First Committee Monitor
Third Edition: 22-26 October 2007
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In this edition:
Introduction
Over the last three weeks, we have heard repeated calls for a new
security environment, within which nuclear disarmament would be
“possible.” We have also heard many largely rhetorical,
often conflicting proposals for achieving this. Pakistan's non-paper
on a new consensus for disarmament argues it should be based on
“universally recognized principles of equity and non-discrimination,”
and the “legitimate national security and economic interests
of all States.” No longer interested in “what would
have to be done to control and eliminate nuclear weapons,”
the United
States delegation has dismissed “laundry lists of traditional
arms control steps” in favour of emphasizing “the practical
challenges of making nuclear disarmament the most stabilizing, deliberate
policy choice.” In statements and working papers submitted
to various disarmament fora, the US argues
“stricter compliance with the [NPT's] non-proliferation rules
is essential” to this end. The US also cites, apparently without
irony, “lessening international tension and strengthening
trust between nations” as necessary precursors for disarmament.
Meanwhile, nearly every state has called for increased “political
will” to overcome the deadlock in disarmament machinery and
to reach consensus on an agenda for disarmament.
Will is constituted by a fixed and persistent intent or purpose.
It also involves choice. In her presentation on disarmament machinery,
Dr. Patricia Lewis of UNIDIR
quoted Arthur C. Clarke, saying, “The only way to discover
the limits of the possible is to go beyond them into the impossible.”
Subsequently, a delegate from Benin suggested that delegations should
strive to set aside their national priorities when they enter deliberative
or negotiating fora, that they should come as agents of change whose
job it is to find solutions to the problems of humankind—something
they are unable to do strictly as representatives of their governments.
On 26 October, civil society for the second year in a row delivered
presentations to First Committee. Five non-government organization
(NGO) representatives spoke about nuclear weapons, outer space security,
small arms, and the Arms Trade Treaty. (See the Outer
Space, Small Arms, and ATT
reports.)
Jacqueline
Cabasso, Executive Director of Western
States Legal Foundation, explored the concept of good faith
obligation to disarm, which is embedded in Article VI of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was unanimously affirmed
by the International
Court of Justice in 1996. Good faith (or lack thereof) provides
a useful perspective for assessing the current impasse in disarmament
and non-proliferation. She explained, “some of the legal elements
of good faith [include] correspondence between word and deed; no
secret reservations; openness and transparency, with a complete
disclosure of material facts; and a readiness to submit one’s
actions to external scrutiny. In addition, good faith requires that
meaningful steps be taken towards the desired goal, with
no backtracking, and within a reasonable time span [emphasis added].”
After the NGO presentations in First Committee, Chairperson Paul
Badji reminded the Committee of the importance of the relationship
between member states and NGOs, emphasizing the value of our presence
and contributions, and pointing out that delegates themselves are
members of civil society—that we are, in short, all on the
same team. It does not always feel this way, however. Badji's reference
to the responsibility of NGOs to present their facts accurately
and fairly reminds us of the delicate balance between our integrity
of belief and the pressure on us to conform ourselves to the medium
in which we act. This view tends to overlook other responsibilities,
such as the need for member states to, as Benin said, balance national
priorities with the need for efficient progress, and for the United
Nations to balance its need to maintain a fraternal atmosphere among
member states while guarding against the curtain of censorship and
fulfilling its obligation to its true constituents—“we
the peoples.”
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Nuclear Disarmament
The third week of First Committee focused on issues other than
nuclear disarmament, so attention on this field centered on the
new draft resolutions. The three key omnibus drafts—the New
Agenda Coalition (NAC)’s, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)’s,
and Japan’s “total elimination”—were released,
as were the traditional drafts covering specific aspects of nuclear
disarmament.
The only new nuclear disarmament draft is “Decreasing the
operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems” (A/C.1/62/L.29).
Co-sponsored by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland,
the draft calls for de-alerting nuclear without using the phrase.
While the United States will likely oppose the text, the use of
the most neutral phrase—“operational readiness”—is
a bid to draw the support of non-nuclear NATO states. In contrast,
India’s annual draft on “Reducing Nuclear Danger”
(A/C.1/62/L.21)
retains the language that the United States finds objectionable,
in particular, “hair-trigger alert,” in its call for
de-alerting and de-targeting. (See section on “Operational
Status of Nuclear Weapons” from last week). India’s
other annual draft, calling on the CD to negotiate a “Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.23),
is unchanged from last year.
The NAC’s resolution (A/C.1/62/L.9),
“Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation
of nuclear disarmament commitments,” essentially follows the
pattern of the 2006 draft, meaning that it calls for support for
the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the decisions from 1995 and
2000, as well for universal adherence to the Treaty. The draft is
a broad brush appeal to implement all practical steps agreed to
at the previous review conferences, specifying only the “vital
importance” of the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It updates the NPT paragraph, welcoming
the first session of the Preparatory Committee, and “looks
forward to a constructive and successful preparatory process.”
The paragraph on North Korea is also updated: last year, the NAC
condemned North Korea’s nuclear test; this year’s draft
urges Pyongyang to “rescind its announced withdrawal”
from the NPT.
In contrast, the Japanese-led annual draft, “Renewed determination
towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.30)
focuses on a number of specific steps. The emphasis is on the need
for the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations
under Article VI of the NPT, calling for “deeper reductions
in all types of nuclear weapons” with an emphasis on “irreversibility
and verifiability, as well as increased transparency.” It
says the US/Russian reductions “should serve as a step for
further nuclear disarmament.” The text calls for the reduction
in operational status of weapons systems and a “diminishing
role for nuclear weapons in security policies.” It endorses
the CTBT, the Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and calls for the “universalization”
of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Like the NAC draft, this text is basically the same as its 2006
version, except for updating the paragraphs on North Korea and the
NPT Preparatory Committee.
The NAM’s annual draft “Nuclear Disarmament”
(A/C.1/62/L.40)
adheres to the Movement’s past declarations and resolutions
on the subject. It contains every nuclear disarmament initiative
endorsed by the Movement including no first use, de-alerting, a
Conference
on Disarmament (CD) ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament,
the CTBT, a “non-discriminatory, multilateral … and
verifiable” FMCT, and a halt to qualitative improvements in
nuclear weapons. The operative paragraphs of the 2007 draft are
identical to 2006’s
resolution.
“Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at
the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.8)
is Iran’s draft resolution on the NPT nuclear disarmament
obligations. The draft focuses on reaffirming the 13
practical steps, the “unequivocal undertaking” by
the nuclear weapon states to eliminate those arms, and the Middle
East resolution.
Neither the US nor Russia tabled drafts either individually or
jointly on their bilateral relations. The last year the two powers
submitted a joint resolution on strategic arms control was 2004.
