First Committee Monitor
Second Edition: 15-19 October 2007
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In this edition:
Introduction
Last week's Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons offered a glimpse
at one of the roots of the current impasse in the disarmament and
non-proliferation regime: a discord of perception of what states
perceive constitutes collective security—and how to attain
it. Most delegations agree that multilateralism is essential, arguing,
“'equal' security can only be achieved collectively, mainly
through the United Nations,” (Ambassador Khan of Pakistan),
and “our common disarmament efforts should not overlook the
principles of multilateralism, non-discrimination, and supremacy
of international laws” (Ambassador Punkrasin of Thailand).
However, stark divergences in opinion, reminiscent of the infamous
dichotomy between disarmament-first and non-proliferation-first,
became apparent during a panel discussion on nuclear disarmament.
Jeffrey Eberhardt, US State Department, asked how the international
community can achieve a global security environment that allows
for nuclear disarmament, an environment that does not “require”
reliance on nuclear weapons. In contrast, many delegations have
asserted in their statements over the past two weeks that the first
step to increasing international security is abolishing nuclear
weapons. (See the report on this panel for
further analysis.) These debates, while valuable in their demonstration
of the difficulties delegations face when trying to reach consensus
on programmes of work, are ultimately unhelpful, as they rest exclusively
on narrowly defined national security priorities that are largely
inflexible at the diplomatic level, with few new ideas presented
to overcome the impasse.
The question of what a collective security environment constitutes,
and how to build it, is extensively addressed in Nuclear
Disorder or Cooperative Security, a civil society response
to the WMD
Commission Report. The authors assert that the concept of security
needs to be reframed, “with a premium on universal human and
ecological security, a return to multilateralism, and a commitment
to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution.”
They further argue that nuclear weapon states, particularly the
US, “should make nuclear disarmament the leading edge of a
global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military
expenditures to meet human and environmental needs.”
Demilitarization is the quest of most delegates and civil society
representatives that attend these debates. At the end of his remarks,
Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands
paraphrased Victor Hugo, announcing that one day the time will come
when the instruments of war, and in particular weapons of mass destruction,
“will be on show in museums in the same way as today one can
visit and inspect instruments of torture, fashionable in the Middle
Ages and thereafter. And we would all be wondering that such weapons
have existed and their use ever contemplated.”
It is this world that we “disarmament sophists” strive
for in our work and lives, with reason, wisdom, and passion. One
of the leaders on this path was Dr. Randall Caroline Forsberg, Executive
Director of the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies and
instrumental figure in the Nuclear Freeze movement, who consistently
argued for the complete abolition of war as an aberration of humankind,
and worked for a world in which weapons and war would no longer
be socially-sanctioned, where they would be as obsolete and morally
reprehensible as slavery.
We note with great sorrow that Dr. Forsberg passed away on 19 October
after a long struggle with cancer, but we are confident that her
vision and work will be carried on by those who share her belief
that our better nature will prevail, and that the abolition of nuclear
and conventional weapons is possible—and inevitable.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Nuclear Disarmament
The General Debate concluded at the beginning of last week with
statements by nations in the tensest regions of the world: Israel,
Iran, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.
Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan
said there has been “a progressive erosion” of disarmament
and non-proliferation structures, adding there is “the need
to construct a new consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
He repeated his government’s earlier proposal for a six pillar
“disarmament architecture,” including a commitment by
the major powers “to address the underlying motives and compulsions
which drive states to acquire weapons of mass destruction and larger
conventional arsenals and forces,” and a commitment by the
nuclear weapon states “to complete nuclear disarmament within
a reasonable timeframe.”
India
promoted its own comprehensive plan, based on the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi
plan. Ms. Sushma Swaraj, MP, said the plan “provided a holistic
framework for disarmament with those with the biggest arsenals having
the greater responsibility for nuclear disarmament.” She added,
“Once the international community agrees on the goal of a
nuclear weapon free world, all states could work together to elaborate
incremental and progressive steps for realizing that goal.”
While Pakistan framed many of its concerns in terms of India, India
never mentioned Pakistan.
Israel and Iran were central to each other’s statements.
Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee of Iran
cited Israel as “the only impediment” to disarmament
in the Middle East and said, “The lack of progress towards
the realization of nuclear disarmament and the failure of certain
nuclear weapon states to fulfill their obligations in this regard
are frustrating.” Deputy Director General Miriam Ziv of Israel
focused on strengthening non-proliferation and export controls regimes
to counter “the danger arising from the existence of such
weapons and systems in the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors,
such as rouge states and terrorist groups.”
Meanwhile, Ambassador Pak Gil Yon of North
Korea said, “It is alleged that there will no longer nuclear
threats once proliferation is held in check. This is no more than
a pretext for monopolizing nuclear weapons by evading nuclear disarmament.”
The Thematic Debate on nuclear disarmament began on Wednesday,
with delegates focusing on specific strategies. Most of those strategies
are detailed in other sections of The First Committee Monitor. Major
non-nuclear weapon states took the opportunity to reinforce their
beliefs in advancing a few core initiatives. Ambassador Sumio Tarui
of Japan
said his government “strongly believes that nuclear disarmament
by the nuclear weapon states based on the [NPT] regime is a necessary
condition for achieving international peace and security…
The nuclear weapon states must therefore completely implement their
obligations under Article VI and make further nuclear disarmament
efforts with ‘renewed determination.’”
Counsellor Craig Maclachlan of Australia
said nuclear disarmament should be advanced “though balanced,
progressive and reinforcing steps,” including permanent reductions
in forces and increased transparency. “We also look to all
states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in their security policies, thereby lowering the risk that
these weapons might ever be used, and advancing their eventual elimination.”
David Da Silva of Canada
also focused on doctrines, saying, “There continue to be worrying
signs as states demonstrate increased reluctance to consider further
reductions, new doctrines are mooted which would assert a role for
nuclear weapons as war-fighting – as opposed to strategic
– tools, and plans for new weapons are discussed. These developments
directly challenge our nuclear disarmament efforts.”
Norwegian
Ambassador Knut Langeland said the seven nation initiative “has
demonstrated that countries with different perspectives can develop
a common understanding on how to move the disarmament and non-proliferation
agenda forward.” He called for “an incremental disarmament
agenda” including further cuts in strategic forces, moving
forward on sub-strategic nuclear weapons, and greater transparency
on disarmament efforts.
The draft resolutions also began to be introduced and issued on
Friday, including the New Agenda Coalition’s annual resolution
(A/C.1/62/L.9);
India
introduced two nuclear disarmament resolutions, “Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.23)
and “Reducing Nuclear Danger” (A/C.1/62/L.21);
and Iran’s draft resolution on the NPT nuclear disarmament
obligations (A/C.1/62/L.8).
