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The First Committee Monitor
Week Four: October 24-28, 2005
In this issue:
- Introduction
- Nuclear Disarmament
- Renewed Determination and a New Agenda
- Disarmament Machinery
- Proliferation
- Terrorism
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
- Negative Security Assurances
- Missiles
- Disarmament and Development
- Landmines
- Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
- Regional Centres
- Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Conventional Weapons
- Biological and Chemical Weapons
1. Introduction
The First Committee took action on 52 draft resolutions this week,
with just 10 left for its final days. Of these, roughly half, 25,
were adopted by consensus, 26 were adopted with one or more delegations
voting against or abstaining, and one was rejected. The vast majority
of the resolutions are reiterations of resolutions from years prior,
with a few notable new additions and substantive updates. Even as
reform discussions on merging duplicitous resolutions and bi- and
tri- annualizing repetitive resolutions take place, “the support
for these texts has remained indefatigable”, in the words
of John Burroughs and Michael Spies, and this “is an annual
testament to the will of the international community, despite the
appearance of hopeless deadlock.” (See Nuclear Disarmament
Report)
The First Committee this year has witnessed attempts to break out
of this deadlock and to make progress on disarmament in all its
issue areas. The Committee adopted a new resolution on the humanitarian
and development impact of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and
a new international instrument on marking and tracing (See SALW
Report). The Committee also adopted a new resolution on radiological
terrorism (See Terrorism Report). With more votes than ever, the
Committee adopted the substantially updated nuclear disarmament
resolutions (See Renewed Determination and a New Agenda Report).
Moreover, some delegations challenged the Committee to use its
voting process to show where the international community stands
on theses issues. In the area of small arms and light weapons, two
delegations, Jamaica and Mexico, abstained from a vote because the
resolution was not progressive enough. (See SALW Report) Usually,
consensus is broken from objections to progress, resulting in a
slew of lowest common denominator resolutions. This is a challenge
to the First Committee to use its voting process to give direction
on disarmament, and pressure for progress, to the international
community.
Votes can serve as snapshots of where the international community
stands on the issues, while consensus adoptions indicate areas of
agreement. Looking at the 27 voted resolutions can illuminate the
divisions on issues and in alliances. The European Union and NATO
voted against five draft resolutions dealing with nuclear weapons
(L.5, L.36, L.52, L.54 and L.53) and abstained from those on nuclear
weapons and their mobility, negative security assurances, and multilateralism
(L.11, L.45, L.19 and L.14). India and Pakistan voted against references
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and resolutions urging them to join
it as Non-Nuclear Weapon States. France, Israel, the UK and the
US voted together on many nuclear weapon issues, sometimes joined
by Russia, but rarely by China. MERCOSUR and CARICOM, with several
other Latin American countries, abstained from the draft decision
on the international instrument on marking and tracing small arms
and light weapons because it was not legally binding.
However, one Member State voted against far more draft resolutions
than any other Member State or block, with France, Israel and the
United Kingdom trailing behind. The United States cast 24 no votes
out of 61 possible votes and 36 votes taken, was the only no vote
on eight draft resolutions and one of only a handful of no votes
on eight more. Of the eight for which the US was the sole no vote,
three were on nuclear weapons issues (PAROS and the CTBT) the US
has made clear it is nearly alone in actively opposing, and three
dealt with the way arms and disarmament interact with other issues
areas (development, human rights and the environment) that the US
does not believe should be connected with the First Committee, despite
the mandate given by Heads of State at the World Summit that these
issues are fundamentally interconnected.
Regardless of each individual reason for voting no, the sheer quantity
of the US’s no votes in comparison to the rest of the General
Assembly, even in comparison to the rest of the Nuclear Weapon States,
is unsettling. Much like its behavior at the World Summit, when
two weeks before negotiations were scheduled to conclude the US
made 750 edits to the draft Outcome Document, the US is exhibiting
unilateral and inflexible behavior in the First Committee. The UN
is based on the sovereign right of every state to look after its
national security interests, but does that give a single state,
or a small group of states, the right to hold the human security
interests of the world, including those states’ own people,
hostage? Total global nuclear disarmament is the democratic will
of the majority of the world’s people and governments. The
votes in the First Committee give a snapshot of who is standing
in the way of the realization of that goal, and its connections
to the well being of the world.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
2. Nuclear Disarmament
Blitzing through its agenda, the First Committee took action on
most nuclear disarmament focused resolutions this week. In the first
General Assembly session following the failures of the NPT Review
Conference and World Summit to advance the disarmament/non-proliferation
agenda, the positions of states have changed little on critical
nuclear disarmament issues. These time-hardened positions have given
rise to a number of static annual resolutions. That the support
for these texts has remained indefatigable is an annual testament
to the will of the international community, despite the appearance
of hopeless deadlock. However, some initiatives have sought to break
through the deadlock, exhibiting flexibility and achieving moderate
successes in achieving a new consensus. (See “Renewed Determination”
and New Agenda report.)
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46, on the “International Court
of Justice Advisory Opinion,” passed with 103 votes in favor,
29 against, with 21 abstentions. The no votes and abstentions were
split amongst the EU and NATO states. Last year the vote was 118
in favor, 28 against, and 18 abstentions. An explanation of vote
by one of the abstaining states, Japan, probably reflects a widespread
view, namely that OP 2 of the resolution is premature in calling
for early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. A separate
vote was taken on OP1, which underlines “the unanimous conclusion
of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.” This paragraph was accepted by 142
states and rejected by Israel, Russia, and the United States, with
five states abstaining. Among the states voting yes were India and
Pakistan. Since the obligation as stated by the ICJ applies to all
states, as noted by Malaysia in introducing the resolution, it appears
that the two South Asian states accept that they are bound by it.