With START set to expire in 2009, and SORT in 2012, many member
states and arms control experts have been calling for renewals or
new agreements to be negotiated. The US
and Russia
did release a joint
statement on the Treaty
on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty), which they
announced on 25 October in First Committee (see Missiles).
- Jim Wurst, Middle
Powers Initiative
Nuclear Weapons Convention
For the eleventh year running, Malaysia has submitted a draft resolution
(A/C.1/62/L.36)
to First Committee on “Follow-up to the advisory opinon of
the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”
The resolution calls for implementation of the universal and unequivocal
nuclear disarmament obligation affirmed in the ICJ opinion through
the commencement of negotiations culminating in a Nuclear Weapons
Convention (NWC), an international treaty prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or
use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.
If the UN Secretary-General’s report on implementation of
this resolution (A/62/165)
is anything to go by, the resolution has had very little impact.
Only four countries—Chile, Cuba, Lebanon and Mexico—submitted
reports to the UN on their implementation efforts. However, lack-lustre
reporting to the UN does not necessarily reflect recent political
developments in favour of a NWC—and general support for nuclear
abolition—within and beyond the UN corridors.
The 2006 Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries, held in Havana, reaffirmed the importance of the unanimous
conclusion of the ICJ and expressed strong support for the Malaysian
resolution.
An increase in support for a NWC from across the political spectrum
is indicated by the launches
of the book Securing
our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons in Australia,
Austria, Canada, Malaysia, and New Zealand. Conservative leaders
such as the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser (former Prime Minister of Australia)
and the Rt
Hon. Jim Bolger (former Prime Minister of New Zealand) have
joined military leaders such as Romeo
Dallaire (former Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda), parliamentary
leaders, international law experts such as Christopher Weeramantry
(former Vice-President of the ICJ) Nobel
laureates, mayors,
UN officials such as Sergio
Duarte (UN High Representative for Disarmament) and others in
supporting an NWC.
General support for nuclear abolition has also gained increased
support from across the political spectrum. In late 2006 the Hoover
Institute hosted a twentieth anniversary conference of the historic
Reykjavik Summit of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, out of
which emerged a statement
from Republicans Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, along with
Democrats Sam Nunn and William Perry, calling for a nuclear weapons
free world.
Last week the Hoover Institute hosted a follow-up
conference, which considered ideas for a nuclear weapons convention.
Nancy
Reagan, President Reagan’s wife, told the conference that
“Ronnie had many hopes for the future and none were more important
to America and to mankind [sic] than the effort to create a world
free of nuclear weapons. As Ronnie said, these are 'totally irrational,
totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing and possibly destructive
of life on earth.'”
Back in the UN, the NWC received a strong push in the non-governmental
statement to the First Committee delivered by Jacqueline Cabasso
on 26 October. Ms. Cabasso noted the NWC has been revised and was
submitted to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee
in May 2007 (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17).
Also on 26 October, the Costa Rican delegation hosted a meeting
of governments interested in joining it and Malaysia in submitting
the revised Model NWC to the United Nations General Assembly at
the current session. Costa Rica noted that the Model NWC, an update
from the 1997 version (A/C.1/52/7),
sets the legal, political and technical elements for the establishment
and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world. As such, it can
assist the deliberative and negotiating processes for nuclear disarmament.
The revised version takes into consideration developments since
1997 relevant to the establishment of a nuclear weapons free regime.
- Alyn Ware, International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
As of the end of the third week of the First Committee, six resolutions
have been introduced relating to nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs).
Two draft resolutions call for the establishment of a NWFZ in the
Middle East. Egypt introduced the annual resolution on the “Establishment
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”
(A/C.1/62/L.1),
calling on countries in the region to adhere to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place all of their nuclear
activities under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Members of the League
of Arab States introduced the annual resolution, “The risk
of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (A/C.1/62/L.2),
reaffirming “the importance of Israel’s accession to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement
of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive [IAEA] safeguards.”
In past years, the draft resolution on the establishment of a Middle
East NWFZ has been adopted without a vote, while the resolution
on proliferation in the Middle East has been repeatedly rejected
by Israel and the United States on the basis of being one-sided
and divisive.
Three other resolutions pertain to existing zones in Latin America
and the Caribbean, Africa and Southeast Asia.
Nigeria introduced the draft resolution “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty” (A/C.1/62/L.26)
calling upon all African states that have not yet done so to sign
and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba so that it may enter into force,
as well as to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with
the IAEA. The resolution further expresses support for the establishment
of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a measure that “would enhance
the security of Africa and the viability of the African nuclear-weapon-free
zone”.
On the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Bangkok entering into
force, States Parties to the Treaty introduced a draft resolution
titled “Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free
Zone” (A/C.1/62/L.19).
The resolution calls on the five NWS to accede to the protocols
of the Treaty and to “provide individual or collective declarations
that they would not contribute to any activity that would violate
the Treaty.”
A group of members of the Treaty of Tlatelolco introduced a draft
resolution on the “Consolidation of the regime established
by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)” (A/C.1/62/L.10).
In the fortieth anniversary year of the historic treaty establishing
the world’s first NWFZ in a densely populated region, this
resolution encourages further cooperation between all existing NWFZs
and the implementation of agreements reached at the 2005
Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.
In this spirit of enhanced cooperation between existing NWFZs,
Brazil and New Zealand introduced the draft resolution “Nuclear-weapon-free
southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/62/L.27).
The resolution reaffirms the significant contribution of existing
NWFZ Treaties to regional and international peace and security,
while sending a strong political message that a large part of the
world is already nuclear weapon free. Support for the resolution
in the past has been strong among the regional NWFZs. Last year,
the resolution was co-sponsored by 25 countries, and was approved
by a large majority.
At a panel discussion sponsored by the Atomic
Mirror, a dialogue between civil society and country delegates
from NWFZs of Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific,
Africa and Central Asia pointed to the need of increased cooperation
and communication among the NWFZs and the involvement of civil society
in these efforts. The 2010 meeting of all NWFZ countries planned
to take place in the Pacific offers new opportunities for advancing
the NWFZ-led path to achieving global nuclear disarmament.
- Monika Szymurska, Atomic
Mirror
Disarmament Machinery
During a panel discussion last week, Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director
of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research, presented her examinations
of disarmament machinery as complex systems—that is, systems
that have many interrelated parts, and in which there are multiple
interactions between many components.
Dr. Lewis explained disarmament machinery is composed of a multiplicity
of fora—multilateral, bilateral, etc.—and each of these
fora is composed of multiple elements—treaties, negotiating
and deliberative bodies, international organizations, and so forth.
Each of these in turn are composed of issues, methods, and actors.