Details on the drafts will be in next week’s report.
- Jim Wurst, Middle
Powers Initiative
Grapes and Cucumbers: Panel
Discussion on Nuclear Disarmament
The Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons in First Committee last
week included a panel discussion with representatives of the US
and Indonesian governments and the Director of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
The 17 October meeting highlighted the contrasting views of the
world’s major nuclear weapon power and a leading member of
the Non-Aligned Movement, specifically the balance between the non-proliferation
and disarmament commitments of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Ambassador
Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, Indonesia’s ambassador to
the United States, said proliferation “has been effectively
contained,” therefore it was “unfair and untenable to
demand the [non-nuclear weapon states] NNWS to comply with their
obligations, while the [nuclear weapon states ] NWS have failed
to live up to their obligations and commitments.” If the NWS
obligations were not “backed by stringent enforcement and
verification measures” as are the obligations of NNWS, the
NPT regime runs the risk of “becoming irrelevant and ultimately
leading to its collapse.” He said, “The consensus political
agreements of 1995 and 2000 [NPT review conferences] must be implemented
in an incremental, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.”
Sudjadnan also called on the US and Russia “to exercise leadership
and commit to further negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons,”
as well as negotiations on sub-strategic weapons.
Mr. Jeffrey Eberhardt, representative from the US State Department,
repeated the argument the US has been making since the start of
First Committee, specifically that the US is fulfilling its disarmament
obligations by reducing its stockpile of nuclear weapons and fissile
material “at an accelerated rate,” and has reduced reliance
on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrines. The bulk of his remarks
focused on how to “achieve a global security environment that
will allow for disarmament.” Referring to the January 2007
op-eds in the Wall Street Journal by Kissinger/Shultz/Perry/Nunn
and by Mikhail
Gorbachev, Eberhardt said the US strategy was not to focus on
“laundry lists” but rather “how to create circumstances
under which such an elimination process would be the most stable
and realistic policy choice.” He said the “greatest
challenge” is how to implement nuclear disarmament without
creating new insecurities. It is only the unrealistic “disarmament
sophists” who dislike struggling with those questions, he
concluded.
Dr. Patricia Lewis, the Director of UNIDIR, said the current situation
was “unstable” because of the “concept of security
with nuclear weapons” and “unsustainable” due
to the unresolved tension of the “haves versus the have-nots.”
Referencing an
experiment by primatologist Frans de Waal, wherein monkeys were
given cucumbers for completing simple tasks, Dr. Lewis explained
the powerful effects that inequity can have on behaviour. When one
monkey began receiving grapes instead of cucumbers, the cucumber-receiving
monkey became increasingly upset, and eventually rejected the cucumber
in protest.
She further argued that the policies that have made nuclear weapons
“a sought after goal” have led to a “domination
fetish”. The challenge of how to avoid nuclear proliferation
is to create the conditions that would lead to nuclear disarmament.
The best route to that goal was to pursue disarmament as agreed
to in the NPT, with “assessments of the security aspects”
at each step. Lewis outlined a number of interim steps and confidence-building
measures necessary since the large number of nuclear weapons means,
even with reductions, that cuts “won’t affect security
immediately.” The key first steps would be entry into force
of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and a moratorium on fissile materials. She also
suggested outlawing nuclear weapons as a normative framework for
disarmament, similar to the bans on chemical and biological weapons.
- Jim Wurst, Middle
Powers Initiative
Operational Status of
Nuclear Weapons
On 10 October, New
Zealand Ambassador Don Mackay reported to the First Committee
that New Zealand would introduce a draft resolution—co-sponsored
by Chile, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland—calling for a stand-down
of nuclear forces.
The initiative had been previously announced in Wellington by the
New Zealand Minister for Disarmament Hon. Phil Goff on 30 August
at a press conference with Dr. Hans Blix, Chair of the Commission
on Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Goff noted that “Thousands of nuclear weapons currently are
on high-alert status, ready for instant launch. This presents a
major threat to global security. Nuclear weapon systems at a high
level of readiness increase the risk of these weapons being used,
including unintentionally or by accident. Such an eventuality would
have catastrophic consequences.”
The draft resolution, entitled “Decreasing the Operational
Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems” (A/C.1/62/L.29),
welcomes steps already taken by some countries to reduce the operational
status of nuclear weapons, and calls for further practical steps
with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from
high alert status.
The initiative caught the attention of the United
States, leading to a statement by Christina Rocca, the US Ambassador
to the UN in Geneva, that “the US forces are not, and never
have been, on hair-trigger alert… In order to comply with
this request we would have to first put our forces on hair-trigger
alert so that we could then de-alert them.”
However, Dr. Bruce Blair, former Minuteman ICBM launch control
officer and Director of the Center
for Defense Information, replied that “Both the United
States and Russia today maintain about one-third of their total
strategic arsenals on launch-ready alert. Hundreds of missiles armed
with thousands of nuclear warheads—the equivalent of about
100,000 Hiroshima bombs—can be launched within a very few
minutes.”
He further argued, “Their command and early warning systems
are geared to launch on warning—firing friendly forces en
masse before the anticipated arrival of incoming enemy missiles
with flight times of 12-30 minutes. The Presidents of both countries
would come under enormous pressure to make quick launch decisions
in the event of an apparent missile strike by the other side. Much
of this decision process has been designed to be quasi-automatic.
It can reasonably be described as going to war by checklist, enacting
a prepared script, with little margin for human error or technical
malfunction.” See Rebuttal
of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces
for further details.
The US claims were also challenged in a paper circulated on 19
October by nuclear stockpiles expert Hans Christensen (Federation
of Atomic Scientists). Christensen reports that new US military
doctrine, especially the new Global Strike mission, “has deepened
the requirement for quick-reaction strikes with forces on high alert…
First articulated in January 2003 and assigned to U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) Global Strike is defined as ‘a capability
to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and
conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information
operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives.’”
See A
Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on Nuclear Weapons Alert, Dismantlements
and Reductions.
Interest in the draft UN resolution was clear from the high turn-out
to a panel on operational status of nuclear weapons held on 17 October,
which featured New Zealand Ambassador Don Mackay, Swedish counselor
Magnus Hellgren, nuclear scientist Steven Starr, and de-alerting
advocate John Hallam, coordinator of the international appeal on
operational status of nuclear weapons. Of particular interest and
concern to the audience of diplomats, UN officials, and civil society
were the reports of incidents where high alert status could have
resulted in a nuclear exchange by accident or miscalculation, the
information on possibilities for infiltration of nuclear command
systems by terrorists, and the new models of severe climatic change
from the use of even a small number of nuclear weapons.