The omnibus resolution A/C.1/60/L.36, “Nuclear Disarmament,”
was approved by a divided vote, 94 in favor, 42 against, with 17
abstentions. Similar to previous years, no votes came mostly from
EU and NATO aligned states, with abstentions mostly from former
Eastern-bloc states. However, New Zealand crossed boundaries to
vote yes. In explaining its abstention, India cited the resolution’s
reference to the NPT while reassuring the Committee that it shares
the objective of achieving a nuclear weapons-free world.
The vote on “Reducing Nuclear Danger” (A/C.1/60/L.52)
followed the same pattern as L.36, with 94 votes in favor, 45 against,
primarily EU and NATO, and 14 abstentions, primarily from former
Eastern-bloc states. The resolution, sponsored by India, calls for
urgent steps, especially by the five NPT nuclear weapon states,
to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons. This vote is virtually unchanged from last year which saw
106 votes in favor, 46 votes against, and 16 abstentions. The vote
on A/C.1/60/L.54, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use
of Nuclear Weapons,” was nearly identical, with 97 in favor,
46 against, and 11 abstentions, again with little change in the
level of support from previous years.
The Committee deferred action on two problematic resolutions discussed
in week two of the Monitor, “Compliance with non-proliferation,
arms limitation and disarmament agreements” (A/C.1/60/L.1)
introduced by the United States, and “Follow-up to nuclear
disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons” (A/C.1/60/L.38/Rev.2), introduced by Iran. Iran revised
its resolution to drop the establishment of an ad hoc committee
on compliance, making the resolution somewhat superfluous in view
of the affirmation of the 2000 outcome contained in the New Agenda
and other resolutions. Perhaps reflecting the widespread revulsion
to the incendiary October 26 call of Iran’s president, Mahmoud
Ahmade-Nejad, for Israel to be “wiped off the map,”
Zambia announced its withdrawal as a sponsor of L.38.
-Michael Spies and John Burroughs, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
3. Renewed Determination and a New Agenda
Striving to reach even wider support after a year of setbacks for
disarmament and non-proliferation, Japan and the New Agenda Coalition
displayed flexibility in offering revised versions of their annual
resolutions and engaged in broad consultations. The result is manifest
in the many votes picked up, despite reservations of some states
on the contents of the drafts. Notably, the New Agenda Coalition
voted en bloc in favor of Japan’s resolution, A/C.1/60/L.28**,
“Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons.” A number of NATO states also shifted to support
the New Agenda resolution, A/C.1/60/L.4, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free
world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments.”
By a vote of 166 to two, with seven abstentions, the First Committee
overwhelmingly approved the “Renewed Determination”
draft resolution sponsored by Japan and eight other states (Australia,
Bangladesh, Chile, Italy, Nepal, Nicaragua, Spain, Switzerland,
and Ukraine). Nearly all governments in the world, including close
allies of the nuclear weapon states, are therefore on record as
favoring application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility,
and verification “in the process of working towards the elimination
of nuclear weapons” (OP 3). While those principles are embedded
in the 2000 NPT Review Conference outcome, the resolution is praiseworthy
for the clear and unambiguous way it declares that the principles,
together, are inherent in effective reduction and elimination. The
resolution also acutely singles out two other general commitments
from 2000 whose fulfillment would greatly facilitate progress towards
abolition and make for a safer world now: “the necessity of
a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies”
(OP 7); and reduction of “the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems” (OP 8). In addition to reiterating these
and other commitments (e.g. re the CTBT and a fissile materials
treaty) made in 2000, the resolution acknowledges the changes in
U.S.-Russian relations since 2000, omitting references to START
and the ABM Treaty and instead calling for full implementation of
the 2002 Moscow Treaty and for further reductions (OP 4). In addition,
in a provision applicable to all nuclear-armed states, it calls
for “deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons”
(OP 3). The resolution also “stresses” the important
of non-proliferation efforts including universalization of the Additional
Protocol (OP 11).
While the resolution “recalls” rather than reaffirms
the 2000 outcome and does not mention the 2000 unequivocal undertaking
to eliminate nuclear arsenals, it captures most of the key 2000
elements. Two significant differences are that it does not make
commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty contingent
upon agreement on a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament,
nor does it call for the establishment of a CD subsidiary body to
deal with nuclear disarmament as part of such a program. Whatever
one’s evaluation of the wisdom or practicality of separating
negotiations on a fissile materials treaty from other elements –
PAROS, security assurances, nuclear disarmament – of a CD
program, it does comport with the commitment on fissile materials
made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. A statement
from China illustrated its continuing insistence on the linkage
opposed by the United States. One of the “basic principles
of nuclear disarmament,” China said, is that “preventing
the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space would be conducive
to promoting the process of nuclear disarmament.”
South Africa’s representative addressed why the New Agenda
states would support the resolution, instead of abstaining as in
the past, notwithstanding their preferences that it should contain
strong references to the practical steps and unequivocal undertaking
agreed in 2000. The First Committee, he said, must send a strong
message in light of the failure of the NPT Review Conference and
the World Summit and in this 60th anniversary year of the bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Another New Agenda member, Egypt, expressed
reservations about focusing the international community on strengthening
non-proliferation measures, and noted that Egypt is not prepared
to enter into the Additional Protocol while a single state in the
Middle East insisted on staying outside the NPT. Stressing the need
for building consensus, Japan said that it “highly appreciates”
the positive votes from New Agenda countries.
The United States and India cast the only negative votes. The abstentions,
down to seven from last year’s 16, came from Bhutan, China,
Cuba, DPRK, Israel, Myanmar, and Pakistan. While generally supporting
the thrust of the “Renewed Determination” resolution
as well as the New Agenda draft and L.36, “Nuclear Disarmament,”
China said it would abstain on the first of the three because “a
few measures it advocates are premature.”
