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The First Committee Monitor

Final Edition

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In this issue:

  1. Introduction
  2. Nuclear Disarmament
  3. Disarmament Machinery
  4. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
  5. Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
  6. North Korea
  7. Negative Security Assurances
  8. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
  9. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
  10. Conventional Weapons
  11. Arms Trade Treaty
  12. Small Arms & Light Weapons
  13. Landmines
  14. Terrorism
  15. Disarmament & Development
  16. International Court of Justice
  17. Biological and Chemical Weapons
  18. Missiles
  19. Verification and Transparency
  20. Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Introduction

The 2006 First Committee made several major substantive contributions to disarmament and non-proliferation. Most significantly, it voted to begin a process moving “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty” (L.55) that would regulate trade in all conventional weapons—from tanks to guns—for the first time. (See ATT report) It also voted to continue the small arms and light weapons (SALW) follow-up process, which the 2006 Review Conference on the illicit trade in SALW was unable to do. (See SALW report) The First Committee also voted to provide support to the upcoming nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle, starting with a 2007 Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna from April 30-May 11. The First Committee vote on the traditionally consensual Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone resolution gave the first comprehensive picture of where the world stands since the controversial treaty was signed on September 8 of this year. The First Committee also condemned the North Korean nuclear test, in three different adopted resolutions, and in statements from across the regional groupings.

Behind the scenes, governments consulted to prepare for the 2007 Conference on Disarmament (CD) session. The annual report from the world’s sole multilateral treaty negotiating body was adopted by the First Committee without a vote, so the most interesting and significant exchanges on the future of the CD happened during the thematic debate on disarmament machinery. (See disarmament machinery report)

The First Committee also made progress in process. Process continues to be vital to disarmament and non-proliferation, as it significantly affects substantive outcomes. There was a more cooperative and optimistic spirit in the room this year, which, according to the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, helps negotiations. Governments also participated more in the general and thematic debates, as well as the inter-active informal sessions. States that are often quiet during the First Committee spoke, and states were generally more willing to engage in extemporaneous debate. A range of experts gave valuable presentations to the First Committee, including the Chair of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Dr. Hans Blix, and the Chair of a committee created by the First Committee. Non-governmental organizations also addressed the Committee on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and the Arms Trade Treaty. (See Introduction, Week 3) Overall, thanks to the able and efficient Chair, Ambassador Mona Juul, and the Committee’s cooperation, procedures went remarkably smoothly, enabling substantive work instead of impeding it, as it should be.

Unfortunately, there were several negative signals as well, both in the Committee and in the backdrop of its meetings. North Korea shocked the world when it conducted a nuclear test on October 9, and possibly changed the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme broke down, and the Security Council began considering sanctions. The United States released its new space policy on October 13, continued its sole opposition vote to the annual “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” resolution, and moved to more unilateral positions on other First Committee issues. (See Introduction, Week 4)

However, as Dr. Blix remarked, the challenges to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, though significant, are the exception. The overwhelming majority of states agree on where to go and on the first steps to get there. (See nuclear disarmament report) As the international community prepares for the 2007 CD session and NPT Preparatory Committee, it should keep this vast agreement, the cooperative spirit of the First Committee, and the success of the conventional and SALW processes in mind. Progress is far from impossible. Good faith is not created by a few, let alone a single state; it is the responsibility of the entire international community. We must continue inching forward, reinforcing existing norms on disarmament and non-proliferation, and negotiating new ones. We are the ones we have been waiting for—it is time to just do it.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will

Nuclear Disarmament

The best light in which to see the debate over nuclear disarmament in this year’s First Committee debate and voting pattern is that there still exists across a broad range of nations a general sense of what an agenda leading to nuclear disarmament should look like. That light dims considerably when that same voting pattern shows that an extremely small number of countries – most notably the United States – have such hardened positions on certain key issues that true consensus is currently impossible.

The three comprehensive nuclear disarmament resolutions this report has been following most closely all session - the Japanese draft on “Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/61/L.32), the draft by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), and the Non-Aligned Movement’s (NAM) text – all have at their hearts the same agenda: concrete disarmament and non-proliferation steps that in and of themselves reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons and cumulatively lead to the elimination of those weapons as envisioned in Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Problems arise because so many of the most important steps have less than a handful of dedicated opponents: mention the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and you lose the US; mention the NPT and you lose India, Pakistan and Israel; use “verification” in conjunction with a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and you lose the US. Then there are the ways to lose huge blocks of countries: do not mention “verification” in conjunction with the FMCT and lose the support of countries championing the ten-year old Shannon mandate; challenge hair-trigger alert and other aspects of US nuclear doctrine (and by extension, NATO nuclear doctrine) and lose the support of NATO and aligned countries. This last issue is behind many of the objections to the Indian draft on de-alerting “Reducing nuclear dangers" (L.49), “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (L.51), “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” (L.45), and the NAM draft on “Nuclear Disarmament”.

The US has placed itself in the tiniest of minorities on most disarmament resolutions. (See PAROS, NSA and SALW reports) The focus here is on the US minority votes on the Japanese and New Agenda drafts. 

The Japanese-sponsored “Renewed Determination” resolution (L.32) was adopted with 169 in favor to 3 opposed (the US, North Korea, and India), with 8 abstentions. The US said, “Of all the resolutions introduced on nuclear disarmament [this is] the most balanced and realistic,” noting the draft’s recognition of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, its call for negotiations on the FMCT and the condemnation of the North Korean nuclear test. The US nonetheless voted against it because of the endorsement of the CTBT.

