First Committee Monitor
Final Edition 2007
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In this edition:
Introduction
In his closing remarks on 2 November, First Committee Chairperson
Paul
Badji outlined the “productivity” of the 2007 session:
more than 315 statements
delivered and 52 draft
texts adopted. If productivity can be measured by volume of
paper circulated, then First Committee was extremely successful.
If, however, we turn to Badji's question of whether or not First
Committee “advanced the cause of disarmament and international
security,” the 2007 session could best be characterized as
underwhelming.
Despite the introduction and adoption of new draft resolutions
on depleted uranium and de-alerting,
Sierra Leone's proposal for First Committee to include human security
as a topic in its Thematic Debate next year, and frequent panels
of experts, First Committee largely consisted of familiar remarks
interspersed with a few severe discrepancies. Most notable of these
was the United
States' statement regarding its nuclear posture, which contained
several misleading or incorrect claims. It was met with rebuttals
by prominent members of civil society, including Bruce
Blair of the World
Security Institute and Hans
M. Kristensen of the Federation
of American Scientists, and was the subject of a critical article
appearing in the Washington
Post. The US statement was a response to the tabling of draft
resolution A/C.1/62/L.29
on de-alerting, which France,
the United Kingdom, and the US voted against. The US delegation
rejected the assertion that their nuclear weapons are on “launch
on warning status” or “hair-trigger alert,” employing
linguistics as cover, yet subsequently argued that as long as nuclear
weapons exist, it is necessary to keep "some portion of our
forces at some level of alert." Perhaps in an attempt to be
less conspicuously contradictory, the UK, whose single remaining
nuclear weapon system is kept on several day's notice-to-fire, simply
argued that de-alerting is not a “useful priority”.
Disagreements abounded at First Committee, with the US and Pakistan,
both nuclear weapon possessors, asserting supposedly different agendas
for moving forward with disarmament and non-proliferation. Pakistan's
“new global consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation,”
outlined in its non-paper
and statements,
emphasizes balanced reductions of military forces and weapons “based
on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a
view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level,
taking into account the need of all States to protect their security.”
Meanwhile, the US
called for “a path to complete nuclear disarmament that avoids
creating new instabilities potentially damaging to global security.”
The similarities in goal are apparent, though while Pakistan's delegation
has set out suggestions for how to accomplish the task, the US has
decided it is no longer useful to focus on the “frequently
debated 'how-to-do-it' questions of controlling fissile materials,
verifying reductions, or physically eliminating weapon systems,”
and would prefer to analyze “the 'why-to-do-it' questions
of how to create the underlying conditions that would make disarmament
a reasonable policy choice.” Laying aside the glaring oversight
that “why-to-do-it questions” in themselves contain
“how-to-do-it questions,” it is remarkable that the
US has clearly stated it believes that discussing steps to disarmament,
including elimination and verification of weapon systems, are no
longer valuable or relevant. The US assertion that “easing
tensions and strengthening trust” are vital to the elimination
of nuclear weapons, is out of step with the vast majority of the
international community that argues easing tensions and strengthening
trust requires concrete steps towards disarmament.
Productivity necessitates constructive engagement with others,
and the promotion of ideas that reflect normative values and aspirations.
While characterizing members of civil society as “sophists”
who only “care about [disarmament] as an instrument of political
coup-counting against the nuclear weapon states, rather than as
a means of accomplishing anything constructive,” the US delegation
neglects to acknowledge that while the intergovernmental community
struggles to adopt agendas, civil society has been initiating and
supporting many paths towards a new collective security environment
where the interests of citizens and states are synonymous, and where
weapons are obsolete. We just happen to believe that in order to
get somewhere, you have to actually take steps,
and not simply ridicule those you don't want to take.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Nuclear Disarmament
The sponsors of the three key comprehensive nuclear disarmament
resolutions decided not to try to break any new ground this year,
and as a result, there were no surprises in either the debate or
the voting.
The Japanese-led annual draft, “Renewed determination towards
the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.30),
was nearly identical to the 2006 version and therefore so was the
vote (and even some of the explanations of vote). The New Agenda’s
resolution, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating
the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (A/C.1/62/L.9),
repeated its language from last year, yet gained a bit more support,
as did the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)’s “Nuclear Disarmament”
text (A/C.1/62/L.40).
The “Renewed determination” draft continues to hit
the right tone and agenda for the vast majority of states. The vote
was 165
to 3 (the US, India, and North Korea), with 10 abstentions.
Last
year’s draft was adopted 169 to 3 (the same three) with
8 abstentions. Using the same language as last
year, the United
States called the draft the “most balanced and realistic”
of the nuclear disarmament texts but opposed it because of the endorsement
of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. Russia, which voted in favor of the draft,
called it “a good example of a balanced combination.”
The New Agenda draft was adopted
151 to 5, with 13 abstentions. This was a slight improvement over
2006’s
tally of 148 in favour to 7 opposed, with 12 abstentions. This
year’s five negative votes were the US, France, India, Israel,
and North Korea. Last year, these five were joined by the United
Kingdom and Pakistan, both of whom abstained this year. A separate
vote on the paragraph calling on India, Pakistan, and Israel
to join the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as “non-nuclear weapon
states promptly and without conditions” drew four negative
votes (those three states plus the United States), 155 affirmative
votes, and 2 abstentions (France and Bhutan). Russia and China voted
yes; the United Kingdom did not vote.
Although the Japanese draft was more detailed than the New Agenda’s,
at heart the two drafts endorse the same agenda: continued commitment
to the non-proliferation and disarmament obligations embedded in
the NPT and the decisions of the treaty’s review conferences.
The main difference is that the Japanese text takes a more positive
tone concerning progress in fulfilling NPT obligations, on issues
including US/Russian strategic arms reductions.
The NAM text L.40, based on the declarations of several heads of
state summits, has remained essentially the same for years. However,
this year’s tally
of 113 to 45, with 17 abstentions was an improvement over 2006’s
105 votes in favour to 45 opposed, with 16 abstentions. This draft
always draws the most negative votes because its ambitious list
of proposed initiatives includes proposals unacceptable to at least
a few countries. Also, unlike the Japanese and New Agenda drafts,
the NAM draft endorses initiatives that are not currently part of
any treaty regime, such as no-first-use pledges and security assurances
to non-nuclear weapon states.