The First Committee’s approval of the New Agenda resolution,
by a vote of 144 to 5, with 19 abstentions, is a resounding affirmation
of the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference as “the framework
for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament”
(OP 1). It implicitly repudiates the U.S. position that practical
disarmament steps specified in 2000 are mere “political”
commitments to be discarded at will based on unilateral determinations
that circumstances have changed. Like the “Renewed Determination”
resolution, it supports an understanding of the core principles,
measures and undertakings of the 2000 outcome as providing authoritative
criteria for interpreting and applying the NPT Article VI disarmament
obligation. (See Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, “Thirteen
Practical Steps: Legal or Political?”, May 2005.)
Significantly, 14 NATO members voted for the resolution, with six
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Slovakia)
joining those which voted for last year’s resolution (Belgium,
Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and
Turkey). For a second consecutive year, Japan voted yes, although
it “does not necessarily agree to all the points contained
in the resolution.” Referring to the failures of the NPT Review
Conference and World Summit, Japan said that “it is essential
that all Member States solidify their efforts to promote nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation.” Disappointingly, another
close U.S. ally, Australia, again abstained. Other abstentions came
from a grab-bag of states including Russia, Pakistan, Poland, Greece,
and Spain. Voting no were France, India, Israel, Britain, and the
United States.
-John Burroughs and Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on
Nuclear Policy
4. Disarmament Machinery
Three disarmament machinery resolutions were adopted without a
vote this week, and a fourth draft decision, "United Nations
conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the
context of nuclear disarmament", was adopted with a vote of
108-5-39. Mexico, the lead sponsor of this draft decision, called
the conference “even more necessary” than when it was
first proposed in the Secretary-General’s Millennium Report
because “the dangers from nuclear weapons have intensified
and have been compounded by the paralysis” of the institutions
tasked with addressing them. Mexico intends to “step up consultations
to give tangible expression to this aspiration.” The votes
mirror last year’s results, with primarily EU and NATO-aligned
states voting against the decision.
On the other hand, "Convening of the fourth special session
of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (A/C.1/60/L.17),
introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, was
adopted without a vote and without discussion.
Despite the controversy surrounding the Conference on Disarmament’s
impasse and efforts to solve it (See Disarmament Machinery Report
Weeks 1 and 2), the “Report of the Conference on Disarmament”
(A/C.1/60/L.20) was also adopted without a vote and without discussion.
The report itself recognizes the efforts of successive CD Presidents
to overcome the deadlock in the CD, recalls the participation of
various Foreign Ministers in the debate, and notes the thematic
debates conducted under the Norwegian Presidency. (See Reaching
Critical Will’s CD Report)
The UNIDIR draft resolution introduced by France, "Review
of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted
by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research" was adopted without a vote,
which India explained would “reaffirm the value of this institution.”
The US used the UNIDIR resolution as illustrative of the utility
of having any statements containing information on budget implications
in advance of the vote. Japan, first noting its appreciation for
the work of UNIDIR, also noted that the budgetary implications of
resolutions should “be considered very carefully.”
Despite the lack of fanfare and the minimal discussion on the resolutions,
First Committee reform generated some excitement when the US surprisingly
requested the vote on the already contentious small arms omnibus
resolution be postponed to give delegations the opportunity to review
its budgetary implications (See SALW Report). This request followed
a US request in the prior session to have statements regarding budget
implications of resolutions in advance and in writing. There was
vocal resistance to postponing the vote from several delegations,
and a legal expert determined that the voting process had already
begun and could not be postponed. Although this first request was
not granted, the same request was granted the following day on less
contentious resolutions when the US made the request before the
vote began. By Friday, the request to have the statements on budgetary
implications in advance in writing was granted, and the US expressed
its appreciation for the Secretariat’s response as it “will
make a profound difference” in the work of the First Committee.
According to the US statements, the request for statements on budgetary
implications in writing in advance of voting is in the interest
of “the transparent management and funding of First Committee
initiatives.” Some delegations, like Japan, share the US’s
prioritization of funding, but other delegations have asserted that
this is the territory of the Fifth Committee, and the First Committee
should focus on and prioritize the substance of disarmament. Although
the US does want budgetary concerns dealt with in the First Committee,
it voted against three resolutions in the First Committee this week
purportedly because the First Committee should focus on disarmament,
peace and security without making “irrelevant” connections
to other issues.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will, a project of the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom
5. Proliferation
As noted in earlier issues of the Monitor, a number of First Committee
resolutions deal with proliferation, and readers are invited to
also look at the Nuclear Disarmament Report, the Nuclear Weapons
Free Zones Report and the Missiles Report. Action on the resolutions
noted in this section last week went as follows:
The resolution introduced annually by Egypt on behalf of a number
of Arab States on "Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East" (A/C.1/60/L.6) was adopted by a vote of 149 to 2 against,
(Israel, United States), with 4 abstentions (Cameroon, Ethiopia,
India, Australia). Canada, which abstained last year, voted for
the resolution but did not address the reason for this change in
its explanation of vote. Marshall Islands and Micronesia, which
voted no in 2004, were absent this year. Other 2004 abstainers absent
this time were Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Trinidad and Tobago.
Explaining its opposition to the resolution, Israel said the text
was one-sided in singling it out in a way not done in any text by
any other UN body. The resolution also ignored evidence that other
States in the region were not in compliance with international agreements.
The United Kingdom noted the support of the States members of the
European Union for the resolution but expressed concern that it
did not contain any reference to relevant developments in the region,
namely, Iran's non-compliance with its Safeguards obligations and
activities incompatible with the international non-proliferation
regime. Australia and Switzerland advanced the same concern in explaining
their abstentions.
As in previous years, action on the resolution as a whole was preceded
by a separate vote on a preambular paragraph that recalled the Final
Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which included, inter
alia, a call for the universality of the NPT. The paragraph was
retained by a vote of 145 in favor to 2 against (India, Israel),
with 5 abstentions (Bhutan, Cameroon, Mauritius, Pakistan, United
States). (See also the NWFZ Report)
A resolution on the "Prohibition of the development and manufacture
of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such
weapons," (A/C.1/60/L.10) calling on the Conference on Disarmament
to keep the matter under review and make recommendations as necessary
to the General Assembly, was adopted by a vote of 150 to 1 against
(United States), with 1 abstention (Israel). The United States explained
its opposition by saying there was no need to deflect the attention
of the international community from real to hypothetical threats.
