly adopted by consensus a biennial resolution,
“United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation
education” ((A/C.1/57/L.7/Rev.2). Reporting on its implementation,
Canada announced that the International Security Research and Outreach
Program (ISROP) recently launched the Graduate Research Awards for
Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in partnership with
The Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies at the University
of British Columbia. Canada noted that the longstanding ISROP provides
“up-to-date, objective information and encourages the exchange
of views on international security matters through web-based and
other publications accessible to the public.” In partnership
with the United Nations Association of Canada, Canada also plans
to create a “comprehensive disarmament education programme
intended for students and teachers at the secondary school level
across Canada.” As last week’s Monitor reported, New
Zealand has already begun implementation of the recommendations
of the UN Disarmament Education study. In cooperation with NGOs,
New Zealand distributed to schools an attractive and thought-provoking
brochure on peace education. India was another country referring
to the importance of the study, calling for action on its recommendations
and emphasizing the essential role of NGOs.
- Nya Gregor Fleron, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
16. Panel: The Future of Disarmament
and Arms Control: Civil Society's Role
Thursday, October 23, 10 AM-noon, Dag Hammarskjold Library Auditorium
This week's briefing about civil society's role in the issue of
disarmament and arms control was put together by the UN Department
of Public Information and the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace
and Security. The panel included Nobuyasu Abe, Under-Secretary-General
of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, Henrik Salander, formerly
the Permanent Ambassador of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament,
currently the Secretary General of the new in International Independent
Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Rebecca Johnson,
Executive Director, of the Acronym
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.
Under-Secretary-General Abe talked about the current challenges
to the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. He stated that these
challenges stem from two major events: the end of the Cold War which
caused many to forget about the threat of nuclear annihilation,
and the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. which
has given priority to the suppression of terrorism over disarmament
and nonproliferation. Mr. Abe also talked about the renewed concern
about compliance with disarmament and nonproliferation norms. He
specifically mentioned Iraq, Iran and the DPRK, but did not specifically
mention the DPRK announcement of withdrawal from the NPT. Mr. Abe
suggested several ways that NGOs and civil society could support
a disarmament and nonproliferation regime, including: funding, education,
advocacy, persuading politicians, research, mobilizing experts,
and keeping countries honest by holding governments accountable
to their international agreements.
Ambassador Henrik Salander spoke mostly about the new Swedish sponsored
Independent Commission on WMD. The commission will be chaired by
Hans Blix, and will hold the first meeting of all 13 commissioners
(12 + Blix, each from a different country) in early 2004. The Commission
will have a broad mandate which will include nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, their delivery vehicles, terrorism related aspects,
and the lack of enforcement for multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation
agreements. The Commission will host open meetings and seminars
and outreach to Universities not just in the United States and Canada
but all over the world.
Rebecca Johnson's speech touched on the difference between civil
society and NGOs; that civil society includes broader movements
like the women's movement, environmental and peace movements. She
spoke of the wide and varied tactical toolbox that is used by NGOs
and about the successes that NGOs have had influencing the UN- specifically
mentioning the work that was done by NGOs that got UN Security Resolution
1325 passed. Ms. Johnson spoke about how most weapons of mass destruction
are really transnational threats- their impact knows no border.
She spoke of three ways that civil society can act to create and
highlight political opportunities- elite activism (academics, experts,
and scientists), grasssroots public movements, and nonviolent direct
action (upholding laws that states have agreed to). Ms. Johnson
noted that "civil society is the moral conscience needed to
speak truth to power."
-Yujin Ha and Susi
Snyder,
Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom
17. Conventional Weapons
Colombia, Japan and South Africa sponsored a resolution on the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/C.1/58/L.1).
This resolution emphasizes the importance of the speedy and full
implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects and states that the Assembly would decide to convene
a United Nations conference to review progress made in implementing
it, in New York from 26 June to 7 July 2006. The draft resolution
also states that the Assembly would hold a session of the preparatory
conference in New York from 9 to 20 January 2006 with another session
if necessary. This resolution also states that the Assembly would
determine that it would be feasible to develop an international
instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small
arms and light weapons and would decide to set up an open ended
working group to negotiate such an instrument. The working group
would hold an organizational meeting in New York on 3 and 4 February
2004. Another issue that the draft touches on is that of brokering,
requesting the UN Secretary-General to hold broad based consultations
on that issue and to report to the Assembly at its next session
on the outcome of those talks, in order to provide more in-depth
consideration of the matter, at the appropriate time by Member States.
Bangladesh, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru and Spain sponsored
a resolution on Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Sub-regional
Levels (INSERT). This resolution would call on the Conference on
Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that would
serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms
control. It anticipates a report of the Conference on this topic.
