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The First Committee Monitor
Final Edition: October 31 - November
1, 2005
In this issue:
- Introduction
- Nuclear Disarmament
- A New Agenda and Renewed Determination
- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
- Disarmament Machinery
- First Committee Revitalization
- Disarmament Education
- Verification, Compliance and Transparency
- Fissile Materials
- Negative Security Assurances
- Disarmament and Development
- Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
- Missiles
- Biological and Chemical Weapons
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Conventional Weapons
- Landmines
- Regional Centres
- Terrorism
1. Introduction
The 60th session of the General
Assembly's First Committee, mandated to address disarmament,
peace and security, has concluded in a year of symbolism-laden expectations
that, to date, have been unfulfilled. The First Committee faced
a frustrating, polarized situation and in some small ways, stood
up and insisted on making progress in disarmament, even if that
progress was often contested.
For our readers' easy reference, this Final Edition of The
First Committee Monitor includes action taken in the final two
days of the First Committee Session, as well as summaries of the
rest of the month. We are also including articles from prior editions
of the Monitor so every issue the First Committee addressed this
year can be found here.
Not unlike other international disarmament fora, definitive and
substantive progress was impeded in the First Committee this year.
During the first week of the First Committee, the United States
reminded the world that it does not support linking negotiations
of a Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to "unrelated issues",
meaning it does not support the near consensus program of work in
the Conference
on Disarmament (CD). (See Disarmament
Machinery Report and Fissile
Materials Report)
Moreover, the US hardened its position against the prevention
of an arms race in outer space (PAROS); changing its abstention
on the PAROS resolution to a loud and lonely no vote, while Israel
was the only abstainer. (See PAROS
Report)
The US also introduced a significantly tougher version of the biannual
resolution
on verification and compliance, which downplayed the role of
international law and promoted US-led plurilateral initiatives instead.
Iran, not to be outdone, introduced a new
draft resolution calling for the Nuclear Weapon States to fulfill
their disarmament obligations agreed at the 1995
and 2000
NPT Review Conferences. (See Verification
and Nuclear
Disarmament Reports) The US had quantitatively more no votes
than any other Member State, including the Nuclear Weapon States,
with 24 no votes out of 61 possible votes and 36 votes taken. (See
Introduction
Week 4)
However, the First Committee also took some risks this year, though
many more are merited. In dealing with weapons systems, the First
Committee had three new small arms resolutions, including one that
linked small arms with development along the lines of the mandate
provided by the World Summit. A vote was called for on the small
arms omnibus resolution because it was not progressive enough. (See
SALW
Report) China voted for the annual resolution in support of
the Mine Ban Treaty
for the first time, though it is still not party to the Treaty.
(See Landmines
Report)
The New
Agenda Coalition (NAC) decided to vote for the Japanese nuclear
disarmament resolution in solidarity, despite having reservations.
Both the NAC and Japan reworked their resolutions this year in light
of the failed Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. (See New
Agenda and Renewed Determination Report)
In dealing with the dysfunctional disarmament machinery tasked
with addressing these weapons systems, the First Committee delved
into issues of consensus and unilateralism. The conversation on
the purpose of consensus and its abuse will continue as various
international disarmament fora struggle to adapt to a changed, and
changing, geopolitical context. (See Introduction
Week 3 and Disarmament Machinery Weeks 1
and 2)
On the last day of the First Committee, Mexico insisted the Disarmament
Commission adopt an agenda by the beginning of its 2006 session,
by vote if necessary. A new alliance of six countries, Brazil, Canada,
Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, presented a creative
proposal to the First Committee to establish four open-ended
ad-hoc committees under the General Assembly consistent with the
Five
Ambassadors' (A5) proposal for a Conference on Disarmament (CD)
programme of work. Although a draft resolution was not tabled, it
caused a stir and demonstrated creative problem solving to address
the deadlock in the CD. If there is no progress in the world's sole
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the resolution will
hopefully be tabled next year with broader support. (See Disarmament
Machinery Report)
The First Committee also assessed its own procedures and made suggestions
for continued reform and revitalization. (See First
Committee Revitalization Report) The First Committee formalized
its positive collaboration with civil society and held a precedent-setting
interactive discussion with NGO experts on disarmament education
at the final session of thematic debate. (See Disarmament
Education Report)
All these inches of movement count because they are cumulative,
but we still have miles to go, both inside and outside the UN. We
can all win a sustainable democratic world based on human security,
or we can all tragically lose and animate our worst nightmares,
and we have to make that choice every day. To win, we have to make
the decision to cooperate and build a world that works for all of
us, which means working through our fears and suspicions, "trusting
but verifying", and using our tools as we develop and build
a cooperative security framework together.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
2. Nuclear Disarmament
The General
Debate held the first week of the First Committee was marked
by a chorus of "frustration," "disappointment,"
"concern," "regret," and "pity" over
the failure of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) 2005 Review Conference and the World
Summit to achieve consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament measures. Egypt described the 60th session of the General
Assembly as "taking place in an atmosphere that can best be
described as overcast, especially with regard to the issues of disarmament
and international security." Despite the perception of crisis,
during ensuing weeks of Committee deliberations, the positions of
states changed little on the critical nuclear disarmament issues.
These time-hardened positions have given rise to a number of static
annual resolutions. That the support for these texts has remained
indefatigable is an annual testament to the will of the international
community, despite the appearance of hopeless deadlock. However,
some initiatives have sought to break through the deadlock, exhibiting
flexibility and achieving moderate successes in achieving a new
consensus. (See Renewed
Determination and A New Agenda report.)
Draft resolution L.46,
on the "International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion,"
passed with 103 votes
in favor, 29 against, with 21 abstentions. The no votes and abstentions
were split amongst the EU and NATO states. However, New
Agenda members Sweden, Ireland, and New Zealand ignored the
North-South divide and voted yes. An explanation
of vote by one of the abstaining states, Japan, probably reflects
a widespread view, namely that OP 2 of the resolution is premature
in calling for early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.
A separate
vote was taken on OP 1, which underlines "the unanimous
conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists
an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control." This paragraph
was accepted by 142 states and rejected by Israel, Russia, and the
United States, with five states abstaining. Among the states voting
yes were India and Pakistan. Since the obligation as stated by the
International
Court of Justice (ICJ) applies to all states, as noted by Malaysia
in introducing the resolution, it appears that the two South Asian
states accept that they are bound by it.
The omnibus resolution L.36,
"Nuclear Disarmament," was approved by a divided vote,
94 in favor, 42 against, with 17 abstentions. Sponsored by Myanmar
and many other Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) members, the resolution comprehensively enumerates
disarmament measures. Its spirit is illustrated by the call (OP
20) for the Conference
on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a "phased programme"
leading to the "eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons."
Similar to previous years, no votes came mostly from EU and NATO
aligned states, with abstentions mostly from former Eastern-bloc
states. However, New Zealand crossed boundaries to vote yes.
The vote on L.52
"Reducing Nuclear Danger," followed the same pattern as
L.36,
with 94 votes
in favor, 45 against, primarily EU and NATO, and 14 abstentions,
primarily from former Eastern-bloc states. The resolution, sponsored
by India, calls for urgent steps, especially by the five NPT Nuclear
Weapon States, to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons. The vote
on L.54,
"Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,"
was nearly identical, with 97 in favor, 46 against, and 11 abstentions.