Iran tabled its biennial draft on the NPT disarmament obligations
(A/C.1/62/L.8).
“Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at
the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” at first looks
like a straight-forward endorsement of the unanimous decisions from
those two review conferences, yet the vote
was 103 to 53 with 15 abstentions. (In 2005, the vote
on a similar
resolution was 70-52-22.)
The negative votes came from NATO, Europe in general, and other
Western-leaning states, such as Japan and Australia. China abstained,
the other four nuclear weapon states party to the NPT voted no.
Of the non-NPT states, India and Pakistan abstained, Israel voted
no. The bulk of the abstentions came from smaller, non-nuclear states
such as Guatemala and Samoa.
There was a separate
vote on the preambular paragraph referring to the 1995 resolution
on the Middle East. That vote produced a near identical tally to
the vote on the draft as a whole: 102 to 48 with 11 abstentions.
This was due to a few of the countries that voted no on the draft
as a whole, but voted yes on that paragraph (Italy and New Zealand);
countries that voted yes on the text, but did not vote on that paragraph
(China and North Korea), or registered a no vote on the whole draft,
but abstained on the paragraph (Russia).
There was little debate and only one explanation of vote over the
resolution. Typically some government goes on record as to why its
votes differed between a single paragraph and the draft as a whole.
With such a divisive tally, someone usually says something about
their thinking. That did not happen in this case. Clearly, delegates
simply wanted to get it over with. There were two problems with
the draft for some delegations: first, it focused exclusively on
disarmament, not non-proliferation, obligations; and second, the
countries that voted no simply did not want to associate themselves
with the draft’s sponsor. “Who made Iran the guardian
of the NPT?” said a delegate from one of the countries voting
against the draft.
The tone of the nuclear disarmament debate improved over last year,
largely on the basis of the belief the key multilateral arms control
conference of the year—the first
session of NPT review cycle—went well. However, except
for the de-alerting
resolution (see Operational Status of Nuclear
Weapons), there were no attempts to push the non-proliferation
and disarmament agenda down any specific paths. The advocates of
these resolutions believe that nothing of substance will change
in First Committee without progress at the Conference
on Disarmament and the NPT cycle. It is also clear that on those
resolutions and issues where the opposition is a small minority,
there is no chance of any movement unless India, Pakistan, and Israel
change their minds on the NPT, and the US changes its position on
the CTBT. Another unsaid calculation that there will be no change
in the policies of the US until there is a change of administration
in 2009.
- Jim Wurst, Middle
Powers Initiative
Operational Status of
Nuclear Weapons
The First Committee adopted new draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.29,
“Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems,”
with 124 votes
in favour, 3 against, and 34 abstentions. The co-sponsors of the
resolution succeeded in splitting NATO, with six states breaking
ranks to vote in favour, including two that host US nuclear weapons,
Germany and Italy. The other four NATO votes in favour came from
Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. The negative votes came from
France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Due to indecision
within the Russian government, the Russian Federation did not participate
in the vote. China abstained, mentioning that different views exist
on the issue—a diplomatic non-answer. De facto nuclear weapon
states India, which sponsors the other draft resolution that deals
with operating status (“Reducing nuclear danger,” A/C.1/62/L.21),
and Pakistan voted in favour.
The resolution was carefully drafted to avoid the semantic arguments
that allow critics to easily dismiss calls for such measures, as
has been the case in India’s annual resolution, which still
makes reference to nuclear weapons on “hair-trigger alert.”
The only substantive point in the parsimonious operative portion
of L.29, “Calls for the taking of further practical steps
to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems,
with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from
high alert status.” The resolution, in its preambular portion,
also non-exhaustively welcomes steps already taken to reduce the
operational status of nuclear weapons.
Despite its careful wording, the resolution attracted controversy
in the form of a largely empty, semantic debate. Responding to the
draft resolution on 9 October, US
Ambassador Rocca stated, “the US forces are not, and never
have been, on hair-trigger alert…. In order to comply with
this request we would have to first put our forces on hair-trigger
alert so that we could then de-alert them.” As noted by the
Washington
Post on 1 November, this (mis)statement caused a stir within
the arms control and disarmament community, and aspects of this
statement were rebutted by prominent experts Hans
Kristensen, of the Federation
of American Scientists and Bruce
Blair, President of the World
Security Institute (see Operating
Status Week 2).
US Ambassador Rocca only partially backed off her earlier position
in her explanation
of the US vote against the resolution. Disagreeing with the
resolution’s assertion that the US level of readiness increases
risk of accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons, Ambassador
Rocca further stated that “the United States does not rely
on launch-on-warning,” without explaining her understanding
of this nebulous term. This denial fails to address the knowledgeable
assessment of Bruce Blair and the crux of international concern
of alert levels, that US command and early warning systems are “geared”
to fire “friendly forces en masse before the anticipated arrival
of incoming enemy missiles with flight times of 12-30 minutes.”
Ambassador Rocca did, however, admit that some US SSBNs are always
on alert, stating that “As long as nuclear weapons exist and
are part of the U.S. deterrent, it is necessary for us to keep some
portion of our forces at some level of alert.”
In explanation of their negative votes, nuclear weapon states France
and the United Kingdom provided better reasoned rationales backing
their national positions, but still obviously came up short of the
resolution’s intent. The United Kingdom stated it disagrees
with the resolution’s basic premise that the world is at risk
due to the alert status of nuclear weapons. In the view of the UK,
the issue has been adequately dealt with and is not a priority issue.
French Ambassador Dobelle explained France was not against the idea
of reducing operational status, noting France had taken the decision
to de-target its nuclear forces in 1997, but France cannot go any
further unless the strategic situation and France’s security
needs allows for it.
The other resolution dealing with alert status, India’s draft,
A/C.1/62/L.21,
“Reducing nuclear danger,” was adopted in a vote
similar to recent years with 113 in favor, 50 against, and 13 abstentions.
The resolution, unchanged from last year, calls for a review of
nuclear doctrines and for immediate steps by the nuclear weapons
states to de-target and de-alert their nuclear forces, controversially
noting, “hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons carries unacceptable
risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons.”
