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The First Committee Monitor
Week Three: October 17-21, 2005
In this issue:
- Introduction
- Nuclear Disarmament
- Verification and Compliance
- Disarmament Machinery
- Disarmament Education
- First Committee Revitalization
- Landmines
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Negative Security Assurances
- Proliferation
- Disarmament and Development
- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
- Regional Centres
- Biological and Chemical Weapons
- Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
- Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Terrorism
1. Introduction
The First Committee, as the only currently functioning multilateral
disarmament forum, has an obligation to take the lead and give direction
to the other deadlocked fora. If the world is going to move forward
with disarmament, it is absolutely necessary for governments to
engage in dialogue and for like-minded states to work together with
civil society to increase the pressure on the handful of holdouts
that have held the world hostage to their narrow security interests.
Creating progressive resolutions and voting in the First Committee
are important tools to increase this pressure, and there are a variety
of new and revamped resolutions this year that may force some governments
to either join the consensus to make progress, or expose themselves
as the impediments to progress.
This week, the First Committee institutionalized ad hoc civil society
collaborations by inviting two representatives from civil society
to formally address the Committee for the first time. Dr. Kathleen
Sullivan and Dr. Peter Lucas made First Committee history by giving
presentations about their work in Disarmament Education and engaging
in interactive debate with the delegates, who called the presentations
"fascinating". Similar NGO presentations have long histories
of utility and effectiveness in other disarmament fora, and the
NGOs look forward to now continuing that tradition in the First
Committee. (See Disarmament Education
and Disarmament Machinery Reports)
In her presentation, Dr. Sullivan used an interactive exercise
from the classroom to encourage the delegates to use their imaginations
and hearts to understand what Japan has called "the true nature
of nuclear weapons." The presentations encouraged the diplomats
to feel as well as think, something they need to continue as they
cast their votes next week.
As Member States gear up for voting, the issue of consensus has
come up repeatedly. Almost all the resolutions strive for consensus
and most achieve it. However, some have been questioning the utility
of sacrificing progress to the lowest common denominator, particularly
in the one functioning multilateral disarmament forum that allows
for voting. From small arms and light weapons to the Conference
on Disarmament (CD), consensus is being used as a veto tool to enact
the tyranny of the minority, which some have called the abuse of
consensus. Indonesia mainly attributed the "failure of the
CD to act on pertinent issues such as disarmament and non-proliferation"
to the "misinterpretation of its rule of consensus."
In much of the activist world, where people working for peace and
justice have struggled to make decisions via consensus, it is understood
that one only blocks consensus if one believes that not doing so
will bring about serious harm. This should not be a common situation.
If an individual blocks consensus more than once a year, either
the rule is being abused or the group does not share a common security
analysis. In international disarmament fora, we have a situation
where consensus is being abused and where the group lacks a common
security analysis. Both of these situations will have to be changed
in order for the international community to move forward on a consensus
basis.
Many delegations this week called the new initiative of the 6 nations
"courageous" because it was creative and challenged the
minority of consensus blockers to expose themselves and really engage
in debate on the issues, assuming that dialogue is the only way
to bridge disagreements. While civil society agrees, and supports
and stands behind the initiative and other progressive efforts at
the First Committee, civil society's understanding of courage comes
from a world very different from the diplomatic UN. "NGOs use
the word courage informed by the lives of individuals such as Phil
Berrigan who spent 11 years of his life in prison on charges from
protesting nuclear weapons, as well as Karen Silkwood and other
whistleblowers who have been killed and silenced," explained
Felicity Hill of Greenpeace International, at a panel on First Committee
Revitalization organized by The Netherlands.
As civil society and governments meet in the middle and collaborate,
we learn from each other. Through understanding courage and the
urgency of the situation with mind and heart, we urge: Do not be
afraid of voting. Do not be afraid to isolate the minority and let
it be public who is blocking movement, and why. Let civil society
continue its efforts to create political will in the states who
are stopping progress, and support those efforts by demonstrating
that you too will work for forward-looking, creative solutions.
Together, we can build a world founded on the rule of law, and "abolish
the scourge of war" and the instruments used to wage war.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
2. Nuclear Disarmament
Three draft texts tabled this week rounded out the gamut of resolutions
on nuclear disarmament.
Japan introduced resolution A/C.1/60/L.28,
“Renewed Determination toward the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons.” The draft text has been completely rewritten and
streamlined from the last year’s resolution, “A path
to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/RES/59/76),
which has been submitted annually since 1994. Last year’s
resolution was widely supported in the General Assembly with 165
votes
in favor, opposition from India, Palau and the United States, and
abstention from the New Agenda Coalition.
Against the backdrop of “the sixtieth anniversary of the
atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” invoked in the
first preambular paragraph, the current resolution recalls “the
Decisions and the Resolutions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference,”
but does not reaffirm them. Also notably absent is any reference
to the “unequivocal undertaking” agreed to by the Nuclear
Weapon States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals.
In its operative sections, the current resolution no longer cites
the “central importance” of specific practical steps
from the 2000 NPT Final Document, nor the principles and objectives
for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995
Conference. Operative Paragraph (OP)3 of the current draft instead
“encourages further steps leading to nuclear disarmament…
including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons,”
emphasizing the importance of irreversibility, verifiability, and
transparency in the process of nuclear disarmament. The resolution,
in OP 6 and 10 respectively, calls for “the nuclear-weapon
States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons
systems,” and for “all States to redouble their efforts
to prevent and curb proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction and the delivery means.” OP9 emphasizes “the
importance of immediate commencement of negotiations on the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty,” dropping language mandating that
the treaty be “effectively verifiable.”
This Resolution and the New Agenda Coalition’s (NAC) Resolution
(A/C.1/60/L.4)
have their strengths for progressing on disarmament. The New Agenda
Resolution broadly reaffirms the consensual agreement to take practical
steps for disarmament made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference, which the Japanese Resolution recalls but does
not reaffirm. The NAC Resolution also recalls the “unequivocal
undertaking” agreed to by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, which
the Japanese Resolution does not mention. The Japanese Resolution,
on the other hand, identifies specific priorities for moving forward.
Thus far, there are indications that certain members of the NAC
will break ranks and support this text, with other members continuing
to abstain. The United States is likely to continue its opposition,
primarily over the language on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Last year, Japan supported the New Agenda Resolution.
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52,
“Reducing Nuclear Danger,” is unchanged from last year’s
text (A/RES/59/79)
introduced by India. Implicitly directed at Russia and the United
States but also applicable to nuclear rivals India and Pakistan,
OP1 of this narrowly focused resolution “calls for a review
of nuclear doctrines and, in this context, immediate and urgent
steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of
nuclear weapons.”
Civil society organizations and other distinguished individuals
made a similar appeal for the reduction of the operational status
of nuclear forces (http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/policypractice/statement.htm),
noting that thousands of warheads in Russia and the United States
remain on high alert, launch-on-warning status. A model resolution
for the United Nations General Assembly on the operational status
of nuclear weapons is available at http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/policypractice/modelresolution.htm.