It is understood that key capitals are coming under pressure from
some nuclear weapon states to not support the resolution. In order
to help balance this, Parliamentary
Network for Nuclear Disarmament Co-Presidents Marian Hobbs and
Alexa McDonough are circulating a letter to parliamentarians around
the world urging them to contact their foreign ministers and United
Nations ambassadors to support the draft resolution when it comes
to a vote.
- Alyn Ware, International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
Nuclear Proliferation
The dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme was again the near-exclusive
focus of discussion over matters concerning nuclear proliferation
in the second week of First Committee. Despite the large amount
of floor time devoted to the issue, delegations generally failed
to add any points of substance to the discussion beyond those covered
already in the General Debate (see Nuclear Proliferation week one).
In the Thematic Debate, the European
Union statement did little more than expand on its position
on Iran incorporated in its general statement. Japan
and Australia
both expressed approval of the work plan between Iran and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve outstanding issues, but
also called on Iran to fully comply with relevant IAEA Board and
UN Security Council resolutions without delay, including the suspension
of uranium enrichment.
Given the active engagement and ownership of this issue by some
major powers, who are also permanent members of the Security Council,
the role of the General Assembly on this matter is certain to remain
limited to repeated reassertion of national positions in prepared
remarks during the general and themed discussions. The only, very
minor, exception to this might be if some states continue to raise
objections to the annual resolution sponsored by the League of Arab
States, A/C.1/62/L.2,
entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East.” Despite its title the resolution exclusively singles
out Israel without reference to other concerns relevant to nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East (i.e. Iran), which has led some
delegations to question its balance.
First Committee also heard both the Iranian and Israeli viewpoints
on this issue in their general remarks. Reiterating familiar rhetorical
points, Iranian
Ambassador Khazaee defended Iran’s nuclear programme as peaceful,
touted the 21 August work plan to resolve all outstanding issues
with the IAEA, which the ambassador noted had been well received
by the international community, and denounced UN Security Council
resolutions adopted on the nuclear issue as “unwarranted …
unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable.” Israeli
Ambassador Ziv, also delivering general remarks from the viewpoint
of her country’s unique perspective on matters of global security,
urged states to regard Iran “as a threat well beyond the geographical
limits of the Middle East” and also as “a threat not
just to the regional stability but also to the global strategic
situation.” Ambassador Ziv’s statements were in part
based on her argument that weapons of mass destruction “in
the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors” is singularly
the problem. These hyperbolic statements are particularly notable
because Israel possesses the only nuclear arsenal in the region.
Such positions were flatly rejected by the Hans Blix-led Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission, which pointedly discarded the
notion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some are safe, but in
the hands of others place the world in mortal jeopardy.
Taking a large step back from the narrow and overtly self-interested
views expressed by the regional antagonists, Ambassador Khan of
Pakistan
observed that in the context of Iran’s nuclear programme,
“resort[ing] to further coercion or worse, the use of force,
will be counter-productive and lead to further and grave instability
and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond. It could also jeopardize
the bright economic prospects of the entire region.” He emphasized
the need to “safeguard the security and independence”
of all states in the region, noting that “[a]symmetry, imbalance
and discrimination will ultimately propel proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction in this region,” rather than facilitating
the goal of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
The Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Discussion of the nuclear fuel cycle continued both inside and
out of the First Committee. The 2007
report of the International
Panel of Fissile Materials, presented at an event in the UN
on 19 October (see Fissile Materials), addresses
issues related to the management of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle
in light of projections anticipating global expansion of nuclear
power. Even if the 1500 MWe growth scenario, used in a key
report by MIT on the future of nuclear power, proves to be too
optimistic, the report notes that even a modest expansion of nuclear
power would result in power reactors coming online in a number of
developing countries that have no or negligible operating nuclear
power plants today. These states include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Indonesia, Iran, North Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Poland, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, and Viet Nam.
Important to determining how to best approach issues related to
the nuclear fuel cycle, the report observes that economics is unlikely
to be a barrier to states seeking to develop indigenous uranium
enrichment capabilities, either to avoid fuel disruption issues
or for other non-economic reasons, as “the cost of nuclear
power is relatively insensitive to the cost of enrichment.”
The report concludes that more countries will acquire national enrichment
capabilities as nuclear power expands, unless some non-discriminatory
framework is established for the supply of nuclear fuel. A forthcoming
stand-alone report from the panel will examine the issue of nuclear
fuel assurances as an alternative to national-based uranium enrichment.
Noting that without concerted action the nuclear fuel cycle could
be the Achilles heel of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Gustavo
Zlauvinen from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), addressing the First Committee,
called for a new multilateral framework on both the front and back
end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Mr. Zlauvinen, who listed various
existing proposals put forward by several countries, stated that
the best way forward would be an incremental approach, which he
described as a three step process to achieve a such a framework.
The first step would be to establish an adequate and reliable mechanism
for supply. The next step would be to place any new uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing facilities under multinational control.
The last step would be to extend multinational control to existing
nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
The European
Union welcomed the report
of the IAEA Director General entitled “Possible New Framework
for the Utilisation of Nuclear Energy: Options for Assurance of
Supply of Nuclear Fuel,” and stated it believes that it is
time for a new approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, noting a “balanced
multilateral mechanism” would reduce proliferation concerns.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Disarmament Machinery
While disarmament machinery is scheduled to be discussed on 25
October, the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) was highlighted during the Thematic Debate
on nuclear weapons, with the presentation by Sergei Ordzhonikidze,
Secretary General of the CD. Last
year, Mr. Ordzhonikidze doubted that the CD could survive another
year without substantive work, and whether the Five
Ambassador's proposal, although widely supported, would ever
accrue consensus. This year, he reported that the potential of the
CD as a negotiating body is alive, and that the P6 package proposal
on a programme of work, L.1,
intensified the CD's work and participation of capitals, and managed
to sustain continuity from the 2006 session.
With these positives in mind, Mr. Ordzhonikidze examined the reasons
for continuing deadlock in the CD. He indicated that changing (and
then hardening) perceptions of security by states is largely responsible
for the impasse. He sees the CD as trying to force consensus on
disparate priorities, when governments need to establish a clear
and convincing understanding of security based on common desires.
He suggested states look beyond narrowly defined national security
interests to determine their policies, but also that the CD review
its working methods to become more responsive to contemporary security
challenges. He questioned the efficacy of a package approach, pointing
out that it has not yet produced a breakthrough—that, ironically,
while trying to adopt a comprehensive work programme, the CD has
ended up with no work programme.
Sri
Lanka's Ambassador Kariyawasam expressed a similar sentiment
in his statement earlier in the week, when emphasizing “the
importance of the Conference to agree on a practical, less ambitious
programme of work, which could direct the Conference towards the
goals for which it was established.”