Speaking before the vote on L.29, India stated the two resolution
had a high level of congruence and the Indian delegation invited
those states who co-sponsored L.29, but opposed India’s resolution,
to reconsider their position in the future. The Indian delegation
did not, however, indicate if it would be willing to moderate their
text, showing a similar flexibility as the co-sponsors of L.29,
in order to ensure the widest possible support.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Proliferation
The nuclear programmes of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran
dominated discussions on nuclear proliferation in the First Committee
(see previous
reports on the DPRK’s nuclear programme). However, given
the active engagement in the Iran issue by major powers who are
also permanent members of the Security Council, the role of the
General Assembly remained largely limited to reassertion of national
positions in prepared remarks during the general and themed discussions.
The only exceptions were the votes over resolutions A/C.1/62/L.2
and A/C.1/62/L.8,
both of which were affected, although in different ways, by the
controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme. In recent years,
the traditionally contentious resolution L.2, “The risk of
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” has attracted increasing
reservations, if only verbally. Despite its title, the resolution,
unchanged in recent years, focuses on the need to universalize the
nuclear
non-Proliferation Treaty and singles out Israel in this context.
Several Western delegations, including Canada
and the European
Union, suggested that the title is misleading, as the resolution
does not address concern over Iran’s nuclear programme, leading
these delegations and others to question its balance.
First
introduced (and only narrowly
adopted) in 2005, Iran’s resolution L.8, “Follow-up
to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000
Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,” now in its second year, gained a number
of votes, easily
passing with 103 in favor, 53 against, and 15 abstentions. The
resolution continues to be seen by many delegations as more of a
finger-pointing exercise and duplicative of existing resolutions.
Despite having agreed to many elements of L.8 that are also contained
in other resolutions, Europe and most Western and developed states
continue to either actively oppose or abstain due to the resolution’s
provenance (see also Nuclear Disarmament).
During the 62nd session of the First Committee, the issue of Iran’s
nuclear programme was largely limited to the General and Thematic
Debates, where the discussion revealed a high degree of divergence,
contrary to exhortations of unity of the international community
on the issue. This was readily apparent in the approach of the P5
on the issue, despite the 28
September P5+2 statement, in which the major powers agreed to
seek a third sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council unless
reports from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the EU High Representative show
progress in November. The United
States again adopted the hardest line against Iran and called
outright for the Security Council to adopt a third sanctions resolution.
Although the EU called upon Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment
programme, it expressed hope that the 21
August work plan would resolve outstanding issues, and made
no reference to an additional Security Council resolution. The Russian
and Chinese delegations both emphasized diplomatic and political
solutions to addressing the Iran nuclear situation, without reference
to the imposition of additional sanctions or even the 28 September
P5+2 statement, indicating their lukewarm support for continued
escalation of the situation (see Nuclear
Proliferation Week 1).
First Committee also heard both the Iranian and Israeli viewpoints
on this issue in their general remarks. Reiterating familiar rhetorical
points, Iranian
Ambassador Khazaee defended Iran’s nuclear programme as peaceful,
touted the 21 August work plan, and denounced Security Council resolutions
adopted on the nuclear issue. Israeli
Ambassador Ziv, delivering general remarks from the viewpoint of
her country’s unique perspective on matters of global security,
urged states to regard Iran “as a threat well beyond the geographical
limits of the Middle East” and also as “a threat not
just to the regional stability but also to the global strategic
situation.” Ambassador Ziv’s statements were in part
based on the argument that weapons of mass destruction are dangerous
only “in the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors,”
a position that was flatly rejected by the Hans Blix-led Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission (see Nuclear
Proliferation Week 2).
Perceptions of the Iran situation were also split along North-South
lines. Delegations affiliated with the Non-Aligned
Movement, of which Iran is a member, tended to adopt a softer
tone, welcoming the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve
outstanding issues and calling for balanced and comprehensive pursuit
of non-proliferation objectives while upholding the right to develop
nuclear energy. Other Western delegations that spoke out on Iran,
including Canada
and New
Zealand, tended to take an approach closer to that of the EU,
emphasizing the need for Iran’s compliance with its Security
Council-imposed obligations. No delegations suggested alternative
solutions to the dispute. However, in the Thematic Debate on nuclear
weapons, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan
observed that further coercion could be counter-productive and place
the whole region in jeopardy, noting also that “[a]symmetry,
imbalance and discrimination” would ultimately propel proliferation
rather than facilitating the goal of a nuclear weapon free zone
in the Middle East.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Amid the ongoing dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme and
anticipation of a global renaissance in nuclear energy, the issue
of the nuclear fuel cycle featured prominently at the sixty-second
session of the First Committee. Responding to predictions of a nuclear
renaissance, delegations, non-government organizations, and others
addressed issues posed by the spread of nuclear power—namely,
the proliferation of sensitive technologies related to the nuclear
fuel cycle, usable either for peaceful civilian use or for use in
the production of weapons (see previous
Nuclear Fuel Cycle reports). Both inside and outside the First Committee,
possible solutions to some of these dilemmas were heard, including
potential multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
Unlike other substantive areas of the First Committee agenda where
the international community is definitively stuck, on the seemingly
equally fraught issue of the fuel cycle the Committee heard various
proposals for solutions, some of which are actually in motion. Gustavo
Zlauvinen, representative of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the UN, addressing the First
Committee, called for a new multilateral framework on both the front
and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Mr. Zlauvinen described
an incremental, three step approach to achieve such a framework,
including: establishment of an adequate and reliable mechanism for
supply; placing any new uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
facilities under multinational control; and extending multinational
control over existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities (see Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Week 2). At a 1 November event organized by the Middle
Powers Initiative (MPI) he mentioned there are currently thirteen
proposals, listed by the IAEA and submitted by member states, which
he described as “mutually complimentary.”