Resolutions on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction" and on the "Prevention of
the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable
air defence systems (MANPADS)" were approved without a vote.
(See also the Conventional Weapons Report and the Terrorism Report)
-Bhasker Menon, UNdiplomatic Times
6. Terrorism
Three resolutions related to terrorism were voted on this week.
“Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction” (A/C.l/60/L.51) urges states to cooperate
to avoid terrorists acquiring WMD. It was adopted without a vote.
In the only explanation of vote, Pakistan commented that the text
could have been improved to better reflect reality and address the
causes of terrorism. It stated that the best guarantee to avoid
having WMD falling in terrorist hands was their total elimination,
criticizing the slow pace of chemical weapons destruction.
The new French draft resolution “Preventing the risk of radiological
terrorism” (A/C.1/60/L.39/Rev.1) aims at better control over
radiological materials and their means of production, to prevent
terrorists from using radiological materials to make a “dirty
bomb.” Because of last minute revisions of the resolution
to ensure consensus, France read a handful of “stylistic”
oral amendments to the text on Friday October 28, to reflect previously
consensus adopted texts verbatim.
In an unusual turn of events, the Chair indicated that a recorded
vote had been requested, but upon taking the vote, 162 countries
voted in favor of the resolution with none opposed or abstained.
Of the 29 states that did not participate in the vote, four, the
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, Lao Peoples’
Democratic Republic, the Solomon Islands, and Turkmenistan, participated
in the vote taken five minutes before but were not recorded as voting
on this resolution.
Draft resolution “Prevention of the illicit transfer and
unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defense systems”
(A/C.1/60/L.49) focuses on control over man-portable devices and
was adopted without a vote. (See Conventional Weapons Report)
-Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and
Security
7. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Draft resolution “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”
(A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1) was the eighth item up for vote on Monday,
24 October 2005. In addition to the original sponsors (Andorra,
Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa),
over 40 new co-sponsors signed on before the vote.
The only revision made to the original text of L.26 was the addition
of preambular paragraph four: “reaffirming the importance
of the Treaty for the continued systematic and progressive efforts
to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.” This paragraph seeks
to emphasize once more the CTBT’s important role in the disarmament
process. (See CTBT Report Week 3)
L.26/Rev.1 was adopted with 149 in favor, the United States against,
and four, Colombia, India, Mauritius, and the Syrian Arab Republic,
abstained. These results identically mirror those from the vote
on last year’s CTBT resolution,
A/RES/59/109 . None of the
five states who did not support the draft resolution has ratified
the CTBT, and Colombia, India, and the US are Annex II states.
Of those who abstained this year, Colombia and Syrian Arab Republic
offered an explanation of their votes. While affirming “unquestionable
support for the spirit and letter of the [CTBT],” Colombia
once again cited constitutional difficulties preventing the legislative
or executive branch of government from ratifying the Treaty, an
issue it also brought up when voting for other resolutions that
mentioned the CTBT. Although the Colombian delegate reiterated his
desire for Colombia to “reach a prompt solution concerning
the constitutional impediments that hinder Colombia’s ratification
of the CTBT nowadays,” Colombia has been engaged in consultation
with participating states and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission regarding
both ratification and financial contributions for several years.
According to its explanation of vote, the Syrian Arab Republic
abstained out of concern for several “substantial loopholes”
in both the CTBT and the text of L.26/Rev.1. The Syrian delegate
insisted that the CTBT ignores interests of Non-Nuclear Weapon States
(NNWS) who have not received Negative Security Assurances (NSA)
from Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), because L.26/Rev.1 does not refer
to the non-use of nuclear weapons, nor to the need to universalize
the NPT. NWS have demonstrated they are not committed to disarmament,
and the CTBT only prohibits tests of nuclear weapons, not the development
of new types of weapons. Syria is also concerned that the verification
system of the Treaty could allow for abuse of International Monitoring
System (IMS) data for political purposes.
The United States did not offer an explanation of its rejection of L.26/Rev.1, though two years ago when the U.S. voted no against CTBT resolution A/RES/58/71, the delegation explained that “the United States does not support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and will not become a party to that Treaty.”
The European Union, Pakistan, and Israel offered explanations of
their votes in favor of L.26/Rev.1. The EU reiterated its full support
for the CTBT and L.26/Rev.1 and countered some of Syria’s
concerns, arguing “global adherence to the [CTBT] will contribute
to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to
the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement
of international peace and security also taking into account that
the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
The EU also called for all Annex II states to sign and/or ratify
the Treaty as soon as possible, and requested that pending the entry
into force of the CTBT, all states abide by the moratorium on nuclear
testing and “refrain from any actions which are contrary to
the obligations and provisions of the CTBT.”
In an explanation similar to last year’s, Israel, an Annex
II state that has not yet ratified the Treaty, outlined its commitment
to and participation in the development and implementation process
of the CTBT. While expressing reservations regarding the wording
of operative paragraph one, which “stresses the importance
and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without
conditions, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the CTBT”,
Israel voted in favor of the resolution because it agrees with the
objectives of the CTBT. The delegation emphasized the importance
of the development of the verification regime as a robust and effective
system to determine non-compliance but not to violate State Signatories’
national security interests. Israel also called for sustained commitment
not to conduct any test explosions, the provision of sufficient
funds for the completion of the verification regime, the operation,
maintenance, and testing of IMS stations and the International Data
Centre “as appropriate to gain experience in order to provide
detection capabilities prior to entry into force (EIF), as well
as a smoothly-operating monitoring system by EIF,” the expansion
of seismic cooperation among Member States, and the construction
of on-site inspection elements of the verification regime.