All these components of the system interact with each other, often
resulting in non-intuitive, non-deterministic behaviour. In complex
systems, history matters—interactions between components in
a complex system are not singular events. Exchanges between diplomats
in First Committee are not simply a product of their experiences
in Conference Room 4, and do not simply effect future exchanges
in this setting.
After developing this framework, Dr. Lewis explained that small
changes in environment, such as the introduction of new or unexpected
methods of work or external events, can effect the entire system.
In this vein, Ambassador Labbé of Chile, Chairperson of the
Open-ended
Working Group on SSOD IV (the fourth special session on disarmament),
introduced new methods to the working group in order to foster a
“critical mass of political support for SSOD IV”. He
encouraged delegates to seek ways to understand each other, to live
with their differences, and to create conditions to keep the idea
of SSOD IV alive. To this end, he held a retreat for delegates to
talk about the issues, insisted everyone refer to each other by
their first names, and invited eleven non-governmental organizations
to speak at one of their sessions.
Ambassador Labbé's approach to the working group is an example
of how small key changes to the environment or methods of work can
effect a complex system: the group had more energy and a spirit
of congeniality that is missing from the rest of the machinery.
While the group was unable to reach consensus on the establishment
of SSOD IV, channels of dialogue remain open and more flexible than
in other parts of the system.
We need this spirit to infect other aspects of the machinery. We
need, in short, a complex adaptive system—a system that learns
or evolves by utilizing acquired information (such as a child learning
her native language). Complex adaptive disarmament machinery would
require the machinery to not simply respond to the multiplicity
of interactions and events, but to grow from it—to become
more effective, or even to change.
Often falling short of this mark, a few delegations made proposals
for reforming First Committee's methods of work. The United
States argued many draft resolutions are no longer “relevant
to today's international security situation,” and suggested
they not be tabled more than five times, while Norway's
delegate suggested “limiting the possibility of co-sponsorship
to resolutions which are introduced for the first time in this committee.”
The Canadian
recommendation of increased reporting on the implementation of resolutions
offers a more substantial change that could improve the machinery's
effectiveness.
Ambassador Duncan of the United
Kingdom spoke of improving the capacity to address the challenges
of the twenty-first century and to “reflect the world as it
is, not as it was.” He believes that to do this, disarmament
machinery might need new instruments or approaches. In her presentation,
Dr. Lewis pointed out that many delegations seem to believe the
idea of a new piece of disarmament machinery is “indistinguishable
from magic.” She argued that new machinery is not magic, and
in fact, might be the only solution. Illustrating this point, the
Canadian
delegation pointed to the Oslo
Process and Ottawa
Convention as indications that “if states are serious
about accomplishing something, they will find the appropriate diplomatic
vehicle for so doing; and second, that innovative, external processes
most often bring us back—sooner rather than later—to
work within our treaty-based multilateral agreements and multilateral
bodies, and make them more relevant and robust.”
Draft resolutions on the Conference on Disarmament (A/C.1/62/L.11),
UN Disarmament Commission (A/C.1/62/L.3),
and SSOD IV (A/C.1/62/L.17)—each
of which contain only technical updates from last year—have
been tabled and will be voted on next week. Further information
about these resolutions will provided in next week's edition.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Missiles
On 25 October, the United
States and Russia
presented a joint
statement to the First Committee, noting the twentieth anniversary
of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and calling for interested countries
to discuss the possibility of internationalizing the Treaty, “though
the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction
of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs.”
The statement, delivered by Russia, also describes the Treaty as
an important and practical step toward fulfillment of Article VI
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), cites the role the
Treaty played in easing tensions in Europe, and expresses concern
about the proliferation of missiles in this range to an ever-greater
number of countries. Speaking after the presentation of the statement,
US Ambassador Rocca, called for greater attention to be paid to
the issue in order to ensure regional stability.
The statement is deliberately vague. Notably, it does not call
on all states to join the Treaty, but rather calls for discussion
on the possibility of “interested” parties to consider
renouncing their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Nor does
it specifically reference whether this commitment would take the
form of a new treaty or, most importantly, how this objective would
be verified. This minimalist, non-committal approach to international
arms control and disarmament perhaps reflects disagreement between
the two former superpowers on the utility of legally-binding treaties
as a means to combat proliferation. However, while this statement
tends to come across as a half-full political gesture, the substantive
aspects of the issues are worth (re)exploring.
As Ambassador Rocca notes, “Today’s world is far different.”
Yet, this is not the first time we have heard calls for internationalizing
the INF treaty. This position initially gained popularity in the
period immediately following the end of the Cold War, at a time
when the former superpower rivals were engaged in verifiable reduction
of their overall strategic inventories, not just those of intermediate-ranges.
It was also a time when very few countries other than the US and
Russia fielded missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 km.
But in the past decade and a half, the strategic sands have begun
to shift. Eight countries now deploy missiles that would be affected
by extending the missile ban covered by the Treaty, including China,
India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
As a complication to possible verification of an expanded INF regime,
most of these countries have developed an indigenous capacity to
manufacture ballistic missiles and a number of them, along with
several states not included in this list, are developing independent
space launch capabilities.
This proposal also faces a number of other issues. Although Rocca
cites proliferation of missiles as a concern to regional stability,
in many cases it is insecurity that has been a key driver of both
missile proliferation and arms races in several regions, particularly
in the Middle East and South and Northeast Asia. As the evolving
situation with North Korea demonstrates, it is often necessary to
address the underlying political causes of insecurity before considering
steps affecting regional stability.
More important to the credibility of this proposal are the policies
and proposals of its proponents and other NPT nuclear weapon states.
Likely incompatible to the goal of internationalizing any regime
governing missiles, these states continue to modernize and develop
more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile systems (ICBMs),
and indeed even are even considering placing conventional warheads
on certain ICBMs previously used only for nuclear missions. Beyond
this, there are US programs for next generation strategic weapons,
such as Prompt Global Strike, which, according to US Air Force planning
documents, involves the possibility of a “range of system
concepts to deliver precision weapons with global reach, in minutes
to hours.” It is also likely that the INF expansion proposal
will be incompatible with approaches to missile non-proliferation
taken over the past two decades: namely establishment of export
control regimes (the efficacy of which is called into question by
the continuing proliferation of longer-ranged missile systems) and
ballistic missile defenses.
While we must certainly acknowledge the achievement by Russia and
the US in eliminating a whole class of weaponry, thereby ensuring
more stable security especially for the peoples of Europe and the
former Soviet Union, the present reality points to the need for
a comprehensive approach to missiles. That said, there are aspects
of the present proposal worth considering, especially if it could
add an international character to a verification regime on missiles,
which would put in place the procedures, institutions, and knowledge
necessary to verify further reductions in ballistic missile inventories.