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.54,
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,”
is also unchanged from the text introduced by India last year (A/RES/59/102).
The preambular paragraphs bear in mind the July 8, 1996 advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice, on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. While the opinion held that
“the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary
to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,”
this finding stopped short of definitively adopting the position,
articulated by several members of the Court, that any use of nuclear
weapons would be categorically unlawful, even in “an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State
would be at stake.” OP1 of L.54 addresses this loophole by
requesting that the Conference on Disarmament commence negotiations
“on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.”
Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee
on Nuclear Policy
3. Verification and Compliance
Verification and Compliance have been key to nearly all of the
topics before the First Committee. In the area of Small Arms and
Light Weapons (SALW), compliance with the proposed international
instrument on marking and tracing will not be strictly enforced
because the instrument is not legally binding, a lack bemoaned by
many delegations. Provisions for enhanced monitoring and reporting
in the 2001 Program of Action on SALW are contentious. The Biological
Weapons Convention is largely seen to be deficient compared to the
Chemical Weapons Convention because it lacks a verification regime
(the Bush administration scuttled negotiations to create one in
the summer of 2001).
Perhaps most central to these discussions, however, is compliance
and verification with regards to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and the potential Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
The United States has claimed that the commitments made at the 2000
Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were political,
and not legally binding, while others have called US compliance,
and that of other Nuclear Weapon States, with Article VI obligations
into question. The United States has accused the Democratic Peoples’
Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran of intentional non-compliance,
and the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
with many abstentions, recently found Iran to have violated its
Safeguards Agreement in the past. Disagreement over whether an FMCT
is effectively verifiable is one of two things stalling its negotiation
in the Conference on Disarmament.
This week in the First Committee, Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary
of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation for the
United States formally introduced the draft resolution “Compliance
with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements”
(A/C.1/60/L.1).
The text of L.1 has changed substantively since its last introduction
in 2003, A/Res/57/86.
The earlier version is more multilateral, while the new one downplays
international law and adopts a tougher tone regarding compliance
enforcement (See Nuclear
Disarmament Week 2 Report). The current text calls on "all
Member States to take concerted action to ensure that all States
comply with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and
disarmament agreements and hold those not in compliance with such
agreements accountable for their non-compliance."
The 2002 resolution (A/Res/57/86)
called upon States to "support efforts aimed at the resolution
of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements
and international law,” and welcomed "the role that the
United Nations has played and continues to play” on the issue.
The current text does not necessitate that compliance questions
be resolved by means consistent with international law, and the
United Nations is listed as one of a range of international actors
the resolution endorses to "take action to prevent serious
damage to international security and stability arising from non-compliance
by States with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation
and disarmament obligations."
The ability to effectively verify the compliance of all States
Parties with any given treaty is essential to its viability. The
US does not believe international cooperative measures, including
technical measures and on-site inspection regimes, are sufficient
for detecting noncompliance. Verifiability assessments are much
broader for the US, and include “the proven reliability of
our negotiating partners in adhering to agreements, the incentives
given parties may have to cheat on a given agreement, and the relative
significance of cheating pursuant to obligations.” This obviously
leaves room for subjective judgments that may have motives going
beyond assessment of compliance. Particularly relevant to negotiations
for an FMCT, the US stated at the beginning of its speech that it
“generally does not join regimes or sign international agreements
that constrain the freedom to exercise our national right to pursue
our security when U.S. compliance is not going to be reciprocated.”
Other states believe that multilateral approaches, such as international
cooperative measures, technical data, and on-site inspections are
the best verification tools. A panel of governmental experts will
examine the issue of verification in 2006 and report their analysis
and recommendations to the First Committee. Canada insists that
verification requires and benefits from research and development
programs such as the Security Research and Outreach Program (ISROP)
and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. Canada also believes
that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) plays a vital role in compliance assessment,
and Member States and NGOs have called for this to become a standing
body to investigate compliance issues. Rebecca Johnson of The Acronym
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy underscored that “multilateral
verification is by definition cooperative and consensual in principle,”
during a panel discussion on Gender, Militarism and War hosted by
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and
Global Action to Prevent War.
Draft resolution L.1 is intended “to exhort governments to
seek common cause in pursuit of diplomatic means to bring international
violators back into compliance.” The resolution and its introduction
call for not only compliance assessment but also compliance enforcement.
Neither the US introduction nor L.1 outlined strategies for compliance
enforcement, but its introduction did underscore the purpose of
verification: “If detection has no consequences for the violator,
then verification has no meaning, and deterrence is unachievable.”Given
the recent invasion of Iraq based supposedly on US assessment of
Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions, such language
to put it mildly is cause for concern. In contrast, Sweden believes
that states must be held accountable for noncompliance based on
the rule of law, and that representatives of civil society have
a role to play in this regard.
Other states emphasized confidence-building measures as an important
aspect of treaty compliance by addressing what China has called
the root causes of non-compliance and proliferation. For instance,
Pakistan’s draft resolution “Confidence-building measures
in the regional and subregional context” (A/C.1/60/L.24)
recognizes that confidence-building measures “have improved
peace and security” and calls for meaningful dialogue and
sustained consultations “while at the same time avoiding actions
which may hinder or impair such a dialogue.” Confidence-building
comes from a cooperative security framework instead of a deterrence-based
force-projection framework.
The DPRK’s right of reply to the US on October 18th demonstrated
the dangers of the deterrence-based force-projection framework.
The DPRK denounced the US statement as the fabricated product of
the hostile policy of the US against the DPRK, and remarked that
it was the US that had systematically pushed the DPRK to turn to
nuclear deterrence, which is clearly the opposite of what a verification
regime within a deterrence-based security strategy intends.
Speakers at a panel discussion hosted by the Department of Disarmament
Affairs (DDA) and the Government of Canada on Verifying Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament Agreements indicated that new strategies for strengthening
treaty verification are necessary to deal with what Angela Woodward
of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
calls a “different political environment of verification.”
Brian Wood of Amnesty International suggested that the international
community create a “supportive architecture” of verification
by “urging states to implement legislation nationally”
in order to prosecute violators. It was also suggested that perhaps
one reason some states were reluctant to support stringent verification
resolutions was that verification technologies are now “too
good” in that they can expose a history of production from
decades past. Thus, states involved in prior activities may be nervous
about being identified as a violator of UN resolutions and treaties.
-Ray Acheson and Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
4. Disarmament Machinery
Political will, which China
called “the precondition for diplomatic efforts”, continued
to be an important element in discussions of the workings, and failings,
of disarmament machinery during the thematic debate this week on
the subject. However, political will is not mysterious; it is decisions
made in capitals. Achieving the “political will” necessary
to unblock disarmament machinery and get back to work on disarmament
and non-proliferation means that every Member State must make the
decision to develop a cooperative security analysis and accept the
security concerns of all other Member States.