In 2005, only the US and India voted no. Besides North Korea joining the minority, Iran also shifted from a positive vote to an abstention. The Iranian delegate said this was because the text was “not appropriately balanced,” noting that the resolution only focuses on the FMCT as an item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, Iran noted, the reference to the FMCT is “not consistent with the previous agreements” on the verifiability of a treaty. The other six abstainers were Bhutan, China, Cuba, Egypt, Israel, and Myanmar. Egypt criticized the text for not fully reflecting the consensus commitment made in the 13 Practical Steps at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The New Agenda Coalition resolution (A/C.1/61/L.13/Rev.2), “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” was adopted with 148 in favor to 7 opposed, with 12 abstentions. This shows a slight improvement with countries shifting from abstentions to voting yes. The UK, US, France, India and Israel voted no in 2005; they were joined by North Korea and Pakistan this year. Speaking on behalf of the UK, US and France, the UK representative said the draft “takes account neither of the concrete progress nor the concrete efforts underway by the three countries” in fulfilling their Article VI obligations, nor mentions their willingness to negotiate an FMCT.

The NAM’s draft on “Nuclear disarmament” (L.39) was adopted 105 votes in favor to 45 opposed, with 6 abstentions. This represents a slight improvement over last year's essentially the identical resolution, yet it remains the most divisive of the omnibus nuclear disarmament resolutions. Because it contains such a sweeping list of recommendations, there is something to offend many countries: it calls for negotiations on a verifiable FMCT; for the entry-into-force of the CTBT; for legal instruments “on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States” and for “a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons”; for de-alerting and a diminished “role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines”; and for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament next year.

The US, UK and France opposed, Russia abstained, and China voted in favor of L.39. India and Pakistan abstained, citing the references to the NPT. NATO countries and the former Soviet republics voted no or abstained. The New Agenda countries split, with the two European countries in the coalition (Ireland and Sweden) abstaining, while the others voted yes. Japan, which abstained, said the resolution “lacked certain elements,” an oblique reference to the failure of the draft to include recognition of what states consider positive elements, such as the reduction of strategic arms by the US and Russia.

In one of the last votes of this year’s session, the draft on the 2010 NPT Review Conference and its preparatory committee (L.21/Rev. 1) was adopted 163 to zero with the three usual abstentions – India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea did not vote. Weeks of negotiations between the US and EU resulted in the decision to hold the first session of the preparatory committee (April 30 to May 11) in Vienna. There was no drama nor debate over this essentially technical resolution. The drama and debate will start next year when delegates take the lessons learned to Vienna and try to find the common ground that alluded them this month.

-Jim Wurst, Middle Powers Initiative

Disarmament Machinery

Even though most states expressed disappointment in the failures of the disarmament machinery, the First Committee still had a sense of hope for the future. States had concrete suggestions to implement their hopes for: the Conference on Disarmament (CD); the Disarmament Commission (DC); the First Committee; and revitalizing the disarmament machinery overall.
 
In debates on disarmament machinery, states disagreed whether the current impasse was a result of the machinery or lack of political will from member states. Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was of the opinion that the disarmament community needs an “all-weather machine” that would allow work to continue even in times of disagreement. Pakistan believed the disarmament machinery was adequate and had huge potential for producing optimum results, while Canada pointed out that “[s]ometimes it is the machinery that is not responding properly, and in these cases, a proper tune-up can help get it going again.”
 
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Despite having no programme of work, substantive progress was made in the 2006 CD session. Coordination among the six rotating presidents (known as the P6 initiative) resulted in structured, focused debates on all agenda items. The six presidents submitted a non-paper called “The P6 vision non-paper,” to serve as food for thought. This non-paper contains a snapshot of where the CD stands on a programme of work, and elaborates suggestions for moving forward. Both Switzerland and South Africa, two of the presidents of next year's session, supported coordination among the 2007 presidents. South Africa, who will serve as the first president of 2007, held consultations with states during the First Committee to determine how to break the impasse on a programme of work in the CD.
 
South Africa also stated that the CD might not need a programme of work, but rather “a programme that works.” Ambassador Zdzislaw Rapacki from Poland, the first 2006 President, suggested that the 2007 CD should establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate issues that are ripe, along with a “schedule of activities” for substantive discussions on all other issues on the CD agenda.
 
The six presidents of 2006 together tabled the draft resolution on the annual CD report (A/C.1/61/L.29). The resolution takes note of the increased deliberation of the Conference, the structured debates, the cooperation among all six Presidents of the Conference, and welcomes the decision of the Conference to request its current President and the incoming President to conduct consultations during the inter-sessional period. The resolution was adopted without a vote on October 25.
 
Disarmament Commission (DC)
The 2006 DC agreed on an agenda, which it had not been able to do since 2003, and created working groups on nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures in conventional weapons. However, the working groups were unable to agree on a working paper or any recommendations. In the plenary meetings, the DC discussed improving the effectiveness of its work, and agreed on recommendations, including electing the chair and bureau at least three months before the session begins. The Chair of the 2006 session, South Korean Ambassador Oh, said that this progress was modest, but with such an abundance of failure, even modest progress was welcome.
 
South Korea submitted the draft resolution “Report of the Disarmament Commission” (A/C.1/61/L.11), which decides to adopt the measures to improve the effectiveness of the Commission’s methods of work, reaffirms the importance of enhancing dialogue with the First Committee and the CD, and requests the DC to meet again to consider the same agenda from April 9-27, 2007.
 
The resolution was adopted without a vote on October 25. However, the United States (US) decided to not participate in the vote. It did not explain why, but in its final statement of the 2006 DC session, it questioned whether the Commission had “finally outlived its usefulness.” During the 2006 DC session, Cuba implied that the US had proposed eliminating the DC in the mandate review process then taking place.
 
First Committee
Governments discussed First Committee reform less this year than in years past, and no one submitted a resolution on reform. While most governments have simply supported implementing previous years’ resolutions on improving the First Committee’s working methods, some made further suggestions. The Chair and the Norwegian delegation highlighted specific reforms for priority  implementation, such as having fewer resolutions and better follow-up to the adopted resolutions. Norway also complimented the value of the NGO participation this year, and was convinced the debates would benefit from even more contributions by civil society. Sierra Leone called for more debates and more interactive exchange among delegates in the First Committee, as well as interaction with other committees, particularly the Third Committee. The United States said that member states should oppose efforts to convene Groups of Governmental Experts when other groups on the same topic had not been able to agree on any outcome. The US also said the revitalization of the First Committee remained incomplete, and called on the General Assembly to formally adopt the thematic clusters.
 