Due to Iran's efforts to shore up support, action was delayed until
October 31, the next to last day, on L.38/Rev.2,
"Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the
1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The revised draft dropped
the establishment of an ad hoc committee on compliance, so that
the resolution serves only to call upon the Nuclear Weapon States
to comply with certain of the commitments made in the practical
disarmament steps adopted by the 2000
NPT Review Conference. The commitments are those specified in
step nine, namely further unilateral reductions, increased transparency,
reduction of non-strategic weapons, reduction of operational status
of nuclear weapons, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons, and
engagement of all Nuclear Weapon States in the disarmament process.
Iran did not explain why only some of the commitments made in 2000
were selected. The resolution also seems superfluous in view of
the affirmation of the 2000 outcome contained in the New Agenda
and its application by other resolutions. However, given that Iran's
draft, unlike other resolutions, focuses solely in its operative
provisions on obligations of Nuclear Weapon States, it would appear
to be a sort of gamesmanship showing that two can play at accusations
of non-compliance with NPT obligations. Based on a past history
of concealment, Iran was found to be in non-compliance with its
safeguards agreement in a divided September 24 vote of the IAEA
Board. Iran's draft in a way invites one to imagine that if there
was a similar Disarmament Board to assess the behavior of the Nuclear
Weapons States, it would find breaches of the 2000 commitments,
especially by the United States. It is troubling that the hard-won
commitments of 2000 would be employed in this way; they are already
under enough stress as it is. Further, especially when dealing with
matters as grave as nuclear weapons, any implication that violations
by one state excuse violations by another must be rejected.
The First Committee approved the resolution in a relatively close
vote,
70 to 52, with 22 abstentions. Afterwards, in a harsh explanation
of its negative vote, the United States said the resolution shrouded
proliferation under the false issue of the pace of nuclear disarmament.
In contrast, South Africa's representative said she considered resolutions
based on their merit and consistency with her country's national
policy; the origin of the resolution did not determine support.
Sri Lanka said it voted for the resolution but regretted its lack
of balance between the obligations of disarmament and non-proliferation.
A separate
vote was held on a preambular
paragraph reaffirming the resolution on the Middle East adopted
at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference. The day of the vote, Iran orally
amended the paragraph to add a characterization of the 1995 resolution
as reaffirming the importance of early realization of universal
adherence to the NPT and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scale
IAEA safeguards - i.e., Israel should join the NPT as a Non-Nuclear
Weapon State. The 1995 document did do this, but in the context
of calling for creation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of
mass destruction and supporting the Middle Eastern peace process.
In a vote that came down to the last few cast, causing murmurs in
the hall, the paragraph was approved by 58 to 54, with 23 abstentions.
Apparently the fact that Iran's draft does not call for compliance
with existing safeguards obligations, the selective characterization
of the 1995 resolution, and the late amendment amplified the opposition
based on the resolution as a whole. Again, here Iran was potentially
undermining the force of a commitment that many states, and certainly
Arab states, consider integral to the 1995 extension of the NPT.
Egypt's representative said that he was shocked and extremely disappointed
at the vote; while the language of the paragraph was not perfect,
it was recalling a main pillar of the NPT's indefinite extension.
-John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy
3. A New Agenda and Renewed Determination
Beginning in 1998, the New
Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
Sweden) has blazed a path towards overcoming North-South divisions
that for many years have impeded unity in pressure for disarmament.
The Japan-led group has followed suit; co-sponsors of Japan’s
resolution
this year were Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Italy, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Spain, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Encouragingly, other efforts have
emerged as well, with the Group of Six (Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico,
New Zealand, Sweden) initiative
on establishment of ad hoc committees and the Seven Nation Initiative
(Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, United
Kingdom), which played an important but ultimately unsuccessful
role in World Summit negotiations. However, with the withdrawal
of the Group of Six initiative and the decision of the Seven Nation
Initiative not to offer a resolution, in this year’s First
Committee the New Agenda and Renewed Determination resolutions remained
the two leading cross-boundary efforts.
Striving to reach even wider support after a year of setbacks for
disarmament and non-proliferation at the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and the World
Summit, Japan and the New Agenda Coalition displayed flexibility
in offering revised versions of their annual resolutions and engaging
in broad consultations. The result is manifest in the many votes
picked up. A number of NATO
states shifted to support the New Agenda resolution, L.4,
“Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation
of nuclear disarmament commitments.” The New Agenda Coalition
reciprocated Japan’s continued support for its resolution
by voting en bloc in favor of Japan’s resolution, L.28,
“Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons,” notwithstanding their preference that it contain
stronger references to the practical steps and unequivocal undertaking
to eliminate nuclear arsenals agreed in 2000. Perhaps coming years
will see a realization of the reform aim of consolidation of resolutions
through a merger of the two efforts.
By a vote
of 166 to two (India, United States), with seven abstentions, the
First Committee overwhelmingly approved the “Renewed Determination”
draft. Nearly all governments in the world, including close allies
of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), are therefore on record as favoring
application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility,
and verification “in the process of working towards the elimination
of nuclear weapons” (OP 3). While those principles are embedded
in the 2000
NPT Review Conference outcome, the resolution is praiseworthy
for the clear and unambiguous way it declares that the principles,
together, are inherent in effective reduction and elimination. The
resolution also acutely singles out two other general commitments
from 2000 whose fulfillment would greatly facilitate progress towards
abolition and make for a safer world now: “the necessity of
a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies”
(OP 7); and reduction of “the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems” (OP 8). In addition to reiterating these
and other commitments (e.g. the CTBT
and a fissile
materials treaty) made in 2000, the resolution acknowledges
the changes in U.S.-Russian relations since 2000, omitting references
to START
and the ABM
Treaty and instead calling for full implementation of the 2002
Moscow Treaty and for further reductions (OP 4). In addition,
in a provision applicable to all nuclear-armed states, it calls
for “deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons”
(OP 3). The resolution also “stresses” the importance
of non-proliferation efforts, including universalization of the
Additional Protocol (OP 11).
While the resolution “recalls” rather than reaffirms
the 2000 outcome and does not mention the 2000 unequivocal undertaking
to eliminate nuclear arsenals, it captures most of the key 2000
elements. Two significant differences are that it does not make
commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty contingent
upon agreement on a program of work in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD), nor does it call for the establishment
of a CD subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament as part
of such a program. Whatever one’s evaluation of the wisdom
or practicality of separating negotiations on a fissile
materials treaty from other elements – PAROS,
security
assurances, nuclear disarmament – of a CD program, it
does comport with the commitment on fissile materials made at the
1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference. A statement from China
illustrated its continuing insistence on the linkage opposed by
the United States. One of the “basic principles of nuclear
disarmament,” China said, is that “preventing the weaponization
of and an arms race in outer space would be conducive to promoting
the process of nuclear disarmament.”
The First Committee’s approval of the New Agenda resolution,
by a vote
of 144 to five (France, India, Israel, United Kingdom, United States),
with 19 abstentions, is a resounding affirmation of the outcome
of the 2000 NPT Review Conference as “the framework for systematic
and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament” (OP 1).
It implicitly repudiates the US position that practical disarmament
steps specified in 2000 are mere “political” commitments
to be discarded at will based on unilateral determinations that
circumstances have changed. Like the “Renewed Determination”
resolution, it supports an understanding of the core principles,
measures and undertakings of the 2000 outcome as providing authoritative
criteria for interpreting and applying the NPT Article VI disarmament
obligation. (See Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, “Thirteen
Practical Steps: Legal or Political?”, May 2005)
Unlike the Renewed Determination resolution, the New Agenda draft
does not identify specific measures for moving forward. Rather it
serves as a strong signal of the continued normative force of the
2000 commitments, while avoiding controversy regarding current priorities.
In accordance with the New Agenda view that compliance on the two
fronts is mutually reinforcing, the resolution also calls for states
“to comply fully” with non-proliferation as well as
disarmament commitments.