Some noted that pieces of disarmament machinery with a permanent
structure were performing better than those without such a structure,
recalling Canada’s repeated suggestions to create an NPT Secretariat.
Others recommended increased cooperation among pieces of the machinery:
“The handling of the weaponization of outer space would, for
example, benefit from a better understanding of the work of COPUOS
and UNISPACE III,” Sweden noted.
Discussions on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) continued to
consider procedural efforts to make substantive progress, while
acknowledging the crucial role of political will. During Tuesday’s
and Wednesday’s sessions, several member states indicated
their support of the new initiative by Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico,
New Zealand and Sweden. The six nations again indicated their willingness
to bring the initiative back to the First Committee if the CD does
not adopt a program of work this year, as well as to work with the
previous and incoming CD Presidents to find a consensual program
of work. Indonesia, the Chair of the disarmament working group of
the Non-Aligned Movement, called it a “good initiative”
that will “give opportunity to move forward with discussion
and deliberations that can set the legal, technical and political
framework for substantive action on the four issues by the CD once
it agrees to do so.”
After praising the “courageous initiative” by the 6
nations, The
Netherlands bemoaned that “next year would be a most unwelcome
jubilee of sorts, if we did not succeed at having at least a meaningful
and structured debate on the core issues at hand.” The next
three CD Presidents, Poland, the Republic of Korea and Romania have
indicated their intention to work together to sustain a structured
discussion of the core issues in the CD. However, as Pakistan
reminded the First Committee, the CD “is a negotiating, not
a deliberative, forum.”
Several speakers also supported creating continuity in the CD presidency
through dialogue and consultations. At the CD, some delegations
have even suggested extending the CD presidency. Poland, the incoming
CD President, “believe[s] that the establishment of a common
platform of cooperation between the session’s Presidents can
advance us closer towards a long awaited progress on substantive
issues.” Poland is conducting consultations during the First
Committee on the program of work, along with current CD President
Peru.
France
was the only Member State besides the US who expressed support for
a CD program of work other than the near-consensus Five Ambassadors’
proposal, or its very similar cousin the Food
for Thought Paper, when it advocated for working on what it
calls ‘new issues’ or ‘out of the box issues’
in the CD.
After the Disarmament Commission’s Chairman’s report,
Member States indicated their support for the Chairman’s work
to achieve consensus, and wondered if the First Committee Resolution
on the Disarmament Commission (DC) would include an agenda this
year. Some indicated they may not be able to vote for a Resolution
with brackets, as the current resolution contains a bracketed agenda.
In the negotiations to achieve an agenda for the DC, almost all
delegations were in agreement, with one exception. The near-consensus
agenda from the DC’s discussions this summer is the agenda
currently in brackets in A/C.1/60/L.59.
Canada suggested the DC, while awaiting an agenda, “do a stocktaking
of what has been achieved and what remains to be done in realizing
the goals set out by UN SSODI, and where goals might be revised”
in order to facilitate agreement on convening an SSODIV.
Several Member States indicated that reviewing the mandates and
the procedures of the disarmament machinery would require going
back to the institution that created them. Convening a Fourth Special
Session on Disarmament (SSODIV) could be used to take stock of the
goals set out for the DC and CD in SSOD I. Indonesia, which calls
an SSOD IV “the only viable alternative to our collective
efforts”, has submitted a draft decision, A/C.1/60/L.17,
to include “Convening of the fourth special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament” (SSOD IV) in the
agenda for its 61st Session. Many members of the Non-Aligned Movement
have increasingly advocated for an SSOD IV, particularly since the
CD and DC, created by the First SSOD in 1978, have been deadlocked
for several years. Last year, Malaysia introduced a consensus-adopted
resolution on convening SSOD IV (A/RES/59/71),
after having withdrawn a similar resolution in 2003. Resolution
A/RES/59/71
reconvened an Open-Ended Working Group to develop objectives and
an agenda for SSOD IV that will meet in the Spring of 2006 and report
back by August, 2006.
According to China,
“Only SSOD and its preparation process can provide UN Member
States with the opportunities to…reach new consensus on adjustment
to multilateral mechanisms,” and although Italy approaches
calls for suspension of the multilateral disarmament fora “with
caution,” it does “not exclude the option of reviewing
the functioning of the existing machinery…follow[ing] the
appropriate institutional processes.”
The Islamic Republic of Iran, “convinced that there is need
for the United Nations to pursue the implementation of nuclear disarmament
obligations,” has submitted the draft resolution “Follow-up
to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review
Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/60/L.38/Rev.1).
The resolution calls for establishing an ad hoc committee of the
General Assembly in 2006 “to hold three one-week sessions
to review the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations”
of the agreements from the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences
and to submit a report on “possible practical mechanisms and
strategies for complete nuclear disarmament”.
The resolution is causing a stir in the First Committee for several
reasons. First, Iran submitted it without consultation or co-sponsorship,
largely as a surprise. Second, it contains relatively strong language
on disarmament. Third, it creates an ad hoc committee under the
General Assembly, which includes three non-States Parties to the
NPT, to review the implementation of the NPT. Finally, the ad hoc
committee in the resolution, which, according to Iran’s introduction
is the one suggested by the President of Iran in his speech during
the General Debate, where he “suggest[ed] that the General
Assembly, as the most inclusive UN organ, mandate an ad-hoc committee
to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical
mechanisms and strategies for complete disarmament,” is also
designed “to investigate as to how—contrary to the NPT—material,
technology and equipment for nuclear weapons were transferred to
the Zionist regime,” according to the same speech.
UNIDIR: On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), France introduced a
resolution that recognized UNIDIR’s importance and requested
Member States to continue to make voluntary contributions to the
Institute. On Wednesday, October 19, Dr. Patricia Lewis, UNIDIR’s
Director, addressed the committee on regional issues.
Mexico tabled its draft decision (A/C.1/60/L.11)
on a “United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating
nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament” again this
year, which again agrees to include that item in next year’s
agenda. This conference was originally called for in the Secretary-General’s
Millennium
Report and elaborated in the 2001 report of the Advisory Board
on Disarmament Matters (A/56/418),
and is also supported in India’s draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will, a project of the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom
5. Disarmament Education
On Friday, October 21, the First Committee heard presentations
from and engaged in interactive discussion with NGOs on Disarmament
Education. Dr.
Kathleen Sullivan and Dr. Peter Lucas, both disarmament educators,
gave presentations about education work on nuclear weapons and small
arms and light weapons, respectively. During her presentation,
Dr. Sullivan demonstrated one of the interactive exercises or ‘thought
experiments’ she uses in the classroom; one of the most engaging
and heart-opening demonstrations the First Committee has experienced
in a long time. Dr. Sullivan first requested the delegates to use
their imaginations “by listening to two sounds, which will
help us understand the firepower of the world’s nuclear arsenal,”
quoting Albert Einstein that “Imagination is more important
that knowledge.”
She dropped a single BB into a tin to represent the total firepower
of all the weapons used in World War II. “That is all bullets,
bombs, grenades and landmines; all the torpedoes and conventional
bombs; and the two new, nuclear weapons used on Japan.” Dr.