Other Disarmament Machinery
There have been various calls for possibilities to overcome the impasse in disarmament. Sierra Leone tabled a new draft resolution entitled “Declaration of the Fourth Disarmament Decade” (A/C.1/61/L.17), to mobilize more intensive global efforts to reverse the current trend in the field of disarmament. The resolution was adopted by 116 votes in favour, one against (the US) and 51 abstentions.
 
The Non-Aligned Movement submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/61/L.4) to convene an open-ended working group to discuss a fourth special session on disarmament. The resolution was adopted by 166 votes in favour, one against (the US) and no abstaining. Indonesia pointed out that the same resolution was adopted in 2004 (59/71) by consensus and that member states had the responsibility to fulfil the mandate entrusted to them by the General Assembly. The US did not explain its vote.
 
The First Committee adopted the following draft resolutions on other parts of the disarmament machinery without a vote: “United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament” (A/C.1/61/L.9); “United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services” (A/C.1/61/L.12); “Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean” (A/C.1/61/L.14); “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa” (A/C.1/61/L.24); and “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific” (A/C.1/61/L.28).
 
- Beatrice Fihn, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

For outer space issues, the First Committee’s 61st session was essentially an echo of the 60th. While there was overwhelming consensus on the need to preserve outer space for peaceful and cooperative uses, there were also major polarized divergences on the method and scope of this preservation.
 
The majority of states recognize that the key threat to preserving outer space is the likelihood of its weaponization and a subsequent arms race. These states perceive the prospect of weapons in space as destabilizing for disarmament, non-proliferation, and international security, and agree that prevention is less costly than remedy.
 
As they did last year, several states called for further substantive debate and negotiations on a comprehensive, legally-binding PAROS treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and for the reestablishment of a PAROS Ad Hoc Committee. Many states also called for space-capable states to guarantee transparency in their outer space activities and to engage in confidence-building measures. Others called for the strengthening and universalization of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and for enhanced dialogue between the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.
 
Both space-related draft resolutions were adopted with an overwhelming majority. “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (A/C.1/61/L.10/Rev.1) and “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” (A/C.1/61/L.36) were opposed only by the United States (US), while Israel abstained from both.
 
Once again, the US refused to acknowledge the prospect of an arms race in outer space. The US National Space Policy provides the backdrop for their First Committee position. The Policy, released in October this year, opposes “the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space,” and declares the US’ intentions to “dissuade or deter others from impeding [its right to operate in space] . . . and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.”
 
Research from space security experts, and documents such as Space Security 2006 from Spacesecurity.org and Weapons of Terror from the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, were presented in various parallel events this session. The research indicates the key problem that will arise from ignoring the need for new legal regimes and approaches to preventing the weaponization of outer space. The WMD Commission argues that while “there are already a number of international treaties and instruments regulating space activities . . . they do not cover the challenges posed by space-based weapons or ballistic missile defence. In particular, although some agreements prohibit or restrict the deployment of weapons or use of force in outer space, the provisions are limited in scope and coverage. Moreover, none of the existing legal instruments unequivocally prevents the testing, deployment and use of weapons – other than nuclear, chemical and biological weapons – in outer space.”

Research also suggests that space security is threatened not only by the development and deployment of dedicated space based weapons, but by the mismanagement of any aspect of outer space. Scott Lofquist-Morgan, a researcher for Spacesecurity.org and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, explained in an event co-sponsored by Canada, Spacesecurity.org, and Project Ploughshares that other threats to space security include space debris; a growing need for orbital slots and radio frequencies; proliferation of capabilities to attack ground stations and communications links; and increased ground-based capabilities to attack satellites.

China has called outer space “the commonwealth of humankind.” Garrett Hardin, renowned for his work on the “tragedy of the commons,” said, “ruin is the destination toward which all men [sic] rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”

Protecting all states’ access to outer space for peaceful uses means preventing the weaponization of outer space. The European Union declared that PAROS “is an essential condition for strengthening strategic stability and for . . . the free exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes by all states.” The First Committee will have the chance again next year to initiate this kind of preventative diplomacy; hopefully it will not simply echo this year’s stalemate.
 
-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty

It is now more than ten years after the UN General Assembly agreed by consensus on a negotiating mandate (GA/48/75L) for a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in weapons. Recent developments had led to renewed optimism on the part of many states who believe the time is ripe the commencement of such negotiations in the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament (CD). Yet, the outcome of the current session of the First Committee revealed that several long-standing disagreements still exist, and that the CD will face serious challenges if it is to finally take up this task.

In May, the United States introduced a draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and negotiating mandate to the CD. Consistent with the US position first expressed in 2005, that “so-called 'effective verification' of an FMCT cannot be achieved,” the US draft text contains no verification provisions, and the mandate makes no reference to verification. In the First Committee's thematic debate, except for the US, all states that spoke on the issue of an FMCT supported a verified treaty. There was disagreement on whether the US mandate provides a suitable basis for negotiation. Western states, notably Canada, the European Union (EU), and Australia, expressed their belief that the proposed mandate does not preclude verification from coming up in the context of negotiations. Many non-aligned states insist upon a verified treaty, in addition to an FMCT that addresses the issue of existing stocks.

At a non-governmental organization event sponsored by the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel expressed skepticism about the US position on verification. In his presentation, Professor von Hippel described how such a treaty could be verified, regardless of the scope of the final treaty and whether it covers existing stocks. In response to government acclaim and interest in the project, Professor von Hippel said his group would undertake to develop a draft verification protocol by early 2007. A full discussion on the verification measures envisaged by the IPFM can be found in its 2006 Fissile Material Report, available at http://www.fissilematerials.org/.

The US negotiating mandate also breaks with the popular Five Ambassadors' Proposal (A5) for a programme of work in the CD by dealing only with the topic of the FMCT. Many Western and developed states, including the EU, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea believe that the FMCT is the only CD agenda item ripe for negotiation, and thus expressed support for proceeding on the basis of the U.S. draft mandate. Again, many non-aligned states, notably Pakistan, disagreed on this point and continue to insist that the CD should commence on the programme of work proposed by the A5, noting that progress on all four agenda items could happen at different paces.