Regardless of the merits of the proposal, it is good to see some
attention being paid to a subject that has slowly become the elephant
in the room of arms control. However, in light of the complicating
factors highlighted above, and in particular the current atmosphere
of superpowers that seem allergic to verifiable and irreversible
reductions in their strategic forces, any proposal that tends to
accentuate existing imbalances in the international strategic framework
without ameliorating the root causes of insecurity seems a bit cynical.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Outer Space
Last week in the First Committee, the co-sponsors of the two anticipated
draft resolutions on outer space tabled their texts, A/C.1/62/L.34,
“Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” and A/C.1/62/L.41,
“Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space”.
Neither contained any significant change from previous years' texts.
The Russia-sponsored L.41 garnered 10 new co-sponsors—Austria,
Cyprus, Denmark, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Romania, Spain, Switzerland,
and Veneuzela.
First Committee heard presentations from the Chairperson of the
UN
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and Magnus
Hellgren of the Swedish Mission, who talked about the role of
COPUOS and the CD, respectively, in dealing with space security
issues, and specifics of the debate surrounding the possibility
of a new treaty. Despite these efforts, a new treaty in space at
this time does not seem possible, in particular due ot the US' stated
objection to such a treaty, as articulated in its 2006
National Space Policy and as reiterated this week by Mr.
George Pataki during the Thematic Debate.
Therefore, as a way to stimulate new ideas and deepen the debate
on the subject, some members of the international community organized
several events over the past two weeks. The Global
Security Institute, the Secure
World Foundation, the UN
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Governments
of Russia and China organized a panel discussion on 15 October entitled
“Exploring Cooperative Approaches to Outer Space Security.”
Russian Counselor Valery Semin discussed elements of the not-yet-released
Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty, and Counselor
Li Yang of China voiced his country's general support of a new legal
instrument, without any specifics attached to such support. US Ambassador
(ret.) Thomas Graham, Chairman of the Bipartisan
Security Group, discussed several initiatives and possibilities
for strengthening our outer space regime, including the Space
Security Index and the possibility of a protocol to the Outer
Space Treaty. He urged that more be done to protect outer space
as a global common, similar to the approach to Antarctica, before
weapons programs “become entrenched.” Dr. Patricia Lewis
of UNIDIR offered a very comprehensive overview of several paths
forward, including a code of conduct, a new treaty, and other new
“rules of the road” options. She appealed to the international
community to build trust, confidence and cooperation, so as to enable
the emerging “space generation” to realize their goal
of exploring outer space in ways unimaginable to us so far.
In the personification of Dr. Lewis's appeal, two young filmmakers
screened their film in Conference Room 4 on Tuesday, Final
Frontier: Explorers or Warriors? This inspiring project
looked insightfully and humorously into the issues of space security,
highlighting the danger of space junk and the folly of the weaponization
of space.
For the first time ever, civil society delivered a presentation
to the First Committee on outer space security, whereby they voiced
support for the suggestion
of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
to convene a high-level panel to assess our security situation in
outer space and recommend ways forward. While it may be too late
for inclusion of this recommendation in this year's resolutions,
individual member states or regional groupings are strongly encouraged
to write letters of support for this idea to the Secretariat. Some
have already voiced their willingness to do so.
For more information or to discuss this initiative further, or
to obtain a copy of the film Final Frontier, contact the
Global Security
Institute.
- Rhianna Tyson, Global
Security Institute and Secure
World Foundation
Verification and Transparency
On 17 October, Gustavo
Zlauvinen, Representative of the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), explained, “effective verification
has four elements: adequate legal authority, state-of-the-art technology,
access to all relevant information and locations, and sufficient
human and financial resources.” Zlauvinen noted IAEA comprehensive
safeguards and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification
standard, but argued that “the Agency's crucial verification
role needs more sophisticated approaches for information analysis,
as well as for continuous updates to verification equipment and
expertise. As new facilities and countries come under safeguards,
the Agency will need the corresponding increases in financial funding
and personnel.” Many delegates have noted the value of IAEA
verification measures, and have called upon states outside of the
disarmament and non-proliferation regime to submit their nuclear
facilities to IAEA inspections.
On 23 October, Dr. John Barrett of Canada provided an update on
the progress of the UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) on Verification.
As Chair of the GGE, Dr. Barrett emphasized the need for reports
to demonstrate how verification has addressed international security
needs. He argued that the success of verification mechanisms can
best be measured by the extent to which member states are in compliance
with verification methods. The United
States delegation subsequently argued that “verification
is designed to strengthen national and international security by
providing the means and methods for the detection and deterrence
of noncompliance.” The US statement focused on “the
importance of responding to noncompliance resolutely and in a timely
fashion,” arguing, “if detection has no consequences
for the violator, then verification has no meaning, and deterrence
is unachievable.” According the US, verification is only the
first step, not an end in itself.
Meanwhile, the Canadian
delegation emphasized, “[e]ffective verification, compliance
and monitoring is a core ingredient in the development of trust
among States.” It pointed out that the most significant multilateral
disarmament and arms control agreements from the 1990s “made
verification an integral tool to reinforce disarmament agreements.”
Canada subsequently introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.47,
“Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification,” which notes
the GGE on Verification's report, requests the Secretary-General
circulate it widely, and encourages member states to read it and
offer additional views to the Secretary-General. Last year, Canada
submitted a draft
decision by the same name, encouraging the GGE on Verification
“to bring its work to an agreed conclusion as soon as possible.”
Transparency was also frequently cited in many statements as necessary
and beneficial to increasing international peace and security. The
European
Union argued that transparency in armaments “is an essential
component in fighting the uncontrolled proliferation” of weapons
and “in providing an atmosphere of confidence and security.”
The EU further contended that transparency in military spending
“constitutes a key element of confidence between States and
can thus contribute to conflict prevention.” Draft resolution
A/C.1/62/L.33,
“Objective information on military matters, including transparency
of military expenditures,” notes the importance of the standardized
reporting system while recognizing it needs to improved. It calls
upon states to contribute to the reporting system, and “[e]ncourages
relevant international bodies and regional organizations to promote
transparency of military expenditures and to enhance complementarity
among reporting systems.” This is a bi-annual resolution,
last introduced in 2005.
The texts are virtually the same.
- Ray Acheson and Sarmadi Almecci, Reaching
Critical Will
Negative Security Assurances
On Wednesday, the delegation of Peru introduced draft resolution
A/C.1/62/L.44
entitled, “Conclusion of effective international agreements
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons.” The resolution was co-sponsored by
27 additional states, although the only nuclear weapon possessing
state to co-sponsor was Pakistan. Peru’s draft resolution
closely resembles the resolutions that have been introduced by Pakistan
in previous years. It stresses the “urgent need to reach an
early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons” and appeals to all member states to work towards
that end.