Finally, Pakistan, another Annex II state and that has not yet signed
or ratified the Treaty, explained that it’s vote in favor
of L.26/Rev.1 is “in standing with Pakistan’s position
on the CTBT.” Pakistan also called for signatures and ratifications
of the Treaty and professed that the goals and objectives of the
CTBT will be facilitated once support for its entry into force is
restored.
Since neither Pakistan nor Israel have signed or ratified the Treaty
and their ratification is required for its entry into force, their
vocal support for the Treaty is undermined by their lack of legal
commitment to it.
-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
8. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space (PAROS)
This week the Russian Federation introduced a revised version of
draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.30, “Measures to Promote Transparency
and Confidence-Building in Outer Space” which included small
amendments to operative paragraph 1 in order to “reduce ambiguity”,
clarifying that this resolution was not intended to limit the use
of space for peaceful purposes. The language used in the revised
resolution is also less forceful than in the original. For example,
it “invites” member states to inform the Secretary General
of their views on transparency and confidence building measures
instead of requesting them to do so, and is “conscious that
further measures should be examined” in searching for agreements
on PAROS, instead of “recognizing the need to study further
measures when drawing up an agreement on PAROS”.
The First Committee adopted A/C.1/60/L.30/Rev.1 with a vote of 158
in favor, one against (United States), and one abstention (Israel).
China gave the only explanation of vote, stating that transparency
and confidence building measures should focus on negotiating and
concluding a legally binding agreement, as this is the fundamental
way to prevent an arms race in space. However, it also acknowledged
that resolutions like this one can help prevent its weaponization.
The First Committee also adopted draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.27 on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” with
160 votes in favor, 1 vote against and 1 abstention. The United
States changed their position from an abstention last year to a
vote against the resolution this year. Israel abstained, as they
have for the past 2 years. Last year the resolution was adopted
with a vote of 167 to 0, with the two abstentions noted above.
The United States explained their vote on L.27, which it said was
equally applicable to L.30. The US proclaimed that “as there
is no arms race in space, there is no arms race to address”.
In the US view, to date there has only been “unprecedented
cooperation” in the peaceful uses of outer space, which also
includes “appropriate defense activities”. The United
States concluded by reaffirming that because the multilateral arms
control regime already adequately deals with the weaponization of
outer space, there was no need to pass a resolution relating to
a non-existent threat.
-Natalie Mendelsohn, Reaching Critical Will
9. Negative Security Assurances
On Monday, the First Committee voted on the draft resolution “Conclusion
of effective international arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear Weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”
(A/C.1/60/L.45). This year’s resolution was adopted with 98
in favor, zero opposed, and 55 abstained. Last year, the same resolution
was adopted in the First Committee 109-0-61, and in the General
Assembly 118-0-63. While seven out of eight states known to have
nuclear weapons abstained from voting, China voted in favor of this
year’s resolution, consistent with its vote last year and
its support for legally binding NSAs. Also similar to last year,
the Republic of Korea offered the only explanation of vote, continuing
to maintain its belief that non-nuclear weapon states both party
to and in full compliance with the NPT should be guaranteed assurances
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but “that
such negative security assurances are [not] of the nature to be
provided to all States Parties to the NPT regardless of their behavior
in fulfilling their obligations under the regime.”
In light of the stalemate in the field of nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation, the Republic of Korea also used its explanation
of vote to encourage governments to think more creatively about
disarmament and non-proliferation before turning to discussion of
legally binding NSAs. Echoing the sentiments of Albert Einstein
who said: “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking
we used when we created them,” the ROK went on to state: “We
are of the view that more creative and innovative confidence building
measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
should precede the genuine discussion for providing the legally
binding negative security assurances.” With the CD at an impasse
in adopting a program of work, and the sponsors of the NSA resolution
offering an identical resolution to last year’s, the ROK’s
call for innovation, creativity, and confidence building is quite
timely.
-Jenna Crouch, Reaching
Critical Will
10. Missiles
The area of missiles continues to be plagued with diverging views
regarding venue (be it the UN, the Missile Technology Control Regime
or the Hague Code Of Conduct) and scope. As Pakistan said in its
Explanation of Vote on A/C.1/60/L.22, proposals continue to lack
consensus, and often the sponsors seem more interested in getting
resolutions adopted than in furthering their goals. All resolutions
this session were put to a vote, and received “no” votes
as well as abstentions.
The draft decision on “Missiles” (A/C.1/60/L.5) submitted by Egypt, Indonesia and Iran resulted in a vote of 101 in favor, 2 against (United States and Israel), and 50 abstentions. These results were close to Egypt, Indonesia and Iran’s resolution A/RES/59/67 from last year (see Missiles, week two), which passed with 98 in favor, 2 against, and 60 abstentions.
“The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” (A/C.1/60/L.22), introduced by the Philippines and sponsored by 108 Member States, encountered similar resistance this year as last. Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Malaysia submitted resolution A/C.1/60/L.62* with the same three amendments to L.22 submitted and rejected last year. The voting results of L.22 were 151 in favor, 1 opposed (Iran) and 11 abstentions, winning slightly more support than last year (A/C.1/59/L.50 received 137 in favor, 2 opposed (Iran and Egypt), and 16 abstentions). All three amendments in L.62* were rejected as follows:
Amendment 1, in the eighth preambular paragraph, “[a]dd the
words ‘development and’ before the word ‘proliferation’”
with oral amendment of adding “in a comprehensive manner”
at the end of the paragraph, was rejected by 26 in favor, 105 against,
and 7 abstentions;
Amendment 2, in operative paragraph 1, “[add] the word ‘first’
before the word ‘practical’” was rejected by 19
in favor, 108 against, and 10 abstentions; and
Amendment 3, in operative paragraph 3, “[r]eplace the words
‘Encourages the exploration of’ with the words ‘Encourages
the United Nations to explore’” was rejected by 24 in
favor, 106 no, and 7 abstentions.