Sullivan then asked for quiet so the First Committee could listen
to the sound that represents all the nuclear weapons that exist
in the world today, 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and poured
2,667 BBs into the tin, creating a crackling explosive sound that
went on for several minutes. Some of the diplomats even closed their
eyes. After a moment of silence, Dr. Sullivan reminded the Committee,
“That sound represents the reality we all live with. 2,667
World War IIs is equivalent to today’s nuclear arsenal —
approximately 31,000 nuclear weapons. And it is important to know
the facts, to ‘combat ignorance, complacency and a culture
of violence’ as the Secretary General stated in the forward
to the UN Study.”
The UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education,
convened by Ambassador Miguel Marín-Bosch of Mexico, was
authorised by UN Resolution A/RES/55/33E
of the General Assembly in November 2000. It was the passion and
commitment of Ambassador Marín-Bosch and support of Mexico
that initiated the two-year study. During that time there was a
great deal of interaction between the Expert Group, NGOs, educators,
as well as members of the UN family of organizations, including
the IAEA, CTBTO, UNIDIR, UNESCO, and others, and not least the pivotal
role played by the DDA as the Secretariat of the study.
In October 2002, after two years of work by the Expert Group, the
report from the Study was launched, and the General Assembly adopted
its 34 recommendations without a vote. When the study was launched,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that "Disarmament education
seeks to inform and empower citizens to work with their Governments
for positive change. I hope that Governments, the United Nations
family, … non-governmental organisations and others …
will do their part to sustain the process of consultation and co-operation
started by the Group of Experts, so that disarmament and non-proliferation
education becomes an integral — and natural — part of
the education of the next generation." (http://disarmament2.un.org).
Member States play an essential role in implementing this hope.
There are many recommendations that are specific to Member States
and require their support in the training of not only the next generation
but of current diplomats, parliamentarians, peacekeepers and military
personnel. As the Study indicates, there is a need to “expand
and improve disarmament and non proliferation education and training
in order to promote disarmament and non proliferation” (VIII
OP43). That means to incorporate not only education about disarmament,
but education for disarmament. Also, the study notes that “in
order for the Department for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate the
implementation of the recommendations of this study, the General
Assembly is encouraged to allocate adequate human and financial
resources to the task.”
There are specific recommendations that Member States work with
NGOs and civil society, and provide financial support for disarmament
education initiatives. This year’s Draft Resolution A/C.1/60/L.28,
encourages Member States to “undertake concrete activities
to implement” the recommendations of the Study. Several states
have contributed reports on disarmament education activities, and
others have collaborated with NGOs to develop new curricula, particularly
regarding small arms disarmament. Canada,
for instance, “supports [the] efforts of Reaching Critical
Will to ensure wide public access to national statements and other
documents emanating from meetings of UN disarmament bodies.”
The DDA is developing disarmament curricula which will be posted
on the UN’s Cyberschoolbus
website.
While it is heartening to see that this item is again on the agenda
of the First Committee, it is tragic to see that the words that
have been put forth year after year are not being followed with
action- specifically with a full-fledged commitment to provide disarmament
education with all the material and human resources that this noble,
indeed, necessary cause requires. For with every dollar transferred
from military expenditures to the cause of disarmament education
future generations may indeed be saved from the “scourge of
war”.
There are many ways to make the process of disarmament education
"integral" to the education of not only young people,
but to the whole community of humanity. Teaching people about disarmament
and non-proliferation, and letting them know that there is a choice
other than violence to resolve conflict, is one step along the path
called Permanent Peace.
See http://disarmament.un.org/education/study.html
for full list of recommendations.
Dr. Kathleen Sullivan, Educators for Social Responsibility
Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org
6. First Committee Revitalization
Although no resolution has been tabled on First Committee reform,
discussions on its continued revitalization and the implementation
of resolution A/RES/59/95
have continued. On Friday, October 21, Chairman Choi held an “informal
informal” on the possible revitalization of the First Committee
for the next session, discussing efforts made under his Chairmanship
this year as well as De Alba’s last year. Norway noted improvements
in the First Committee’s working methods already, calling
the General Debate “more focused” and the thematic debate
“more interactive and interesting.” Canada
praised the First Committee for “continu[ing] to give democratic
expression to the hopes and expectations of the UN membership”
on disarmament and international security matters, and New Zealand
called the First Committee the “ideal forum” for discussing
ideas and alternatives to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) deadlock.
Several delegations have suggested that First Committee Reform
include at least, in the words of The Netherlands, a “modest
further opening up” of the Committee to Civil Society, and
this First Committee witnessed the first NGO presentation ever,
on Friday, October 21. Two well-known Disarmament Educators and
Civil Society representatives made presentations and engaged in
interactive discussion with the Committee in a dialogue Member States
called “fascinating” “very interesting”
and “educational.” (See Disarmament Education
Report) A practice that has been in place for years in various
other disarmament fora, including conferences on the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and Small Arms and Light Weapons, this interaction was precedent-setting
in the General Assembly, and created an important avenue for NGOs
and governments to critically engage each other within the institution
of the United Nations.
Other discussions of First Committee Reform included improved implementation
and follow-up of resolutions (OP 6 of A/RES/59/95),
as well as the merging of duplicitous resolutions and the bi- and
tri-annualization of repetitive resolutions. The general feeling
was that this should all be the responsibility of the co-sponsors.
Some Member States argued that there were important reasons for
maintaining the independence and the frequency of certain resolutions.
“The question of the merger of resolutions or changing freestanding
resolutions into omnibus resolutions should be left to the sponsors,”
said Pakistan.
Admittedly, follow-up mechanisms for the General Assembly and the
First Committee are lacking. However, some thought the reports requested
from DDA, particularly those requiring Member States’ input,
were of questionable utility, an issue also discussed last year.
There is room for using the reports as verification and compliance
instruments, and utility in increasing their analytic nature, but
it was suggested that Member States exercise restraint in calling
for them. Sweden noted that “year after year the UNGA produces
Resolutions that are not implemented” and asked “What
can be done to hold States accountable?”
In the discussion on First Committee Revitalization organized by
The Netherlands on October 6, Felicity Hill of Greenpeace International
offered an explanation for this seemingly redundant repetition,
and a suggestion for getting out of it. “If the Security Council
had produced this plan [Article 26 of the UN Charter],” she
said, “to save money and human life from being diverted and
bucketed into creating more sophisticated and gruesome ways of slaughtering
each other, the First Committee wouldn’t have become the plea
making, resolution-reaffirming chamber of repetitious refrains,
which it can sometimes be reduced to.”
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
7. Landmines
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.56,
“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction” was presented again this year with minor
textual updates. This resolution aims at eliminating landmines from
existing fields, prohibiting their production and distribution and
providing assistance to victims.