Most delegations, however, consistently express support for the
comprehensive package. Iran's
Ambassador Khazaee advocated a “balanced programme of work,”
and
during the General Debate most delegates called on CD member
states to adopt the L.1 proposal at the start of the 2008 session.
During the CD's 2007 session, the overwhelming majority of delegations
argued
that the package proposal is the best way to proceed in the CD.
A balanced programme is a non-discriminatory approach that would
allow for the interests and concerns of more than a few select states
to be acknowledged and accomodated.
During his statement on 15 October, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan,
like Mr. Ordzhonikidze, recognized the “need to construct
a new consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
He argued, “Such a new consensus will require a revival of
commitment to collective security architecture based on equity,
balance, restraint and cooperation among States.” However,
in response to Mr. Ordzhonikidze's presentation, Ambassador Khan
expressed doubt that political will is all that is lacking to reach
such a consensus. He asked where political will should be exerted
in the CD, arguing that at one point, all member states agreed to
a certain structure for the negotiation of a Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)—the Shannon
Mandate—but that understanding was reneged upon.
During his presentation, Mr. Ordzhonikidze also argued the need
for civil society and the media to reach out to people that will
give the CD the support it needs, indicating that the CD is suffering
from a lack of civil society involvement. In the informal question
period, New Zealand's Ambassador Mackay agreed the CD would benefit
from further civil society involvement and greater transparency.
However, challenging Mr. Ordzhonikidze to consider how civil society
involvement could be enhanced, he pointed out that non-government
organization (NGO) access to the CD is severely restricted, especially
in comparison to the level of participation in which NGOs are allowed
to engage at the First Committee and the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle. Despite restricted access
to the CD, the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom monitors and reports
on all formal plenary meetings and posts governmental statements
and papers
from the CD.
During the concluding statements from the General Debate last week,
Mrs. Sushma Swaray of the Indian
delegation emphasized the importance of the First Committee's contributions
to CD. She explained, “The First Committee and the General
Assembly have a special role in forging a better understanding on
the entire range of issues on the global disarmament agenda. Through
such an exercise, they can promote purposive actions internationally
and provide useful direction to the [CD].” It is unfortunate
that the Canadian
delegation determined it would not be able to table a draft decision
on the FMCT again this year because of lack of consensus—such
a decision could have acted as just such a purposive action providing
direction to the CD.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Fissile Materials
For the second year in a row, the Canadian delegation found itself
unable to move forward with a draft text on a Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), due to lack of consensus. In
the 2006 session of the First Committee, the Canadian delegation
withdrew its draft resolution, A/C.1/61/L.23,
in the belief that a resolution passed without consensus would not
send the right message to the Conference
on Disarmament (CD). The draft resolution took a minimalist
approach, simply calling on the CD “to commence immediately
negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials
for nuclear weapons,” without reference to verification or
existing stocks, which the Canadians maintained could be brought
up during negotiations. This year, Canadian
Ambassador Marius Grinius stated his delegation would seek a decision
from the First Committee on an FMCT. Despite choosing not to proceed
with a draft decision, Canadian
representative David Da Silva called on all states to support the
presidential draft decision, L.1,
tabled at the CD this year.
At an event entitled, “Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear
Weapon Materials,” the Princeton University-based International
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) presented its 2007
Global Fissile Material Report, and highlighted technical issues
faced by the international community in securing and irreversibly
reducing fissile material stocks. IPFM co-chair Frank von Hippel
gave an overview of the 2007 report which, inter alia, examines
possible mechanisms for detection of clandestine fissile material
production, key for effective verification of a FMCT. As a long-term
problem for efficacy of a fissile materials production ban regime,
Alexander Glaser emphasized the complications posed by continued
production and stockpiling of highly-enriched uranium fuel for naval
reactors and civilian stocks of fissile materials, which will be
vastly larger than military stocks once nuclear arsenals in Russia
and the United States drop below 1000 warheads each. Harold Feiveson
emphasized the panel’s concern that the lack of a permanent
repository for nuclear waste was driving renewed global interest
in spent fuel reprocessing, which is not only problematic from a
proliferation standpoint, but is also extremely expensive and does
not necessarily save repository space. Forthcoming stand-alone reports
of the IPFM will explore verification of an FMCT, including recommendations
on possible treaty text, a verification protocol, and mechanism
for international monitoring. All reports of the IPFM are accessible
on their website, www.fissilematerials.org.
In the Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, delegations discussed
their differences over the scope of an FMCT and preconditions for
negotiation. Many delegations that spoke on the subject expressed
support for the package deal tabled by the six presidents of the
CD, including those of Canada,
Japan,
the Republic
of Korea, and Australia.
The Chinese
and Indian
delegations reiterated their support for a multilateral, non-discriminatory,
and effectively verifiable FMCT. The Netherlands
and the European
Union called for commencement of negotiations without preconditions.
Ambassador Khan of Pakistan
elaborated on his government’s continuing objections to proceeding
with negotiations on any basis but the 1995
Shannon Mandate. While he agreed that any issue may of course
be raised in negotiations, he stated that specific reference to
such matters as verification in the negotiation mandate is crucial,
as when entering negotiations “one has to be sure what is
sacrosanct and what is not.”
The necessity of a fissile material production ban, ideally in
conjunction with a commitment to deep reductions in the US and Russian
nuclear arsenals, is made more urgent by the prospects of a nuclear
arms race in South Asia. At its event, members of the IPFM noted
that construction was continuing on a breeder reactor in India,
exempt from safeguards under the US-India
deal for nuclear cooperation, which would greatly increase its
plutonium production capacity. In addition, within the past year
it had been revealed that Pakistan began construction of two additional
plutonium production reactors.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Weapon Free
Zones
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) continued to feature prominently
in this week’s deliberations of First Committee, with states
reaffirming their support for existing zones, proposing measures
to strengthen their objectives, and encouraging the creation of
new NWFZs.
China's
delegation reaffirmed its support for “the efforts made by
relevant states and regions in establishing nuclear-weapon-free
zones,” as demonstrated by China’s signing of the relevant
protocols of NWFZ Treaties. Norway,
Indonesia,
and Laos
joined China in calling on nuclear weapon states (NWS) to ratify
supporting protocols of existing NWFZ Treaties.
Unlike regional NWFZs, single state zones lack the formal agreements
from NWS respecting their nuclear weapon free status (NWFS). Mongolia
is setting the precedent in seeking a legally-binding NWFS and negative
security assurances from NWS. In this week’s statement, Mongolia
recalled the recognition by NWS in a 2000 joint statement of Mongolia’s
NWFS and negative security assurances. Mongolia welcomed progress
on a draft trilateral treaty between Mongolia and its nuclear neighbors,
China and the Russian Federation.