In its explanation before the vote on L.22, Egypt supported active
involvement and engagement within the UN on missiles, and asserted
that the UN is the proper forum for discussing this aspect of peace
and security. Since receiving the first draft of the HCOC in 2000,
it has seen serious shortcomings in addressing peaceful uses, cooperation,
and assistance to states. The resolution also lacks comprehensiveness
because it only addresses the proliferation of missiles and not
their development, and focuses on ballistic missiles only.
The Philippines, on behalf of the co-sponsors of L.22, requested
a recorded vote on L.62*. They noted that the three amendments delivered
orally last year were all rejected, and that dialogue on these differences
is needed. As chair of the HCOC, the Philippines hopes that the
amendments will be brought to the next HCOC plenary to be discussed,
but that they can’t be considered now. For these reasons,
the Philippines stated its intention to vote against L.62*, and
invited co-sponsors of L.22 to do the same.
Chile supported the statements of the Philippines as chairman of
the HCOC, and regretted that the amendments were not submitted to
the HCOC meeting in June. Chile was against politicizing the Code
because its purpose is to create transparency and confidence in
the area of missiles. Although it voted against proposal L.62* it
is prepared to discuss and analyze possible changes [at the next
HCOC meeting] in Vienna.
Algeria and Cuba explained after the vote that they abstained on
L.22 because attention was not paid to the vertical proliferation
of missiles, including design, development, testing and deployment.
Cuba also noted the lack of transparency, as the HCOC was developed
outside of the UN. Additionally, the HCOC should address peaceful
uses of missile technology as the promotion of economic development
should be the other half of the work on nonproliferation.
Again, China voted in favor of the HCOC resolution because it believes
in the nonproliferation objective, though it is not a member of
the HCOC.
Iran, the only State to vote against L.22, said in its EoV that
it was forced to vote against it because the sponsors were not willing
to develop or change the text to give room to non-subscribing HCOC
states. Because the HCOC was developed outside of the UN, engagement
of all states is now necessary and asking States to agree on the
text on a take it or leave it basis is unfair.
India and Indonesia stated that the best approach to eliminating
missiles and weapons of mass destruction is to make an instrument
that is multilaterally negotiated and legally binding. They both
abstained on L.22.
Syria echoed the sentiments raised earlier regarding the selective
and discriminatory inclusion of only ballistic missiles, and that
proliferation is discussed without the reasons for proliferation.
Syria would like to see the committee adopt a resolution on missiles
that is inclusive and within the UN, rather than imposing an instrument
created outside of it.
-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War
11. Disarmament and Development
As voting progressed during the fourth week of the First Committee,
the discussion of development moved from the calls of developing
nations to reduce arms expenditures to delegations’ opinions
on the connection between disarmament and development and its implementation.
These discussions manifest in Draft Resolutions A/C.1/60/L.16, “Relationship
between Disarmament and Development” and A/C.1/60/L.34 “Addressing
the Humanitarian and Development impact of the illicit trade in
small arms and light weapons”.
The Non-Aligned Movement’s Draft Resolution L.16 was adopted
on October 28th with a 164-1-2 vote, with the US against and France
and Israel abstaining. The United States voted against and France
and Israel abstained on the same resolution last year.
In its explanation of vote, the United Kingdom supported mainstreaming
development policy, but asserted that there was no automatic link
between disarmament and development. Rather, they exist in a complex
relationship that the resolution does not explain. The United States,
according to its explanation of vote, claims disarmament and development
are distinct issues that are not linked, despite the World Summit
declaration from heads of state, including the US President, that
they are fundamentally linked.
On October 12th 2005 the Netherlands introduced Draft Resolution
L.34. Jordan commented on October 28th 2005, that determining the
influence of small arms and light weapons, especially in post conflict
areas, is of extreme importance for the security, development and
cooperation of those areas. The draft resolution says that “the
illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and
light weapons and their excessive accumulation have a wide range
of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and pose a serious
threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and
sustainable development”. L.34 was adopted on October 28th,
2006 in an almost unanimous vote of 160-1. In its explanation of
vote, Egypt supported addressing small arms from a “humanitarian
development perspective”. The United States, as the only vote
against, did not wish to link SALW with their humanitarian and socio-economic
consequences.
The adoption of these resolutions shows a commitment to the connection
between development and security. While security can be defined
and measured on many broad levels, it is important to note that
the security of the individual is inextricably linked not only to
disarmament in general, but among other things, to the effects of
illicit small arms trade and the need for economic and social development.
-Karen Tilli
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
12. Landmines
Draft resolution “General and complete disarmament implementation
of the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction”
(A/C.1/60/L.56) passed this week with 147 votes in favor, none opposed
and 15 abstained. All 15 abstentions, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran,
Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar,
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Syrian
Arab Republic, the United States and Viet Nam, are not States Parties
to the Treaty. To date, 154 countries have signed the Treaty and
147 have ratified it.
China cast their first vote in favor of this resolution although
they are not party to the Convention. They emphasized however that
they are involved in demining activities, including helping Thailand
with mine removal.
In their explanations of vote, Cuba, India, Kazakhstan, Myanmar,
Pakistan, and Republic of Korea stated that they supported the humanitarian
aspect of the Convention but claimed the right of self-defense in
defense of their continued use of landmines. Russia indicated that
it intends to eventually join the Convention after it completes
a review of its military options. Azerbaijan, Singapore, and Morocco,
who are also not States Parties to the Treaty, voted in favor of
the resolution but also claimed the right of self-defense for the
continued use of landmines.
Mine clearance and victim assistance, one of the major outstanding
issues of the Mine Ban Treaty, is also being addressed in the Fourth
Committee on Special Political and Decolonization issues. There,
the UK, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stated “mine
action remains an important political priority for the EU, with
Euro 384 million allocated for such activities since 2003”.