The text of the resolution is essentially the same as A/RES/59/84
with the following new points:
• 147 countries have now formally accepted the obligations
of the Convention;
• It recognizes the contribution of regional seminars to its
implementation; and
• It welcomes the potential for partnership between the mine
action community and the World Bank.
Last year, the votes
in the General Assembly were 157 in favor, none opposed, with 22
abstentions.
-Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee
on Disarmament, Peace and Security
8. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT)
The CTBT did not receive much attention this week in the First
Committee, though the “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”
draft resolution was submitted by Andorra, Australia, Czech Republic,
Finland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. The draft resolution,
A/C.1/60/L.26,
both reaffirms the CTBT’s importance and underlines the necessity
of its universal ratification. Echoing the comments made throughout
the first two weeks of the 60th session of the First Committee,
draft resolution L.26 “underlines the need to maintain momentum
towards completion of the verification regime”; “urges
all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear-weapons test
explosions . . . and to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the Treaty”; and “urges all States
that have not yet signed [and/or ratified] the Treaty to sign and
ratify it as soon as possible.” The draft resolution also
requests the Secretary-General and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission to “prepare a
report on the efforts of States that have ratified the Treaty towards
its universalization and possibilities for providing assistance
on ratification procedures to States that so request it, and to
submit such a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first
session.”
Last year’s CTBT resolution, A/RES/59/109,
did not include two statements made in this year’s preamble.
While 59/109 “reiterates that the cessation of nuclear-weapon
test explosions or any other nuclear explosions constitutes an effective
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure,” it is
not “convinced that [banning nuclear-weapon test explosions]
is a meaningful step in the systematic process to achieve nuclear
disarmament.” 59/109 also does not “Reaffirm the importance
of the Treaty for the continued systematic and progressive efforts
to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control,” as this year’s
does.
This year’s additional comments indicate that the submitting
states are concerned the importance of the CTBT is not being recognized
to its fullest extent. By including text emphasizing that the CTBT
is a necessary and effective step towards the total elimination
of nuclear weapons, L.26 is concretely framed as a disarmament measure.
In addition to the submission of L.26, a few States made mention
of the CTBT or nuclear testing in their statements during Thematic
Debate this week. While introducing draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3
on a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East, Egypt called
on all draft states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons or
conducting nuclear weapon tests. On October 18th, Norway reiterated
its call for the entry into force of the CTBT, in context of the
discussion on disarmament machinery.
Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical
Will
9. Negative Security Assurances
This week, a draft resolution on the “Conclusion of effective
international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/60/L.45)
was introduced in the First Committee. The resolution, identical
in both text and sponsorship to the one adopted last year (A/RES/59/64),
appeals to all states, particularly Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs)
to be proactive in working toward a “common formula that could
be included in an international instrument of legally binding character.”
(OP 3)
In his statement to the First Committee on October 4, Ambassador
Nana Effeh-Apenteng of Ghana
reaffirmed his delegation’s belief in the critical nature
of legally binding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs): “A
grave concern to my delegation is the perennial issue of negative
security assurances. The fear among the majority of states regarding
the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be assuaged, if Security
Council Resolution 984
is affirmed by a legally binding document, as rightly stipulated
in paragraph
8 of the decision of the 1995 [NPT] Review and Extension Conference.
Legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapons states to
non-nuclear-weapon states would impact positively on the NPT, with
its attendant effect on disarmament and non-proliferation.”
Although Ghana is not a co-sponsor of the resolution, Ambassador
Effeh-Apenteng’s call for legally binding NSAs echoes the
major concerns addressed in the resolution.
In addition to reaffirming that until universal nuclear disarmament
is achieved the only way to prevent further proliferation is to
develop measures to ensure the security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States
(NNWSs), the resolution also calls upon the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) to adopt a program of work that would include discussion of
a legally binding international convention to assure NNWSs against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Although the resolution
takes note of the existing widespread support for a legally binding
NSA convention and urges the CD to “actively continue intensive
negotiations,” the CD has been idling without a program of
work since 1995. The most broadly supported proposal for a CD program
of work, the Five
Ambassadors’ (A5) Proposal, includes an Ad Hoc Committee
with a mandate to “negotiate with a view to reaching agreement
on effective international arrangements” on NSAs, which “could
take the form of a legally binding agreement.”
Last year, the resolution passed
in the General Assembly with 118 votes in favor, 63 against and
no abstentions. In the only explanation of vote on this resolution,
the Republic
of Korea maintained that “we do not believe that such
negative security assurances would be of a nature to be provided
to all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT regardless of
their behavior in fulfilling obligations under the Treaty [NPT].”
Although this year’s voting patterns will be confirmed next
week, as the NSA resolution remains unchanged, many delegations’
objections and support will probably still stand.
-Jenna Crouch, Reaching
Critical Will
10. Proliferation
In reporting how First Committee resolutions reflect international
concerns with weapons proliferation, it is necessary, in this 60th
anniversary year of the United Nations, to note that the General
Assembly has never dealt with a central and critically important
element of the issue: the role of arms corporations. Not only do
they manufacture most of the world's weapons, they drive research
and development and play a significant role in shaping military
doctrines and the international security policies of governments.
International insecurity and conflict are extremely profitable for
arms manufacturers and traders, and they have shown no compunction
in actively promoting arms sales to areas of conflict and tension,
often to regimes with heinous human rights records. In addition
to the large established multinational corporations that produce
everything from small arms to aircraft and missiles, small corporate
entities also play a dangerous role in weapons proliferation. For
example, the infamous nuclear proliferation activities of the A.Q.Khan
network were conducted largely through a variety of shell corporations.
The trafficking of small arms and light weapons into areas of conflict
also usually involves companies fronting for organized crime or
terrorist groups. Despite this broad involvement, governments have
ignored the need to address corporate governance and responsibility
in dealing with proliferation issues.
Many resolutions currently before the First Committee deal directly
and indirectly with proliferation issues. For other reports dealing
with proliferation, see the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Report and Verification Report.
India has slightly reworked its annual draft resolution (since
2002) on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction” (A/C.1/60/L.51),
to reflect the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540,
which mandates such action by governments. Its other annual submission,
on the "Role of science and technology in the context of international
security and disarmament" (A/C.1/60/L.53)
remains unchanged from 2004 (A/RES/59/62).
It deals with the international transfers of dual use goods and
technologies and high technologies with military use. States are
urged to undertake multilateral negotiations to reach "universally
acceptable, nondiscriminatory guidelines" on such international
transfers.
Egypt on behalf of Arab States introduced its annual resolution
on "Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East"
(A/C.1/60/L.6).
It calls on Israel to renounce nuclear weapons and join the NPT.
(See NWFZ Report)
A Russian Federation initiative calls, as in the past, for the
"Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types
of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"
(A/C.1/60/L.10).
It calls on the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under
review and communicate its recommendations to governments and to
the General Assembly.
An Australian-led initiative (A/C.1/60/L.49)
on man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that was adopted for
the first time last year (A/RES/59/90)
reappears. It calls on States to exercise effective control on MANPADS,
combat their illicit trade, and prevent their transfer to non-State
groups.