Fourteen NATO members voted for the New Agenda draft, with six (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Slovakia) joining those
that voted for last year’s resolution (Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey).
- John Burroughs, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
4. Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space (PAROS)
Throughout this year's First Committee, many Member States expressed
strong support for moving ahead with negotiations on outer space
issues. In particular, they focused on the re-establishment of a
Conference
on Disarmament (CD) Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan
and Sri Lanka all expressed the hope that such a committee would
reinvigorate debate on the adoption of a legally binding document
relating to the weaponization of outer space. The US, however, continued
to oppose attempts to create such a document, arguing that the existing
multilateral arms control regime is sufficient and that there is
no need to address a "non-existent threat." John Bolton,
US Ambassador to the United Nations, echoed this view at a G8 Senior
Group Meeting last year, stating "[w]e are not prepared to
negotiate on the so-called arms race in outer space. We just don't
see that as a worthwhile enterprise." The UK also warned against
adopting additional legal instruments, suggesting that a more practical
approach would be to adopt 'rules of the road' on PAROS.
This year the new Russian draft resolution 'Measures to Promote
Transparency and Confidence Building in Outer Space' (L.30/Rev.1)
and the annual 'PAROS' resolution (L.27)
introduced by Sri Lanka were both adopted by an overwhelming majority,
with only the United States voting against them and Israel abstaining.
As Sri Lanka noted last year in the First Committee, "the annual
presentation of the PAROS resolution in the First Committee and
the almost universal endorsement of its principles...has had the
salutary effect of according to these objectives the status of customary
law".
However, this fact is unlikely to have any influence over the United
States, which has hardened its position on this issue during the
past year. For years the US has abstained on the PAROS resolution,
but voted against it this year, stating that there is “no
arms race to address.” In light of the US withdrawal from
the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Bush Administration's clear pursuit
of further militarization of space, this is a disturbing development.
Lance Lord, head of the US
Air Force Space Command, has been forthright about US ambitions,
stating in a recent congressional appearance that "[w]e must
establish and maintain space superiority. That means freedom to
attack as well as freedom from attack."
The driving forces behind such ambitions were discussed at the 'Space
Security: Core Issues and Questions' side
event co-hosted by the Global
Security Institute and Spacesecurity.org.
Aaron Tovish compared the United States’ current quest for
dominance in outer space to the US military's belief in 1945 that
they would have a monopoly over the production of nuclear weapons
for at least two decades, an illusion discussed in the book 'The
Making of the Atomic Bomb' by Richard Rhodes. The current Long Range
Plan (LRP) of the US Space Command states that since "the United
States does not expect to face a global peer competitor within the
next two decades...this period offers the US military and opportunity...for
exploring innovative war-fighting concepts and capabilities,"
a strategy read by Jonathan Granoff of Global Security Institute
at the same event.
All of this begs the question of whether it is possible for the
rest of the international community to truly prevent the weaponization
of space without the cooperation of the United States, given that
they have the largest number of military space assets and greatest
control over outer space resources. The draft
resolution proposing the creation of four open-ended ad-hoc
committees under the General Assembly (including one ad-hoc committee
on PAROS) provided a creative solution to this dilemma, using the
voting power of the General Assembly to mitigate against the continued
abuse of consensus rules in the CD. However, as this resolution
was not tabled in the First Committee this year, substantive debate
on how such a committee would impact PAROS negotiations was minimal.
The hope remains, however, that the possibility of this resolution
being re-introduced in a more 'potent form' next year will spur
the 2006 session of the CD into action, leading to substantive and
meaningful work on PAROS. History has shown that one country will
not dominate military technology for long, something Russia has
stated in the present, and we will be left with another ever-spiraling
multi-billion dollar race for destruction.
- Natalie Mendelsohn, Reaching
Critical Will
5. Disarmament Machinery
Nearly all the statements during the General Debate opened with
paragraphs of disappointment over the past year's disarmament and
non-proliferation failures. These generally identified the Non-Proliferation
Treaty's failure to achieve any substantive outcome, the Conference
on Disarmament's repeated failure to agree on a program of work,
the World
Summit's failure to include a section on disarmament and non-proliferation,
and often included the Disarmament
Commission's inability to agree on an agenda.
In the first week of the First Committee, Brazil, Canada, Kenya,
Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden introduced a non-paper,
with an explanatory
note outlining elements of a draft resolution that would establish
four open-ended Ad Hoc Committees on the four priority issues of
the Five
Ambassadors (A5) proposal for a programme of work in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD). These Ad Hoc Committees would meet in Geneva
with resources from within the regular CD budget, and be open to
the 66 CD Member States as well as any interested UN Member State.
(See Disarmament
Machinery Report Week 1)
By the second week, they decided not to table the draft resolution.
According to their joint statement, this innovative proposal that
captured the imaginations of many governments and members of civil
society, "would benefit from the opportunity to mature and
for all delegations to gain a fuller understanding of what they
entail." However, pressure from the United States, who circulated
a memo
denouncing the initiative to Member States' capitals, was also a
major factor. (See Disarmament
Machinery Report Week 2)
Although it was not introduced, the initiative did have several
positive impacts. First, it put the CD on notice that if it cannot
agree on a program of work the First Committee is willing to step
in and initiate discussions following the broadly supported program
of work developed by the Five Ambassadors for the CD. Second, it
reignited discussions on the relationship between and among different
pieces of international disarmament machinery. Third, it got Member
States and civil society thinking creatively about how to work together
to address the current impasse in the disarmament and non-proliferation
regime.
The next three CD Presidents, Poland, the Republic of Korea and
Romania have indicated their intention to work together to sustain
a structured discussion of the core issues in the CD. Many Member
States support creating continuity in the CD presidency through
dialogue and consultations. Poland, the incoming CD President, "believe[s]
that the establishment of a common platform of cooperation between
the sessions' Presidents can advance us closer towards a long awaited
progress on substantive issues." Poland is conducting consultations
during the First Committee on the program of work, along with current
CD President Peru.
Despite the controversy surrounding the Conference on Disarmament's
impasse and efforts to solve it, the "Report of the Conference
on Disarmament" (A/C.1/60/L.20)
was also adopted without a vote and without discussion.
The First Committee finally took action on the draft resolution
on the Disarmament Commission (DC) (A/C.1/60/L.59Rev1)
during the final session on November 1. When Sierra Leone introduced
the resolution the day prior and brought the Committee's attention
to new operative paragraph five (OP 5), "replacing the previous
paragraphs and all the square brackets in the original draft."
This new paragraph does not recommend the two agenda items agreed
on but not endorsed at the DC Organizational Meeting this summer,
and instead "recommends that the Commission intensify consultations…
with a view to reaching agreement before the start of its substantive
session in 2006." (emphasis added)
This formulation of the draft resolution was supposed to be a compromise
that would achieve a consensus adoption of the resolution. Sierra
Leone made extensive connections between this resolution and the
resolution on the Conference on Disarmament, which was adopted by
consensus. Unfortunately, although removing the endorsement of the
agenda from the resolution was presumably aimed at the only Disarmament
Commission member to reject the agenda this summer, that delegation,
the United States, announced before the vote that it would not participate
in the vote. The resolution was then adopted without a vote. Canada
lamented that the First Committee missed the opportunity to use
its ability to vote to endorse the near-consensus agenda for the
Disarmament Commission. A vote would have also exposed the United
States as the lone Member State standing in the way of proceeding
with work.
The Disarmament Commission, a deliberative body that operates by
consensus, has been unable to agree on an agenda for three years.