At the MPI event, he elaborated on the first step—establishment
by the IAEA of an adequate and reliable mechanism for supply. He
explained the purpose of such a mechanism would be:
… to deal with possible consequences of interruptions of
supply of nuclear fuel due to political considerations that are
not related to non-proliferation, not related to commercial of
other aspects in terms of fulfillment of contractual obligations
… [a]nd, at the same time, to reduce the vulnerabilities
that might create incentives for countries to build new national
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities…. Therefore, an
assurance of supply mechanism would be envisaged solely as a backup
mechanism to the operation of the current normally functioning
market…
Mr. Zlauvinen also explained aspects of an IAEA proposal, not yet
made public, for nuclear fuel assurances presented to the IAEA Board
on 15 June 2007 and welcomed by the European
Union in its statement during the Thematic Debate on nuclear
weapons. The proposal draws on a study by the four uranium enrichment
companies under the auspices of the World
Nuclear Association (WNA), which primarily calls for a three-tiered
systems of assurances, which include: existing market based assurances;
backup commitments provided by enrichment and fuel fabrication suppliers
to be evoked when predetermined criteria are met following a political
disruption of supply; and a physical low-enriched uranium reserve
located in one or more locations, coupled with fuel fabrication
development in “consumer” states. Under this proposal,
it seems decision-making capacity for use of the mechanism would
be held by the IAEA Board. Moreover, the proposal foresees the Board
establishing non-proliferation criteria in advance so that it would
not need to decide on a case by case basis. The IAEA Board has yet
to have a full and comprehensive discussion on this proposal, but
Mr. Zlauvinen anticipates this may happen in spring 2008.
In light of the disproportionate attention the fuel bank proposal
has received in the United States over other proposals—it
featured prominently at the IAEA special
event on the nuclear fuel cycle in September 2006 and has been
the objective of several pieces of legislation making their way
through US Congress—a cautious approach is advisable. Any
supply assurance mechanism alone would not be a panacea for proliferation
concerns. As Dr. John Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy, pointed out at the MPI event, “for
a country concerned about energy … the most reliable approach
is having facilities on its own territory under its physical control.”
Specifically referring to the WNA proposal, the fuel bank it would
establish would operate as “more or less an afterthought to
the real world of nuclear production and supply.” In reality,
this business-as-usual model may dissuade only a few marginal nuclear
states that are not likely proliferators, while providing a political
weapon to those interested in opposing the nuclear programmes of
others.
Another difficulty facing the international community in proceeding
with this mechanism will be establishing functional non-proliferation
criteria for use of the backup mechanisms. Given the dual-use nature
of nuclear technology, in a dispute between a consumer state and
a major power, recent history suggests any political dispute affecting
supply could be characterized as motivated by “proliferation
concerns.” The involvement of the IAEA Board as the decision-making
authority in this context may undermine the credibility of the assurance.
As a political (not technical or legal) body where the global-North-tilted
assortment of Governors are national representatives upholding their
countries’ interests, the Board’s suitability as an
impartial guarantor of nuclear fuel supply is questionable. Establishing
universally acceptable non-proliferation criteria before a fuel
bank is set up may reduce this potential contradiction, but given
the non-representative and non-inclusive nature of the Board, any
formulation may still provide insufficient assurances to states
not represented in this process or on the Board.
With these caveats in mind, any mechanism for credible fuel assurances
could help alleviate proliferation concerns. However, the costs
for taking a bad approach could be high. As an example, within a
year of the US administration announcing its Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, a number of states expressed interest
in pursuing the nuclear fuel cycle, as Dr. Burroughs pointed out,
either to be recognized as a fuel cycle supplier state or to avoid
becoming dependent on an emerging cartel. Therefore, as Mr. Zlauvinen
indicated in his remarks to the First Committee, attention must
also be paid to other crucial aspects of achieving a new framework
for nuclear fuel supply: extension of multinational control over
new and existing facilities.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Disarmament Machinery
For years, First Committee has been a repository of complaints
about the state of the disarmament agenda and the machinery designed
to advance it. This year, however, the routine complaints made by
virtually every delegation were limited to the stalemate in the
Conference
on Disarmament (CD), as opposed to previous years' chastisement
of the failure of other multilateral machinery. There was scant
discussion on revitalizing the work of First Committee, or enhancing
cooperation between the major pieces of machinery. Several delegations
lamented the erosion of multilateralism, and pointed to the politicization
of technical and legal issues and double-standards that are impacting
and undermining the machinery and once again called for change without
offering concrete proposals.
The disarmament machinery procedural draft resolutions, and their
voting results, were likewise stale. Draft texts on the CD, UN
Disarmament Commission (UNDC), and the fourth special session
on disarmament (SSOD IV)—each of which contain only technical
updates from last year—were adopted last week.
A/C.1/62/L.11*,
“Report of the Conference on Disarmament,” was adopted
without a vote again. The text notes the increased deliberations
and constructive contributions of member states to the 2007 session
of the CD, welcomes intersessional consultations by the incoming
presidents, and requests all member states cooperate to achieve
“the early commencement of substantive work in its 2008 session.”
During General and Thematic Debates, most delegations called for
the adoption of the comprehensive
programme tabled by the six presidents during the 2007 session.
A/C.1/62/L.3,
“Report of the Disarmament Commission,” reaffirms the
mandate of the UNDC, recommends it continues deliberating on recommendations
for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and for confidence-building
measures in the field of conventional weapons, and encourages increased
cooperation between First Committee, the UNDC, and the CD. Though
Benin's representative referred to the UNDC as a “theatre
of confrontations” during the Thematic Debate, he and most
other delegates still feel the UNDC has potential to advance the
disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.
However, while L.3 was adopted without a vote, the US delegation
insisted, both in its explanation of vote and in its statement
on disarmament machinery, that the UNDC “damaged its credibility”
by electing a representative from Iran to serve as one of the vice-chairs
in April 2007. The US refused to take part in the vote, arguing,
“the conduct of the last UNDC session unfortunately does not
give reason for optimism that the current three-year study cycle
will have a productive result.” This position turns the UNDC
from a theatre of confrontation into a theatre of the absurd—not
to mention one of severe politicization. For a nuclear weapon state
to discredit a disarmament body, because of the election of a non-nuclear
weapon state to a position in this body, carries the mark of the
dramatic non sequitur.
A/C.1/62/L.17/Rev.1,
“Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament,” has been slightly rearranged from
the original draft text, without significant substantive changes.
Short of the CD creating an Ad Hoc Committee on disarmament to push
the agenda forward, SSOD IV is the next logical step to review the
current impasse in disarmament and to review the functionality of
disarmament machinery. L.17/Rev.1 argues SSOD IV “would offer
an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the
current international situation, the most critical aspects of the
process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community
and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of
conventional weapons.” The resolution was adopted 166-1-0
for the second year in a row, with the US voting against. The US
delegation did not offer an explanation of vote for its rejection
of this resolution either year, though its record of vote indicates
it does not see any value in establishing SSOD IV.