The resolution also stresses the role the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) has to play in bringing about negative security
assurances. It notes there seem to be no objections in the CD to
the principle of negative security assurances, and “recommends
that the CD actively continue intensive negotiations with a view
to early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons.”
Several other draft resolutions introduced this week also brought
up the subject of negative security assurances. A/C.1/62/L.8,
“Follow up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at
the 1995 and 2000 review conference of the parties to the [nuclear
Non-Proliferaty Treaty],” introduced by Iran without co-sponsors
noted, among other things, that “the 2000 review conference
of the parties to the treaty agreed that legally binding security
assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon
States parties to the treaty strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”
Draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.40,
introduced by Myanmar with 32 co-sponsors, is titled “General
and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament.” Among the
resolution’s operative paragraphs is one that “[c]alls
for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments
on adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.”
During last year’s First Committee, the “Conclusion
of effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”
draft
resolution passed 108-1
with 57 abstentions, and the resolution passed 119-1
with 59 abstentions in the General Assembly. The United States
was the only state to vote against the resolution.
- Nathan Band, Global
Security Institute
Biological and Chemical
Weapons
On 17 October, Hungary submitted a draft resolution entitled “Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction”
(A/C.1/62/L.37).
The document notes with satisfaction the growing number—from
55 last year to 59 this year—of parties to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
The new parties are Gabon, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, and Trinidad
and Tobago.
Discussion on biological weapons during Thematic Debate focused
on the outcome of the Sixth
Review Conference of the BTWC, which took place in December
2006, vis-à-vis the strengthening of the Convention. The
draft resolution submitted by Hungary praised the successful outcome
of this Conference. Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan,
the president of the Sixth Review Conference and Chairperson of
the BTWC at the First Committee, said the outcome of the Conference
established a “common vision for the Convention and its implementation.”
Russia emphasized the adoption of practical measures at the Conference
for the strengthening of the BTWC, and the contribution of the former
to the establishment of a verification system for the latter.
On 23 October, Poland introduced a draft resolution entitled “Implementation
of the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction”
(A/C.1/62/L.7).
A similar draft
resolution was introduced last year, and there are no substantial
differences between the two. This year’s draft resolution
notes there is an ongoing effort to achieve the objective and the
purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The draft reaffirms how essential the outcome of the First Special
Session of the Conference of the State Parties to Review the Operation
of the CWC was to achieving the objective and the purpose of the
Convention. Also, the universality of the CWC is vital to achieving
these goals, so the draft resolution calls on the states that have
not become parties to the Convention to do so without delay.
The implementation of the CWC was a reoccurring theme in the Thematic
Debate on other weapons of mass destruction. According to Indonesia,
the destruction of chemical weapons has been more successful than
the destruction of other weapons of mass destruction; however, Indonesia
expressed some pessimism by stating that 5 out of 6 possessors of
chemical weapons have asked for extensions to destroy their stockpiles,
until 2012. There is an overall sentiment that possessors of chemical
weapons will not be able to meet this deadline; the delegation also
regretted that only one-third of the world’s chemical weapons
stockpiles have been destroyed.
Another reoccurring theme in L.7 is the importance of the “effective
application of the verification system”, which contributes
to the compliance with the CWC by establishing confidence building
measures. The draft mentions the vital work of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in this respect, in
addition to the organization’s contribution to the implementation
of the Convention.
- Edgar Socarras, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Depleted Uranium
For the second time in First Committee, a draft resolution related
to depleted uranium (DU) has been tabled. In 2002, Iraq tabled draft
resolution A/C.1/57/L.14
in First Committee, entitled “Effects of the use of depleted
uranium in armaments.” Only 35 states voted in favour of the
resolution and it was not adopted. The European
Union, Pakistan,
and United
States objected to DU being characterized as a weapon of mass
destruction, and the EU and US argued that scientific studies by
the World Health
Organization (WHO) and UN
Environmental Programme had found no evidence that DU in armaments
has a notable impact on human health or the environment.
This year, the Cuban delegation drafted the text and secured sponsorship
from the rest of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In a letter circulated
to fellow delegations, the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of
the NAM explains the text “is fully consistent with the international
concern on this issue and the factual information available in this
regard.”
The draft resolution, “Effects of the use of armaments and
ammunitions containing depleted uranium” (A/C.1/62/L.18),
considers the potential harm caused by DU armaments and ammunitions
on human health and the environment, and subsequently requests the
Secretary-General “seek the view of Member States and relevant
international organizations” on these harmful effects and
submit a report to the General Assembly next year. It also requests
member states “refrain from using armaments and ammunitions
containing depleted uranium until studies to determine the effects
of such armaments and ammunitions on human health and the environment
are completed.”
DU is a by-product left over when natural uranium ore is enriched
for use in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. It is a toxic,
dense, hard metal. If it is ingested, inhaled, or enters the body
through other means, it creates risks as both as a toxic heavy metal
and as a radioactive material. DU munitions explode upon impact
and release uranium oxide dust. It has been used by the US and other
militaries in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and both recent conflicts in
Iraq.
The WHO’s depleted
uranium fact sheet notes that uranium released from embedded
fragments (shrapnel wounds) may accumulate in the central nervous
system tissue, though it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from
the few studies reported. The one area of potentially demonstrable
health hazard is liver and kidney damage due to long-term exposure,
because both the kidneys and liver help to filter ingested uranium
out of the human body.
There have been striking coincidences of increased cancer rates,
childhood cancers, still-births, and birth defects in southern Iraq
(Basra), and among military personnel involved in areas in which
DU has been used extensively in both the 1991 Gulf War and the ongoing
conflict in Iraq. Whether these cancers are causally linked to DU
has not been irrefutably established.
At the Fourth International Conference on DU Weapons, Professor
Manfred Mohr of the International Association of Lawyers Against
Nuclear Arms argued the use of DU armaments raises questions under
the principles of international humanitarian law, including those
of distinction, indiscriminate effect, proportionality, and precaution.
For more information about Professor Mohr's remarks and the rest
of the Conference, please see RCW's Conference
Report. For more information about DU, please see RCW's backgrounder
and the International
Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons website.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Conventional Weapons
On behalf of the European
Union (EU), Ambassador Gomes of Portugal stated, “Uncontrolled
stocks of ammunition contribute to the risks of trafficking and
proliferation and to the prolongation and intensification of armed
conflicts.” In this regard, the EU looks forward to the work
of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Conventional
Ammunition Stockpiles in Surplus” in 2008. The EU also noted
that the recommendations of the GGE on the “continuing operation
of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further
development” were incorporated into resolution
61/77 on Transparency in Armaments. Ambassador Tarui of Japan
noted he “values China’s efforts as a first step towards
confidence building in the international community through the improvement
of transparency in armaments” by returning to the Register
(see Conventional
Weapons Week 1).