Although the body operates by consensus, it is not formally required
to do so. Mexico, who only accepted the draft resolution's compromise
text because it refers to the DC agreeing on an agenda before its
next substantive session, resolved that if the DC does not agree
on an agenda beforehand "the DC will adopt a decision on the
first day, if necessary on the basis of a vote."
During the thematic debate, Canada suggested the DC, while awaiting
an agenda, "do a stocktaking of what has been achieved and
what remains to be done in realizing the goals set out by UN SSODI,
and where goals might be revised" in order to facilitate agreement
on convening an SSODIV.
Several Member States indicated that reviewing the mandates and
the procedures of the disarmament machinery would require going
back to the institution that created them. Convening a Fourth Special
Session on Disarmament (SSODIV) could be used to take stock of the
goals set out for the DC and CD in SSOD I. Indonesia, which calls
an SSOD IV "the only viable alternative to our collective efforts",
submitted a draft decision, A/C.1/60/L.17,
to include "Convening of the fourth special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (SSOD IV) in the agenda
for its 61st Session, which was adopted without a vote and without
discussion.
Many members of the Non-Aligned
Movement have increasingly advocated for an SSOD IV, particularly
since the CD and DC, created by the First SSOD in 1978, have been
deadlocked for several years. According to China, "Only SSOD
and its preparation process can provide UN Member States with the
opportunities to…reach new consensus on adjustment to multilateral
mechanisms," and although Italy approaches calls for suspension
of the multilateral disarmament fora "with caution," it
does "not exclude the option of reviewing the functioning of
the existing machinery…follow[ing] the appropriate institutional
processes."
Even if we are disappointed that the new initiative was not tabled
this year, much has been done and there is much to do in revitalizing
our disarmament machinery. And, as Kenya
said, we "anticipate its re-introduction in a more potent form
next time if the Conference on Disarmament does not awaken."
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
6. First Committee Revitalization
At the final session of the First Committee, delegates continued
the conversation on First Committee revitalization and reform (See
Week
3 First Committee Revitalization Report). First Committee reform
issues came up during the formal session's discussion of a program
of work for next year and continued when the Chair suspended the
formal session for an informal discussion of revitalization issues.
The main reform topics were agenda, general debate and thematic
debate, in addition to early issues of civil society participation
and resolutions.
Delegations agreed on the utility of the achievements of last year's
First Committee Chair, Ambassador De Alba of Mexico, and universally
commended the work and continuation of those achievements by this
year's Chairman, Ambassador Choi of the Republic of Korea. In discussing
the program of work for next year, Member States were concerned
about the general debate's length, rolling list and general utility.
Every speaker supported keeping the general debate confined to one
week, but Egypt, Cuba, Armenia and Jordan were concerned that the
number of sessions not dip below seven, as they had just been cut
down from ten. Due to room-sharing constraints however, this required
the seven sessions to spill over into the second week, which disappointed
The Netherlands. It was agreed that the First Committee would return
to the practice of confining the general debate to one week the
following year.
Within the discussion on the length of the general debate, Uganda
proposed that long statements be transmitted to delegations electronically
to give more time for interactive discussion. This year, delegations
were urged to limit their speeches, but the Chair, in what Sri Lanka
called a "flexible and gracious manner," did not cut off
the more long-winded speeches.
In order to use time more effectively, many of the delegations
advocated making true use of the rolling list of speakers, as this
year "some days we had to close up shop just because we had
no speakers," as The Netherlands pointed out. However, the
practice has been that delegations request to speak on certain days,
and even if the speakers list is exhausted, most delegations scheduled
to speak the following day are unprepared to speak at the end of
the session a day early. Armenia pointed out that many delegations
try to speak on the last days of the session, and Mexico urged that
last year's decision to use the rolling list "needs to be applied
strictly."
During this discussion, delegations differed in their evaluation
of the general debate's utility. Some delegations, like Cuba, Egypt
and Armenia, valued the general debate highly, particularly because
"in practice, smaller delegations can only participate in the
general debate" as the thematic debate is held at the same
time as resolution consultations, according to Cuba. Uganda, on
the other hand, said that as a smaller delegation, "less general
debate would be easier for small delegations that have to hop from
committee to committee." Chile had a low opinion of the general
debate's "liturgical rigidity, its repetitiousness, and its
long tedious statements," and preferred to move to interactive
discussions sooner, a sentiment it presented in its brief general
debate statement.
Delegations all praised the thematic debate this year, which Mexico
called "useful and fresh", and Argentina called "very
useful". These debates could continue to be improved by giving
delegations more notice of the speakers' identities to facilitate
appropriate preparation, and by delegations gaining practice at
interactive discussions. Although Mexico did suggest possibly breaking
"the rigid separation between debate and decision making"
by adopting resolutions that are 'already mature' during thematic
debate, Armenia said it would be "virtually impossible"
for small delegations to take action at the same time as the thematic
debate because smaller delegations are often in consultations. The
Chair informed the Committee that it could not make decisions in
Conference Room 4 unless they are without a vote, because Conference
Room 4 does not have a voting machine. As this would be very difficult
to separate out, the suggestion was "too complicated for now."
The session also included an informal discussion of revitalization
regarding the organization of the agenda and the new use of the
seven clusters. These were first proposed last year in Ambassador
De Alba's letter to the President of the 59th Session of the
General Assembly and have since been used to cluster the thematic
debate and the action on resolutions. Most delegations felt they
were a useful ordering device for voting and thematic work, and
two proposals for their continued work were presented: one from
the Chair, and another
from Argentina, one of the Vice-Chairs.
The proposal from the chair created a bridge between the formalized
agenda items and the informal clusters by putting the number of
the cluster at the end of each of the agenda items. Intended to
establish a clearer link between the two ordering mechanisms, it
was not agreed to because a few delegations indicated they would
not be in a position to link the formal and the informal practices.
The proposal from Argentina ascribed the seven clusters into the
General Assembly agenda, with the current items becoming sub-items
under the clusters. Some delegations indicated this was a complicated
proposal, and though they appreciated Argentina's constructive suggestions,
changing the agenda items, which could have other implications,
would require more discussion and consultation with capitols.
In previous weeks, First Committee reform has included civil society
participation and resolutions (See Week
3). This First Committee witnessed the first NGO presentation
ever, on Friday, October 21. (See Disarmament
Education Report) A practice that has been in place for years
in various other disarmament fora, including conferences on the
Non-Proliferation
Treaty and Small
Arms and Light Weapons, this interaction was precedent-setting
in the General Assembly, and created an important avenue for NGOs
and governments to critically engage each other within the institution
of the United Nations.
Other discussions of First Committee Reform included improved implementation
and follow-up of resolutions (OP 6 of A/RES/59/95), as well as the
merging of duplicitous resolutions and the bi- and tri-annualization
of repetitive resolutions. The general feeling was that this should
all be the responsibility of the co-sponsors. (See First
Committee Revitalization Report, Week 3)
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
7. Disarmament Education
On Friday, October 21, the First Committee heard presentations
from and engaged in interactive discussion with NGOs on Disarmament
Education. Dr. Kathleen Sullivan and Dr. Peter Lucas, both disarmament
educators, gave presentations about education work on nuclear weapons
and small arms and light weapons, respectively. During her presentation,
Dr. Sullivan demonstrated one of the interactive exercises or ‘thought
experiments’ she uses in the classroom; one of the most engaging
and heart-opening demonstrations the First Committee has experienced
in a long time. Dr. Sullivan first requested the delegates to use
their imaginations “by listening to two sounds, which will
help us understand the firepower of the world’s nuclear arsenal,”
quoting Albert Einstein that “Imagination is more important
that knowledge.”