Two weeks ago, Patricia Lewis of UNIDIR asked delegates, if SSOD
IV is not the appropriate venue for the imperative review of disarmament
machinery and lack of progress on disarmament, then what is? Her
question emphasizes the necessity of changing, abandoning, or strengthening
existing machinery—and of achieving disarmament. It also points
to the lackluster and uninspired discussion taking place on these
subjects. The situation demands creative, responsive people, such
as Ambassador Labbé of Chile, Chair of the SSOD
IV working group, and Dr. Lewis, who can establish creative,
responsive instruments by which to make real progress. The system
that currently exists is insufficient and inexcusable, and while
calls for a new security environment, a new consensus, or a new
architecture are welcome, they must be accompanied by concrete ideas
that not only make the relevant players think differently, but act
differently.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
While the world media draws attention to existing and emerging
nuclear threats, states in over half the planet have quietly been
taking their regions out of the nuclear equation by linking up with
their neighbors in Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs). The texts
of NWFZ treaties recognize that denuclearized zones are not an end
in themselves, but are steps towards global nuclear disarmament,
and enhanced security for everyone. This year marked the 40th anniversary
of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean;
and the 10th anniversaries of the Outer
Space Treaty (creating a NWFZ in outer space) and the Treaty
of Bangkok, establishing the Southeast Asian NWFZ. Discussions at
this year’s First Committee emphasized the importance and
contribution of these and all NWFZs to nuclear non-proliferation
and the advancement of total nuclear disarmament.
Since the first historic gathering of all NWFZ countries in Mexico
City in 2005, states have been working to strengthen dialogue and
cooperation among existing zones and to establish new zones in other
parts of the world. During the panel, “The Contribution of
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,”
ambassadors from the Kyrgyz Republic and South Africa encouraged
states and non-governmental organizations to promote dialogue between
the zones, both among states and across civil society. All panelists
spoke of the need to deepen these discussions and ties in preparation
for the next meeting of all NWFZ countries, planned for 2010.
Brazil and New
Zealand proposed the creation of a “Nuclear-weapon-free
southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/62/L.27),
which would link existing zones in Latin America, the South Pacific,
Southeast Asia, and Africa, and encourage future additions to the
zone in the northern hemisphere. The proposal has received strong
support in the past and was adopted again this year, with 162 votes
in favour. Seven states, including Bhutan, India, Israel, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Pakistan, and Russia abstained from the resolution.
As in previous years, France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States voted against it,
questioning the effect the resolution would have on the Law of the
Sea, despite New Zealand's assurances
the resolution did not contravene any international laws. Pakistan
noted that “[t]he call in operative paragraph 6 of the resolution
for the creation of a NWFZ in South Asia however fails to acknowledge
reality on ground.” India's
delegation reiterated its explanation from previous years and
noted that the proposal for the establishment of a NWFZ in South
Asia “has no greater validity than the establishment of nuclear
weapon free zones in other parts of the world such as in East Asia,
Western Europe or North America.” Ambassador Jeenbaev of the
Kyrgyz Republic reminded us that the first NWFZ in the northern
hemisphere, the Central Asian NWFZ, came into being in the past
year through the Treaty of Semipalatinsk.
A/C.1/62/L.10,
“Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(Treaty of Tlatelolco),” was adopted without a vote, as was
A/C.1/62/L.26,
“African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,” which called
upon all African states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify
the Treaty of Pelindaba so that it may enter into force. The resolution
further calls for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East
as a measure that “would enhance the security of Africa and
the viability of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.”
A number of delegations, including the Non-Aligned
Movement, Syria,
Egypt,
Malaysia,
Turkey,
Viet
Nam, Bangladesh,
Qatar,
United
Arab Emirates, Jordan,
Iran,
Kuwait,
Lebanon,
Morocco,
and Palestine
have also called for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East
as a means of increasing stability and security in the region. As
in previous years, resolution A/C.1/62/L.1,
“Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East,” was adopted without a vote. Israel
noted that the process of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East
“cannot begin in situations where some of the parties concerned
still maintain a state of war with each other, refuse in principle
to maintain peaceful relations with Israel and even call for its
destruction.” The annual resolution “The risk of nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East” (A/C.1/62/L.2),
reaffirming “the importance of Israel’s accession to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement
of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive [IAEA] safeguards,”
was rejected by the United
States and Israel, with abstentions from Australia, Cameroon,
Canada,
Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and India.
While voting in favour, the European
Union noted that the resolution does not reflect the international
community’s concern over Iran’s nuclear program and
its failure to comply with Security Council resolutions.
Many states recognized the challenges in making NWFZ treaties fully
effective and operational. States Parties to NWFZ treaties, including
members of the Rio
Group and ASEAN,
called on nuclear weapon states (NWS) to accede to protocols providing
security assurances for member states of NWFZs. Draft resolution
A/C.1/62/L.19/Rev.1,
“Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone”,
calling on the five NWS to accede to the protocols of the Treaty,
received 161 votes
in favour, with abstentions from Andorra, France,
Israel, and the United Kingdom. The United
States voted against the resolution.
Motarilavoa Hilda Lini, chief of the Turaga Nation and former Minister
of Health and Justice of the Republic of Vanuatu, speaking on the
aforementioned panel, noted that all NWFZs are rooted in the traditional
values of the peoples of their respective regions. She recalled
that the Treaty of Rarotonga, creating the South Pacific NWFZ, took
its inspiration from the Peoples’
Charter for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific. This prophetic
document, adopted in 1983 in Vanuatu, called for a Pacific Nuclear
Free Zone embracing all states and colonies in the region, banning
all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and giving us a compelling
vision for the whole planet.
At a time when people and governments of nearly every persuasion
look for better ways to be safe and create the conditions for their
children and societies to flourish, the citizens and governments
of the world’s NWFZs have much to teach us. Sustaining and
expanding NWFZs, as underscored by this year’s First Committee
resolutions, can lead the way to a Nuclear
Weapons Convention, which would make the whole world a Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone. When Ambassador Gumbi of South
Africa said, “It’s an issue of humankind, not states,”
he sounded very like the late Sir Professor Joseph Rotblat in his
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, when he said, “Remember
your humanity, and forget the rest.”