France’s
Ambassador Dobelle noted that conventional weapons have the greatest
immediate impact on the security, well-being, and survival of the
inhabitants of the planet. The Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), while an example of
an effective instrument for addressing conventional weapons issues,
is in crisis. France is organizing an informal conference on the
CFE to be held in early November, to which all States Parties and
candidates for adhesion to the treaty are invited.
The Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) was highlighted this week
by Ambassador
Rivasseau (France), President of the CCW Third Review Conference.
Ambassador Rivasseau spoke in particular of the Plan of Action (PoA)
to Promote Universality of the Convention, pursuant to the decision
on universality as contained in the Final Declaration of the Third
CCW Review Conference. This PoA contains a number of successive
steps: urging all States Parties to the CCW to join all Protocols
and the amendment to Article 1; fostering interest in and prevent
violations of the Convention; and encouraging involvement in universalization
efforts.
Regarding cluster
munitions, the EU
again urged the High Contracting Parties to the CCW to support its
proposal for a negotiating mandate on cluster munitions (CCW/GGE/2007/WP.3)
(see Conventional
Weapons Week 1), so that the CCW can show its relevance to matters
of International Humanitarian Law, considering both military requirements
and humanitarian concerns. The delegations of Japan,
France,
the United
Kingdom, and Switzerland
also support the negotiation of an international agreement on cluster
munitions within the CCW, with Switzerland calling for support of
the Oslo
Declaration on cluster munitions as well. Guatemala’s
delegation, on behalf of the Centre for Central American Integration
System (SICA) and Mexico, stated that participants of the Latin
American Conference support efforts to create a cluster munitions-free
zone, and asked countries that produced cluster munitions to cease
doing do immediately. Ambassador Mtshali of South
Africa noted the humanitarian crisis caused by unexploded munitions
in the aftermath of the conflict in Lebanon demands the international
community take action to prevent such a situation from reoccurring,
and that South Africa remains flexible as to whether negotiations
on an international instrument to prohibit cluster munitions takes
place within the framework of the CCW or as part of a separate process.
On man-portable
air defense systems (MANPADS), the EU
“firmly supports broader efforts in various multilateral fora,
focusing particularly on export controls,” and supports initiatives
targeting MANPADS-related issues separately, including through implementation
of General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus.
In closing, Ambassador
Rivasseau aptly reminded states that “multilateral diplomacy
is not to score goals against some of us but to dig tirelessly the
furrow where to seed the hopes of a world which would be more just
and fair, therefore more peaceful and more secure.” This sentiment
should carry through the remaining deliberations on resolutions
and voting in this year’s First Committee.
- Waverly de Bruijn, Global
Action to Prevent War
Small Arms and Light Weapons
The Thematic Debate on conventional weapons included a range of
issues on small
arms and light weapons (SALW), such as UN and regional measures
to combat the illicit trade in SALW. Most are echoed in the draft
resolution, co-sponsored by 25 states, “The illicit trade
in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” (A/C.1/62/L.49).
The preamble of L.49 is slightly different from last
year's SALW resolution, in that it bears in mind “the
importance of regular national reporting, which could greatly facilitate
the rendering of international cooperation and assistance to affected
States.” The new text also “takes note of the report
submitted to the General Assembly by the Group of Governmental Experts
... and encourages States to implement its recommendations.”
Unlike its predecessor, L.49 notes the relationship between the
uncontrolled spread of SALW and sustainable development, remarking
on the “wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences”
of illicit trade. Furthermore, it “[r]ecognizes the necessity
for interested States to develop effective coordination mechanisms
... to make international cooperation and assistance more effective,”
and “encourages civil society and relevant organizations to
strengthen their cooperation and work with States at the respective
national and regional levels to achieve the implementation of the
Programme of Action.”
Daniël
Prins, Chair of the Group
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Illicit Brokering in Small Arms
and Light Weapons, offered a presentation on the work of that
body. The presentation stressed that not only should states work
against illicit brokering, they should also work to support international
cooperation. These efforts to combat illicit brokering should be
linked to the UN’s 2001 Programme
of Action (PoA) to Combat, Prevent, and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. Prins’ presentation
also touched on the Biennial Meeting of States (BMS), set to take
place in July 2008 in New York, as a way to move forward. South
Africa and other delegations lauded the report
of the GGE and hope the General Assembly will endorse the recommendations
of the group.
In light of the failure of the 2006
Review Conference of the PoA to produce any substantive outcome,
many states have focused on the upcoming BMS as a focal point of
the work on SALW. Finland
suggested that the BMS could develop new instruments, like peer
review on PoA implementation. Japan
also hoped the upcoming BMS would include discussion on implementing
the International
Instrument on Marking, Recordkeeping and Tracing, which could
help keep track of the movement of SALW. The European
Union (EU) and Nigeria
also expressed support for this instrument.
The Thematic Debate gave many states a chance to speak on regional
and local initiatives in the area of SALW. Japan’s
statement highlighted its “Tokyo
Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons,” called “SALW
Issues from the Perspective of the Protection and Empowerment of
the Peaceful Community.” This workshop aimed to develop best
practice on SALW control. Statements by Nigeria,
the EU,
and MERCOSUR
emphasized their existing regional initiatives. The Centre
for Central American Integration System (SICA) and Mexico referenced
the May 2006 Antigua
Declaration.
Section III of the PoA, assistance to states on projects related
to SALW control, was also an important topic. Japan
spoke about its initiatives to assist the Central African Republic
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. South
Africa identified “capacity, financial, and other concrete
needs” for reduction of illicit trade in SALW. The EU
said it provided 105 million Euro for such assistance between 2003
and 2005. Mali, on behalf of the members of the Economic Community
of West African States, tabled its annual resolution on “Assistance
to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light
weapons and collecting them” (A/C.1/62/L.5).
The text is virtually the same as its predecessor.
Throughout the debate on SALW, states noted the work of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as well. MERCOSUR's
statement supported the efforts of civil society in the area of
SALW, as did that of Switzerland. The EU
statement supported the “Geneva
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development,” a project
driven in part by NGOs.
Friday’s NGO presentations to the First Committee allowed
for civil society input on SALW. Bob
Barr of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities
raised concerns that efforts to limit SALW would ultimately limit
legitimate civilian possession. Rebecca
Peters of the International Action Network on Small Arms said
her organization was disappointed this year’s SALW did not
commit to regular review processes of the PoA. She also recommended
that the BMS be less formal, more dynamic, and allow more structured
NGO participation, and urged more funding for PoA implementation.
