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The First Committee Monitor
Final Edition
In this issue:
- Introduction
- Nuclear Disarmament
- Disarmament Machinery
- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
- Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
- North Korea
- Negative Security Assurances
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
- Conventional Weapons
- Arms Trade Treaty
- Small Arms & Light Weapons
- Landmines
- Terrorism
- Disarmament & Development
- International Court of Justice
- Biological and Chemical Weapons
- Missiles
- Verification and Transparency
- Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Introduction
The 2006 First Committee made several major substantive contributions
to disarmament and non-proliferation. Most significantly, it
voted to begin a process moving “Towards an Arms Trade
Treaty” (L.55)
that would regulate trade in all conventional weapons—from
tanks to guns—for the first time. (See ATT
report) It also voted to continue the small arms and light
weapons (SALW) follow-up process, which the 2006 Review Conference
on the illicit trade in SALW was unable to do. (See SALW
report) The First Committee also voted to provide support
to the upcoming nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) review cycle, starting with a 2007 Preparatory
Committee meeting in Vienna from April 30-May 11. The First
Committee vote on the traditionally consensual Central Asian
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone resolution
gave the first comprehensive picture of where the world stands
since the controversial treaty was signed on September 8 of
this year. The First Committee also condemned the North Korean
nuclear test, in three different adopted resolutions, and in
statements from across the regional groupings.
Behind the scenes, governments consulted to prepare for the
2007 Conference on Disarmament
(CD) session. The annual report from the world’s sole
multilateral treaty negotiating body was adopted by the First
Committee without a vote, so the most interesting and significant
exchanges on the future of the CD happened during the thematic
debate on disarmament machinery. (See disarmament
machinery report)
The First Committee also made progress in process. Process continues
to be vital to disarmament and non-proliferation, as it significantly
affects substantive outcomes. There was a more cooperative and
optimistic spirit in the room this year, which, according to
the UN Institute for Disarmament
Research, helps negotiations. Governments also participated
more in the general and thematic debates, as well as the inter-active
informal sessions. States that are often quiet during the First
Committee spoke, and states were generally more willing to engage
in extemporaneous debate. A range of experts gave valuable presentations
to the First Committee, including the Chair of the Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission, Dr. Hans Blix, and the Chair
of a committee created by the First Committee. Non-governmental
organizations also addressed the Committee on nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation, and the Arms Trade Treaty. (See Introduction,
Week 3) Overall, thanks to the able and efficient Chair,
Ambassador Mona Juul, and the Committee’s cooperation,
procedures went remarkably smoothly, enabling substantive work
instead of impeding it, as it should be.
Unfortunately, there were several negative signals as well,
both in the Committee and in the backdrop of its meetings. North
Korea shocked the world when it conducted a nuclear test on
October 9, and possibly changed the disarmament and non-proliferation
regime. Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme broke
down, and the Security Council began considering sanctions.
The United States released its new space
policy on October 13, continued its sole opposition vote
to the annual “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”
resolution, and moved
to more unilateral positions on other First Committee issues.
(See Introduction, Week 4)
However, as Dr. Blix remarked, the challenges to the disarmament
and non-proliferation regime, though significant, are the exception.
The overwhelming majority of states agree on where to go and
on the first steps to get there. (See nuclear disarmament
report) As the international community prepares for the
2007 CD session and NPT Preparatory Committee, it should keep
this vast agreement, the cooperative spirit of the First Committee,
and the success of the conventional and SALW processes in mind.
Progress is far from impossible. Good faith is not created by
a few, let alone a single state; it is the responsibility of
the entire international community. We must continue inching
forward, reinforcing existing norms on disarmament and non-proliferation,
and negotiating new ones. We are the ones we have been waiting
for—it is time to just do it.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
Nuclear Disarmament
The best light in which to see the debate over nuclear disarmament
in this year’s First Committee debate and voting pattern
is that there still exists across a broad range of nations a
general sense of what an agenda leading to nuclear disarmament
should look like. That light dims considerably when that same
voting pattern shows that an extremely small number of countries
– most notably the United States – have such hardened
positions on certain key issues that true consensus is currently
impossible.
The three comprehensive nuclear disarmament resolutions this
report has been following most closely all session - the Japanese
draft on “Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/61/L.32),
the draft by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), and the Non-Aligned
Movement’s (NAM) text – all have at their hearts
the same agenda: concrete disarmament and non-proliferation
steps that in and of themselves reduce the risks posed by nuclear
weapons and cumulatively lead to the elimination of those weapons
as envisioned in Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
Problems arise because so many of the most important steps have
less than a handful of dedicated opponents: mention the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and you lose the US; mention the
NPT and you lose India, Pakistan and Israel; use “verification”
in conjunction with a Fissile
Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and you lose the US. Then
there are the ways to lose huge blocks of countries: do not
mention “verification” in conjunction with the FMCT
and lose the support of countries championing the ten-year old
Shannon
mandate; challenge hair-trigger alert and other aspects
of US nuclear doctrine (and by extension, NATO nuclear doctrine)
and lose the support of NATO and aligned countries. This last
issue is behind many of the objections to the Indian draft on
de-alerting “Reducing nuclear dangers" (L.49),
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”
(L.51),
“Conclusion of effective international arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons” (L.45),
and the NAM draft on “Nuclear
Disarmament”.
The US has placed itself in the tiniest of minorities on most
disarmament resolutions. (See PAROS, NSA
and SALW reports) The focus here is on the
US minority votes on the Japanese and New Agenda drafts.
The Japanese-sponsored “Renewed Determination” resolution
(L.32)
was adopted
with 169 in favor to 3 opposed (the US, North Korea, and India),
with 8 abstentions. The US
said, “Of all the resolutions introduced on nuclear disarmament
[this is] the most balanced and realistic,” noting the
draft’s recognition of the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty, its call for negotiations on
the FMCT and the condemnation of the North Korean nuclear test.
The US nonetheless voted against it because of the endorsement
of the CTBT.
In 2005, only the US and India voted no. Besides North Korea
joining the minority, Iran also shifted from a positive vote
to an abstention. The Iranian
delegate said this was because the text was “not appropriately
balanced,” noting that the resolution only focuses on
the FMCT as an item on the agenda of the Conference
on Disarmament. Furthermore, Iran
noted, the reference to the FMCT is “not consistent with
the previous agreements” on the verifiability of a treaty.
The other six abstainers were Bhutan, China, Cuba, Egypt, Israel,
and Myanmar. Egypt criticized the text for not fully reflecting
the consensus commitment made in the 13 Practical Steps at the
2000 NPT Review Conference.
The New Agenda Coalition resolution (A/C.1/61/L.13/Rev.2),
“Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the
implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” was
adopted
with 148 in favor to 7 opposed, with 12 abstentions. This shows
a slight improvement with countries shifting from abstentions
to voting yes. The UK, US, France, India and Israel voted no
in 2005; they were joined by North Korea and Pakistan this year.