Forty-eight States Parties have officially declared no stockpile
of landmines and 62 States have completed the destruction of their
stockpile, while work is underway for most other States party to
the Convention.
In the face of the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, the
progress on landmines demonstrates the importance of NGOs in the
disarmament process. Strong NGO anti-landmine campaigns throughout
the world resulted in the progress on landmines, and gives hope
for civil society to lead the way on other disarmament issues.
-Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and
Security
13. Nuclear Weapon Free
Zones
Seven resolutions or decisions focused on NWFZs (Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones). On Wednesday, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
advocated “wiping Israel off the map”, grabbing international
headlines and underscoring the difficulty of disarmament in the
Middle East. Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemned the statement.
“The Secretary-General has read with dismay the remarks attributed
to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran,” declared Annan’s
spokesperson. “He reminds all Member States that Israel is
a long-standing Member of the United Nations with the same rights
and obligations as every other member.” Palestinian and Egyptian
representatives also strongly denounced the comment.
The draft resolutions and decisions on NWFZs as an instrument for
disarmament included A/C.1/60/L.3 (Middle East NWFZ), A/C.1/60/L.6 (Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East), A/C.1/60/L.7 (NWFZ in Central Asia), A/C.1/60/L.8 (NWFZ in Africa), A/C.1/60/L.12 (NWF Southern Hemisphere), and A/C.1/60/L.25 (Consolidation of NWFZ
in Latin America). Of these decisions, L.3, L.7, L.8, and L.25 were
adopted without a vote. On behalf of the EU, Ambassador John Freeman
of the U.K. endorsed the NWFZ in Africa (L.8): “Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones
enhance regional and global peace and security and are a means to
promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence.” He
went on, however, to address a concern of the geographic definition
of the treaty. “Every nuclear-weapon-free-zone must be a well
defined geographic entity. The EU shares Spain’s legitimate
concern…[and] calls upon all parties concerned to…find
a solution acceptable to all.”
L.3, which calls for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East,
was adopted without a vote. Israel has supported this resolution
alongside its neighbors for many years, and supports the eventual
adoption of an NWFZ in the region, but differs with its neighbors
on means to create such a zone. This schism is magnified in the
more aggressive L.6, which was adopted with two no votes and four
abstentions from the U.S. and Israel, and India, Cameroon, Ethiopia,
and Australia, respectively. Israel described L.6 in a manner similar
to last year, claiming the resolution to be biased and undiplomatic,
focusing on one non-aggressive party and ignoring more dangerous
ones.
The EU explained before the vote on L.6 that although it “will vote in favor of this draft resolution…The EU shares the concerns of the international community over Iran’s nuclear programme.” Canada also supported L.6 but voiced disappointment in the omission of the IAEA’s Board of Governors (Gov/2005/77) call for Iranian compliance. However, Canada believes Israeli adherence to NPT would be an important step in the peace process. India abstained from L.6 because “The call for those States remaining outside the NPT to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities is at variance with this principle [freely exercised sovereign choice]. Our long-standing position on the NPT is well known.”
The resolution on a Nuclear Weapon Free Southern Hemisphere was
adopted with three votes against and six abstentions. France, the
UK, and the US voted against the resolution and India, Israel, Pakistan,
Russia, Bhutan, and Spain abstained. France, on behalf of the UK
and US, questioned the purpose of creating a new NWFZ for the Southern
Hemisphere, and expressed concern over the impact such a resolution
would have on the high seas. It should be mentioned that, in the
presentation of the resolution, New Zealand attempted to assuage
such fears, emphasizing that the governing of the high seas follows
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Several other resolutions are related to the regional confidence
building and disarmament like the NWFZs. “Implementation of
the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” (A/C.1/60/L.19),
was adopted this week. France, the UK and the US were again the
only votes against, with 44 were abstentions, primarily from EU
and NATO members. India, Pakistan and China all voted yes. L.24,
on regional confidence building, and L.23, on regional disarmament,
were both adopted without a vote.
-David Sklar, NGO Committee on
Disarmament, Peace and Security
14. Regional Centres
One of the four resolutions concerning Regional Centres was decided
on this week. “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and
Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific” (A/C.1/60/L.32) reaffirms
support for the center, appeals for contributions from Member States
and asks the Secretary General to provide the necessary assistance
to the Center and to ensure its operation from Kathmandu. This resolution
was adopted without a vote.
-Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and
Security
15. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
The First Committee took action on Wednesday on omnibus draft resolution
“Illicit trade in small arms and lights weapons in all its
aspects,” (A/C.1/60/L57*) with lead sponsors Japan, South
Africa and Colombia. As previewed during earlier discussions on
the EU amendments and some States’ unhappiness with the slow
movement forward (see SALW report Weeks 2 and 3), Mexico called
for a vote to be taken on L.57* though it is usually adopted by
consensus.
After a procedural disagreement between Japan, the lead sponsor
of the resolution, and Mexico, who called for the vote, the US used
a point of order to voice its disappointment that a budgetary statement
on L.57* had not been circulated (See Disarmament Machinery Report),
and called for the vote to be postponed until the following day.
Several delegations actively protested, and the Secretariat called
a legal expert. After fifteen minutes of confusion, they decided
that because the voting process had begun, it should continue to
its conclusion and not be postponed. In response, the U.S. simply
did not vote at all, a slightly more cooperative position than in
2003 when it was the sole vote against the resolution.
The vote on L.57 was split, and a separate vote was taken on operative
paragraph 2 (OP2), with the rare occurrence of Member States voting
on a paragraph of the resolution and then passing the resolution
by consensus. Mexico and Jamaica abstained in the vote on OP2, citing
their concern that the paragraph did not mention legally binding
international agreements on marking and tracing, a key area of contention
within the committee. The resolution as a whole was adopted by consensus.
Thus, though consensus was not broken on the resolution as a whole,
a point was made consensus should not be used to create lowest common
denominator resolutions.