Firmly believing that “[t]he time to act [on the FMCT] is now,” Canada tabled draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.23 entitled, “Prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The simple resolution urged the CD “to commence immediately negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.” Notably, the resolution did not reflect the 1995 Shannon mandate, which is “to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty” on the understanding delegates would not be precluded from raising issues relating to existing stocks. Canada’s resolution contained no reference to the negotiation of a verified FMCT, nor reference to existing stockpiles, consistent with the US draft mandate.

Citing the lack of consensus over the self-described “minimalist approach” taken by the draft text, Canada ultimately withdrew its resolution in the belief that a resolution passed without consensus would not send the right message to the CD. Citing the progress made in CD this year, Canada vigorously defended its resolution, believing that it would have been appropriate for the First Committee to make a contribution as well. While the fate of this resolution has no direct bearing on the procedures of the CD, it failure suggests that states will have to struggle to bridge these differences to commence negotiations when the CD reconvenes in 2007.

-Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

North Korea

The October 9 nuclear test of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a major challenge to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The test is the first since the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, breaking the global moratorium on nuclear testing. More importantly, it is the first time a non-nuclear weapon state party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has left the treaty and conducted a nuclear explosion. On October 9, the DPRK referred to the disarmament conventions as “good-for-nothing dead documents without any binding force, the main factor for plunging the world into a nuclear arms race.”

The DPRK blamed the perceived US threat to its sovereignty for its nuclear test. Ambassador Kim Kwang Il said, “The US extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process of bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense.” The Six-Party Talks, initially intended to resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula, broke down in 2005 after the US imposed financial sanctions against the DPRK for alleged involvement in money laundering and counterfeiting.

Across the political spectrum, the First Committee urged a return to diplomacy, and called for the DPRK to comply with its disarmament obligations. Many delegations renewed calls for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be brought into force. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which DPRK is a member, urged restraint and a resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Japan argued that the test “is not only in violation of Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration and the Joint Statement by the Six Party Talks, but also disregarding the spirit of UN Security Council [SC] resolution 1695 and the Presidential Statement of the Security Council dated October 7th this year.” The European Union also affirmed that the test violated SC 1695 and the December 1991 North-South De-nuclearization Declaration. The DPRK acknowledged its commitments to the Joint Statement, but it did not mention SC 1695, the 1991 Declaration, or the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. 

The SC unanimously approved resolution 1718 on Saturday, 14 October, imposing weapons and financial sanctions. The resolution forbids the export or import of material that could be used for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. It restricted funds and travel of anyone judged by a newly constituted SC committee to be related to the DPRK weapons or missile programs. The resolution also reinforces the importance of the NPT by underlining “the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations.” It did not authorize use of force.

Three resolutions before the First Committee specifically condemned the DPRK nuclear test. 169 countries voted in favor of Japanese-sponsored “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/61/L.32). Only the DPRK, the US, and India voted against. The resolution on the CTBT (A/C.1/61/L.48) was adopted with 175 in favor, two opposed (US and DPRK) and 4 abstentions. The New Agenda Coalition resolution, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (A/C.1/61/L.13/Rev.2), condemns all nuclear testing and “urges the [DPRK] to rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty.” The UK, US, DPRK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan voted against L.13/Rev.2.

On Tuesday, 31 October 2006, China announced that Six-Party Talks would resume, perhaps as early as November. According to the New York Times, the talks, which still aim to de-nuclearize the peninsula, would focus on the September 2005 accord. The DPRK’s Foreign Ministry stressed that it is returning to the talks “on the premise that the issue of lifting financial sanctions will be discussed and settled between the (North Korea) and the U.S. within the framework of the six-party talks,” as reported in Bloomberg news. Substantive issues remain to be surmounted in the Six-Party Talks. However, the widespread calls for diplomacy and the condemnation of the nuclear test prove that the international community believes a robust disarmament regime is possible.

-Neal Sandin, Middle Powers Initiative

Negative Security Assurances

In the First Committee, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was the most vocal in insisting upon legally binding negative security assurances (NSAs) for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). During the general debate, the NAM repeatedly called for a legally-binding treaty on NSAs.

China, the only nuclear weapon state recognized under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that has made an unconditional assurance not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against NNWS or nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) at any time or under any circumstances, reiterated its support for a NSA treaty during the First Committee general debate.

In their military doctrines, the United States and France have declared that they maintain the option of using nuclear weapons as retaliation against an attack with weapons of mass destruction, including chemical or biological weapons. Reiterating civil society's support for a legally-binding treaty on NSAs, Ms. Merav Datan of Greenpeace International explained to the First Committee that “[n]uclear weapons are not a legitimate or proportionate response to either terrorism or the use of chemical and biological weapons.”

Russia, the US and Israel did not mention NSAs during the First Committee's debate.

The European Union (EU), which includes two nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom and France, supported “pursuing consideration of the issue of security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT.”

India, a nuclear-weapon possessing member of NAM, reiterated its nuclear doctrine of non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. 

Pakistan introduced the annual draft resolution (A/C.1/61/L.45) calling for a legally-binding instrument for NSAs. The annual resolution has traditionally been adopted with large numbers of abstentions, primarily from North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, but without any votes against it.

The United States (US) opposed the resolution for the first time this year. In their explanation of this sole vote against, they declared that they continue to oppose any proposal for an NSA treaty, or other global, legally binding security assurances regime. The US has made this explanation before, when they abstained, and they did not give any explanation as to why they changed to voting against.

The resolution was adopted with 108 votes in favor, one vote against, and 57 abstentions.

NSAs is still one of the four core issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and most states believe it should be negotiated there. Hopefully the US vote against the resolution is not a signal that they will oppose considering NSAs in the 2007 session.