Indonesia
and New
Zealand introduced resolutions to strengthen existing NWFZs
and to enhance the means of cooperation and communication between
the zones. Indonesia, on behalf of the States Parties to the Southeast
Asia NWFZ introduced the draft resolution (A/C.1/62/L.19)
entitled “Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
(Bangkok Treaty)”. The objectives of the resolution are “to
seek universal support for the SEANWFZ Treaty; to encourage ongoing
consultation with NWS with a view to early accession by NWS; to
enhance and explore further ways and means of cooperation between
SEANWFZ with other nuclear-weapon-free-zones; and to further contribute
to global efforts in achieving a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere
and Adjacent Areas.” New Zealand and Brazil introduced the
annual resolution (A/C.1/62/L.27)
affirming the creation of a nuclear weapon free Southern Hemisphere
and adjacent areas that would unite the existing NWFZs covering
virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere, while assuring that the
freedom of navigation on the high seas would not be undermined.
Support for this initiative has been strong in the past among the
UN General Assembly and the regional NWFZs.
A number of governments, including Bangladesh,
Jordan,
Iran,
Kuwait,
Lebanon,
Morocco,
Sudan,
and Palestine
called for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a means
of restoring the non-proliferation regime and contributing to regional
and global peace and security. In this regard, Jordan, Iran, Lebanon,
and Palestine called for Israel to accede to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its provisions. Jordan argued
that “this would not only defuse existing tensions, bring
about tangible progress on other bilateral tracks of the peace process,
enhance confidence-building measures between all parties, and have
an overall positive impact on regional peace and security, but would
also prevent the occurrence of potential nuclear accidents and radiological
contamination.” Last week, Egypt tabled its annual resolution
(A/C.1/62/L.1)
on “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle
East” and, along with the League of Arab States, a resolution
(A/C.1/62/L.2)
on “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”.
In addition to the proposed NWFZ in the Middle East, discussions
are currently underway at the UN and in respective regions about
the creation of NWFZs in South Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Europe,
Arctic/Nordic region, and in the Mediterranean. As stated by Ambassador
Don Mackay of New
Zealand, “[a] powerful symbol for demonstrating the renunciation
of weapons of mass destruction is the reach, and potential reach,
of nuclear weapon free zones over the landmasses of the globe.”
The establishment of the Central Asian NWFZ in 2006, the first NWFZ
in the Northern Hemisphere, serves as an important reminder and
encouragement for the emergence of additional zones leading the
way to nuclear disarmament and the fulfillment of NPT promises.
- Monika Szymurska, Atomic
Mirror
North Korea's Nuclear
Programme
During the second week of First Committee meetings in 2006, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced it
had conducted a nuclear weapon test. This announcement was met with
widespread condemnation, as well as renewed focus on the First Committee
and its role in forging normative consensus among states regarding
proliferation, disarmament, and nuclear testing, and in creating
the necessary legal instruments to facilitate practical steps towards
a less armed, more secure world.
Last week during Thematic Debate, a majority of delegations articulated
their concerns about the DPRK’s
nuclear programme. Many also recognized the progress that has
been made this past year in the Six-Party Talks. They lauded the
agreement reached in September between the DPRK and the other Six-Party
members, which is leading to the full de-nuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, beginning with the closure of plutonium-producing reactor
at Yongbyon.
Thailand
and Gabon's
representatives, among others, lauded the progress made thus far,
and expressed their desire to see the full de-nuclearization of
the Peninsula in the near future. The peaceful resolution of the
DPRK situation has been cited as a significant step towards a more
secure world through multilateral diplomacy, and within the non-proliferation
regime as a whole. Japan's
Ambassador Tarui noted the success of the Six-Party talks and urged
further progress towards full transparency and compliance with the
nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The DPRK did not offer a governmental
statement during the sessions this week.
Though the Six-Party talks have been the primary nexus of negotiating
the settlement of the issue, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been present at each step. The
IAEA, with its international team of nuclear experts and inspectors,
has taken a lead role in facilitating the de-nuclearization of the
DPRK. Additionally, the success of the negotiations have offered
an example of the potential for negotiated de-nuclearization of
states that have violated, withdrawn from, or are not party to the
NPT.
- Anna Walter, Reaching
Critical Will
Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty
Tibor Tóth, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission
for the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) delivered a presentation
to the First Committee last week during Thematic Debate on nuclear
weapons.
Tóth commented on the successful outcome of the Fifth
Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the CTBT
in Vienna, where 100 of the 140 states that have ratified the Treaty
and state signatories were present. This conference's Final
Declaration, which reflected the consensus of the participants,
calls on those states that have not ratified the CTBT to do so without
delay.
The issue of the CTBT's entry into force was a recurring theme
during the second week of First Committee. Nineteen delegations,
in addition to the European Union (EU), which was represented by
Portugal, spoke on this topic. Most delegates expressed their dissatisfaction
with the fact that the CTBT has not entered into force despite it
reaching the eleventh anniversary of adoption this year. They urged
all states, especially the Annex II group whose ratification is
needed for the Treaty's entry into force, to sign and ratify as
soon as possible.
Bangladesh's
representative mentioned it was the first Annex II nation in South
Asia to have signed and ratified the CTBT, and urged the remaining
eleven Annex II States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.
Sergio
Duarte, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, emphasized
the contribution of the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry
into Force of the CTBT. He added that the Office of Disarmament
Affairs and its regional centres for peace and disarmament in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and in the Asia/Pacific, have worked
actively with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to promote the entry
into force of the Treaty.
According to Tóth, the Conference and its Final Declaration
are evidence of the international community's desire to have a universal
and internationally effective and verifiable tool in the area of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Seven delegations and the EU stressed the importance of the CTBT
vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Bangladesh
stated that the CTBT and the NPT are "the cornerstone of the
global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime." Dr.
Patricia Lewis, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR),
emphasized nuclear disarmament when talking about the importance
of the entry into force of the CTBT. Gustavo
Zlauvinen, Representative of the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations, talked about
the CTBT's contribution to halting the development of nuclear weapons
by both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.
Tóth reported that since September 2005, 20 or more states
have signed or ratified the treaty, bringing the total numbers to
177 signatories and 140 ratifications, and bringing its universality
closer to reality. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear
test, according to Tóth, was a performance challenge for
the CTBTO, its fledgling verification regime, its technical capabilities,
and its procedures. Although the yield of the explosion was low,
and at the time the CTBTO had only less than 180 of the International
Monitoring System's 321 stations in operation, the nuclear test
was well recorded by the Organization's system. This successful
outcome in nuclear test detection added value to the CTBT verification
system.