Speaking on behalf of the UK,
US and France, the UK representative said the draft “takes
account neither of the concrete progress nor the concrete efforts
underway by the three countries” in fulfilling their Article
VI obligations, nor mentions their willingness to negotiate
an FMCT.
The NAM’s draft on “Nuclear disarmament” (L.39)
was adopted
105 votes in favor to 45 opposed, with 6 abstentions. This represents
a slight improvement over last year's essentially the identical
resolution, yet it remains the most divisive of the omnibus
nuclear disarmament resolutions. Because it contains such a
sweeping list of recommendations, there is something to offend
many countries: it calls for negotiations on a verifiable FMCT;
for the entry-into-force of the CTBT; for legal instruments
“on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon
States” and for “a joint undertaking not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons”; for de-alerting and a diminished
“role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines”;
and for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc
committee on nuclear disarmament next year.
The US, UK and France opposed, Russia abstained, and China voted
in favor of L.39. India and Pakistan
abstained, citing the references to the NPT. NATO countries
and the former Soviet republics voted no or abstained. The New
Agenda countries split, with the two European countries in the
coalition (Ireland and Sweden) abstaining, while the others
voted yes. Japan,
which abstained, said the resolution “lacked certain elements,”
an oblique reference to the failure of the draft to include
recognition of what states consider positive elements, such
as the reduction of strategic arms by the US and Russia.
In one of the last votes of this year’s session, the draft
on the 2010 NPT Review Conference and its preparatory committee
(L.21/Rev.
1) was adopted 163 to zero with the three usual abstentions
– India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea did not vote.
Weeks of negotiations between the US and EU resulted in the
decision to hold the first session of the preparatory committee
(April 30 to May 11) in Vienna. There was no drama nor debate
over this essentially technical resolution. The drama and debate
will start next year when delegates take the lessons learned
to Vienna and try to find the common ground that alluded them
this month.
-Jim Wurst, Middle
Powers Initiative
Disarmament
Machinery
Even though most states expressed disappointment in the failures
of the disarmament machinery, the First Committee still had
a sense of hope for the future. States had concrete suggestions
to implement their hopes for: the Conference
on Disarmament (CD); the Disarmament
Commission (DC); the First
Committee; and revitalizing the disarmament machinery overall.
In debates on disarmament machinery, states disagreed whether
the current impasse was a result of the machinery or lack of
political will from member states. Dr.
Patricia Lewis, Director of United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
was of the opinion that the disarmament community needs an “all-weather
machine” that would allow work to continue even in times
of disagreement. Pakistan
believed the disarmament machinery was adequate and had huge
potential for producing optimum results, while Canada
pointed out that “[s]ometimes it is the machinery that
is not responding properly, and in these cases, a proper tune-up
can help get it going again.”
Conference on Disarmament
(CD)
Despite having no programme of work, substantive progress was
made in the 2006 CD session. Coordination among the six rotating
presidents (known as the P6 initiative) resulted in structured,
focused debates on all agenda items. The six presidents submitted
a non-paper called “The
P6 vision non-paper,” to serve as food for thought.
This non-paper contains a snapshot of where the CD stands on
a programme of work, and elaborates suggestions for moving forward.
Both Switzerland and South Africa, two of the presidents of
next year's session, supported coordination among the 2007 presidents.
South
Africa, who will serve as the first president of 2007, held
consultations with states during the First Committee to determine
how to break the impasse on a programme of work in the CD.
South Africa also stated that the CD might not need a programme
of work, but rather “a programme that works.” Ambassador
Zdzislaw Rapacki from Poland,
the first 2006 President, suggested that the 2007 CD should
establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate issues that are ripe,
along with a “schedule of activities” for substantive
discussions on all other issues on the CD agenda.
The six presidents of 2006 together tabled the draft resolution
on the annual CD report (A/C.1/61/L.29).
The resolution takes note of the increased deliberation of the
Conference, the structured debates, the cooperation among all
six Presidents of the Conference, and welcomes the decision
of the Conference to request its current President and the incoming
President to conduct consultations during the inter-sessional
period. The resolution was adopted without a vote on October
25.
Disarmament Commission (DC)
The 2006 DC agreed on an agenda, which it had not been able
to do since 2003, and created working groups on nuclear disarmament
and confidence-building measures in conventional weapons. However,
the working groups were unable to agree on a working paper or
any recommendations. In the plenary meetings, the DC discussed
improving the effectiveness of its work, and agreed on recommendations,
including electing the chair and bureau at least three months
before the session begins. The Chair of the 2006 session, South
Korean Ambassador Oh, said that this progress was modest,
but with such an abundance of failure, even modest progress
was welcome.
South Korea submitted the draft resolution “Report of
the Disarmament Commission” (A/C.1/61/L.11),
which decides to adopt the measures to improve the effectiveness
of the Commission’s methods of work, reaffirms the importance
of enhancing dialogue with the First Committee and the CD, and
requests the DC to meet again to consider the same agenda from
April 9-27, 2007.
The resolution was adopted without a vote on October 25. However,
the United States (US) decided to not participate in the vote.
It did not explain why, but in its final
statement of the 2006 DC session, it questioned whether
the Commission had “finally outlived its usefulness.”
During the 2006 DC session, Cuba implied that the US had proposed
eliminating the DC in the mandate review process then taking
place.
First Committee
Governments discussed First Committee reform less this year
than in years past, and no one submitted a resolution on reform.
While most governments have simply supported implementing previous
years’ resolutions on improving the First Committee’s
working methods, some made further suggestions. The Chair and
the Norwegian
delegation highlighted specific reforms for priority implementation,
such as having fewer resolutions and better follow-up to the
adopted resolutions. Norway
also complimented the value of the NGO participation this year,
and was convinced the debates would benefit from even more contributions
by civil society. Sierra
Leone called for more debates and more interactive exchange
among delegates in the First Committee, as well as interaction
with other committees, particularly the Third Committee. The
United States said that member states should oppose efforts
to convene Groups of Governmental Experts when other groups
on the same topic had not been able to agree on any outcome.
The US also said the revitalization of the First Committee remained
incomplete, and called on the General Assembly to formally adopt
the thematic clusters.
Other Disarmament Machinery
There have been various calls for possibilities to overcome
the impasse in disarmament. Sierra Leone tabled a new draft
resolution entitled “Declaration of the Fourth Disarmament
Decade” (A/C.1/61/L.17),
to mobilize more intensive global efforts to reverse the current
trend in the field of disarmament. The resolution was adopted
by 116 votes in favour, one against (the US) and 51 abstentions.