She dropped a single BB into a tin to represent the total firepower
of all the weapons used in World War II. “That is all bullets,
bombs, grenades and landmines; all the torpedoes and conventional
bombs; and the two new, nuclear weapons used on Japan.” Dr.
Sullivan then asked for quiet so the First Committee could listen
to the sound that represents all the nuclear weapons that exist
in the world today, 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and poured
2,667 BBs into the tin, creating a crackling explosive sound that
went on for several minutes. Some of the diplomats even closed their
eyes. After a moment of silence, Dr. Sullivan reminded the Committee,
“That sound represents the reality we all live with. 2,667
World War IIs is equivalent to today’s nuclear arsenal —
approximately 31,000 nuclear weapons. And it is important to know
the facts, to ‘combat ignorance, complacency and a culture
of violence’ as the Secretary General stated in the forward
to the UN Study.”
The UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education,
convened by Ambassador Miguel Marín-Bosch of Mexico, was
authorised by UN Resolution A/RES/55/33E of the General Assembly
in November 2000. It was the passion and commitment of Ambassador
Marín-Bosch and support of Mexico that initiated the two-year
study.
During that time there was a great deal of interaction between the
Expert Group, NGOs, educators, as well as members of the UN family
of organizations, including the
IAEA, CTBTO,
UNIDIR, UNESCO,
and others, and not least the pivotal role played by the DDA
as the Secretariat of the study.
In October 2002, after two years of work by the Expert Group, the
report
from the Study was launched, and the General Assembly adopted its
34 recommendations without a vote. When the study was launched,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that "Disarmament education
seeks to inform and empower citizens to work with their Governments
for positive change. I hope that Governments, the United Nations
family, … non-governmental organisations and others …
will do their part to sustain the process of consultation and co-operation
started by the Group of Experts, so that disarmament and non-proliferation
education becomes an integral — and natural — part of
the education of the next generation." (http://disarmament2.un.org).
Member States play an essential role in implementing this hope.
There are many recommendations that are specific to Member States
and require their support in the training of not only the next generation
but of current diplomats, parliamentarians, peacekeepers and military
personnel. As the Study indicates, there is a need to “expand
and improve disarmament and non proliferation education and training
in order to promote disarmament and non proliferation” (VIII
OP43). That means to incorporate not only education about disarmament,
but education for disarmament. Also, the study notes that “in
order for the Department for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate the
implementation of the recommendations of this study, the General
Assembly is encouraged to allocate adequate human and financial
resources to the task.”
There are specific recommendations that Member States work with
NGOs and civil society, and provide financial support for disarmament
education initiatives. This year’s Draft Resolution A/C.1/60/L.28,
encourages Member States to “undertake concrete activities
to implement” the recommendations of the Study. Several states
have contributed reports on disarmament education activities, and
others have collaborated with NGOs to develop new curricula, particularly
regarding small arms disarmament. Canada,
for instance, “supports [the] efforts of Reaching Critical
Will to ensure wide public access to national statements and other
documents emanating from meetings of UN disarmament bodies.”
The DDA is developing disarmament curricula which will be posted
on the UN’s Cyberschoolbus
website.
While it is heartening to see that this item is again on the agenda
of the First Committee, it is tragic to see that the words that
have been put forth year after year are not being followed with
action- specifically with a full-fledged commitment to provide disarmament
education with all the material and human resources that this noble,
indeed, necessary cause requires. For with every dollar transferred
from military expenditures to the cause of disarmament education
future generations may indeed be saved from the “scourge of
war”.
There are many ways to make the process of disarmament education
"integral" to the education of not only young people,
but to the whole community of humanity. Teaching people about disarmament
and non-proliferation, and letting them know that there is a choice
other than violence to resolve conflict, is one step along the path
called Permanent Peace.
See http://disarmament.un.org/education/study.html
for full list of recommendations.
- Dr. Kathleen Sullivan, Educators
for Social Responsibility
- Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
(This report was taken from Week
Three's Disarmament Education report)
8. Verification
Competing visions of verification, compliance, and transparency
faced off in the last two days of First Committee, with draft resolutions
L.1/Rev.1*,
L.38/Rev.2,
and L.50/Rev.1
all adopted by recorded vote. The US draft "Compliance with
non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements"
(A/C.1/60/L.1/Rev.1*) was adopted with a vote
of 137-0-11. The abstentions came from Barbados, Belarus, Cuba,
Egypt, Grenada, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Russian Federation, South
Africa, and Venezuela. Iran's controversial draft "Follow-up
to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons" (A/C.1/60/L.38/Rev.2) was adopted by a
much narrower margin, with a vote
of 70-52-22. Finally, "Transparency in armaments" (A/C.1/60/L.50/Rev.1)
was adopted with a vote
of 122-0-21.
The three resolutions reveal the deep polarization in the international
community's understanding of compliance and verification, not only
in what constitutes verification, but also in what parties are complying
with. L.1/Rev.1* and L.38/Rev.2 delineate the polarized perspectives
over these issues. All but one of the 11 states who abstained from
L.1/Rev.1* voted in favor of L.38/Rev.2, and 74 of the states who
voted in favor of L.1/Rev.1* abstained from or rejected L.38.Rev.2
(including all Member States of the EU and NATO). A comparison of
the two texts depicts the political grandstanding present in both
of them and between the states that introduced them.
The final draft of L.1/Rev.1* included several significant revisions
and new co-sponsors after the US received an abundance of amendments
to its original
draft. It eased off hard-line demands for compliance enforcement,
and drew the UN and other multilateral venues back into its compliance
framework. For example, the call for compliance enforcement in preambular
paragraph five was removed during revision. Likewise, where L.1
called for "concerted action to ensure that all States comply
with their existing arms limitations, non-proliferation and disarmament
agreements and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements
accountable for their non-compliance," L.1/Rev.1* "calls
upon all Member States to take concerted action in a manner consistent
with relevant international law to encourage, through bilateral
and multilateral means, the compliance by all States . . . and to
hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for
their non-compliance in a manner consistent with the Charter of
the United Nations."
L.1/Rev.1* is still not as committed to international law and multilateral
fora as its predecessors were. While preambular paragraph seven,
"Noting that verification and compliance, and enforcement in
a manner consistent with the Charter, are integrally related,"
was added, the resolution still does not give the highest recognition
to the UN Charter or international law in issues of compliance and
verification. This is a rapid change from the 2003 verification
resolution, A/RES/57/86. 57/86 was not only "convinced that
observance by Member States of the Charter of the United Nations,
treaties to which they are parties and other sources of international
law is important for the strengthening of international security,"
but also recognized, "the resolving of compliance concerns
effectively by means consistent with such agreements and international
law can, inter alia, contribute to better relations among States
and the strengthening of world peace and stability." China,
Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Russian Federation, and
Venezuela believe that L.1/Rev.1* has lost its objectivity and balance
from previous years' versions, and lament the departure from the
spirit and content of resolutions 57/86 and its predecessor, A/RES/52/30.
The increasing role for international law in the final draft of
L.1/Rev.1* still does not address the United States' assertion in
its introduction for L.1 that noncompliance should be judged by
whatever methods it deems appropriate and viable. L.1/Rev.1* does
not explain the requirements or methods for judging the degree of
verifiability of a treaty or of the compliance of a State with that
treaty.
For example, there is no indication that the US is retracting its
belief that "international data declarations, international
cooperative measures (including technical measures) and on-site
inspection regimes by themselves will [NOT] be sufficient for detecting
noncompliance." The IAEA
has reportedly "initiated intensive verification efforts in
a number of countries and investigated the illicit procurement network
… [and] strengthened the verification system through enhanced
use of satellite imagery, environmental sampling and a variety of
new technologies."1 The US has made it clear it believes these
measures are insufficient but has only proposed subjective alternatives.