- Pamela Meidell and Monika Szymurska, Atomic
Mirror
Negative Security Assurances
The First Committee adopted several draft resolutions that call
for, or reinforce previous calls for, legally-binding negative security
assurances (NSAs). Draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.8,
“Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at
the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” introduced by
Iran, “[n]otes that the 2000 Review Conference of Parties
to the [NPT] agreed that legally binding security assurances by
the five nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states
parties to the Treaty strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”
The resolution passed
103-53 with fifteen states abstaining (see Nuclear
Disarmament for more details).
Draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.23,
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,”
included a preambular paragraph arguing, “a multilateral,
universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the
nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international
peace and security.” Meanwhile, the resolution titled “Follow-up
to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” A/C.1/62/L.36,
recognizes the need for negative security assurances for non-nuclear
weapon states without explicitly calling for them. Brazil's
delegation, in explaining its vote on L.23, emphasized the importance
of negative security assurances, but also stressed that they “cannot
be a substitute for mutually agreed disarmament measures which should
be irreversible, transparent and verifiable.”
A/C.1/62/L.44,
“Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons,” focused on NSAs. The resolution “reaffirms
the urgent need to reach early agreement on effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” It also stressed the
importance of the role of the Conference on Disarmament in trying
to negotiate legally-binding negative security assurances. The resolution
had 27 sponsors, although Pakistan was the only state that possesses
nuclear weapons to sponsor the resolution. The draft resolution
passed
120-1 with 54 abstaining. The United
States was the only state to vote against the resolution.
Support for the concept of NSAs has been gradually increasing in
the United Nations. Only two years ago, a resolution very similar
to this year’s L.44 received less than 100 votes.
However, most nuclear weapon states are reluctant to provide guarantees
outside of those already given in Security Council resolutions 255
and 984.
China remains the exception, having voted in favour of resolutions
on NSAs for the last several years.
- Nathan Band, Global
Security Institute
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
This year, the only change to the draft resolution on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), A/C.1/62/L.28*,
is that whereas the 2006 resolution condemned the announcement by
the Democratic
People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) that it had conducted
a nuclear test, L.28* urges the continuation of the Six-Party Talks,
a peaceful settlement to the issue, and “the successful implementation
of Joint
Statement of 19 September 2005.”
Like previous draft resolutions on the CTBT, L.28* emphasizes the
importance of the cessation of nuclear tests to the non-proliferation
regime, and “[u]rges all States to maintain their moratoriums
on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions
and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose
of the Treaty, while stressing that these measures do not have the
same permanent and legally binding effect as the entry into force
of the Treaty.” It also urges those states that have not done
so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.
In a general statement before the vote, the European Union (EU)
delegate emphasized that the CTBT is an essential instrument for
disarmament and non-proliferation; therefore, it is vital that the
countries in Annex 2 sign and ratify the Treaty for its entry into
force. The EU noted the importance of the CTBTO
Preparatory Committee, and called on the member states of the
Treaty to meet their financial obligations. In addition, the EU
stressed the importance of the moratorium on nuclear tests and the
verification system of the CTBT.
On 31 October, the First Committee adopted
L.28*, with 166 countries in favour, one (the United States) against,
and four abstentions—Colombia, India, Mauritius, and Syria.
Last year, the DPRK voted against the draft resolution, but did
not vote at all this year. The list of states that abstained remained
the same.
In its explanation of vote, Pakistan's
delegation reiterated its support of the CTBT over the years,
which is reflected in its vote in favour of the resolution. The
delegation expressed that it would like the moratorium to be reflected
in the draft resolution.
In its explanation of vote, Israel's delegation said that it signed
the CTBT in 1996, and mentioned its contribution to the verification
system of the CTBT, its payment of dues to the CTBT Organization,
and its participation in workshops related to the Treaty. The delegation
of Israel called for the compliance with the CTBT by “others”
in the Middle East, and emphasized the importance of the moratorium
on nuclear tests.
Iran
expressed its “strong desire to ban any nuclear tests”;
the delegation pointed out that while “[t]he principal objective
of the Treaty is to terminate fully and comprehensively further
qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons,”
some states, including the US, are modernizing and qualitatively
upgrading their nuclear arsenals “in contravention with the
letter and spirit of the CTBT” and in opposition to “the
vision of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament.”
Syria explained it abstained because the CTBT ignores the concerns
of non-nuclear weapons states that request a guarantee against a
nuclear attack. The Syrian delegation also argued that L.28* fails
to mention the illegality of the threat to use or actual use of
nuclear weapons, or the nuclear weapon states obligation to disarm.
Furthermore, the delegation of Syria criticized the draft resolution
for not mentioning nuclear laboratory tests and the renovation of
nuclear weapons by some nuclear weapons states.
Colombia
reiterated that its abstention merely reflects the constitutional
challenges its government is facing in ratifying the CTBT, and emphasized
its support for the Treaty.
- Edgar Socarras, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security and Anna Walther,
Reaching Critical
Will
Verification and Transparency
The issues of verification and transparency remain vitally important
for international peace, security, and stability. Transparency allows
states to monitor implementation of agreements, while verification
provides technical assurances, and both help the international community
build confidence in states' respect for international law and compliance
with treaty obligations.
This year in First Committee, visions of a clearer and more successful
verification and transparency regime were presented in the form
of three resolutions: “Objective information on military matters,
including transparency of military expenditures” (A/C.1/62/L.33),
“Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space
activities” (A/C.1/62/L.41)
(see Outer Space report) and “Verification
in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in
the field of verification” (A/C.1/62/L.47).
L.47 was adopted without a vote, but met concerns from Cuba and
Pakistan. The Cuban delegation explained that it is too soon to
reflect fully on the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) report,
as it was circulated only recently. Pakistan
explained, “we had decided in 2004 to go along with the resolution
that established the Panel of Governmental Experts but we were neither
convinced then nor now that any Panel of Experts with limited representation
could make a significant contribution to the philosophy of verification.”
The Pakistani delegation suggested that such a panel would be more
widely accepted and more legitimate if representation of all relevant
countries was ensured in future work.
L.33, “Objective information on military matters, including
transparency of military expenditures,” was widely supported.