-Bhasker Menon, UNdiplomatic Times
11. Disarmament and Development
With over $US 1 trillion spent annually on the military, it is
more important than ever that the First Committee address Disarmament
and Development in its Resolutions. At the side event on “Revitalizing
the General Assembly First Committee”, organized by The Netherlands,
Felicity Hill of Greenpeace
International suggested the First Committee do this in the context
of Article 26 of the
UN Charter, and called for the International Community to develop
a means of compliance with this early goal of the UN. This Article
calls on the Security Council to develop a plan for “peace
and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's
human and economic resources” (Article 26). However, “the
Security Council permanent members have participated in arms races
and weapons profiteering,” instead, according to Hill.
The Draft Resolution introduced on October 18 by Indonesia
titled “Relationship between disarmament and development”
(A/C.1/60/L.16)
continued to stress “the importance of the symbiotic relationship
between disarmament and development and the important role of security
in this connection”. While this resolution does not differ
from last year’s Resolution (A/RES/59/78)
it continues to call for the “international community to devote
part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament
and arms limitation agreements economic and social development”
.
The Regional Centre for Peace,
Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
is also addressing the nexus between disarmament and development.
On October 18, Argentina introduced the Draft Resolution, “UN
Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin
America and the Caribbean” (A/60/L.21),
highlighting the “important role that the [Regional Centre]
can play in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control
and limitations, disarmament and development at a regional level”.
This resolution differs from last year’s Resolution A/RES/59/99
in its review of the endeavors the Regional Centre has undertaken
in the past year. Noting that “assistance was provided in
the form of inter alia, weapons destruction and stockpile management,
training courses for the law enforcement community, members of organizations,
guidance on reporting in connection with weapons related instruments
and the development of methodologies for future confidence building
among States”.
It is becoming increasingly clear that in order to increase security
interests across the globe we must further the progress of social
and economic development. It is through a commitment to Article
26 of the UN Charter as well as the Millennium
Development Goals that we will see an increase in development
and security. We must recommit ourselves to freeing the world’s
human and economic resources from the production of arms.
Karen Tilli
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
disarmtimes@igc.org
12. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space (PAROS)
Two draft resolutions relating to weapons in outer space have been
introduced to the First Committee this year. Russia’s new
resolution entitled ‘Measures to ensure transparency and confidence
building in the uses of outer space’ (A/C.1/60/L.30)
builds upon GA
resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, which reaffirmed the
importance of confidence building measures as a means to ensure
the prevention of an arms race in outer space. During its introductory
statement, Russia voiced its hope that the resolution would be adopted
by consensus due to its simplicity and its applicability to all
States.
Sri Lanka’s
draft resolution ‘Prevention of an arms race in outer space’
(A/C.1/60/L.27)
is identical to resolution A/RES/59/65
adopted by the First Committee in 2004. The resolution highlights
the importance of complying with existing multilateral and bilateral
agreements, and points out that as the current legal regime on outer
space does not itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in
outer space, “there is a need to consolidate and reinforce
that regime and enhance its effectiveness.” It reiterates
that the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) plays a pivotal role in the negotiation
of any multilateral agreement regarding the prevention of an arms
race into outer space, and reaffirms the contribution made by the
Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS during its 9 years of operation. The draft
urges states to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of all
progress in the area of bilateral and multilateral agreements.
The Sri Lankan resolution was discussed this week at a Department
of Public Information (DPI) panel discussion entitled ‘Preserving
Outer Space for Peaceful Uses’. Egypt’s Ambassador Abdelaziz
and Sri Lanka’s Ambassador Fernando both commented on the
importance of the PAROS resolution in preserving space for peaceful
uses, and agreed that preventing an arms race is a much easier task
than decelerating a race once it has begun. Sri Lanka noted that
the resolution calls for the reinstatement of the Ad Hoc Committee
on PAROS as soon as possible in order to work towards a legally
binding instrument banning the weaponization of space, and Egypt
lamented that the CD’s stalemate was severely impeding progress
on PAROS (See Disarmament Machinery Report). Egypt
also highlighted the need for a legally binding document specifically
preventing the weaponization of outer space, “Many countries
still argue that there is no need for a further legally binding
instrument on the uses of outer space,” he said, “however
nothing could be further from the truth.”
Egypt may be concerned that some states are on the verge of weaponizing
space. Laura Grego, a Staff Scientist with the Union
of Concerned Scientists, discussed defending and attacking satellites
at length, noting that the character of military space has changed
significantly, and conventional warfare, as well as telecommunications
and meteorology, now rely heavily on satellite systems. Grego noted
US STRATCOM’s policy in this area: ‘One may deceive,
disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy adversary space capability”
(1996
National Space Policy). Destruction of satellites continues
to be a major concern, particularly as their destruction creates
space debris which can render entire orbits useless for space activities.
Grego concluded that Ballistic Missile Defense Systems are not viable
as missile defense, as they are onerously expensive, technically
unfeasible and so vulnerable that they are absolutely useless as
missile defense systems. However, such defense systems are effective
at attacking other satellites.
Ambassador Fernando focused on the particular impact that space
activities have on developing countries, asking “can we really
afford to have an arms race in outer space when the world is still
faced with the problem of extreme poverty and hunger?” (See
Disarmament and Development Report) She reiterated the inherently
universal nature of outer space, stating that “all States
are custodians of the global commons, for the benefit of unborn
generations.” Egypt recognized and commended the role NGO’s
have played in the UN’s work on PAROS.
-Natalie Mendelsohn, Reaching
Critical Will
13. Regional Centres
On Thursday, October 20, the First Committee heard presentations
from and about the three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament.
Governmental statements over the past three weeks have emphasized
the usefulness of the Regional Centres. In the first week of the
First Committee, the ASEAN
group stated: “We wish to take this opportunity to express,
once again, our appreciation to the United Nations Regional Centres
for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America
and the Caribbean and Africa for their effective contributions towards
international peace and security. Regional Seminars and Forums,
which were organized by those Centres, effectively contribute to
the progress of ongoing security and disarmament process in respective
regions.”
At Thursday’s session, Under Secretary-General for Disarmament
Affairs Nobuyasu Abe
stressed the need for cooperation between the U.N. and regional
organizations. “In September, at the 2005 World Summit, world
leaders expressed their support for a stronger relationship between
the United Nations and regional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter,” he reminded the Committee. Agnes
Marcaillou, Chief of the Regional Disarmament Branch of DDA,
also emphasized integrating the work of the UN and regional organizations.
The Centres should facilitate this by sharing experiences and ideas
and transferring knowledge.
However, the three Regional Centres face significant financial
and logistical challenges. “Past experience has led the Department
of Disarmament Affairs to understand that donors are ready to
make financial contributions in support of projects and activities,
but many are unable to provide the same support for the operating
costs of the Centres. The lack of core funding for the operating
costs of the Centres has thus become a persistent challenge for
the Centres to ensure their financial viability and to fulfill their
mandates in the regions,” explained USG Abe.