The international community is also preparing for another NPT review cycle. Giving legally-binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear states parties in compliance with the NPT would certainly be a significant incentive to remain a party to the treaty in good standing. It would also remove a major NNWS point of contention and bolster confidence at a time when the treaty regime desperately needs it.

- Beatrice Fihn, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

During this session of the First Committee, an overwhelming majority of states voiced support for the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to prevent nuclear testing. Originally opened for signature in 1996, this year marks the 10th anniversary of the CTBT. Many states agreed it is time for the ten remaining Annex II states to ratify the treaty. The 44 states identified in Annex II of the CTBT have significant nuclear programmes, so their ratifications are necessary for the treaty to enter-into-force. China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have not yet ratified the treaty.

Entry-into-force became a major issue in the First Committee this year when the DPRK proclaimed it successfully conducted a nuclear test. The incident was met with multilateral condemnation from the Republic of Korea, the US, the Russian Federation, the EU, Japan, India, Pakistan, Israel, Mexico, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Brazil.

Canada asserted, the "announcement by the DPRK underlines the necessity of a universal, legally-binding and permanent international ban on all nuclear test explosions." The delegation added that the moratorium on nuclear testing is good, but "[t]here are no substitutes for a legally binding compact."

In an effort to expedite the entry-into-force of the CTBT, Australia introduced "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" (A/C.1/61/L.48/Rev.1), co-sponsored by 44 other states. The vast majority of states voted in support of the resolution, and the First Committee adopted it with 175 in favor, two opposed (North Korea and the US) and four abstentions (Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syrian Arab Republic).

Regarding its opposition, the US explained, "[w]e cannot support a resolution supporting the CTBT." The US also voted against "Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" (A/C.1/61/L.32) due to its support of the CTBT. "Nevertheless," the US delegate declared, "I would like to note our support for the position expressed in Operative Paragraph 5 (A/C.1/61/L.48/Rev.1), which condemns the DPRK's nuclear test and demands that the DPRK do [sic] not conduct further tests."

Although strongly opposed to a nuclear test in North Korea, the US failed to mention its own sub-critical nuclear weapons testing at its Nevada Test Site, the last one of which was in August 2006. According to the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, these tests are necessary “to assure the safety and reliability” of the US’s nuclear weapons (p.55). Due to the policies in the Nuclear Posture Review, Iran accused the US of causing a “serious setback” to the entry-into-force of the CTBT. However, Iran is also an Annex II state that has not yet ratified the Treaty.

Despite the actions of the US and the test by North Korea, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) noted the “significant progress” the CTBT has made over the last year by attaining 10 new signatories. The CTBT also gained an important ratification from Viet Nam, the most recent Annex II state to complete this process. Three other Annex II states, Indonesia, Colombia and Venezuela, also made statements in the First Committee supporting the CTBT, despite prolonged delays in their ratification.

The CTBT verification regime has also had significant accomplishments. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is nearly complete and successfully detected the test in North Korea. Currently comprised of 189 of its intended 321 stations, the IMS is designed to detect signs of a nuclear blast from any corner of the earth; it also has useful civil applications, such as the early detection of tsunamis and volcanic eruptions.

Many consider the CTBT to be a vital step in the effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In his presentation to the First Committee on October 16, Dr. Hans Blix stressed, "[n]o measure could be more urgent, important in substance and as a signal that arms control and disarmament are again on the world agenda than the signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by states which have not yet done so.”

However, the US and North Korea have made it clear they oppose ratifying the CTBT. Additionally, other needed Annex II states, such as India and Syria, have remained cold to the CTBT due to concerns that it is unfair. Despite this, the international community should continue to push for the ratification of the CTBT. The North Korea's test shows that a moratorium on nuclear testing is not sufficient, and the entry-into-force of the CTBT is needed to turn the moratorium into international law.

-Jennifer Leigh Schwerer, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) featured prominently in discussion at this year’s First Committee. The Central Asian NWFZ was established just before session began (see CANWFZ report), provoking discussion about possibilities for future NWFZs and about the procedures used to establish them. There are now seven regional and single state NWFZs, and 113 states are members of such zones. NWFZs have a growing appeal in the current international political context. Their potential to increase regional security, strengthen norms and controls against nuclear weapons, constrain the nuclear weapon states (NWS), and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world is unmatched by most other disarmament measures.

Kazakhstan emphasized the contributions of NWFZs to promoting the principles and objectives of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Kazakhstan also contended that NWFZs are important confidence-building measures for enhancing regional cooperation and stability.

Many states and regions are interested in the prospect of establishing more NWFZs.  During the general debate, Belarus renewed its proposal for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe, which could include a number of non-contiguous European countries that are committed not to acquire or station nuclear weapons on their territories.

A number of governments, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Viet Nam, and the Non-Aligned Movement, called for action on the proposal to make the Middle East a NWFZ or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE believe that a nuclear weapon or WMD free zone in the Middle East would increase security in the region. The UAE argued, “international conditions require a NWFZ in the Middle East, [as it would] alleviate tensions and instability, renew dialogue and the peace process” over the occupation of the Palestinian territories. Iraq highlighted the need for treaties, guarantees, and assurances, and emphasized that a Middle Eastern NWFZ would offer all three to the international community and to the region.

However, during the non-governmental organization presentations, Merav Datan from Greenpeace International pointed out, “the deadlocked positions regarding a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East are as well known as they are entrenched.” Israel pinpointed Iran’s nuclear programme as the source of instability in the Middle East, describing it as one of the key threats to regional and international peace and security. While some other Middle Eastern states, such as the UAE, recognized the problem of Iran “pursuing nuclear energy outside the IAEA,” most viewed Israel as the main impediment to a peaceful Middle East free from WMD.

While Israel did join consensus in adopting the draft resolution L.1, “Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” it emphasized that the process towards a Middle Eastern NWFZ cannot begin when some parties maintain a state of war and refuse to acknowledge the existence of other parties in the region. Meanwhile, the draft resolution L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” was rejected by Israel as being biased, unbalanced, and unfair towards Israel.