During both the General and Thematic Debates, China
proudly reiterated the specific measures it has taken to report
its basic data of military spending, adding that military transparency
is important because it promotes confidence-building and trust among
member states. In addition, when introducing L.33 on 29 October,
Ambassador Brasack of Germany
asserted, “A fully updated UN reporting system on military
expenditures could provide the internationally accepted information
basis needed to contribute to transparency and confidence building.”
The Cuban delegation supported L.33, but in its explanation of vote
argued against the establishment of a new GGE. Cuba expressed concern
about the trend of establishing GGEs in First Committee, arguing
it should be an exception not a rule, and that priority should be
given to transparent and open discussions where all member states
can take part. Cuba would prefer that the high cost of an additional
GGE ($11 million) be devoted to other priorities.
Throughout First Committee, most delegations continued to express
support for treaties that include systems of verification, while
calling for verification in treaties that do not provide for it,
such as the Biological
and Toxic Weapons Convention, and in those yet to be negotiated,
such as a Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty. Member states called upon one another
to support these treaties to ensure a more effective verification
regime, and to place confidence in and further support the verification
work of organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Pakistan
summed up many member states' positions on verification in its explanation
of vote, stating, “Verification is essential to promoting
confidence among States in compliance with disarmament treaties
and agreements to which they are Parties. Verification ensures the
effectiveness and integrity of such agreements. However, the practice
of verification is integral to arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
Verification has no independent existence and concepts relating
to verification cannot be promoted in a vacuum.”
- Sarmadi Almecci, Reaching
Critical Will
Fissile Materials
This year, the long-awaited start of negotiations on a treaty banning
the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear explosives
(FMCT)
never seemed closer. At the end of its 2007 session, the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) was near agreement on a package deal, L.1,
which would have enabled it to begin negotiations on an FMCT in
2008 (see Disarmament
Machinery Week 1). Many delegations expressed support for the
package deal, including those of Canada,
Japan,
the Republic
of Korea, and Australia.
The Netherlands
and the European
Union called for commencement of negotiations without preconditions.
Although the United
States prefers to proceed with the FMCT without discussion of
any other of the CD’s priority issues, the US delegation explained
a conscious decision had been made this year to not block consensus
on the P6 proposal.
Even once negotiations begin, the process toward achieving an effective
FMCT may still be difficult to attain without political shifts in
key capitals, as no consensus exists on a number of issues pertaining
to its scope, definition, and verification. Most delegations that
spoke about an FMCT in the General and Thematic Debates merely restated
their national positions, revealing lingering differences. The Chinese
and Indian
delegations reiterated their support for a multilateral, non-discriminatory,
and effectively verifiable FMCT. While Ambassador Khan of Pakistan
agreed that any issue may of course be raised in negotiations, he
stated that specific reference to such matters as verification in
the negotiation mandate is crucial, as when entering negotiations
“one has to be sure what is sacrosanct and what is not.”
At an event entitled, “Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear
Weapon Materials,” members of the Princeton University-based
International
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) highlighted a number of technical
issues the international community will face in securing and irreversibly
reducing fissile material stocks. One such issue is the continued
production and stockpiling of highly-enriched uranium fuel for naval
reactors and civilian stocks of fissile materials. Posing a dilemma
for efficacy in a fissile material ban regime, stocks in these categories
of materials will be vastly larger than military stocks once nuclear
arsenals in Russia and the United States drop below 1000 warheads
each (see Fissile
Materials Week 2).
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the outcome of the sixty-second
session of the First Committee, the FMCT, commonly referred to as
the next logical step in nuclear disarmament, remains out of reach.
The Canadian
delegation found itself unable to move forward with what Ambassador
Grinius described as “a strictly procedural draft decision
that would have added the issue of the prohibition of the production
of fissile material to next year’s First Committee agenda,”
due to lack of consensus in preliminary consultations. This outcome
repeats that of the 2006 First Committee, where the Canadian
delegation withdrew its “minimalist” draft resolution,
A/C.1/61/L.23,
which simply called on the CD “to commence immediately negotiations
on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons,” without prejudice to any issue any delegation might
want to raise in the course of negotiations. The failure to adopt
the decision has no direct bearing on the struggle to adopt a programme
of work in the CD, but further signifies lack of consensus on the
issue.
Despite these outcomes, the necessity of a fissile material production
ban, ideally in conjunction with a commitment to deep reductions
in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, has been made more urgent
by the prospects of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The IPFM
noted that construction was continuing on a breeder reactor in India,
exempt from safeguards under the proposed US-India deal, which would
greatly increase its plutonium production capacity. In addition,
within the past year it has been revealed that Pakistan began construction
of two additional plutonium production reactors, a development that
also tends to cast doubt on Pakistan’s sincerity toward achieving
an FMCT in the near term (see Fissile
Materials Week 2).
The need for a “global internationally verifiable”
FMCT was also emphasized by Gustavo Zlauvinen, representative of
the International Atomic Energy Agency to the UN, in the context
of achieving a suitable multilateral mechanism for control of the
nuclear fuel cycle. Speaking on 1 November at an event organized
by the Middle
Powers Initiative, he stated, “As long as the loophole
is there, any new framework for multilateral approaches to the nuclear
fuel cycle will still have a backdoor.” In other words, unless
there is a global and verifiable fissile material production ban
regime in place, states will be able to legally stockpile nuclear
weapons usable materials even if the global civilian nuclear fuel
cycle is subject to international control.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Missiles
First Committee adopted
draft decision A/C.1/62/L.20,
“Missiles,” introduced as in previous years by Iran
and co-sponsored by Egypt and Indonesia. The decision recalls past
resolutions and includes the item on the provisional agenda of the
sixty-third (2008) session of the General Assembly. 117 states,
generally affiliated with the Non-Aligned Movement but also including
Russia and China, voted in favor, while 51 states, mostly coming
from Europe and the West abstained. The six opposing votes were
Denmark, France, Israel, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
Iran
decided to introduce a draft decision on missiles rather than a
substantive resolution, “as suggested by the 2005 Committee
on “methods of work,” because the third Panel of Government
Experts on this subject, established by UNGA
resolution 59/67 (2004), will have two additional sessions in
2008. The mandate of the third Panel is to “explore further
ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of
missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus
can be reached.” It met in its first session in June 2007
and is to submit its report, expected to be completed by June 2008,
to the next session of the General Assembly. Since its establishment
there has been controversy over whether the Panel should draw on
the work of the two previous Panels, as preferred by NATO-aligned
states, or whether it should start its work anew. Although the United
States voted against the decision, US Ambassador Rocca stated in
her explanation of vote that the Panel should draw on previous sessions.