- Gabriel Morden-Snipper, Quaker
United Nations Office
Arms Trade Treaty
Delegations from the European
Union (EU), Nigeria,
Finland,
Japan,
Lesotho,
the United
Kingdom, and France
spoke in favor of the Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) process. The EU regards it as a “pressing
need,” as irresponsible arms transfers negatively impact peace,
security, human rights and sustainable development, and expressed
that “the United Nations is the only appropriate forum to
deliver a truly universal instrument.” The delegation of Finland
assessed that the ATT is “one of the core issues at the nexus
of development, human rights and security,” and looks forward
to the report of the upcoming Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)
to the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly. Ambassador Duncan
stated that the United Kingdom’s vision of the Responsibility
to Protect is to “improve our capacity to prevent the emergence
of conflict.... A critical dimension is controlling the spread of
weapons whose easy availability makes it so simple to set up militias,
and provoke violence and mayhem.”
Uruguay’s Ambassador Perazza, on behalf of MERCOSUR,
stated that while “respecting the premise that no regulation
shall undermine the sovereign right of States to acquire arms for
their security and for the exercise of their legitimate defence,”
MERCOSUR takes note of the upcoming GGE to examine the feasibility,
scope, and parameters for an ATT. MERCOSUR encouraged states to
discuss the standards in a “non-discriminatory, objective,
balanced and transparent” way, and reiterates its appeal for
states to “reinforce regulations on the acquisition and possession
of arms to prevent the diversion of legally acquired arms towards
the illicit market.”
Mr.
Bob Barr, on behalf of the World Forum on the Future of Sport
Shooting Activities (WFSA), and Mr.
Joseph Dube, on behalf of the International Action Network on
Small Arms (IANSA), addressed First Committee on the ATT during
the NGO statements on 26 October. Mr. Barr noted that the majority
of the estimated 875 million small arms in the world are owned by
civilians, many of whom are “law-abiding hunters, sport shooters,
collectors and other firearms owners.” He reported that the
WFSA feels these owners are “at risk” to be impacted
by the results of the ATT. He accused the Treaty of being “no
more than an exercise in ‘gesture politics.’”
Mr. Dube's presentation followed, in which he told the story of
a 13-year-old boy in West Africa who lost his parents and sister
and was forced at gunpoint to become a child soldier, because of
the uncontrolled arms trade. Mr. Dube further noted that the process
that Cambodia, Mali, and Costa Rica is now supported by 153 (80%
of) member states, who voted to start the ATT process. Mr. Dube
reiterated that the ATT will not prevent states from acquiring arms
for legitimate defense purposes, but should have at its heart respect
for human rights, international humanitarian law, and sustainable
development.
A number of side events held by Control
Arms, Parliamentarians
for Global Action, the Parliamentary
Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and others also highlighted
the need for an ATT. They included testimony by parliamentarians
and gun violence survivors, and showcased analyses of member states
and “people’s consultations” on the feasibility,
scope, and parameters of such a treaty.
Forward motion on the establishment of an ATT is continuing. Of
the ATT process, Mr. Dube aptly quoted President Nelson Mandela
who once said “it always seems impossible UNTIL IT’S
DONE.”
- Waverly de Bruijn, Global
Action to Prevent War
Landmines
To mark the tenth anniversary of the Mine
Ban Treaty, Australia convened a panel discussion to outline
the achievements and challenges concerning the Treaty. Australia’s
Ambassador Miller highlighted the Treaty’s unique role in
banning an entire class of weapons, noting also that the Treaty
has the highest membership of any conventional arms treaty. However,
challenges still remain, with key anti-personnel mine-producing
nations yet to ratify the Convention.
Dr. Reza of the Mine
Action Centre for Afghanistan outlined the humanitarian impact
of landmines, stating that Afghanistan needs to “banish the
legacy of mines … with people unable to reclaim their lives
until this remanent of war is removed.” Dr. Reza noted that
since Afghanistan signed the Treaty in 2003, it has cleared sixty
percent of contaminated land, but it requires more financial assistance
to meet its obligations. Ian Mansfield from the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining highlighted that
other than the “cheap” factor there was little historical
evidence of the useful military purpose of anti-personnel mines,
with the long term humanitarian impact outweighing any military
benefits.
On 17 October, draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.39,
“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction” was introduced. The omnibus resolution,
sponsored by Australia, Croatia, and Jordan, is similar to last
year’s resolution, with minimal text changes. This resolution
aims at eliminating landmines from existing fields, prohibiting
their production and distribution, and providing assistance to victims.
Ambassador Mtshali of South
Africa supported the resolution and called on member states
to provide further financial assistance in rehabilitation and mine
victim support. Canada also voiced its support, noting that 40 states
are yet to ratify the Treaty and that 160-180 million landmines
are still stockpiled in China, Russia, the United States, Pakistan,
and India.
The Republic of Korea and China (both non-signatories to the Treaty)
responded informally to the panel discussion. The Republic of Korea
stated that while innocent civilians must be protected from irresponsible
use of landmines, there is a distinction between military use and
targeting civilians. China explained it supports the principles
of the Treaty, and while it is not a party to the Treaty, it has
voted in favour of the resolution since 1995. The United States
issued a written
statement reiterating its position of destroying “non-self
destructing anti-personnel landmines” but maintaining stockpiles
for defence of South Korea, training, and research. While non-signatories
do support demining and victim assistance, universal membership
would make the Mine Ban Treaty a more effective tool in the quest
to ban anti-personnel landmines.
- Kavitha Suthanthiraraj, Global
Action to Prevent War
Disarmament
and Development
Methods and tools for increasing awareness of the link between
disarmament and development were discussed last week in both governmental
statements and the introduction of resolutions. The United Nations
CyberSchoolBus was hailed by the Japanese
delegation as an important program in explaining the link between
development and disarmament, emphasizing, “[as] long as there
are landmines in the ground, people will be deprived of their basic
right to a decent life; communities will be denied the opportunity
to prosper.” In presentations marking the tenth anniversary
of the Mine
Ban Treaty, several panelists also highlighted mine contaminated
areas as a hindrance to development, and the need for continued
efforts in disarming for development.
Delegates reiterated the necessity to follow through on agreements
and treaties that would enable countries to designate funds to development
programs. Finland
reiterated the importance of the Arms
Trade Treaty “as one of the core issues at the nexus of
development, human rights and security.” The European
Union similarly argued that irresponsible arms transfers negatively
impact “peace, reconstruction, security, stability, human
rights and sustainable development,” which is “especially
damaging to developing countries,” and further emphasized,
“it diverts scarce resources from vital poverty alleviation
and other development work.”
The delegation from Switzerland
reported that at a ministerial
summit in Geneva in June 2006, a decision was reached with provisions
to reduce consequences of armed violence on socio-economic development.