Iran pointed out that the clear lack of trust in "competent
multilateral organizations" and the dissatisfaction of the
United States with technical means of verification leaves room for
entirely subjective judgments of compliance. Complicating matters,
the US will not become party to any treaty deemed to be not "effectively
verifiable." (See Verification
Report, Week 3)
Many states expressed concern with the lack of clarity surrounding
OP.4, which calls for concerted action. Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, and
the Russian Federation all remarked that the lack of clearly defined
parameters and the ambiguous language raises doubts about the true
design of the resolution. The Russian Federation argued that L.1/Rev.1*
"abounds with provisions that give grounds for arbitrary interpretations
. . . not necessarily associated with the goals of non-proliferation
and disarmament."
The debate over L.38/Rev.2 proved more contentious. In the days
prior to the vote, groups across the political spectrum hoped this
"politically misguided initiative" would be withdrawn.
As Rebecca Johnson, Acronym
Institute, noted, Iran took advantage of the structure of the
First Committee, which "makes it difficult to defeat any resolution
that gestures sufficiently towards past agreements, the rhetoric
of a moral high ground (however spurious) or even the blandly meaningless."
L.38/Rev.2 is framed in the language and content of many previous
resolutions sponsored by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and follows
the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, making it difficult for
the supporters of these agreements to vote against it. (For textual
analysis and NAM reactions, see Nuclear Disarmament Final
and Week
4 Reports)
The US and the EU declared that the text should be judged in the
context of its submission. Because Iran was found in non-compliance
with its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, they voted against the Iranian resolution
calling for compliance with the Non-Prolferation
Treaty (NPT). While presenting a strict approach to compliance
enforcement in one resolution, the US rejected another calling on
specific states to comply with their treaty obligations. In addition,
as Egypt and Cuba pointed out, the chief author of L.1/Rev.1* maintains
the world's largest nuclear arsenal though clearly obliged to take
steps to reduce it. One cannot help but notice the double standard.
(See Nuclear
Disarmament Report)
Egypt, Cuba, and Iran are also politicizing these issues and concealing
their true intentions behind the language of multilateralism, as
demonstrated during the explanation of votes for L.50/Rev.1. In
supporting the UN
Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR), L.50/Rev.1 confronts compliance
and verification through a major multilateral weapons transparency
mechanism. While UNCAR is voluntary, it builds confidence towards
legally-binding agreements; voluntary transparency is "verification-lite".
As one delegation pointed out, significant, serious, voluntary submission
of information by some states is good leverage for demanding transparency
from others.
In its remarks about L.50/Rev.1, following an earlier statement
that verification machinery is designed to enhance cooperation among
states, Cuba declared that "transparency is important for a
climate of trust," and should lead to the protection of national,
regional, and international security. Cuba, however, abstained from
L.50/Rev.1, as did Egypt and Iran. Their reservation was that UNCAR
is limited to conventional weapons. By excluding nuclear weapons,
materials, and systems, UNCAR is qualitatively unbalanced. Egypt
(speaking for the Arab League), Syrian Arab Republic, and Sudan
all expressed concern at this, arguing that Israel has the most
destructive weapons in the Middle East, and yet is not subjected
to the same suspicion as Iran and Iraq, whose armaments are less
qualitatively destructive.
Cuba, however, has never participated in UNCAR, and Egypt and Iran
have not participated since 1992 and 1998, respectively. For all
their talk about multilateralism, transparency, and comprehensiveness,
none of the three main opponents of L.1/Rev.1* has been actively
contributing to a major UN multilateral transparency mechanism.
The art of double standards is not practiced by the US alone.
The issues of verification, compliance, and transparency remain
vitally important for international peace, security, and stability.
In the IAEA
Annual Report to the General Assembly, Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei argued that the world currently faces an "unprecedented
array of challenges to the non-proliferation and arms control regime."2
Clearly there is consensus on the need for effective verification
and compliance mechanisms, but there is no consensus on what constitutes
compliance and verification, which treaties are effectively verifiable,
what are the most appropriate measures for confidence-building,
nor even with what States need to comply.
-Rachel ("Ray") Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
1 Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, "Statement to the Sixtieth Regular
Session of the United Nations General Assembly," Statements
of the Director General (New York: IAEA.org, 31 October 2005)
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n015.html
2 Ibid.
9. Fissile Materials
Ten years after the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference committed States to commence
negotiations on a fissile
materials treaty (FMT), no such negotiations are underway in
the Conference
on Disarmament (CD). Last year's General Assembly resolution
(A/RES/59/81)
calling for the CD to adopt a program of working including negotiations
on an "effectively verifiable" FMT has been ignored. During
the first week of the First Committee, two years after China's change
of position, the world finally received an answer to the A5 (Five
Ambassadors) proposal for a CD program of work from the state
most often identified as blocking consensus on that proposal. The
United States stated
its support for a fissile materials cut-off negotiating mandate
which is "unencumbered by linkages to unrelated proposals"
- as it is under the A5 approach, where it is linked to discussions
on PAROS,
security
assurances, and nuclear disarmament. The United States also
reiterated that the mandate should not "refer to verification
measures." However, this in itself should not be an obstacle
to negotiations; other states have basically conceded that whether
and how to verify can be addressed in negotiations.
As the U.S. insistence on delinkage is a stance very unlikely to
garner acceptance from key states (China came a long way just to
back the A5 proposal), it appears that prospects are dim for FMT
negotiations in 2006. The issue was not directly tested in the First
Committee this fall, as Canada did not offer a resolution on the
FMT. Instead Canada was one of the co-sponsors of the initiative,
eventually withdrawn, for establishment of ad hoc committees of
the General Assembly based on the A5 proposal, one of which would
have negotiated the FMT.
While fissile materials issues sometimes seem to induce a certain
lethargy among NGOs and governments alike, in fact they go to the
heart of disarmament and non-proliferation. Most obviously, a cut-off
halts growth in arsenals. This point was illustrated sharply by
Pakistan's rebuff
during the General
Debate of the U.S.-backed proposal for a formal moratorium pending
agreement on an FMT, stating that it will only "halt fissile
material production consistent with the requirements of its nuclear
posture."
A verified FMT would also bring international monitoring of facilities
in nuclear-armed states, generally advancing the framework for abolition
and, not insignificantly, contributing to the capability to prevent
diversion to terrorists and other non-state actors, notably in Russia
and Pakistan.
Finally, depending on its provisions, an FMT could contribute directly
to disarmament. For example, as South Africa has proposed, it could
provide that materials declared surplus to military requirements
would be subject to international monitoring. Indonesia's
remarks during the General Debate illustrated that many states want
a disarmament-oriented treaty, calling for "negotiations without
conditions on a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT),
focusing attention both on existing stocks and future production
of weapons-usable material - whether civil or military."
For a comprehensive inventory of all nuclear materials, see Reaching
Critical Will's Model
Nuclear Inventory: Accountability is Democracy, Transparency
is Security.
-John Burroughs and Michael Spies, Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy
10. Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)
Despite the increase in both the number and urgency of calls for
a codified, legally binding instrument to assure Non-Nuclear Weapon
States that they will not be threatened with or suffer an attack
by nuclear weapons, Negative
Security Assurances (NSAs) remain an elusive and contested subject
in the disarmament and non-proliferation arena. The Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) and its Member States have been calling for legally
binding NSAs for an extended period of time and have been quite
vocal throughout the First Committee meetings this year, particularly
through the Chair of the NAM disarmament working group, Indonesia.