The main logistical concerns regard possibly moving the site from
Nepal to Bangkok (where the Asian ECOSOC branch lies) and from Togo
to Nairobi (UN facility in Africa) or Addis Ababa (African ECOSOC
branch). No decision has been made, but consultations continue.
Nepal and Togo both made their desire to keep the Regional Centres
clear during the general debate and the thematic debate. The Centre
in Peru is more well-funded and without such logistical questions.
Patricia Lewis, Director of the UN
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), also participated
in the panel on Regional Centres. She proposed a Regional Centre
be created in the region “that perhaps needs it most”:
the Middle East. Some Member States indicated interest in the suggestion,
which they will follow up with UNIDIR.
Four draft resolutions on Regional Centres have been tabled; one
general resolution, A/C.1/60/L.18,
“United Nations Regional Centres for peace and disarmament”,
and then three resolutions specific to each of the three Centres.
They all recognize the Centres’ contributions to disarmament
(the Latin American Resolution (A/C.1/60/L.21)
includes development as well) and ask Member States and the Secretary
General for financial support. All of them are recurring resolutions
that are traditionally adopted without a vote.
-Jean-Marie Goldstein and David Sklar, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
14. Biological and Chemical
Weapons
This week, draft resolutions on the strengthening and implementation
of both the Chemical
and Biological
Weapon Conventions were introduced by Poland and Hungary respectively.
Although Poland’s draft resolution on the implementation of
the CWC (A/C.1/60/L.33)
is almost identical to the one it proposed to the First Committee
last year (A/RES/59/72),
significant changes include greater emphasis on the importance of
the Action Plan for implementation of national legislation (Article
7). In his statement
to the First Committee on October 12, Ambassador Paturej also highlighted
a new section of the resolution that will “for the first time
reaffirm the importance of Article 11 provisions relating to the
economic and technological development of States Parties and recall
that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of
these provisions will contribute to universality.” While there
were few other changes in the text of the resolution, it continues
to reflect the progress made in the implementation of the CWC and
urges States Parties, the UN, and the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to continue to
push for substantive progress in this critical area of disarmament
and non-proliferation.
Hungary’s resolution on the implementation of the BWC (A/C.1/60/L.33)
includes several new paragraphs, primarily welcoming increased participation
in meetings of States Parties and reaffirming the importance of
the Convention’s implementation. The resolution also requests
support from the Secretary General for assistance in services required
for the implementation of decisions and recommendations of the BWC
Review Conferences. Throughout the previous two weeks of First Committee
sessions, numerous delegations called for development of verification
mechanisms for the BWC, hoping to achieve them with the assistance
of the Secretary-General at the 6th BWC Review Conference, to be
held in Geneva in 2006.
Both Poland and Hungary hope for and expect adoption of the resolutions
without a vote.
-Jenna Crouch, Reaching
Critical Will
15. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs)
Draft resolutions and decisions tabled this year pertaining to
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) were often identical to their
2004 predecessors. Seven of this year’s resolutions focused
on NWFZs; five of these resolutions are specifically about NWFZs,
while the other two referred to NWFZs in the language of the resolution
as an integral part of regional peace and security. Support for
regional disarmament action continued this week, particularly in
the light of the disappointment with international disarmament machinery.
On Thursday, October 20, the Committee invited an expert panel to
discuss U.N. regional peace centers (see U.N. Regional
Peace Center Report).
The Central Asian NWFZ (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Kazakhstan) tabled the same draft decision this year (A/C.1/60/L.7)
as last year (A/C.1/59/L.7),
when it was adopted without a vote. As this is a by year, Mongolia
did not table its biannual “Mongolia’s international
security and nuclear-weapon-free status”, which was adopted
without a vote last year (A/RES/59/73).
It its statement to the First Committee this year, Mongolia did
note that the first Conference
of States Parties to NWFZs “has also been helpful in strengthening
further Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status” by proclaiming
recognition and full support for it.
Nigeria tabled the biennial resolution in relation to the African
NWFZ, A/C.1/60/L.8,
which was adopted without a vote when Nigeria presented it in 2003
(A/RES/58/30).
Parties to the Treaty
of Tlatelolco, the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ, tabled
its triannual resolution on consolidating the NWFZ (A/C.1/60/L.12),
traditionally adopted without a vote.
Indonesia presented
the biannual resolution “Implementation of the Declaration
of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” (A/C.1/60/L.19),
tabled by Malaysia two years ago (A/RES/58/29).
At that time it received three no votes (France, UK, and US), 42
abstentions, and 110 yes votes
in the First Committee. The same three states also voted
no on last year’s “Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere
and Adjacent Areas” (A/RES/59/85).
This year the resolution (A/C.1/60/L.12)
is sponsored by Brazil, New Zealand, Ecuador, and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines.
In regards to the Middle East, several nations co-sponsored the
resolution entitled “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in
the Middle East” (A/C.1/60/L.6),
which received 157 yes votes, 4 no votes, and 8 abstentions last
year (A/RES/59/106);
with Israel, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the US voting
no. Egypt presented the draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3
this week, which refers to the creation of a Middle Eastern NWFZ,
and was adopted without a vote last year (A/RES/59/63).
During this week’s thematic debate on Regional Disarmament
and Security on Monday October 17, several Middle Eastern nations
spoke, including Algeria, United
Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Jordan, Morocco,
Iraq, Syria, and Iran.
Establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East was a key topic. For instance,
Jordan “continues to view efforts to establish a zone free
of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons in the
Middle East as vital…Jordan would like to remind that since
1974, the General Assembly has adopted more than thirty-two resolutions
on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone…and has
called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking practical
and urgent steps required for the implementation of this proposal…to
date, however, this remains yet to be realized.”
Middle Eastern States also discussed nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East, often using language similar to the Draft Resolution
“The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”
(A/C.1/60/L.6),
which includes a call for a NWFZ in the ME, and directly focuses
its concerns on Israel’s nuclear facilities. This resolution
is obviously more contentious that the traditionally consensus-adopted
NWFZ resolution. Last year, Israeli Director for Arms Control, Mr.
Alon Bar, explained its no vote to the “The Risk of Nuclear
Proliferation in the Middle East” resolution, stating, “The
first committee is called upon to vote on A/C.1/59/L.37…a
resolution which is blatantly one-sided, contentious and divisive
and undermines, rather than enhances confidence between the states
of the region. The bias of this resolution stems from the fact that
the real risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East emanates
from countries that, despite being parties to international treaties
do not comply with their relevant international obligations.”
-David Sklar, NGO Committee on
Disarmament, Peace and Security
16. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
Because thematic debate this week focused on disarmament machinery
and disarmament and security, Draft Resolutions on Small Arms and
Light Weapons were only being discussed outside of the plenary,
save for comments made by Monday’s opening speaker, UN Secretary
General’s Advisory
Board on Disarmament Matters Chairman Vincente Berasategui.