The Non-Aligned Movement submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/61/L.4)
to convene an open-ended working group to discuss a fourth special
session on disarmament. The resolution was adopted
by 166 votes in favour, one against (the US) and no abstaining.
Indonesia
pointed out that the same resolution was adopted in 2004 (59/71)
by consensus and that member states had the responsibility to
fulfil the mandate entrusted to them by the General Assembly.
The US did not explain its vote.
The First Committee adopted the following draft resolutions
on other parts of the disarmament machinery without a vote:
“United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament”
(A/C.1/61/L.9);
“United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory
services” (A/C.1/61/L.12);
“Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development
in Latin America and the Caribbean” (A/C.1/61/L.14);
“United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Africa” (A/C.1/61/L.24);
and “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Asia and the Pacific” (A/C.1/61/L.28).
- Beatrice Fihn, Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom
Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space
For outer space issues, the First Committee’s 61st session
was essentially an echo of the 60th. While there was overwhelming
consensus on the need to preserve outer space for peaceful and
cooperative uses, there were also major polarized divergences
on the method and scope of this preservation.
The majority of states recognize that the key threat to preserving
outer space is the likelihood of its weaponization and a subsequent
arms race. These states perceive the prospect of weapons in
space as destabilizing for disarmament, non-proliferation, and
international security, and agree that prevention is less costly
than remedy.
As they did last year, several states called for further substantive
debate and negotiations on a comprehensive, legally-binding
PAROS treaty in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) and for the reestablishment of a PAROS
Ad Hoc Committee. Many states also called for space-capable
states to guarantee transparency in their outer space activities
and to engage in confidence-building measures. Others called
for the strengthening and universalization of the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, and for enhanced dialogue between the
Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.
Both space-related draft resolutions were adopted with an overwhelming
majority. “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”
(A/C.1/61/L.10/Rev.1)
and “Transparency and confidence-building measures in
outer space activities” (A/C.1/61/L.36)
were opposed only by the United States (US), while Israel abstained
from both.
Once again, the US refused to acknowledge the prospect of an
arms race in outer space. The US
National Space Policy provides the backdrop for their First
Committee position. The Policy, released in October this year,
opposes “the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or
use of space,” and declares the US’ intentions to
“dissuade or deter others from impeding [its right to
operate in space] . . . and deny, if necessary, adversaries
the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.”
Research from space security experts, and documents such as
Space
Security 2006 from Spacesecurity.org and Weapons
of Terror from the Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, were presented in
various parallel events this session. The research indicates
the key problem that will arise from ignoring the need for new
legal regimes and approaches to preventing the weaponization
of outer space. The WMD Commission argues that while “there
are already a number of international treaties and instruments
regulating space activities . . . they do not cover the challenges
posed by space-based weapons or ballistic missile defence. In
particular, although some agreements prohibit or restrict the
deployment of weapons or use of force in outer space, the provisions
are limited in scope and coverage. Moreover, none of the existing
legal instruments unequivocally prevents the testing, deployment
and use of weapons – other than nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons – in outer space.”
Research also suggests that space security is threatened not
only by the development and deployment of dedicated space based
weapons, but by the mismanagement of any aspect of outer space.
Scott Lofquist-Morgan, a researcher for Spacesecurity.org
and the Canadian Centre
for Treaty Compliance, explained in an event co-sponsored
by Canada, Spacesecurity.org, and Project
Ploughshares that other threats to space security include
space debris; a growing need for orbital slots and radio frequencies;
proliferation of capabilities to attack ground stations and
communications links; and increased ground-based capabilities
to attack satellites.
China has called outer space “the commonwealth of humankind.”
Garrett
Hardin, renowned for his work on the “tragedy of the
commons,” said, “ruin is the destination toward
which all men [sic] rush, each pursuing his own best interest
in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom
in a commons brings ruin to all.”
Protecting all states’ access to outer space for peaceful
uses means preventing the weaponization of outer space. The
European
Union declared that PAROS “is an essential condition
for strengthening strategic stability and for . . . the free
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes by
all states.” The First Committee will have the chance
again next year to initiate this kind of preventative diplomacy;
hopefully it will not simply echo this year’s stalemate.
-Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Fissile
Materials Cut-Off Treaty
It is now more than ten years after the UN General Assembly
agreed by consensus on a negotiating mandate (GA/48/75L)
for a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for
use in weapons. Recent developments had led to renewed optimism
on the part of many states who believe the time is ripe the
commencement of such negotiations in the deadlocked Conference
on Disarmament (CD). Yet, the outcome of the current session
of the First Committee revealed that several long-standing disagreements
still exist, and that the CD will face serious challenges if
it is to finally take up this task.
In May, the United States introduced a draft Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and negotiating
mandate to the CD. Consistent with the US
position first expressed in 2005, that “so-called
'effective verification' of an FMCT cannot be achieved,”
the US draft text contains no verification provisions, and the
mandate makes no reference to verification. In the First Committee's
thematic debate, except for the US, all states that spoke on
the issue of an FMCT supported a verified treaty. There was
disagreement on whether the US mandate provides a suitable basis
for negotiation. Western states, notably Canada, the European
Union (EU), and Australia,
expressed their belief that the proposed mandate does not preclude
verification from coming up in the context of negotiations.
Many non-aligned states insist upon a verified treaty, in addition
to an FMCT that addresses the issue of existing stocks.
At a non-governmental organization event sponsored by the International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
(INESAP) and the International
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Princeton physicist Frank
von Hippel expressed skepticism about the US position on verification.
In his presentation, Professor von Hippel described how such
a treaty could be verified, regardless of the scope of the final
treaty and whether it covers existing stocks. In response to
government acclaim and interest in the project, Professor von
Hippel said his group would undertake to develop a draft verification
protocol by early 2007. A full discussion on the verification
measures envisaged by the IPFM can be found in its 2006 Fissile
Material Report, available at http://www.fissilematerials.org/.
The US negotiating mandate also breaks with the popular Five
Ambassadors' Proposal (A5) for a programme of work in the
CD by dealing only with the topic of the FMCT. Many Western
and developed states, including the EU, Canada, Japan,
and the Republic
of Korea believe that the FMCT is the only CD agenda item
ripe for negotiation, and thus expressed support for proceeding
on the basis of the U.S. draft mandate. Again, many non-aligned
states, notably Pakistan,
disagreed on this point and continue to insist that the CD should
commence on the programme of work proposed by the A5, noting
that progress on all four agenda items could happen at different
paces.