The summit adopted a text called The
Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, in
which ministers and representatives from 42 countries pledged to
strengthen their “efforts to integrate armed violence reduction
and conflict prevention programmes into national, regional and multilateral
development frameworks, institutions and strategies, as well as
into humanitarian assistance, emergency, and crisis management initiatives.”
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emphasized the importance of achieving
the Millennium Development Goals through the draft resolution “Relationship
between disarmament and development” (A/C.1/62/L.50).
Speaking for the NAM, Indonesia's
Ambassador Wibowo introduced L.50, emphasizing “that the symbiotic
relationship between disarmament and development and the important
role of security in this connection.” NAM also expressed concern
“at the increasing global military expenditures, which could
otherwise go into development, poverty eradication and the elimination
of diseases, particularly in the developing countries. NAM reiterates
the importance of exercising restraint in military expenditure,
so that human and financial resources thus saved can be used for
the on-going efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.”
The draft is similar to last
year's resolution. It adds paragraphs noting the fact that 2007
marks the twentieth anniversary of the adoption in 1987 of the Final
Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between
Disarmament and Development,” and remarks on the importance
of following up on the implementation of the action programme adopted
there. There is also a new operative paragraph (6), which “[i]nvites
Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information
regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made
available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation
agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing
the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.”A
decrease in arms and redistribution of military expenditures to
development programmes would help improve the quality of life and
decrease the number of unnecessary deaths associated with both war
and poverty.
- Gabrielle Walther and Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Regional Disarmament
In 1986, the UN General Assembly created Regional Centres for Peace
and Disarmament in Asia and Africa, and for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin American and the Caribbean. The Centres operate
under the auspices of the Office
of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). Their contributions to the implementation
of peace and disarmament initiatives in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America are highly valued by the states of their regions, but their
efficacy continues to be hampered by the at-will funding mechanisms
that provide their operating budgets. Lack of funds has inhibited
a more robust role for the Centres in implementating norms and principles
of disarmament.
Last week, the Director of the ODA Regional Disarmament Branch,
Ms.
Anges Marcaillou, reported on the Centres. Both she and the
delegation of Nepal mentioned that arrangements for the relocation
of the Asia/Pacific Centre to Kathmandu have been finalized. Ms.
Marcaillou also noted that eleven Central African states have commended
the work of the Regional Centre in Africa, and that the Lima Centre
in Latin America and the Caribbean has assisted in regulating small
arms and light weapons in the region. Overall, her presentation
emphasized the vital role of the Centres in implementing global
norms and efforts in specific regional contexts. She expressed hope
for collaboration of the Regional Centres in the implementation
of worldwide projects, but emphasized the importance of tailoring
projects to the specific needs of each Centre’s region.
Unlike the other two Centres, the Lima Centre’s mandate includes
economic and social development—a distinction noted by the
Peruvian
delegation in its statement introducing draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.4
on the Centre. As in previous years, this resolution emphasizes
the importance of the Regional Centre to peace and security in Latin
America, especially in its support of the implementation of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone in Latin America. The resolution also highlights
the Centre’s efforts in the field of development.
Nepal introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.35,
on the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and
the Pacific, which commends the efforts and successes of the Centre.
Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, introduced a similar draft
resolution, A/C.1/62/L.24,
which commends the work of the Centre in Africa, but expresses deep
concern about the chronic inability to sufficiently fund its work,
encourages close cooperation with the African Union to help stabilize
the funding situation, and urges all states and intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions
to strengthen the Centre.
In addition to the attention given the Regional Centres, draft
resolution A/C.1/62/L.31,
"Regional Disarmament," states, “global and regional
approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore
be pursued simultaneously” in areas of disarmament, nuclear
proliferation, security, and confidence-building measures. The complementarity
of global and regional approaches corresponds with Dr. Patricia
Lewis of UNIDIR’s presentation, in which she spoke of the
need for a multiplicity of approaches and fora to pursue global
peace and security. Additionally, a resolution on "Confidence-building
measures in the regional and subregional contexts," A/C.1/62/L.43,
is intended to address the need for a regional approach to confidence-building
and transparency, while draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.42
addresses conventional arms control at the regional and subregional
levels, calling for closer cooperation to prevent proliferation
of conventional weapons and illicit trafficking. Lastly, draft resolution
A/C.1/62/L.48
calls for the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean
region.
- Anna Walther, Reaching
Critical Will
Terrorism
During Thematic Debate, a few states referenced specific issues
of concern regarding terrorism. Sudan’s
Counsellor Hassan stated the successful implementation of Security
Council resolution 1540 (2004) depends on international, regional,
and sub-regional institutions assisting developing countries in
their implementation efforts. He added that “[n]on-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons [must] move towards a global disarmament process
to discourage the new arms race.”
Ambassador Langeland of Norway
focused on the threat of bioterrorism, which “makes it even
more important to renew our preventive efforts in the field of biosafety
and biosecurity.” Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s Ambassador
Aitimova argued that information available online poses a potential
threat if used by terrorists.
India
tabled the draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.22,
“Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction,” which was adopted without a vote last year.
Besides purely cosmetic updates, there has been a substantial swap
among the sponsors. The draft resolution was brought forward by
18 previous sponsors and two new ones (Bangladesh and Malaysia),
but without the support of Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia,
France, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,
Malta, Monaco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America, or Zambia.
France
reintroduced a draft resolution on “Preventing the acquisition
by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources” (A/C.1/62/L.46),
which had been previously adopted with consensus by the General
Assembly in 2005 (A/60/73).
The former title, “Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism,”
has been slightly changed “to encompass a diverse range of
instruments by the member states to circumvent terrorists of acquiring
radioactive materials or sources,” according to Ambassador
Dobelle of France.
L.46 has a three fold goal: to maintain support for the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a central player in securing
sources of radiological materials, to sustain the universalization
of existing international instruments, and to promote the expansion
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation aimed at enforcing the
security of radioactive sources.
The preambular paragraph related to the IAEA introduces the establishment
of technical guidance as a particularity of the IAEA’s activities
in promoting and reinforcing the safety and security of radioactive
materials and sources. A new paragraph (3) encourages member states
to extend their control measures to detect trafficking of radioactive
materials inside their territory, in addition to maintaining border
controls, which they are already obliged to. Ambassador
Dobelle emphasized this amendment “did not evoke any difficulties
due to prior informal consultations … even though we all comprehend
that … everybody is lead in their actions by the resources
to his disposition.” A second new paragraph (7) welcomes the
efforts undertaken by member states “to search for, locate
and secure unsecured and/or uncontrolled sources (“orphan
radioactive sources”).”
Barbados tabled amendments (A/C.1/62/L.53)
to draft resolution L.46, which extend the focus on the cessation
of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of
small island developing states. By the time of writing this article,
the negotiations on the revision of the draft resolution L.46 were
still taking place.
- Philip Urech, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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