Another resolution that caused some contention was draft resolution
A/C.1/60/L.55 on an “International instrument to enable States
to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit
small arms and light weapons,” which represented the outcome
of the open-ended working group (OEWG) on Marking and Tracing. The
resolution was adopted with a vote of 145 in favor, 0 against, and
25 abstentions, primarily from MERCOSUR and CARICOM. In their detailed
explanation of vote, they expressed deep regret that the OEWG was
unable to achieve consensus on a legally binding international agreement
on marking and tracing, and failing to include ammunition. They
felt that the final outcome was not significantly stronger than
already existent national and regional legislation like the Interamerican
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition Explosives and Other Related Materials adopted
by the Organization of American States on this issue.
On Friday, the new “one time only” resolution on “Addressing
the humanitarian and development impact of the illicit trade in
small arms and light weapons” (A/C.1/60/L.34/Rev.1) was adopted.
Having hoped for a consensus adoption, lead sponsor the Netherlands
was much aggrieved that the US requested a registered vote in which
it was the only vote against, while 160 member States voted in favor
and there were no abstentions. During the General Statements before
the vote, the Netherlands regretted that “one country has
asked for a vote because it could not accept our approach.”
In its Explanation of Vote, the US highlighted its concern that
the resolution linked efforts to prevent the spread of trade in
illicit SALW with the humanitarian and socio-economic effects of
SALW, which it believed should not be raised in the First Committee,
despite Heads of States’ agreement at the World Summit that
peace, security, development and human rights are fundamentally
linked. It also felt that the resolution pre-empted planning for
the Review Conference on the 2001 Programme of Action on SALW at
the Preparatory Conference in January 2006, which the Netherlands
said the resolution did not do.
Other states took the opportunity to raise concerns regarding similar
areas and why they still voted in favor. For Egypt it was the resolution’s
reiteration of the need to abide by international law and recognition
for the sovereignty of states and the rights of people to self-determination,
as well as the good intentions and hard work of the co-sponsors
in getting consensus, that overcame their concern about including
aspects outside of the mandate of the First Committee. Some states
like Venezuela and Pakistan were concerned about ambiguous references
to ‘excessive’ stockpiles without a clarification as
to how this would be measured.
Resolution A/C.1/60/L.37/Rev.1 “Assistance to States for
curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and
collecting them” was adopted by consensus on Friday, as it
was last year and before that in 2003.
Draft Resolution A/C.1/60/L.40* on “Problems arising from
the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus”
will be voted on Monday, October 31.
-Katherine Nightingale, Reaching Critical Will
16. Conventional Weapons
The first committee voted this week on all five resolutions (L.35,
L.44, L.48, L.49/Rev1, and L.58) pertaining to conventional weapons.
“National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use technology” (A/C.1/60/L.35), sponsored by the Netherlands, was adopted on Friday without a vote, as it was in 2003 (A/RES/58/42). This resolution, which focuses on both conventional weapons and terrorism, invites members, “without prejudice to the provisions contained in Security Council resolution 1540…to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures” to exercise control over the transfer of certain goods and technology, and to voluntarily report to the Secretary-General on these changes. In its Explanation of Vote (EoV), Cuba stressed again this year that systems of export controls based on discriminatory criteria will discriminate against states’ import and export for peaceful purposes.
“Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” (A/C.1/60/L.44) received 147 votes in favor, 1 against (India), and 1 abstention (Bhutan). India and Bhutan were also the only votes against and abstentions last year. Belarus, Italy and Spain joined Bangladesh, Germany, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru and the Ukraine as co-sponsors this year. India, understanding that the resolution is historically concerned with the dispute between India and Pakistan, explained again in its EoV that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should not be concerned with regional agreements on arms control because its purpose is legal instruments of global application. Further, due to the current global characteristics of security, “the idea of preservation of a balance in defence capabilities in a regional or sub-regional context is both unrealistic and unacceptable.”
The “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons, Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” (A/C.1/60/L.48)
was adopted again without a vote, as it has been for the past few
years. The resolution calls upon states to become party to the aforementioned
Convention.
A/C.1/60/L.49/Rev.1 on the “Prevention of the illicit transfer
and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems”
was adopted without a vote on Friday, October 28. The resolution
is very similar to last year’s with some updates, including
the acknowledgment of the role of unauthorized transfer of relevant
materials and information, such as training and instruction materials,
in assisting the illicit manufacture and transfer of MANPADS, and
the exercise of control over “brokering” as well as
access and transfer of MANPADS. It decided to “remain seized
of the matter,” and no further plans were put forth.
Resolution A/C.1/60/L.58 entitled “Information on confidence-building
measures in the field of conventional arms” was adopted without
a vote. With 71 co-sponsors, the resolution enjoyed a few more co-sponsors
than last year with about one third of sponsors from last year replaced
with new Member States. The resolution text is verbatim from last
year’s except for encouraging members to continue the dialogue
on confidence-building measures rather than engage in it.
Thus, all resolutions adopted on conventional weapons this year
had the same outcome as last year. There were no new resolutions
and no states voted differently. Perhaps it is time for more ingenuity
and risk on behalf of member states to introduce resolutions that
progress worldwide aspirations in the area of conventional weapons.
-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action
to Prevent War
17. Biological and Chemical Weapons
On Monday, the First Committee adopted Poland’s draft resolution
“The Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/60/L.31) without a vote.
Biological and Chemical weapons is one area without contentious
votes and explanations thereof, and on Friday the First Committee
again adopted without a vote Hungary’s draft resolution on
the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (A/C.1/60/L.33).
Although there is still much work to be done, the substantive progress
already achieved and ability to reach consensus in the field of
Biological and Chemical Weapons has been a bright spot in the otherwise
bleak disarmament and nonproliferation picture this year. However,
as these resolutions have conveniently left out any contentious
issues (like that of verifying the BWC regime) the brightness of
this particular spot is debatable.
-Jenna Crouch, Reaching Critical Will
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