Viet Nam indicated NWFZs also struggle to convince the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to respect the protocols that restrict NWS from threatening to use or using nuclear weapons against member states or deploying nuclear weapons in the zone. Some NWS have either been reluctant to endorse these protocols, or have attached reservations to them in order to protect their nuclear deployment policies. The NWS have made such undertakings with respect to some zones (Latin America, South Pacific and Africa) but not all NWS have committed to negative security assurances to other zones (South East Asia and Central Asia). Only China has signed the protocols to the Southeast Asia NWFZ. The other NWS are concerned that to do so might prevent them from transiting the straits of Southeast Asia with their nuclear-armed submarines. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have similar concerns about the CANWFZ.

The fact that NWFZs do not require the immediate support of the NWS to enter-into-force has, however, been vital in their establishment. For example, it took ten years after entry-into-force of the South Pacific NWFZ for France, the UK and the US to sign its protocols. That all NWS eventually signed, is a positive example for other regions to follow and to proceed in establishing NWFZs even when there is a lack of support from the NWS.

The CANWFZ treaty was signed without support from NWS, and while this caused many states to abstain from the draft resolution L.54/Rev.1 regarding the CANWFZ, most states, including those that have experienced difficulty in establishing their own zones, argue the CANWFZ is valid and commendable.

All NWFZs have overcome obstacles to their establishment. One can hope that even where nuclear weapons currently exist, the international community’s desire for a world free from nuclear weapons will eventually prevail over any impediments.

-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will 
-Alyn Ware, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms 

Conventional Weapons

Statements made during the First Committee reflected a deep and continued effort by the international community to tackle the negative effects of conventional weapons. “The proliferation of conventional weapons is also a matter of increasing concern to the international community,” said the Republic of KoreaPakistan felt that the extreme focus on weapons of mass destruction and small arms and light weapons is diverting focus from conventional weapons, which they see as “becoming something of a blind spot of the international community.” Discussion focused on the failed 2006 UN Review Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons (see SALW report), the upcoming Review Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the draft resolution calling for a conventional Arms Trade Treaty (see ATT report), among others.

“Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons” (L.18)
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) enjoyed continued support this year. According to the Arms Control Association the 1980 convention “aims to protect military troops from inhumane injuries and prevent noncombatants from accidentally being wounded or killed by certain types of arms.” The European Union, China, Switzerland, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey made statements reaffirming the value of the CCW. On October 25, the resolution on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (A/C.1/61/L.18), which had roughly 45 co-sponsors, was adopted without a vote as it has been in years past. In discussing the CCW, governments focused on the upcoming CCW review conference to be held in Geneva in November 2006, the anticipated entry-into-force of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), the conclusion of the discussion on Mines Other than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), and the question of negotiating an international, legally binding instrument to address cluster munitions.

Ambassador Rivasseau of France, the President-designate of the CCW Review Conference, was the guest speaker during the second thematic debate on conventional weapons. He felt that the CCW has been a relatively successful regime which, because of its flexible mandate and the proximity of the humanitarian effects of conventional weapons on civilians, has somewhat escaped the disarmament crisis that other machinery has experienced.

With regard to the CCW review conference, Switzerland, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Austria, speaking on behalf of the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden, urged conclusion to the discussion on cluster munitions through the creation of a legally binding instrument. New Zealand proposed five key elements which needed to be addressed: the persistent nature of failed cluster munitions; the use of cluster munitions in areas populated by civilians; indiscriminate use that attack both combatants and civilians; the way these weapons kill civilians and destroy civilian objects; and the proliferation and retention of “outmoded” cluster munitions. Austria made clear that “this is not a proposal for a total ban on cluster munitions.” Denmark, too, voiced its support for the statements made on cluster munitions. During a side-event of the First Committee, Landmine Action launched “Foreseeable harm: The use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006”. This report by Thomas Nash details the consequences of Israel’s use of cluster munitions in Lebanon based on field research conducted September 6-11, 2006. Several states have already taken action to limit the grave humanitarian effects of cluster munitions. According to Arms Control Today, “Belgium has banned [cluster munitions], Norway has enacted a moratorium on use, and Germany has stopped procurement of new cluster munitions with plans to explore phasing existing systems out by 2015.”

Furthermore, the Republic of Korea, Israel, Canada, China, and Switzerland welcomed the coming entry-into-force of Protocol V on the Explosive Remnants of War. As the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuaki Tanaka stated, “the final success of this vital endeavour is now in states parties’ hands - in the ability to achieve further progress in the implementation of the convention and ensuring its compliance.” In the statement read by Finland, the European Union wished to see the universalization of Protocol V.

Reduction of Forces
There was some mention of the reduction of armed forces and military expenditures in conjunction with discussions on conventional weapons.  Pakistan placed special emphasis on the balanced reduction of forces and conventional armaments, noting that this should be “the prime objective of arms control” and citing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as an important example. Benin agreed, remarking that humankind must devote fewer resources to weapons. Russia noted its regret that the CFE Treaty's entrance-into-force has been delayed, and urged its partners to continue to move forward on this.

“Transparency in Armaments” (L.38)
The Netherlands introduced the draft resolution on Transparency in Armaments, which acknowledges the success of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as an international security and confidence-building measure. At various junctures during the First Committee, Switzerland, Argentina, the Holy See, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey spoke of the progress made with the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

New in the draft resolution is reference to the optional standardized reporting form adopted by the 2006 Group of Governmental Experts on the UN Register of Conventional Arms (GGE) and a request “to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2009 to review the continuing operation of the Register.”

The Chair of the GGE, during his address to the First Committee, recognized the relatively high level of participation by member states: 170 countries have participated in the arms register since its inception. The Republic of Korea and Indonesia noted with satisfaction the GGE's reduction of the minimum size of warships from 750 to 500 metric tons, which will increase the number of warships reported, while Israel and Japan applauded the 2003 GGE's inclusion of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) as a sub-category of Missiles within the Register.

Separate votes on Operative Paragraphs (OP) 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7b, and 9 of Transparency In Armaments were called. The resolution was adopted as a whole with 141 in favor, none opposed, and 23 abstentions, which is an increase of roughly 20 votes in favor and 2 abstentions from last year.