Despite the CTBTO's accomplishments, Tóth revealed that
the organization has important challenges ahead of it. There are
considerable technical, financial and political challenges in the
process of the installation and certification of many remaining
stations.
- Edgar Socarras, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Missiles
A few delegations addressed the issue of missiles in their statements
to the General Debate in the First Committee (see Missiles
week one). The delegation of Iran
expressed pleasure that the third Panel of Government Experts on
missiles seemed to have a “very constructive and serious discussion”
during its first substantive session. In light of the fact that
the panel will have two additional sessions in 2008, the Iranians
announced they would introduce a draft decision on the issue of
missiles instead of a substantive resolution “as suggested
by the 2005 recommendations of the Committee on ‘methods of
work.’”
In his general statement to the First Committee, Ambassador Khan
of Pakistan
described the proliferation and development of missiles and anti-ballistic
missile systems as an emerging threat to international stability,
and stated it should be dealt with in an international agreement
as part of what he described as a proposed “new disarmament
architecture”. Referring to existing export regimes as discriminatory,
Ambassador Khan stated they would never work because they would
not constrain states determined to develop a ballistic missile capability.
He also called for a multilateral treaty to prohibit deployment
of ballistic missile defense systems, which he described as “inherently
destabilizing both at the strategic and the regional levels,”
and for an accompanying agreement for limitations on other kinds
of missile systems. Ambassador Khan further advocated for the Conference
on Disarmament to take up the issue of anti-ballistic missiles
as a priority item and to consider discussions of missiles.
Also chiming in on the subject of ballistic missile defense, Ambassador
Pak Gil Yon of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea took the floor during the General
Debate to denounce the deployment of US missile defense systems.
US State Department representative Jeffrey Eberhardt, in a panel
discussion on nuclear disarmament, took a contrary approach, suggesting
that the deployment of ballistic missile defenses could actually
facilitate nuclear disarmament by assisting in creation of a “new
security environment”.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Conventional Weapons
On behalf of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), High Representative
H.E.
Sergio Duarte shared the levels of submissions generated by
the request of resolutions introduced last year. Resolution 61/72,
“Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition
stockpiles in surplus” (A/62/166 and Add 1), received 18 submission
this year, an increase of 10. 61/82, “Conventional arms control
at regional and subregional levels” (A/62/93), experienced
an increase of 5 submissions to reach a total of 12 this year. 61/89,
“Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”
(A/62/278/Parts I and II and Add.1), received an unprecedented 97
submissions. Unfortunately, reporting on the UN Register of Conventional
Arms (A/62/170 and Add.1 and Add.2) dropped from 116 submissions
to 107. Overall, Duarte noted, submissions to conventional weapons-related
resolutions are faring better than others.
In his statement, Serbia's
Ambassador Kruljevic announced that Serbia has taken necessary measures
to ratify the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)’s
Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and to accede to Amended
Protocol II. India
reported that it was among the first 23 states to ratify Protocol
V and “one of 25 states to have signed and ratified the CCW
and all its five protocols.” Belarus
is working to accede to Protocol V and hopes to accomplish this
in the near future. A representative from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that the First Meeting
of States party to the Protocol on ERW will be held in Geneva in
November 2007, and needs to “produce clear guidelines for
how all States Parties should proceed with the recording, retention
and transmission of information required by the Protocol, and for
it to establish an operational framework for addressing the massive
problem of existing ERW.”
Serbia's
delegation also noted its active involvement both within the CCW
and the Oslo Process to ban the use of cluster
munitions in highly populated civilian areas, and towards the
destruction of munitions stockpiles. High-Representative Duarte
also stated the support of the ODA for the establishment of norms
governing cluster munitions. “Now is the time to finally address
this problem by adopting legally binding rules,” stated the
ICRC.
“Until such time as they enter into force, we urge States
to refrain from using, producing or transferring inaccurate and
unreliable cluster munitions.”
Georgia's
delegation noted with concern the challenges in implementing the
Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty and the intention of the Russian Federation
to withdraw from it. Georgia continues to call for a national or
international monitoring team to inspect the military base in Gudauta
to verify its closure, as claimed by the Russian Federation.
Regarding the regulation of man-portable
air defense systems (MANPADS), Belarus
supports the “elaboration and adoption under the SALW Programme
of Action of the measures to counter uncontrolled transfer of SALW,
including MANPADS.” Israel's Ambassador Ziv stated her support
for the draft resolution advanced by Australia on the regulation
and control of transfers of MANPADS.
On 19 October, the European Union and the ODA showcased its joint
project on promoting the universality of the CCW and its Protocols.
The joint action was established in November 2006, and plans have
been made to hold 7 regional seminars to increase the number of
signatories to the CCW while increasing support for its sponsorship
program, which provides resources for the participation of mine-affected
low income countries. Increased membership in the CCW will allow
it to more fully respond to advancements in weapons technology and
developments in the nature and conduct of armed conflict.
- Waverly de Bruijn, Global
Action to Prevent War
Arms Trade Treaty
The Holy
See articulated its support for an Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT), driven from the grave concern it shares
with conflict-ridden countries “whose experience tells us
that illicit trade in arms, their accumulation and illicit production
are a hindrance to the peaceful settlement of disputes, drive tensions
into armed conflicts and are a key factor in prolonging them, thus
heavily compromising peace and development.”
As a co-sponsor of last
year’s draft resolution, “Towards an arms trade
treaty,” Ethiopia
“vehemently supports” the ATT process, and “will
continue to extend its unreserved support and cooperation to the
successful conclusion of this important treaty.” Statements
made by the delegations from Albania,
Georgia,
and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) echoed support for the ATT
initiative, with Jamaica,
Montenegro,
and Serbia
also noting that they have submitted a report to the Secretary-General
on this matter.
Sudan's
delegation is closely following the discussion on the proposed ATT,
and will “continue to engage constructively in this process,
to figure out its feasibility, how far it will serve the disarmament
objectives within the multilateral context and in full transparency
without prejudice to the legitimate rights of the member states.”
Iran's
Ambassador Khazaee is of the opinion that efforts towards implementation
of the UN
Programme of Action should not be abandoned, and that “given
the current positions and disagreements on the issue of Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT), it is also premature to begin a new process.”
Thailand's
Ambassador Punkrasin noted his support for the Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE), the members of which were appointed on 28 September
from the following 28 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and United States.