Firmly believing that “[t]he time to act [on the FMCT]
is now,” Canada tabled draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.23
entitled, “Prohibition of the production of fissile materials
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
The simple resolution urged the CD “to commence immediately
negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials
for nuclear weapons.” Notably, the resolution did not
reflect the 1995 Shannon
mandate, which is “to negotiate a non-discriminatory,
multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty” on the understanding delegates would not be precluded
from raising issues relating to existing stocks. Canada’s
resolution contained no reference to the negotiation of a verified
FMCT, nor reference to existing stockpiles, consistent with
the US draft mandate.
Citing the lack of consensus over the self-described “minimalist
approach” taken by the draft text, Canada
ultimately withdrew its resolution in the belief that a resolution
passed without consensus would not send the right message to
the CD. Citing the progress made in CD this year, Canada vigorously
defended its resolution, believing that it would have been appropriate
for the First Committee to make a contribution as well. While
the fate of this resolution has no direct bearing on the procedures
of the CD, it failure suggests that states will have to struggle
to bridge these differences to commence negotiations when the
CD reconvenes in 2007.
-Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
North Korea
The October 9 nuclear test of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a major challenge to the nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The test is the first
since the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, breaking the global
moratorium on nuclear testing. More importantly, it is the first
time a non-nuclear weapon state party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) has left the treaty and conducted a nuclear
explosion. On October 9, the DPRK
referred to the disarmament conventions as “good-for-nothing
dead documents without any binding force, the main factor for
plunging the world into a nuclear arms race.”
The DPRK blamed the perceived US threat to its sovereignty for
its nuclear test. Ambassador Kim Kwang Il said, “The US
extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel
the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process of
bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for
defense.” The Six-Party Talks, initially intended to resolve
the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula, broke down in
2005 after the US imposed financial sanctions against the DPRK
for alleged involvement in money laundering and counterfeiting.
Across the political spectrum, the First Committee urged a return
to diplomacy, and called for the DPRK to comply with its disarmament
obligations. Many delegations renewed calls for the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be brought into force. The Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), of which DPRK is a member, urged restraint and
a resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Japan argued that the test
“is not only in violation of Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
and the Joint Statement by the Six Party Talks, but also disregarding
the spirit of UN Security Council [SC] resolution 1695 and the
Presidential Statement of the Security Council dated October
7th this year.” The European
Union also affirmed that the test violated SC 1695 and the
December 1991 North-South De-nuclearization Declaration. The
DPRK
acknowledged its commitments to the Joint Statement, but it
did not mention SC 1695, the 1991 Declaration, or the Japan-DPRK
Pyongyang Declaration.
The SC unanimously approved resolution 1718
on Saturday, 14 October, imposing weapons and financial sanctions.
The resolution forbids the export or import of material that
could be used for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.
It restricted funds and travel of anyone judged by a newly constituted
SC committee to be related to the DPRK weapons or missile programs.
The resolution also reinforces the importance of the NPT by
underlining “the need for all States Parties to the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply
with their Treaty obligations.” It did not authorize use
of force.
Three resolutions before the First Committee specifically condemned
the DPRK nuclear test. 169 countries voted in favor of Japanese-sponsored
“Renewed determination towards the total elimination of
nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/61/L.32).
Only the DPRK, the US, and India voted against. The resolution
on the CTBT (A/C.1/61/L.48)
was adopted with 175 in favor, two opposed (US and DPRK) and
4 abstentions. The New Agenda Coalition resolution, “Towards
a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation
of nuclear disarmament commitments” (A/C.1/61/L.13/Rev.2),
condemns all nuclear testing and “urges the [DPRK] to
rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty.” The
UK, US, DPRK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan voted against
L.13/Rev.2.
On Tuesday, 31 October 2006, China announced that Six-Party
Talks would resume, perhaps as early as November. According
to the New York Times, the talks, which still aim to de-nuclearize
the peninsula, would focus on the September 2005 accord. The
DPRK’s Foreign Ministry stressed that it is returning
to the talks “on the premise that the issue of lifting
financial sanctions will be discussed and settled between the
(North Korea) and the U.S. within the framework of the six-party
talks,” as reported in Bloomberg news. Substantive issues
remain to be surmounted in the Six-Party Talks. However, the
widespread calls for diplomacy and the condemnation of the nuclear
test prove that the international community believes a robust
disarmament regime is possible.
-Neal Sandin, Middle Powers
Initiative
Negative
Security Assurances
In the First Committee, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was the
most vocal in insisting upon legally binding negative security
assurances (NSAs) for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). During
the general debate, the NAM
repeatedly called for a legally-binding treaty on NSAs.
China,
the only nuclear weapon state recognized under the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) that has made an unconditional assurance not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons against NNWS or nuclear
weapons free zones (NWFZs) at any time or under any circumstances,
reiterated its support for a NSA treaty during the First Committee
general debate.
In their military doctrines, the United States and France have
declared that they maintain the option of using nuclear weapons
as retaliation against an attack with weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical or biological weapons. Reiterating civil
society's support for a legally-binding treaty on NSAs, Ms.
Merav Datan of Greenpeace International explained to the
First Committee that “[n]uclear weapons are not a legitimate
or proportionate response to either terrorism or the use of
chemical and biological weapons.”
Russia, the US and Israel did not mention NSAs during the First
Committee's debate.
The European
Union (EU), which includes two nuclear weapon states, the
United Kingdom and France, supported “pursuing consideration
of the issue of security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon
States Parties to the NPT.”
India,
a nuclear-weapon possessing member of NAM, reiterated its nuclear
doctrine of non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS.
Pakistan
introduced the annual draft resolution (A/C.1/61/L.45)
calling for a legally-binding instrument for NSAs. The annual
resolution has traditionally been adopted with large numbers
of abstentions, primarily from North
Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, but without any
votes against it.
The United States (US) opposed the resolution for the first
time this year. In their explanation of this sole vote against,
they declared that they continue to oppose any proposal for
an NSA treaty, or other global, legally binding security assurances
regime. The US
has made this explanation before, when they abstained, and they
did not give any explanation as to why they changed to voting
against.
The resolution was adopted
with 108 votes in favor, one vote against, and 57 abstentions.
NSAs is still one of the four core issues on the agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament, and most states believe it should
be negotiated there. Hopefully the US vote against the resolution
is not a signal that they will oppose considering NSAs in the
2007 session.
The international community is also preparing for another NPT
review cycle. Giving legally-binding negative security assurances
to non-nuclear states parties in compliance with the NPT would
certainly be a significant incentive to remain a party to the
treaty in good standing. It would also remove a major NNWS point
of contention and bolster confidence at a time when the treaty
regime desperately needs it.