Syria, speaking on behalf of the Arab League (whose members abstained on the vote), stated that L.38 does not take into account the special situation in the Middle East. For any mechanism to succeed, Syria said, it should be balanced, transparent, non-discriminatory and strengthen the security of all. In its explanation of vote, Cuba stated its concern with the increased emphasis on small arms and light weapons without thought to including weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in the Register. These concerns were also registered during the vote on the resolution “Transparency in armaments” during the 2005 First Committee.

Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
Though there was no resolution focusing on MANPADS this year,  Israel, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Belarus highlighted the dangers of their proliferation and unauthorized use. Australia urged countries to continue progress on creating effective controls over the illicit transfer and unauthorized use of MANPADS.

“Information on Confidence-Building measures in Conventional Arms” (L.40)
 “Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms” (A/C.1/61/L.40), introduced by Argentina, was adopted without a vote as it was in 2004 and 2005. Whereas the 2005 resolution requests the establishment of such a database, the 2006 resolution welcomes the establishment of the electronic database and requests the Secretary-General keep the database updated.

“Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” (L.43)
“Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” (A/C.1/61/L.43) was adopted with the following results: 166 in favor (voting record indicates 165, though Spain stated immediately following the vote that it had intended to vote “yes”), 1 opposed (India), and 1 abstention (Bhutan). India and Bhutan also opposed and abstained, respectively, last year. After the vote was taken, India again explained its opposition, asserting that the threats to states often extend beyond regional boundaries. Furthermore, L.43 requests the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to consider principles for regional agreements on arms control, and India views the CD as a forum for international rather than regional agreements.

Final Thoughts
Resolution L.55 “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty” caused quite a stir on conventional weapons issues, and resolutions introduced again this year continued forward movement to control conventional weapons. As was aptly stated by some member states, nuclear weapons may cause mass-scale destruction and death; conventional weapons kill scores of civilians every day. The international community and individual member states should do whatever they can to standardize arms transfers and production and increase confidence-building and transparency measures in order to prevent the illicit access to and trade in these weapons.

-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War

Arms Trade Treaty

In a promising step forward, the First Committee adopted the resolution, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” (A/C.1/61/L. 55) on Thursday, October 26.  The number of co-sponsors of the text rose to an impressive 116 member states when Gambia, Azerbaijan, and San Marino were added just prior to the vote.

Formally introducing the resolution on Wednesday, October 18, the UK Ambassador John Duncan, speaking on behalf of the co-authors (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, and Kenya) said, “we believe that [efforts to establish an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)] must be a discussion that involves both consumers and producers and that the UN is the most suitable forum for the discussion.”

The voting results on the resolution as a whole were: 139 governments in favor, 1 opposed, and 24 abstentions. Particularly strong support was demonstrated from across Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Among the supporters are a few major and emerging exporters of weapons, including France, Germany, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and countries that have been devastated by armed violence such as Colombia, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, and Rwanda.

The Control Arms Campaign, which lobbied states in support of the resolution and organized two campaign actions during the First Committee, said right after the vote: “This massive vote to develop a global Arms Trade Treaty is an historic opportunity for governments to tackle the scourge of irresponsible arms transfers. Any credible Treaty must outlaw those transfers, which fuel the systematic murder, rape, torture and expulsion of thousands of people.”
 
While there was notable support from a few states in the Middle East and North Africa including Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Tunisia, most of the abstainers came from these two regions.  Several major arms exporting states such as China, Russia, and India also abstained from the resolution. The United States was the lone vote against the resolution.
On behalf of the EU, Finland highlighted the support for the effort earlier in the month when it said, “everyday, everywhere, people are affected by the side effects of irresponsible arms transfers. As there is currently no comprehensive internationally binding instrument available to provide an agreed regulator framework for this activity, the EU welcomes the growing support, in all parts of the world, for an ATT.”

During two open lunchtime meetings on the resolution, most of the concerns focused on procedural issues.  For example, several major arms exporting states and one Middle Eastern state said the creation of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was prescriptive in nature and the next steps should come after a UN Secretary-General’s report that collects the views of governments, as is the traditional practice.

The Control Arms Campaign said debate on the resolution was particularly strong among the Arab League.  Initially, some of their expressed concerns were about the inclusion of the word “transparency” in earlier draft versions of the resolution.  These concerns were allayed in later drafts of the resolution. Libya, on behalf of many Middle Eastern and North African states, also said that any effort on an ATT must be “non-selective” and “comprehensive”.

Responding to procedural concerns that were not resolved before the final draft of the resolution, the UK said the aim of the initiative is to start a discussion on the feasibility and draft parameters of an ATT and that those “agnostic” states will have a clear opportunity to engage in the process.  After the vote, Algeria indicated that the effort must receive broad-based support from states and be based on the principles of the UN Charter.

Before the resolution is formally adopted, it must be approved by the UN General Assembly. The final vote is expected in late November or early December, and it is likely that the resolution will pick up more supporters as several of the resolution’s co-sponsors were absent during the vote in the First Committee.

- Colby Goodman, Amnesty International

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Many states saw the First Committee as an opportunity to revive the UN SALW process after the failure to agree a substantive outcome document at the July 2006 United Nations Small Arms Review Conference (RevCon). Brazil said, “[t]he General Assembly should adopt a decision in order to ensure a proper framework for the continuous assessment of the implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA), as well as measures to strengthen it.”

In a statement to the committee, the RevCon President, Ambassador Kariyawasam of Sri Lanka, blamed its failure on various factors, including states' lack of confidence in the UN's ability to address disarmament issues; the unresolved issues of transfers to non-state actors and civilian possession of small arms; and an unreasonable interpretation of the consensus rule. At the First Committee, five of the six SALW resolutions required a vote, but all were overwhelmingly supported, with the United States as the lone opposition vote on any small arms resolution.