On 17 October, the Non-Governmental Organizations ATT Steering
Committee and the Control
Arms campaign launched A
Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want, an analysis
of the 97 submissions made to the Secretary-General on the feasibility,
scope and draft parameters for an ATT. The report concludes that
“Some 86 of the 92 submissions analysed either explicitly
reiterated their support or provided views as to how this initiative
could move forward.” Regarding scope, 57 submissions expressed
the view that an effective ATT should include “all”
conventional arms, and that the range of activities (including a
broad definition of transfers) that fall within the scope of an
ATT must be clearly and precisely defined. The submissions of member
states were compiled into a substantial list of recommendations
to the GGE, with the understanding that “If the GGE report
is sufficiently constructive it could lead to the establishment
by the UN General Assembly of an Open Ended Working Group in 2009
to negotiate the terms of a global Arms Trade Treaty so that the
international community can agree and benefit from such a Treaty
as soon as possible, hopefully by the year 2010.”
- Waverly de Bruijn, Global
Action to Prevent War
Disarmament and Development
Highlighting the link between vast governmental expenditures on
military capability and armaments, the potential uses of those same
resources for development purposes was a theme in this past week’s
Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons. During the panel discussion
and subsequent informal session on the morning of 17 October, High
Representative Sergio
Duarte articulated that disarmament and development is a wide
and intricate subject. Compared to enormous arms expenditures, states
spend tiny amounts on development projects—whether domestic
development or foreign aid.
The delegations from Cuba and Nicaragua
argued that investments in armaments could be redirected to overcome
development challenges being faced in their own states and beyond.
Likewise, Ambassador Chang of the Republic of Korea stressed the
necessity of having a security environment conducive to disarmament
in order to be afforded the option of apportioning funds freed up
from military expenditures to development projects. Nicaragua's
Ambassador Duarte argued that the money nuclear weapon states spend
on modernization programmes could eradicate communicable diseases
and illiteracy in the developing world.
However, High Representative Duarte pointed out the difficulty
in harnessing resources currently dedicated to the military for
redirection towards civilian development goals. He referred to a
proposal of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, which asked for a tax
on military spending, known as the 1% tax for human folly. The Secretary
General of the Conference on Disarmament agreed that even if military
budgets were to shrink, such reductions would offer no guarantee
that those funds would be redirected towards development. States
have a myriad of competing interests and goals among which resources
are divided, and thus military and development expenditures are
not necessarily inversely proportional.
Furthermore, Duarte, as well as the representative from the International
Atomic Energy Agency, noted that disarmament and non-proliferation
goals also require significant investment. Some states must choose
between allocating funds towards honouring their treaty commitments
and those related to UNSCR
1540, and other worthy development projects or goals. Another
concern in the disarmament and development debate was energy security.
As economies expand and their demand for energy soars, states must
take measures to secure access to sufficient energy resources. Spending
in this arena, which could involve money from former miltiary budgets,
might also be seen as related to development.
During the formal governmental statements, developing nations took
the lead in addressing the link between disarmament and development.
Oman,
Cuba, Pakistan,
Thailand,
Jamaica,
Gabon,
Nicaragua,
and Morocco
each made references to it. Jamaica's Ambassador Brown purported
that the crux of the disarmament debate lies firmly at the nexus
between disarmament and development—that the “deleterious
effects” of weapons, particularly small arms, wreaks “havoc
and harm in many parts of the world, daily.” She emphasized
the “needless burden on the socio-economic structure of many
governments” that results “in the diversion of scarce
resources from our national budget to tackle its crippling effects
and so, retard levels of growth and development.” Ambassador
Moussotsi of Gabon argued that the continuing increase in global
military expenditures is an ethical problem, especially as aid to
Africa decreases.
- Anna Walther, Reaching
Critical Will
Landmines
The second week of debate on landmines continued to focus on the
need for universal membership to the Ottawa Convention (also known
as the Mine
Ban Treaty), with delegates from Jordan,
Ethiopia,
Jamaica,
Serbia,
Belarus,
and Thailand
reiterating the importance of this goal. Delegates also called upon
member states and donor nations to assist with landmine clearance
operations and victim rehabilitation. Ambassador Kolsenik of Belarus
stated, “the responsible attitude of donors in providing necessary
assistance at the stage of implementation of the Convention is one
of the factors that can promote its universality.”
The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pointed to the tenth anniversary
of the Mine Ban Treaty as an important success story in creating
international norms, and a positive trend in the field of international
humanitarian law regulating weapons. The Representative for the
ICRC, Ms. Pellandini, noted that commitment to the treaty and the
“model of cooperation between states, international organizations
and civil society” acted as an “inspiration” for
action in the area of cluster munitions and the Protocol on Explosive
Remnants of War. A side panel on the “EU Joint Action in support
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)’”
highlighted the success achieved through the Ottawa Convention and
universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), noting the
potential for further successes in dealing with cluster munitions,
anti-vehicle mines, and Explosive Remnants of War.
Ethiopia, Jordan, Belarus, Albania,
and Serbia's delegations outlined their commitment to the destruction
of anti-personnel landmines. Ethiopia,
which ratified the Convention in 2004, confirmed the destruction
of four thousand mines and close to forty thousand items of unexploded
ordnance. Belarus,
while reaffirming its commitment to the universality of the Convention,
noted the difficulty it faced in destroying the seventh largest
arsenal of anti-personnel mines in the world, due to the high estimated
cost of destruction. Serbia's
Ambassador Kruljevic indicated more success with the destruction
of anti-personnel mine stockpiles held by the Serbian Army in May
2007, and that final mine field clearance is scheduled for the end
of 2008.
In November 2007, Jordan will host the eighth Meeting of States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty at the Dead Sea. Ambassador Majali
of Jordan
stated that the conference will provide an opportunity for “mine
affected countries to voice their concerns, needs and undertaking
… and bring State Parties and their partners closer towards
full implementation of the Convention.” Many delegations see
the Dead Sea meeting as crucial in ensuring the 2009 mine clearance
deadlines are met, and that any extensions are only for the shortest
period possible. In line with last week’s statement from Australia,
Jordan confirmed its intention to table a joint resolution on the
Convention.
Jordan’s presidency of the meeting and its location at the
Dead Sea provides a new regional venue for the Convention. Both
Iraq and Kuwait (who recently acceded to the Convention) received
special note from Jordan and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC also noted that it had held conferences
for the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and of the Magreb
to address the problems of mines in the region.
- Kavitha Suthanthiraraj, Global
Action to Prevent War
Biological and Chemical
Weapons
Delegations spoke in broad agreement about the imperative of complete
implementation and universalisation of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), in order to preserve and develop the
benefits from these two multilateral regimes.
Most States Parties consider the Sixth Review Conference of the
BTWC in December 2006 a success. Ambassador Park from the Republic
of Korea praised the Meeting of Experts, which was held in August,
as “a good opportunity to share experiences and learn from
others, especially on the national implementation of the Convention.”