- Beatrice Fihn, Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
During this session of the First Committee, an overwhelming
majority of states voiced support for the early entry-into-force
of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) to prevent nuclear testing. Originally opened
for signature in 1996, this year marks the 10th anniversary
of the CTBT. Many states agreed it is time for the ten remaining
Annex II states to ratify the treaty. The 44 states identified
in Annex II of the CTBT have significant nuclear programmes,
so their ratifications are necessary for the treaty to enter-into-force.
China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United
States have not yet ratified the treaty.
Entry-into-force became a major issue in the First Committee
this year when the DPRK proclaimed it successfully conducted
a nuclear test. The incident was met with multilateral condemnation
from the Republic
of Korea, the US, the Russian
Federation, the EU,
Japan,
India,
Pakistan,
Israel,
Mexico,
Canada,
New Zealand, Australia,
the Netherlands,
Norway,
Indonesia,
Bangladesh,
and Brazil.
Canada
asserted, the "announcement by the DPRK underlines the necessity
of a universal, legally-binding and permanent international
ban on all nuclear test explosions." The delegation added that
the moratorium on nuclear testing is good, but "[t]here are
no substitutes for a legally binding compact."
In an effort to expedite the entry-into-force of the CTBT, Australia
introduced "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" (A/C.1/61/L.48/Rev.1),
co-sponsored by 44 other states. The vast majority of states
voted in support of the resolution, and the First Committee
adopted
it with 175 in favor, two opposed (North Korea and the US) and
four abstentions (Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syrian Arab Republic).
Regarding its opposition, the US
explained, "[w]e cannot support a resolution supporting the
CTBT." The US also voted against "Renewed Determination towards
the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" (A/C.1/61/L.32)
due to its support of the CTBT. "Nevertheless," the US delegate
declared, "I would like to note our support for the position
expressed in Operative Paragraph 5 (A/C.1/61/L.48/Rev.1),
which condemns the DPRK's nuclear test and demands that the
DPRK do [sic] not conduct further tests."
Although strongly opposed to a nuclear test in North Korea,
the US failed to mention its own sub-critical nuclear weapons
testing at its Nevada Test Site, the last one of which was in
August 2006. According to the 2002 Nuclear
Posture Review, these tests are necessary “to assure
the safety and reliability” of the US’s nuclear
weapons (p.55). Due to the policies in the Nuclear Posture Review,
Iran accused the US of causing a “serious setback”
to the entry-into-force of the CTBT. However, Iran is also an
Annex II state that has not yet ratified the Treaty.
Despite the actions of the US and the test by North Korea, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) noted the
“significant progress” the CTBT has made over the
last year by attaining 10 new signatories. The CTBT also gained
an important ratification from Viet Nam, the most recent Annex
II state to complete this process. Three other Annex II states,
Indonesia, Colombia and Venezuela, also made statements in the
First Committee supporting the CTBT, despite prolonged delays
in their ratification.
The CTBT verification regime has also had significant accomplishments.
The International Monitoring System (IMS) is nearly complete
and successfully detected the test in North Korea. Currently
comprised of 189 of its intended 321 stations, the IMS is designed
to detect signs of a nuclear blast from any corner of the earth;
it also has useful civil applications, such as the early detection
of tsunamis and volcanic eruptions.
Many consider the CTBT to be a vital step in the effort to rid
the world of nuclear weapons. In his presentation to the First
Committee on October 16, Dr.
Hans Blix stressed, "[n]o measure could be more urgent,
important in substance and as a signal that arms control and
disarmament are again on the world agenda than the signature
and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
by states which have not yet done so.”
However, the US and North Korea have made it clear they oppose
ratifying the CTBT. Additionally, other needed Annex II states,
such as India and Syria, have remained cold to the CTBT due
to concerns that it is unfair. Despite this, the international
community should continue to push for the ratification of the
CTBT. The North Korea's test shows that a moratorium on nuclear
testing is not sufficient, and the entry-into-force of the CTBT
is needed to turn the moratorium into international law.
-Jennifer Leigh Schwerer, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones
Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) featured prominently in discussion
at this year’s First Committee. The Central Asian NWFZ
was established just before session began (see CANWFZ
report), provoking discussion about possibilities for future
NWFZs and about the procedures used to establish them. There
are now seven regional and single state NWFZs, and 113 states
are members of such zones. NWFZs have a growing appeal in the
current international political context. Their potential to
increase regional security, strengthen norms and controls against
nuclear weapons, constrain the nuclear weapon states (NWS),
and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world
is unmatched by most other disarmament measures.
Kazakhstan
emphasized the contributions of NWFZs to promoting the principles
and objectives of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards agreement and additional protocol.
Kazakhstan also contended that NWFZs are important confidence-building
measures for enhancing regional cooperation and stability.
Many states and regions are interested in the prospect of establishing
more NWFZs. During the general debate, Belarus
renewed its proposal for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe,
which could include a number of non-contiguous European countries
that are committed not to acquire or station nuclear weapons
on their territories.
A number of governments, including Algeria, Bangladesh,
Turkey,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Viet
Nam, and the Non-Aligned
Movement, called for action on the proposal to make the
Middle East a NWFZ or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Iraq,
Pakistan,
Kuwait, Qatar,
and the UAE believe that a nuclear weapon or WMD free zone in
the Middle East would increase security in the region. The UAE
argued, “international conditions require a NWFZ in the
Middle East, [as it would] alleviate tensions and instability,
renew dialogue and the peace process” over the occupation
of the Palestinian territories. Iraq highlighted the need for
treaties, guarantees, and assurances, and emphasized that a
Middle Eastern NWFZ would offer all three to the international
community and to the region.
However, during the non-governmental organization presentations,
Merav
Datan from Greenpeace International pointed out, “the
deadlocked positions regarding a WMD Free Zone in the Middle
East are as well known as they are entrenched.” Israel
pinpointed Iran’s nuclear programme as the source of instability
in the Middle East, describing it as one of the key threats
to regional and international peace and security. While some
other Middle Eastern states, such as the UAE, recognized the
problem of Iran “pursuing nuclear energy outside the IAEA,”
most viewed Israel as the main impediment to a peaceful Middle
East free from WMD.
While Israel
did join consensus in adopting the draft resolution L.1,
“Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East,” it emphasized that the process towards
a Middle Eastern NWFZ cannot begin when some parties maintain
a state of war and refuse to acknowledge the existence of other
parties in the region. Meanwhile, the draft resolution L.2,
“The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,”
was rejected by Israel
as being biased, unbalanced, and unfair towards Israel.