A large cross regional group of states sponsored a resolution on
Regional Promotion in the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/C.1/58/L.46).
Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States sponsored a draft
on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Africa (A/C.1/58/L.13) in which
the Assembly would appeal to all states as well as to international
governmental and non governmental organizations and foundations
to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programmes
and activities of the Regional Centre. This was co-sponsored by
a large cross regional group of states.
A large cross regional group of states sponsored a draft resolution
on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed To Be Excessively
Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (A/C.1/58/L.50)
calling on all States that have not yet done so to become parties,
as soon as possible, to the Convention and its annexed protocols.
A large group of European and African states sponsored a draft
resolution on Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Collecting Them (A/C.1/58/L.51)
calling on the international community to provide technical and
financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil organizations
to combat that trade.
Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon sponsored a resolution on Activities
of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions
in Central Africa (A/C.1/58/L.54).
Statements by member states:
South Africa, Japan and Colombia spoke mainly about their draft
resolution on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
(A/C.1/58/L.1). The representative of
South Africa said that she hoped this resolution could again be
adopted without a vote. Both the representative of Japan and Colombia
stressed the importance of work done by non-governmental organizations
in this field and the importance of the strong partnership between
governments and civil society groups on the issue of small arms
and light weapons, the representative of Colombia asserting that
it is hard in fact to find a better collaboration between states
and civil society than on this question.
The representative of Colombia stressed the importance of maintaining
political pressure to tackle this problem and quoted figures from
the 2002 Small Arms Survey to underline the magnitude of the problem.
Canada underlined that the work of the UNGA first committee goes
beyond traditional arms control, much being impelled by human security,
humanitarian concerns and humanitarian law. Canada described SALW,
from small handguns to automatic assault rifles as “instruments
of social and economic destruction” which have moved beyond
the traditional battlefield and war torn regions “into our
streets and into our homes” affecting developed and developing
countries alike. Switzerland along with Colombia and Canada underlined
the need to recognize the human security dimension of SALW, along
side the state security dimension.
Canada stated that time and resources must be used wisely if actual
progress is to be made on curbing the availability and misuse of
small arms in advance of the 2005 biennial meeting and 2006 review
conference on SALW. Canada stated that increased attention should
be given to transfers between states and non-state actors as well
as to issues such as the misuse of those weapons by law enforcement
officials.
Nigeria and Rwanda spoke for some time strongly in support of better
arms controls, arguing that the failure of the international community
to hold their manufacturers, agents and brokers to account has been
largely responsible for the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW in
Africa.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo called for negotiations on
a legally binding convention prohibiting the illicit trade and trafficking
of small arms and light weapons arguing that implementation of such
a convention would bring added value to existing mechanisms.
Nigeria spoke in support of the proposed convention on marking
and tracing, as did Rwanda, Norway and Sierra Leone.
Norway spoke of how with the Netherlands it is seeking to take
the issue of brokering forward, underlining that only about twenty
countries worldwide have legislation that regulated brokering and
arguing that regional organizations should play a crucial role in
helping to establish such legislation. Norway stated that it supports
the proposal by South Africa, Japan and Colombia, particularly operative
paragraph 10 of the draft on the subject of brokering.
Australia welcomed the development of a protocol to the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons to reduce the humanitarian impact
of explosive remnants of war, stating that the draft framework paper
developed by Ambassador Sanders of the Netherlands had provided
a sound basis for consensus on a legally binding instrument. Norway,
Lithuania, India, Canada, Sweden and the Republic of Korea supported
the development of this protocol also.
Australia, Norway, Lithuania, Canada, Sweden and the Republic of
Korea expressed support for a protocol on mines other than anti-personnel
mines.
Many countries underlined the ongoing importance of addressing
the impact of landmines. Australia stated that universalisation
of the Ottowa Convention and mine action remained one of its key
priorities. It urged that all states in Asia and the Pacific that
had not yet done so should accede to the Convention. Lithuania stated
that earlier in 2003 it ratified the Ottowa convention, being the
first amongst its region to do so. It stated that in 2004 it would
host a regional seminar to advance the goals of the Ottowa Convention.
Turkey updated the Committee on its country’s landmine activities,
having declared a three year renewable moratorium on mine transfers
and trade Turkey has also engaged in demining activitiee on his
close to border areas. Turkey also briefed the Committee on the
fact that after negotiations Turkey and Greece had joined the Ottowa
Convention together and had simultaneously deposited their instruments
of ratification on 25 September 2003.
-Sarah Sullivan, Amnesty
International
Eliza Kretzmann, Quakers
International
Jennifer Nordstrom,
Global Action
to Prevent War
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008
| 