The annual “omnibus” resolution (A/C.1/61/L.15/Rev.1) on small arms was adopted with 172 votes in favor, 1 opposed (the US), and no abstentions. This resolution confirms a 2008 date for the next meeting of the UN small arms process, as stipulated in the PoA. The overwhelming support for this resolution completely justified the cosponsors’ decision to break consensus.

“Towards an Arms Trade Treaty” (A/C.1/61/L.55), one of the most high-profile and ultimately successful resolutions of the First Committee, was adopted with 139 votes in favor, 1 opposed (the US), and 24 abstentions. Although small arms are only one category of the conventional arms regulated by a future Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), their misuse is causing more devastation than any other weapons. This was recognized by Jamaica, which focused on small arms in its speech prior to the vote on the resolution.

“Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/C.1/61/L.26), which calls for a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2008 to “consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles,” was adopted with 164 votes in favor, 1 opposed (the US), and 1 abstention (Japan). A separate vote on OP7, which calls for the establishment of the GGE, was similarly successful with 163 votes in favor, 2 opposed (the US and Japan), and no abstentions. After the vote, Japan explained that they could not vote in favor as they were skeptical of the utility of the GGE at this time, and questioned the judgment of expanding the UN budget to accommodate it. However, many states support the development of a separate process on ammunition control, especially since ammunition has had an uncertain place within the existing SALW process. While it was included in the PoA, it was removed from the scope of the 2005 Tracing Instrument.

The “Transparency in Armaments” (A/C.1/61/L.38) resolution, adopted with 141 votes in favor, none opposed, and 23 abstentions, invites states to provide information on international transfers of SALW when they report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, as recommended by the 2006 GGE. This is an important step in promoting transparency, since existing international customs information does not provide reliable information on the quantities of small arms transferred, only the value.

Emphasizing the need for UN peacekeeping operations to engage in disarmament activities, the “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures” (A/C.1/61/L.37) resolution was adopted with 158 votes in favor, no abstentions, and 1 opposed (the US). This resolution also encourages states, including those donors comprising the Group of Interested States, to support international, regional, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their post-conflict disarmament efforts. Additionally, the “Assistance to States” (A/C.1/61/L.25) resolution, was adopted without a vote for the ninth year in a row. This resolution encourages cooperation between civil society and states, in particular on National Commissions on SALW, and calls upon the international community to provide financial and technical support to both states and civil society in their efforts to curb the illicit trade in SALW.

Both of these resolutions recognize the valuable contribution made by civil society, also emphasized by Nigeria, which commented on the “prominent role” of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the global network of NGOs working against gun violence, in its speech prior to the vote on the ATT resolution.

In her presentation to the First Committee, Rebecca Peters, Director of the IANSA, highlighted the devastating effects of the proliferation of SALW. Speaking of the murder of peace activist Dr. Vincent Makanju, a Nigerian IANSA member shot dead on 11 October, she underlined the important role the UN SALW process must play in preventing similar tragedies.

Two new SALW initiatives were outlined during the First Committee. Canada hosted an informal side event with states and NGOs to discuss a meeting on controlling international SALW transfers, to be hosted by Switzerland, June 18-22, 2007 in Geneva. Intended to be complementary to the formal UN SALW process, this meeting will “identify and/or refine global principles to govern the transfer of SALW throughout the world,” and will discuss further the principles proposed by government experts at an international meeting on transfer controls in Nairobi, April 2006.

The other initiative is being led by Switzerland, which intends to coordinate a core group of 10 states to follow-up the “Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development,” adopted at a Ministerial Summit in June 2006. The group will encourage states to join the declaration; promote research addressing the links between armed violence and development; and work with donor and recipient countries to integrate armed violence prevention into development programs.

The results of the First Committee are extremely promising, indicating the value of rejecting the distorted interpretation of consensus used to date during the UN Small Arms process. The PoA has been used as a starting point for states to reform policies and practices in combating the proliferation and misuse of SALW. The resolutions at First Committee have ensured that this process will continue and expand into some key areas where PoA commitments require further elaboration. Building on the achievements of this First Committee will ensure that progress at the UN will not fall behind regional and national progress.

There is still much work to be done, with up to 1,000 people killed at gunpoint every day. As the Secretary-General remarked in his opening statement to the 61st General Assembly, “[i]n far too many parts of the world – especially the developing world – people are still exposed to brutal conflicts, fought with small but deadly weapons.”
 
-Mark Marge, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

Landmines

The First Committee adopted “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/61/L.47/Rev.1) with 157 votes in favor, none opposed and 15 abstentions. Fewer governments addressed landmines during the 2006 First Committee general debate than in previous years. Most statements urged universalization of the Ottawa Convention on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty); reported on regional mine destruction and clearance; and called for continued financial assistance to mine-clearing operations and victim rehabilitation.

As President of September’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Australia recapped some of the achievements and challenges concerning the Mine Ban Treaty. At the meeting, states parties adopted a process to assist states in fulfilling their obligations to clear and destroy all known landmines. To date, 38 million mines have been destroyed and another ten million are scheduled to be destroyed, and seven of 52 states parties affected by landmines have cleared their mined areas. As the first disarmament treaty that addresses the needs of survivors, states parties to the Treaty discussed practical measures to assist survivors. Australia also said it has initiated a universalization strategy.

Mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM), such as anti-vehicle landmines, are not banned by the Mine Ban Treaty. States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) have been considering the issue, and it is one of three subjects the states parties to the CCW will focus on at its Review Conference in November.

After five years of discussions and preparatory work by the CCW's Group of Governmental Experts, progress on MOTAPM continues to gain momentum, albeit slowly. It remains unclear whether there is enough political will to reach an agreement to create a new legally binding instrument banning their use. The President-Designate of the CCW, Ambassador Rivasseau of France, called Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil's (Coordinator of the CCW's Working Group on MOTAPM) efforts to introduce a protocol on MOTAPM a “mission impossible”.

Pakistan also noted that differences remain in the areas of detectability, active life, recording and removal of minefields, and categorization of fuses and censors. India said that even on these contentious issues, “a balanced approach could accommodate national security imperatives, humanitarian requirements, financial costs and technological constraints.” Switzerland, echoed by