Ambassador Park further mentioned the importance of penal legislation
as well as strict export controls on biological agents and associated
dual-use technology and equipment. Ambassador Gomas from Portugal,
on behalf of the European
Union (EU), mentioned the adoption of an EU Action Plan to “revitalise
interest in and use of BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBM) ensuring
the annual submissions of returns by all EU Member States.”
The EU urged all State Parties to enhance transparency through the
submission of CBM returns.
Santiago Oñate, the Legal Advisor of the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC),
elaborated on the status of national implementation of the CWC,
which has risen from less than one third of States Parties in 2003
to 79%. However, there is still a large backlog in terms of comprehensive
national legislation, which has only been introduced by 42% of the
States Parties. Oñate added that an incomplete implementation
of the CWC holds the risk of a “return to chemical weapons”.
Ambassador Park from the Republic
of Korea highlighted “the importance of enhancing the
effectiveness of chemical-industry verification.” Ralph Trapp
from the OPCW pointed out challenges arising from the relocation
of the chemical industry from traditional to new locations in eastern
Europe and the southern hemisphere. This leads to expansion of chemical
development in countries with little prior experience in national
implementation of the Convention, and adds to the complexity in
maintaining the quality of the verification regime.
Rogelio
Pfirter, Director-General of the OPCW, pointed out that while
30% of the chemical weapons stockpile has been destroyed over the
last 10 years, the remaining 70% have to be destroyed in just 5
years. Regarding the Russian Federation, Pfirter called for continued
international funding, whereas in the case of the United States
he focused on the complexity of safe practices.
Pfirter articulated his hopes that the second review conference
to be held in Den Haag in 2008 will not focus on the issue of possible
non-compliance with the 2012 deadline. Trapp emphasized that the
conference should cater to the rapid changes in science and technology,
and embrace these innovations as new opportunities. This view was
shared by Ambassador Park , who called for “an opportunity
to assess and address the current challenges, laying a solid foundation
for ensuring full implementation and enhancing the effectiveness
of the Convention.”
Projecting the future of the OPCW after 2012, Hans Reeps of the
OPCW assured the need of maintaining the Organization, as chemical
weapons will keep “popping up over the next 50 years.”
Ralph Trapp added, if chemical weapons should ever be used in the
future, the technical competence and capabilites of the OPWC will
be indispensable. Pfirter mentioned the OPWC would benefit the international
community as watchdog, deterrent, and through its activities in
industry monitoring and verification.
Poland introduced the draft resolution entitled “Implementation
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”
(A/C.1/62/L.7).
Similar resolutions have been introduced by Poland in preceeding
years. This draft resolution contains only cosmetic changes in comparison
to last year's.
- Philip Urech, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Negative Security Assurances
As the First Committee concluded its General Debate and began a
Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, negative security assurances
(NSAs) remained an issue of concern for many countries.
Several states possessing nuclear weapons took stands in favor
of legally-binding NSAs. India's
delegation emphasized its government's policies of no-first-use
and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, and said it was willing
to turn these policies into legally-binding treaties. Pakistan's
Ambassador Khan took the argument further, claiming that as a corollary
to the idea of NSAs, the Security Council should come to the aid
of non-nuclear weapon states who are threatened with nuclear weapons.
Several non-nuclear weapon states also voiced their support. During
the General Debate, Kuwait's
delegation argued for “making effective international arrangements
that gives [sic] non-nuclear states assurances against the use of
nuclear weapons or the threat of their use.” This sentiment
was echoed in statements by delegates from Belarus,
Thailand,
and several others.
During the Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, the Republic
of Korea cited NSAs as a means to alleviate the security concerns
of non-nuclear weapon states. The United
Arab Emirates delegation also stressed the importance of “[d]eveloping
a universal, unconditional instrument that provides the necessary
safeguards for non-nuclear states against any threats or risks that
might result from the use of existing nuclear arsenals.”
Of the nuclear weapon states that spoke during the Thematic Debate,
only China's
delegate brought up the topic of NSAs. He emphasized that “[b]efore
the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons is achieved, nuclear weapon states should commit themselves
to no first use of nuclear weapons, undertake unconditionally not
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and negotiate and conclude
an international legal instrument on this matter.”
During Thematic Debate, Iran
tabled draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.8,
which, among other things, notes that “the 2000 review conference
of parties to the treaty [on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons]
agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear
weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty
strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”
- Nathan Band, Global
Security Institute
Terrorism
During the second week of the First Committee, most discussions
relating to terrorism centered on the threat posed by weapons of
mass destruction, though questions of small arms and the civilian
use of nuclear energy were also addressed.
Norway's
Ambassador Langeland identified the proliferation dangers of nuclear
power generation and emphasized the need to minimize the use of
highly enriched uranium while expressing support for the revised
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Convention
on Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism.
Thailand
and Israel's
delegations addressed the danger of small arms in possession of
terrorist groups. Both expressed support for the UN Programme of
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons.
The concern about terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction
is in many ways addressed by Security
Council resolution 1540 (2004). It establishes legally-binding
obligations on all UN member states to enact and enforce legal and
regulatory measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their delivery systems by state or non-state
actors. Albania emphasized the importance of this resolution as
an “essential tool to combat proliferation” and an “entirely
appropriate measure” to counter the threat of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery falling into the hands of
terrorists or non-state actors.
Jordan's
Ambassador Majali, stressed that “complete and effective implementation
of Security Council resolution 1540 … requires constant cooperation
and coordination among Member states.” She also pointed out
that Jordan hosted the first regional workshop for Arab states on
the implementation of the resolution in September this year, providing
the opportunity for the exchange of information between experts
from the region and from relevant international bodies. The European
Union, in a statement delivered by Portugal, also emphasized the
importance of resolution 1540 and its implementation. Portuguese
Ambassador Gomes stated further that “the EU is fully ready
to continue to provide assistance, in particular in building legal
and administrative infrastructure, sharing our experience of implementation
and training relevant national authorities.”
Another central element in the efforts of the international community
to prevent nuclear terrorism is the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
from April 2005. It addresses the unlawful possession or use of
nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. It calls for states
to cooperate in investigation and prosecution and to develop appropriate
legal frameworks to prevent nuclear terrorism. The convention entered
into force on 7 July 7 2007, after the receipt of the 22nd instrument
of ratification (from Bangladesh). India
welcomed the entry into force and Norway voiced its full support
for the convention.
India's
delegation also expressed its hope that the resolution on measures
to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
which has been adopted by the First Committee annually since 2002,
“will receive similar endorsement this year, with an even
greater number of sponsorships.”
Meanwhile, Sri
Lanka’s Ambassador Kariyawasam argued, “only a legitimate,
rule-based system that is robust and internationally respected …
could have the capacity to combat terrorism effectively.”
- Christoph Pilger, Global
Security Institute
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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