In his opening
statement to the First Committee, Ambassador Rezlan Ishar Jenie
of Indonesia stated: “NAM also reaffirms that the total elimination
of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, pending the total
elimination of such weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal,
unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances
to non-nuclear-weapons-States should be pursued as a matter of priority.”
As Chair of the NAM disarmament working group, Indonesia has also
taken the lead on sponsoring a number of resolutions calling for
strengthening of multilateralism in general and legally binding
NSAs in particular. This year’s resolution on NSAs, “Conclusion
of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”
(A/C.1/60/L.45)
was adopted in the First Committee with 98
votes in favor, zero against and 55 delegations abstaining.
Although most Nuclear Weapon States believe that existing NSAs as
given through Security
Council resolutions 255 and 984 remain sufficient, China has
lent support to the calls for legally binding NSAs and was the only
Nuclear Weapon State to vote in favor of resolution L.45.
Although they expressed support for legally binding NSAs, both China
and the Republic of Korea also encouraged their colleagues to look
for more innovative methods of engaging in international dialogue
surrounding disarmament and non-proliferation before turning to
discussion of a legally binding instrument. China’s Ambassador
Zhang Yan, Director General of the Department
of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), noted that governments
are not doing enough to eradicate fear and distrust in the international
community. Ambassador Zhang stated: “Countries should respect
each other’s security interests and strive for a relationship
based on mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and cooperation
so as to realize mutual security, thus eradicating the motivations
behind proliferation.” While innovation and the courage to
maintain a vision of a world free from war are hard to come by in
a global environment where powerful political actors value destruction
and war rather than development, humanity, peace, health, and human
rights, it is imperative that countries, supported by NGOs and civil
society, strive to amass the necessary political will to achieve
mutual trust and equality among states so that one day the increasing
need for NSAs will be diminished and eventually completely eradicated.
-Jenna Crouch, Reaching
Critical Will
11. Disarmament and Development
The 60th Session of the First Committee began with calls for decreasing
alarmingly high worldwide military expenditures, reallocating resources
to development, increasing development and security through disarmament
and fulfilling the Millennium
Development Goals and Article
26 of the UN Charter. These appeals manifested in draft resolutions
A/C.1/60/L.16,
“Relationship between Disarmament and Development”,
A/C.1/60/L.34,
“Addressing the Humanitarian and Development impact of the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons” and A/C.1/60/L.21,
“UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development
in Latin America and the Caribbean”.
Draft Resolution A/C.1/60/L.16 was adopted with a 164-1-2
vote. The United States voted against and France and Israel
abstained, which reflects the same voting
pattern as last year’s resolution A/RES/59/78.
L.16 does not differ from last year’s resolution, and continues
to stress “the importance of the symbiotic relationship between
disarmament and development and the important role of security in
this connection” and calls for the “part of the resources
made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation
agreements to economic and social development”.
The United Kingdom supported mainstreaming development policy, but
asserted that there was no automatic link between disarmament and
development. The United States claimed disarmament and development
are distinct issues that are not linked, despite the World Summit
declaration from heads of state, including the US President, that
they are fundamentally linked.
“UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development
in Latin America and the Caribbean” (A/C.1/60/L.21) highlights
the “important role that the [Regional Centre] can play in
promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitations,
disarmament and development at a regional level”, and was
adopted by the First Committee without vote.
Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.34 says that “the illicit manufacture,
transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their
excessive accumulation have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic
consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation,
safety, security, stability and sustainable development”.
L.34 was adopted on in an almost unanimous vote
of 160-1, with no abstentions. Jordan commented that determining
the influence of small arms and light weapons, especially in post
conflict areas, is of extreme importance for the security, development
and cooperation of those areas. The United States, as the only vote
against, did not wish to link SALW with their humanitarian and socio-economic
consequences.
The debates, votes and resolutions of the 60th session of the First
Committee show a continued commitment to promoting development and
security through disarmament. Member nations cited the surge in
military expenditures as increasing the urgency of reallocating
resources to development, established the link between small arms
and light weapons and their humanitarian and socio-economic consequences
and called for a fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals
and Article 26 of the UN Charter which calls upon member nations
“to promote the establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the
world's human and economic resources”.
-Karen Tilli, NGO Committee on
Disarmament, Peace and Security
12. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
In 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution defining
Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones as, "any zone recognized as such by the
General Assembly, which is established by a group of States freely
exercising their sovereign rights and by means of an International
Treaty or a Convention."
The NWFZ already in force were repeatedly mentioned in the 2005
First Committee. Myanmar
spoke on behalf of ASEAN, requesting that the Nuclear Weapon States
(NWS) sign the protocol to the 1997 Treaty
of Bangkok as soon as possible. The NWFZ in the South Pacific
established through the 1986 Treaty
of Rarotonga was mentioned in the general debate, with Pacific
states expressing their satisfaction in the regional confidence
it has helped to promote. The first NWFZ in Latin America and the
Caribbean entered into force in 1968 (Treaty
of Tlatelolco). A convention of all states party to a NWFZ was
held in Mexico this summer, and received significant praise from
many delegations in the First Committee.
The NWFZ in Africa (Treaty
of Palindaba, ready for signature in 1996) has not yet entered
into force. Many states have already ratified the Treaty while others
are waiting for the instruments to be submitted by the relevant
national legislatures. African nations and nations from other regions
have expressed strong support for the African NWFZ. Many African
nations called for their neighbors to ratify the Treaty as soon
as possible so it may enter into force. Similarly, the Central Asian
NWFZ is strongly supported by the states of the region (Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), although
France, the UK and the US have expressed doubts in regard to the
language of the treaty, while Russian and China have been more supportive.
France, the UK and the US are hesitant to give negative
security assurances to states under the Russian nuclear umbrella.
Seven resolutions or decisions were tabled which pertain directly
to NWFZs. Several items were presented involving either regional
disarmament work or nuclear disarmament, all of which pertain to
NWFZs. The NWFZ resolutions included: L.3
(Middle East NWFZ), L.6
(Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East), L.7 (NWFZ in
Central Asia), L.8
(NWFZ in Africa), L.12
(NWF Southern Hemisphere), and L.25
(Consolidation of NWFZ in Latin America). Of these decisions, L.3,
L.7, L.8, and L.25 were adopted without a vote. L.19
(The Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a
Zone of Peace) does not directly mention NWFZs, but a zone of general
peace.
Beginning with L.19, Pakistan, India, China, and 118 other states
voted
for the resolution, opposed by France, the UK and the US as a group,
with 44 abstentions.
The NWF Southern Hemisphere (A/C.1/60/L.12) was adopted again this
year, receiving 144 votes
in favor. Six states, Bhutan, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and
Spain, abstained from the resolution, and France, the UK and the
US were the solitary votes against once again. France, on behalf
of these three, was concerned this resolution was designed to affect
the law of the seas. The Indian delegation explained their abstention:
"in calling for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia,
this specific proposal logically has no greater validity than the
establishment of NWFZs …in East Asia, Western Europe or North
America."
L.6, on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, is rife with
controversy. The week the First Committee voted on resolutions,
the Iranian president suggested "Israel be wiped off the map."
This statement was rebuked by figures from the Pope to Kofi Annan
to Palestinian spokespeople. The L.6 resolution, which Israel considers
completely one-sided and biased, calls for Israel to accede to the
NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. Israel's neighbors, including
Jordan and Egypt, argue that balance and peace in the region will
be impossible if one nation outweighs the others in weaponry capability.
This dialogue is particularly relevant given the ongoing situation
with Iran's nuclear program. The L.6 resolution received 159 votes
in favor, two votes against (US and Israel) and four abstentions
(Australia, Ethiopia, India, Cameroon). The EU
and Canada noted their concern with the omission of Iranian IAEA
compliance in the resolution.