Viet
Nam indicated NWFZs also struggle to convince the nuclear
weapon states (NWS) to respect the protocols that restrict NWS
from threatening to use or using nuclear weapons against member
states or deploying nuclear weapons in the zone. Some NWS have
either been reluctant to endorse these protocols, or have attached
reservations to them in order to protect their nuclear deployment
policies. The NWS have made such undertakings with respect to
some zones (Latin America, South Pacific and Africa) but not
all NWS have committed to negative security assurances to other
zones (South East Asia and Central Asia). Only China has signed
the protocols to the Southeast Asia NWFZ. The other NWS are
concerned that to do so might prevent them from transiting the
straits of Southeast Asia with their nuclear-armed submarines.
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have similar
concerns about the CANWFZ.
The fact that NWFZs do not require the immediate support of
the NWS to enter-into-force has, however, been vital in their
establishment. For example, it took ten years after entry-into-force
of the South Pacific NWFZ for France, the UK and the US to sign
its protocols. That all NWS eventually signed, is a positive
example for other regions to follow and to proceed in establishing
NWFZs even when there is a lack of support from the NWS.
The CANWFZ treaty was signed without support from NWS, and while
this caused many states to abstain from the draft resolution
L.54/Rev.1
regarding the CANWFZ, most states, including those that have
experienced difficulty in establishing their own zones, argue
the CANWFZ is valid and commendable.
All NWFZs have overcome obstacles to their establishment. One
can hope that even where nuclear weapons currently exist, the
international community’s desire for a world free from
nuclear weapons will eventually prevail over any impediments.
-Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
-Alyn Ware, International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
Conventional
Weapons
Statements made during the First Committee reflected a deep
and continued effort by the international community to tackle
the negative effects of conventional weapons. “The proliferation
of conventional weapons is also a matter of increasing concern
to the international community,” said the Republic
of Korea. Pakistan
felt that the extreme focus on weapons of mass destruction and
small arms and light weapons is diverting focus from conventional
weapons, which they see as “becoming something of a blind
spot of the international community.” Discussion focused
on the failed 2006 UN Review Conference on Small Arms and Light
Weapons (see SALW report), the upcoming Review Conference on
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the draft
resolution calling for a conventional Arms Trade Treaty (see
ATT report), among others.
“Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons” (L.18)
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) enjoyed
continued support this year. According to the Arms
Control Association the 1980 convention “aims to protect
military troops from inhumane injuries and prevent noncombatants
from accidentally being wounded or killed by certain types of
arms.” The European
Union, China,
Switzerland,
New
Zealand, Canada,
Japan,
the Republic
of Korea, Russia,
South
Africa, and Turkey
made statements reaffirming the value of the CCW. On October
25, the resolution on the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (A/C.1/61/L.18),
which had roughly 45 co-sponsors, was adopted without a vote
as it has been in years past. In discussing the CCW, governments
focused on the upcoming CCW review conference to be held in
Geneva in November 2006, the anticipated entry-into-force of
Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), the conclusion
of the discussion on Mines Other than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM),
and the question of negotiating an international, legally binding
instrument to address cluster munitions.
Ambassador Rivasseau of France, the President-designate of the
CCW Review Conference, was the guest speaker during the second
thematic debate on conventional weapons. He felt that the CCW
has been a relatively successful regime which, because of its
flexible mandate and the proximity of the humanitarian effects
of conventional weapons on civilians, has somewhat escaped the
disarmament crisis that other machinery has experienced.
With regard to the CCW review conference, Switzerland,
New
Zealand, Norway, the Republic
of Korea and Austria,
speaking on behalf of the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
and Sweden, urged conclusion to the discussion on cluster munitions
through the creation of a legally binding instrument. New Zealand
proposed five key elements which needed to be addressed: the
persistent nature of failed cluster munitions; the use of cluster
munitions in areas populated by civilians; indiscriminate use
that attack both combatants and civilians; the way these weapons
kill civilians and destroy civilian objects; and the proliferation
and retention of “outmoded” cluster munitions. Austria
made clear that “this is not a proposal for a total ban
on cluster munitions.” Denmark, too, voiced its support
for the statements made on cluster munitions. During a side-event
of the First Committee, Landmine
Action launched “Foreseeable
harm: The use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006”.
This report by Thomas Nash details the consequences of Israel’s
use of cluster munitions in Lebanon based on field research
conducted September 6-11, 2006. Several states have already
taken action to limit the grave humanitarian effects of cluster
munitions. According to Arms
Control Today, “Belgium has banned [cluster munitions],
Norway has enacted a moratorium on use, and Germany has stopped
procurement of new cluster munitions with plans to explore phasing
existing systems out by 2015.”
Furthermore, the Republic
of Korea, Israel,
Canada,
China, and Switzerland
welcomed the coming entry-into-force of Protocol V on the Explosive
Remnants of War. As the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament
Affairs Nobuaki
Tanaka stated, “the final success of this vital endeavour
is now in states parties’ hands - in the ability to achieve
further progress in the implementation of the convention and
ensuring its compliance.” In the statement read by Finland,
the European
Union wished to see the universalization of Protocol V.
Reduction of Forces
There was some mention of the reduction of armed forces and
military expenditures in conjunction with discussions on conventional
weapons. Pakistan
placed special emphasis on the balanced reduction of forces
and conventional armaments, noting that this should be “the
prime objective of arms control” and citing the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as an important example. Benin
agreed, remarking that humankind must devote fewer resources
to weapons. Russia
noted its regret that the CFE Treaty's entrance-into-force has
been delayed, and urged its partners to continue to move forward
on this.
“Transparency in Armaments”
(L.38)
The Netherlands introduced the draft resolution on Transparency
in Armaments, which acknowledges the success of the United
Nations Register of Conventional Arms as an international
security and confidence-building measure. At various junctures
during the First Committee, Switzerland,
Argentina,
the Holy
See, the Republic
of Korea, and Turkey
spoke of the progress made with the UN Register of Conventional
Arms.
New in the draft resolution is reference to the optional standardized
reporting form adopted by the 2006 Group of Governmental Experts
on the UN Register of Conventional Arms (GGE) and a request
“to ensure that sufficient resources are made available
for a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2009 to
review the continuing operation of the Register.”
The Chair of the GGE, during his address to the First Committee,
recognized the relatively high level of participation by member
states: 170 countries have participated in the arms register
since its inception. The Republic
of Korea and Indonesia
noted with satisfaction the GGE's reduction of the minimum size
of warships from 750 to 500 metric tons, which will increase
the number of warships reported, while Israel
and Japan
applauded the 2003 GGE's inclusion of Man-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) as a sub-category of Missiles within the Register.