Berasategui discussed regional security and global standards for
SALW, which are moving forward with the help of regional and subregional
organizations as well as civil society. To further progress on the
issue of SALW, Berasategui, on behalf of the Board, recommended
the Second Biannual Meeting of States look at the implementation
of the Programme of Action on small arms, and discuss the creation
of global norms in greater detail. He also urged the General Assembly
and the Security Council to begin working more closely with each
other in order to treat SALW more comprehensively.
The Netherlands has held 5 discussions regarding draft resolution
A/C.1/60/L.34
“Addressing the Humanitarian and Development Impact of the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.” An experiment
in the ability of states to mold resolutions into a consensus document
together at the First Committee, most recent drafts reflect Member
States’ urging for increased emphasis on the link between
SALW and development, while removing some references to human rights.
For example, a line that read “Calls upon States to take full
account of the interconnections between development, peace, security
and human rights, which are markedly relevant to the issue of small
arms and light weapons” now reads “Calls upon States,
when dealing with the issue of the illicit trade in SALW in all
its aspects, to explore ways to more effectively address the humanitarian
and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and
circulation of SALW and their excessive accumulation.” The
suggestion of requiring “adequate care and assistance of victims
of small arms violence, including support to ensure their social
and economic reintegration” was removed entirely, as was a
call to “implement strategies to report on, prevent and punish
gender-based violence.” Some southern countries wanted more
explicit language on the commitment of donor states to contributing
funds to countries for preventing the illicit trade in SALW.
Following the discussions last week (See SALW
Report, Week 2) on possible amendments to the omnibus resolution
(A/C.1/60/L.57)
on the “Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all
its aspects”, lead sponsors South Africa, Japan and Colombia
held a consultation this week. The three amendments proposed by
the EU last week, as in years past, were: (1) emphasizing work on
SALW transfer controls, (2) including suggested topics to be submitted
to the preparatory committee “without prejudice to the eventual
agenda for the Review Conference in 2006,” and (3) using stronger
language on the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts
on developing an instrument on brokering. Once again, these proposals
were rejected in favor of keeping consensus on the resolution. This
choice was made after certain states (China, Egypt, India, US, and
some of the NAM states) threatened to vote against the resolution
if needed.
Other changes from last year’s resolution include the recognition
of NGOs “in the provisions of assistance to states for implementation
of the Programme of Action,” noting the outcomes of the 2005
World Summit, the Second Biannual Meeting of States, and the Open
Ended Working Group. The most substantive change is the call for
the establishment of a Governmental Group of Experts to convene
after the Review Conference to “consider further steps to
enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating
illicit brokering.”
In subsequent workshops, including one sponsored by Mexico, the
Netherlands, Sierra Leone, and the Biting
the Bullet Project on “Issues and Priorities for the 2006
Programme of Action Review Conference,” Member State representatives
focused on the struggle between receiving broad-based support of
resolutions through consensus or being caught by the tyranny of
the minority when consensus is used as a veto tool (See Disarmament
Machinery Report).
There is also much contention regarding the purpose of the 2006
review Conference on the Programme of Action, and whether moving
forward constitutes “re-opening the original PoA,” or
whether simply “reviewing” the PoA stagnates the process
and allows only “backward looking” discussions.
The new draft resolution “Problems arising from the accumulation
of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/C.1/60/L.40)
was introduced in the context of a proposed international marking
and tracing instrument that does not include ammunition. This followed
the inclusion of this item in the provisional agenda of the 60th
session (A/C.1/59/L.48).
It “calls upon all interested states to determine the size
of their surplus stockpiles of ammunition, explosive materials,
and detonating devices if they represent a security risk and if
external assistance is required to eliminate this risk,” encourages
States to assist other States, and asks States to develop measures
to combat illicit trafficking of ammunition. When France
introduced the resolution on Friday, October 14, it insisted that
it is intended as a non-intrusive voluntary exercise in which States
determined if they had excess ammunition. France was encouraged
by the support and useful proposals for the resolution that came
from the open-ended meeting it held before introducing it. Co-sponsors
include Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey.
The draft resolution “Assistance to States for curbing the
illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them”
(A/C.1/60.L.37)
was submitted again this year (last year A/RES/59/74
was adopted in the GA without a vote), and decides again to include
the aforementioned topic in the provisional agenda of the 61st session
and acknowledges the most recent accomplishments in the area. It
also calls on the international community to “provide technical
and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil society
organizations to take action to combat the illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons.”
In a meeting of the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament
Measures, the Department
for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) and Interpol
presented on “International Cooperation and Assistance in
the Implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States
to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit
Small Arms and Light Weapons,” to promote and explore draft
decision A/C.1/60/L.55.
Interpol has developed a Weapons Electronic Tracing System (IWeTS)
to “enhance both national and international criminal investigations
in relation to the tracing of firearms” and may be launching
a project for “collecting and analyzing information regarding
key figures involved in [the illicit brokering of SALW] and their
modus operandi.”
Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action
to Prevent War
17. Terrorism
Four draft resolutions were presented that relate to terrorism,
a multi-faceted threat that involves weapons ranging from WMD to
small arms. Singapore
emphasized that new global security threats had appeared through
non-state actors against whom deterrence is inoperative, and that
global terrorist networks now have the means to acquire WMD. Morocco
pointed out that cooperation between countries is critical to counter
this threat by stressing that the states surrounding the Mediterranean
had to coordinate their efforts. United
Arab Emirates expressed concerns about nuclear weapons falling
in the hands of terrorists.
The new draft resolution “Preventing the risk of radiological
terrorism” (A/C.1/60/L.39)
aims at better control over radiological materials and their means
of production to prevent their use by terrorists to make a “dirty
bomb”. When introducing the resolution, France
called radiological terrorism and dirty bombs instruments of mass
disruption.
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.51,
“Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction”, urges states to cooperate to avoid terrorists
acquiring WMD. This resolution has 14 new sponsors this year, bringing
the total to 24. Its text is similar to last year’s consensus
adopted text (A/RES/59/80),
with an updated urge for states to sign and ratify the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
that was adopted on April 28, 2005.
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.49,
“Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access
to and use of man-portable air defense systems”, focuses on
control over man-portable devices. In the second week of the First
Committee meetings, the European
Union stated: “The use of Man Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS) by terrorists and non-state actors as a tool for threatening
civil aviation (and also aviation involved in peacekeeping operations)
warrants worldwide attention and immediate action.” Some 51
sponsors were added this year bringing the total to 57. Last year
this resolution (A/RES/59/90)
was adopted without a vote.
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.29,
“Developments in the field of information and telecommunications
in the context of international security”, sponsored by the
Russian Federation, is designed to improve information security.
It aims to keep terrorists, among others, from using information
systems to their benefit and to keep them from disrupting society
by attacking information systems. The group of experts on information
technology, chaired by Russia, was unable to achieve consensus this
year on their study due to the complexity of the issue and disagreements
over language. In discussing the findings with the First Committee,
the Chair affirmed that common definitions would facilitate future
work.
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