-David Sklar, NGO Committee on
Disarmament, Peace and Security
13. Missiles
The area of missiles continues to be plagued with diverging views
regarding venue (be it the UN,
the Missile Technology
Control Regime or the Hague
Code Of Conduct [HCOC]) and scope. As Pakistan said in its explanation
of vote (EOV) on A/C.1/60/L.22,
proposals continue to lack consensus, and often the sponsors seem
more interested in getting resolutions adopted than in furthering
their goals. All resolutions on missiles this session were put to
a vote, and received no votes as well as abstentions.
A few countries addressed missiles in their general statements during
the first week of the First Committee. Norway
urged more countries to sign up to the HCOC. On behalf of the ASEAN
Member States, Myanmar
urged “multilaterally negotiated, comprehensive and non-discriminatory
agreements” on missiles, which was verbatim from its comments
in 2004. During the thematic debate in week two, China mentioned
that it was “willing to join the Missile
Technology Control Regime.”
A draft decision (A/C.1/60/L.5),
submitted by Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran, “decides to include
in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled
‘Missiles’.” The same countries sponsored last
year’s resolution (A/RES/59/67) that requested the Secretary-General
to first, submit a report in 2006 identifying areas where consensus
can be reached, and second, with the assistance of a third Panel
of Governmental Experts to be convened in 2007, to prepare an additional
report on missiles to be submitted in 2008.
L.5 resulted in a vote
of 101 in favor, 2 against (United States and Israel), and 50 abstentions.
These results were close to Egypt, Indonesia and Iran’s resolution
A/RES/59/67 from last year (see Missiles,
Week 2), which passed
with 98 in favor, 2 against, and 60 abstentions.
“The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”
(A/C.1/60/L.22),
introduced by the Philippines and sponsored by 108 Member States,
encountered similar resistance this year as last. Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, and Malaysia submitted resolution A/C.1/60/L.62*
with the same three amendments to L.22 submitted and rejected last
year. The voting
results of L.22 were 151 in favor, 1 opposed (Iran) and 11 abstentions,
winning slightly more support than last year (A/C.1/59/L.50
received 137 in favor, 2 opposed (Iran and Egypt), and 16 abstentions).
All three amendments in L.62* were rejected as follows:
Amendment 1, in the eighth preambular paragraph, “[add] the
words ‘development and’ before the word ‘proliferation’”
with an oral amendment adding “in a comprehensive manner”
at the end of the paragraph, was rejected by 26 in favor, 105 against,
and 7 abstentions;
Amendment 2, in operative paragraph 1, “[add] the word ‘first’
before the word ‘practical’” was rejected by 19
in favor, 108 against, and 10 abstentions; and
Amendment 3, in operative paragraph 3, “[r]eplace the words
‘Encourages the exploration of’ with the words ‘Encourages
the United Nations to explore’” was rejected by 24 in
favor, 106 no, and 7 abstentions.
Egypt, the Philippines, Chile, Algeria, Cuba, China, Iran, India,
Indonesia and Syria explained their votes on L.22 and L.62* (see
Missiles, Week 4).
Points raised against L.22 were that it focused solely on ballistic
missiles; that the UN is the proper forum for dealing with missiles
issues; that the HCOC has serious shortcomings in addressing peaceful
uses of missile technology; that attention was not paid to the vertical
proliferation of missiles including design, development, testing
and deployment; that the HCOC’s development lacked transparency;
and that L.22 was not legally binding.
Iran, the only State to vote against L.22, said in its EOV that
it was forced to vote against it because the sponsors were not willing
to develop or change the text to give room to non-subscribing HCOC
states. Because the HCOC was developed outside of the UN, engagement
of all States is now necessary and asking States to agree on the
text on a take it or leave it basis is unfair.
The Philippines and Chile, the current and former chairs of the
HCOC, respectively, both voted against L.62* but advised that the
amendments, although they cannot be considered now, should be brought
to the next HCOC plenary meeting.
- Waverly de Bruijn, Global
Action to Prevent War
14. Biological and Chemical Weapons
While there were notmany groundbreaking changes during
the past year in the field of chemical
and biological
disarmament, to date, the overall steady progress of the implementation
of both the Biological
and Chemical
Weapons Conventions has been a success in the disarmament arena
as well as an important example for the disarmament and non-proliferation
of other types of weapons. During the second week of First Committee
meetings, in the Thematic
Debate on "Other Weapons of Mass Destruction" and
PAROS
many government delegations recognized the importance of the progress
already made in terms of chemical and biological disarmament, but
also stressed the need for continued progress in these critical
areas as a basis for general and complete disarmament. Speaking
on October 12 on behalf of the European Union, Ambassador John
Freeman from the United Kingdom stressed the importance of the BWC
and CWC as the basis for progress in other areas of disarmament
and non-proliferation. He stated: "These Treaties have an essential
role in countering the threat of chemical and biological weapons,
and together with other key multilateral agreements provide a basis
for the international community's disarmament and non-proliferation
efforts, which contribute to international confidence, stability,
and peace, including the fight against terrorism."
Other key issues raised throughout First Committee discussions
of biological and chemical weapons included the need to find a balance
between developing new technologies to improve the quality of human
life and the prevention of using these technological advances to
promote discrimination, war, and destruction. In addition, both
Russia
and Cuba called upon governments to provide financial assistance
for carrying out the destruction of biological and chemical weapons
in accordance with the national implementation measures of the BWC
and CWC. Cuba also stated that along with monetary support for implementation
of the BWC and CWC, the UN should encourage the development for
appropriate mechanisms for promoting socio-economic growth in developing
countries.
This year's resolutions on the implementation of the BWC (A/C.1/60/L.33)
and CWC (A/C.1/60/L.31),
introduced and sponsored by Hungary and Poland respectively were,
as in previous years, both adopted without a vote in the First Committee.
There were no major changes to the text of either of the resolutions;
however, minor changes include greater emphasis on implementation
of national legislation under the CWC and calls for financial support
from the Secretary General for the 2006 BWC review conference to
be held in Geneva in 2006.
Looking forward to the BWC review conference in 2006, many governments
stressed the need for a verification instrument for the BWC, similar
to that of the CWC, the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Summarizing
the concerns of many government delegations, on October 5, Ambassador
Deborah Panckhurst of New
Zealand stated: "the Biological Weapons Convention still
lacks any verification mechanism. This remains a major hole in multilateral
defenses at a time when biological weapons have been identified
as a growing threat. We hope that the BWC Review Conference next
year will provide an opportunity to consider how to address this
issue." With the substantive progress already made in implementing
the CWC, and the calls for support for verification and transparency
in the field of biological disarmament, governments should take
full advantage of the 2006 BWC review conference to make these goals
a reality.
-Jenna Crouch, Reaching
Critical Will
15. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
The majority of opinions expressed about the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the First Committee this session
were enthusiastically supportive of its entry into force and its
role in the non-proliferation and the disarmament process. Brazil’s
statement in the first week set the tone for positive reflection
on the Treaty’s norm-setting standards: “The CTBT is
intended to be a bulwark against both vertical and horizontal proliferation,
by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear
weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear
weapons. It constitutes a crucial step towards the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons.” The success of this Treaty, according
to the Executive Secretary of its Secretariat, the Preparatory
Commission of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), is dependent on
“two crucial factors: its universality and its verifiability.”
Through statements and sponsorship of the draft resolution "Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty" (A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1)
many states and organizations offered their support for the implementation
of the CTBT, the development of its verification regime, the |