Separate votes on Operative Paragraphs (OP) 2,
3,
4,
5,
6,
7b,
and 9
of Transparency In Armaments were called. The resolution was
adopted
as a whole with 141 in favor, none opposed, and 23 abstentions,
which is an increase of roughly 20 votes in favor and 2 abstentions
from last year.
Syria, speaking on behalf of the Arab League (whose members
abstained on the vote), stated that L.38 does not take into
account the special situation in the Middle East. For any mechanism
to succeed, Syria said, it should be balanced, transparent,
non-discriminatory and strengthen the security of all. In its
explanation of vote, Cuba
stated its concern with the increased emphasis on small arms
and light weapons without thought to including weapons of mass
destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in the Register.
These concerns were also registered during the vote on the resolution
“Transparency in armaments” during the 2005 First
Committee.
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS)
Though there was no resolution focusing on MANPADS this year,
Israel,
Kazakhstan,
Turkey,
and Belarus highlighted the dangers of their proliferation and
unauthorized use. Australia
urged countries to continue progress on creating effective controls
over the illicit transfer and unauthorized use of MANPADS.
“Information on Confidence-Building
measures in Conventional Arms” (L.40)
“Information on confidence-building measures in
the field of conventional arms” (A/C.1/61/L.40), introduced
by Argentina, was adopted without a vote as it was in 2004 and
2005. Whereas the 2005 resolution requests the establishment
of such a database, the 2006 resolution welcomes the establishment
of the electronic database and requests the Secretary-General
keep the database updated.
“Conventional arms control
at the regional and sub-regional levels” (L.43)
“Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional
levels” (A/C.1/61/L.43) was adopted
with the following results: 166 in favor (voting record indicates
165, though Spain stated immediately following the vote that
it had intended to vote “yes”), 1 opposed (India),
and 1 abstention (Bhutan). India and Bhutan also opposed and
abstained, respectively, last year. After the vote was taken,
India again explained its opposition, asserting that the threats
to states often extend beyond regional boundaries. Furthermore,
L.43 requests the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to consider
principles for regional agreements on arms control, and India
views the CD as a forum for international rather than regional
agreements.
Final Thoughts
Resolution L.55
“Towards an Arms Trade Treaty” caused quite a stir
on conventional weapons issues, and resolutions introduced again
this year continued forward movement to control conventional
weapons. As was aptly stated by some member states, nuclear
weapons may cause mass-scale destruction and death; conventional
weapons kill scores of civilians every day. The international
community and individual member states should do whatever they
can to standardize arms transfers and production and increase
confidence-building and transparency measures in order to prevent
the illicit access to and trade in these weapons.
-Waverly de Bruijn, Global
Action to Prevent War
Arms Trade
Treaty
In a promising step forward, the First Committee adopted
the resolution, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing
common international standards for the import, export and transfer
of conventional arms” (A/C.1/61/L.
55) on Thursday, October 26. The number of co-sponsors
of the text rose to an impressive 116 member states when Gambia,
Azerbaijan, and San Marino were added just prior to the vote.
Formally introducing the resolution on Wednesday, October 18,
the UK
Ambassador John Duncan, speaking on behalf of the co-authors
(Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, and Kenya)
said, “we believe that [efforts to establish an Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT)] must be a discussion that involves both consumers
and producers and that the UN is the most suitable forum for
the discussion.”
The voting results on the resolution as a whole were: 139 governments
in favor, 1 opposed, and 24 abstentions. Particularly strong
support was demonstrated from across Africa, Europe, and Latin
America. Among the supporters are a few major and emerging exporters
of weapons, including France, Germany, Serbia, and Bulgaria,
and countries that have been devastated by armed violence such
as Colombia, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, and Rwanda.
The Control Arms Campaign,
which lobbied states in support of the resolution and organized
two campaign actions during the First Committee, said right
after the vote: “This massive vote to develop a global
Arms Trade Treaty is an historic opportunity for governments
to tackle the scourge of irresponsible arms transfers. Any credible
Treaty must outlaw those transfers, which fuel the systematic
murder, rape, torture and expulsion of thousands of people.”
While there was notable support from a few states in the Middle
East and North Africa including Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon,
and Tunisia, most of the abstainers came from these two regions.
Several major arms exporting states such as China, Russia,
and India also abstained from the resolution. The United States
was the lone vote against the resolution.
On behalf of the EU, Finland highlighted the support for the
effort earlier in the month when it said, “everyday, everywhere,
people are affected by the side effects of irresponsible arms
transfers. As there is currently no comprehensive internationally
binding instrument available to provide an agreed regulator
framework for this activity, the EU welcomes the growing support,
in all parts of the world, for an ATT.”
During two open lunchtime meetings on the resolution, most of
the concerns focused on procedural issues. For example,
several major arms exporting states and one Middle Eastern state
said the creation of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was
prescriptive in nature and the next steps should come after
a UN Secretary-General’s report that collects the views
of governments, as is the traditional practice.
The Control Arms Campaign said debate on the resolution was
particularly strong among the Arab League. Initially,
some of their expressed concerns were about the inclusion of
the word “transparency” in earlier draft versions
of the resolution. These concerns were allayed in later
drafts of the resolution. Libya, on behalf of many Middle Eastern
and North African states, also said that any effort on an ATT
must be “non-selective” and “comprehensive”.
Responding to procedural concerns that were not resolved before
the final draft of the resolution, the UK said the aim of the
initiative is to start a discussion on the feasibility and draft
parameters of an ATT and that those “agnostic” states
will have a clear opportunity to engage in the process.
After the vote, Algeria indicated that the effort must receive
broad-based support from states and be based on the principles
of the UN Charter.
Before the resolution is formally adopted, it must be approved
by the UN General Assembly. The final vote is expected in late
November or early December, and it is likely that the resolution
will pick up more supporters as several of the resolution’s
co-sponsors were absent during the vote in the First Committee.
- Colby Goodman, Amnesty International
Small Arms
and Light Weapons
Many states saw the First Committee as an opportunity to revive
the UN SALW process after the failure to agree a substantive
outcome document at the July 2006 United Nations Small Arms
Review Conference (RevCon). Brazil
said, “[t]he General Assembly should adopt a decision
in order to ensure a proper framework for the continuous assessment
of the implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA), as well
as measures to strengthen it.”
In a statement to the committee, the RevCon
President, Ambassador Kariyawasam of Sri Lanka, blamed its
failure on various factors, including states' lack of confidence
in the UN's ability to address disarmament issues; the unresolved
issues of transfers to non-state actors and civilian possession
of small arms; and an unreasonable interpretation of the consensus
rule. At the First Committee, five of the six SALW resolutions
required a vote, but all were overwhelmingly supported, with
the United States as the lone opposition vote on any small arms
resolution.
The annual “omnibus” resolution (A/C.1/61/L.15/Rev.1)
on small arms was adopted
with 172 votes in favor, 1 opposed (the US), and no abstentions.
This resolution confirms a 2008 date for the next meeting of
the UN small arms process, as stipulated in the PoA. The overwhelming
support for this resolution completely justified the cosponsors’
decision to break consensus.
“Towards an Arms Trade Treaty” (A/C.1/61/L.55),
one of the most high-profile and ultimately successful resolutions
of the First Committee, was adopted
with 139 votes in favor, 1 opposed (the US), and 24 abstentions.
Although small arms are only one category of the conventional
arms regulated by a future Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), their misuse
is causing more devastation than any other weapons. This was
recognized by Jamaica,
which focused on small arms in its speech prior to the vote
on the resolution.
“Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional
ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/C.1/61/L.26),
which calls for a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2008
to “consider further steps to enhance cooperation with
regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles,”
was adopted
with 164 votes in favor, 1 opposed (the US), and 1 abstention
(Japan). A separate vote on OP7, which calls for the establishment
of the GGE, was similarly successful
with 163 votes in favor, 2 opposed (the US and Japan), and no
abstentions. After the vote, Japan explained that they could
not vote in favor as they were skeptical of the utility of the
GGE at this time, and questioned the judgment of expanding the
UN budget to accommodate it. However, many states support the
development of a separate process on ammunition control, especially
since ammunition has had an uncertain place within the existing
SALW process. While it was included in the PoA, it was removed
from the scope of the 2005 Tracing Instrument.
The “Transparency in Armaments” (A/C.1/61/L.38)
resolution, adopted
with 141 votes in favor, none opposed, and 23 abstentions, invites
states to provide information on international transfers of
SALW when they report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms,
as recommended by the 2006 GGE. This is an important step in
promoting transparency, since existing international customs
information does not provide reliable information on the quantities
of small arms transferred, only the value.
Emphasizing the need for UN peacekeeping operations to engage
in disarmament activities, the “Consolidation of peace
through practical disarmament measures” (A/C.1/61/L.37)
resolution was adopted
with 158 votes in favor, no abstentions, and 1 opposed (the
US). This resolution also encourages states, including those
donors comprising the Group of Interested States, to support
international, regional, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in their post-conflict disarmament efforts. Additionally,
the “Assistance to States” (A/C.1/61/L.25)
resolution, was adopted without a vote for the ninth year in
a row. This resolution encourages cooperation between civil
society and states, in particular on National Commissions on
SALW, and calls upon the international community to provide
financial and technical support to both states and civil society
in their efforts to curb the illicit trade in SALW.
Both of these resolutions recognize the valuable contribution
made by civil society, also emphasized by Nigeria, which commented
on the “prominent role” of the International
Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the global network
of NGOs working against gun violence, in its speech prior to
the vote on the ATT resolution.
In her presentation to the First Committee, Rebecca Peters,
Director of the IANSA, highlighted the devastating effects of
the proliferation of SALW. Speaking of the murder of peace activist
Dr. Vincent Makanju, a Nigerian IANSA member shot dead on 11
October, she underlined the important role the UN SALW process
must play in preventing similar tragedies.
Two new SALW initiatives were outlined during the First Committee.
Canada hosted an informal side event with states and NGOs to
discuss a meeting on controlling international SALW transfers,
to be hosted by Switzerland, June 18-22, 2007 in Geneva. Intended
to be complementary to the formal UN SALW process, this meeting
will “identify and/or refine global principles to govern
the transfer of SALW throughout the world,” and will discuss
further the principles proposed by government experts at an
international meeting on transfer controls in Nairobi, April
2006.
The other initiative is being led by Switzerland,
which intends to coordinate a core group of 10 states to follow-up
the “Geneva
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development,” adopted
at a Ministerial Summit in June 2006. The group will encourage
states to join the declaration; promote research addressing
the links between armed violence and development; and work with
donor and recipient countries to integrate armed violence prevention
into development programs.
The results of the First Committee are extremely promising,
indicating the value of rejecting the distorted interpretation
of consensus used to date during the UN Small Arms process.
The PoA has been used as a starting point for states to reform
policies and practices in combating the proliferation and misuse
of SALW. The resolutions at First Committee have ensured that
this process will continue and expand into some key areas where
PoA commitments require further elaboration. Building on the
achievements of this First Committee will ensure that progress
at the UN will not fall behind regional and national progress.
There is still much work to be done, with up to 1,000 people
killed at gunpoint every day. As the Secretary-General remarked
in his opening statement to the 61st General Assembly, “[i]n
far too many parts of the world – especially the developing
world – people are still exposed to brutal conflicts,
fought with small but deadly weapons.”
-Mark Marge, International Action
Network on Small Arms (IANSA)
Landmines
The First Committee adopted
“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/61/L.47/Rev.1)
with 157 votes in favor, none opposed and 15 abstentions. Fewer
governments addressed landmines during the 2006 First Committee
general debate than in previous years. Most statements urged
universalization of the Ottawa Convention on the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on Their
Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty);
reported on regional mine destruction and clearance; and called
for continued financial assistance to mine-clearing operations
and victim rehabilitation.
As President of September’s Seventh Meeting of States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Australia
recapped some of the achievements and challenges concerning
the Mine Ban Treaty. At the meeting, states parties adopted
a process to assist states in fulfilling their obligations to
clear and destroy all known landmines. To date, 38 million mines
have been destroyed and another ten million are scheduled to
be destroyed, and seven of 52 states parties affected by landmines
have cleared their mined areas. As the first disarmament treaty
that addresses the needs of survivors, states parties to the
Treaty discussed practical measures to assist survivors. Australia
also said it has initiated a universalization strategy.
Mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM), such as anti-vehicle
landmines, are not banned by the Mine Ban Treaty. States Parties
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) have
been considering the issue, and it is one of three subjects
the states parties to the CCW will focus on at its Review Conference
in November.
After five years of discussions and preparatory work by the
CCW's Group of Governmental Experts, progress on MOTAPM continues
to gain momentum, albeit slowly. It remains unclear whether
there is enough political will to reach an agreement to create
a new legally binding instrument banning their use. The President-Designate
of the CCW, Ambassador Rivasseau of France, called Ambassador
Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil's (Coordinator of
the CCW's Working Group on MOTAPM) efforts to introduce a protocol
on MOTAPM a “mission impossible”.
Pakistan
also noted that differences remain in the areas of detectability,
active life, recording and removal of minefields, and categorization
of fuses and censors. India said that even on these contentious
issues, “a balanced approach could accommodate national
security imperatives, humanitarian requirements, financial costs
and technological constraints.” Switzerland,
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