Statements made in the General Debate of the First Committee demonstrated
continuing divergence on how to address the issue of missiles (whether
in the context of nuclear disarmament delivery systems or as part
of a broader mandate under general and complete disarmament) and
in what setting (in a treaty regime or through voluntary measures;
or on a case by case basis or in a comprehensive and universal manner).
States showed little interest or will to bridge the gap. Nor were
there any signs of a multilateral missile treaty emerging anytime
soon, as was pointed out by High Representative for Disarmament
Affairs Sergio
Duarte. The European
Union continued to approach the issue of missiles narrowly as
a bloc, focusing on weapons of mass destruction delivery systems
and urging universalization of the Hague
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Developing
and Non-Aligned states' positions were exemplified by Myanmar’s
statement on behalf of the Association of South East Asian Nations,
which called for a comprehensive approach in the shape of “multilaterally
negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory”
agreements (see Missiles
Week 1). Ambassador Khan of Pakistan
called for a multilateral treaty to prohibit deployment of ballistic
missile defense systems, for an accompanying agreement for limitations
on other kinds of missile systems, and for the Conference on Disarmament
to take up the matter as a priority issue (see Missiles
Week 2).
On 25 October, the United
States and Russia
presented a joint
statement to the First Committee, noting the twentieth anniversary
of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and calling for interested countries
to discuss the possibility of internationalizing the Treaty, “though
the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction
of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs.”
The statement, delivered by Russia, also describes the Treaty as
an important and practical step toward fulfillment of Article VI
of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and expresses concern about the
proliferation of missiles in this range to an ever-greater number
of countries (see Missiles
Week 3). The US/Russian Joint Statement was welcomed by several
European delegations, including Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland,
Italy, who acknowledged the Treaty’s role in reducing tensions
in Europe. The Netherlands expressed its readiness to participate
in discussions on internationalizing the treaty as called for by
the statement, although it remains to be seen how the United States
and Russia might follow through with this proposal.
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’
Committee on Nuclear Policy
Outer Space
The 62nd session of the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament
and International Security overwhelmingly adopted two resolutions
that seek to enhance the security of outer space.
Both draft resolutions garnered nearly exactly the same votes as
they did last year. The Russian-sponsored A/C.1/62/L.41
on transparency and confidence-building measures was adopted
overwhelmingly by 167 votes in favour, with one abstention (Israel)
and the US voting against. Neither dissenting state provided an
explanation.
The “omnibus” space resolution, “Prevention of
an arms race in outer space” (A/C.1/62/L.34),
also finished with nearly the same vote as last year. This year’s
vote
on the Sri Lanka-sponsored resolution won 170 in favour—up
three from last year—with, yet again, Israel and the US abstaining
and voting against, respectively. Neither provided an explanation
on the floor, but the US’s oft-repeated
assertion that “there is no arms race in space”
is presumably the rationale behind their lone vote of opposition.
Some delegations voted in favor of L.34 despite some reservations
they held. Brazil,
Japan,
and the European
Union were a bit disappointed that the resolution failed to
take into account the substantive discussions on the issue that
took place in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) this year. They nonetheless offered their
support to prevent an arms race in outer space in the framework
outlined in this annual resolution.
There currently exist several possibilities for advancing a cooperative
security regime in outer space. The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,
adopted by the UN
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and now the General
Assembly, could soon be vamped up into more official “rules
of the road” sometime in the near future. The UN Secretary-General
might convene a high-level panel to assess outer space security
in all its aspects, as recommended by his Advisory
Board and the community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in their statement
to First Committee last week. In addition, the CD might finally
adopt a program of work, allowing it to further explore the issue
in their 2008 session.
However the space regime moves forward in the coming year, move
forward it must. For if it does not, as the NGOs said in their statement
last week, “the security of our heavens, and those of us who
live beneath them, remain at risk.”
- Rhianna Tyson, Global
Security Institute and Secure
World Foundation
Correction:
Last week’s Outer Space report incorrectly identified the
co-sponsors of the L.41 resolution, which are: Armenia, Austria,
Belarus, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Kazakhstan,
Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Russian
Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela.
Biological and Chemical
Weapons
On 31 October 2007, the First Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/62/L.37,
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction” without a vote. The Committee also
adopted without a vote draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.7,
“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction”. These voting results are consistent
with previous years, which demonstrates a continuing universal commitment
to the abolition of biological and chemical weapons.
The universalization of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was consistently called
for in First Committee. The BTWC still faces gaps and challenges,
foremost of which is its lack of a verification system. However,
the BTWC Review Conference, which took place in December 2006, was
frequently referred to as a success in strengthening the Convention
through the establishment of confidence-building measures. The Conference
also contributed to the implementation of the BTWC by establishing
the Implementation Support Unit, which assists State Parties.
The implementation and universalization of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) was also a reoccurring theme this year. The States
Parties to the CWC did not address the possibility of extending
the deadlines for destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles,
and Rogelio
Pfirter, Director-General of the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemcal Weapons (OPCW), expressed hope
that the Second Review Conference, to be held in Den Haag in 2008,
will not focus on the issue of non-compliance with the deadline.
However, during the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the
entry into force of the CWC, which was held on 27 September 2007,
the participants stressed the need to complete the destruction of
chemical weapons by the deadline. Albania has been praised for being
the first State Party to have completely eliminated its chemical
weapons stockpile in July 2007, as confirmed by the OPCW. This achievement
has been inspiring for the OPCW's work in the field of disarmament
and non-proliferation.
However, there has been an overall sentiment that the state possessors
of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles, namely the United States
and the Russian Federation, will not meet their deadline for destruction.
According to Pfirter, 30 percent of the global chemical weapons
stockpile has been destroyed over the last 10 years, while the other
70 percent must be destroyed in only 5 years.
- Edgar Socarras, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Depleted Uranium
On 30 October, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) submitted a revised
version of draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.18,
“Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing
depleted uranium.” The new text, A/C.1/62/L.18/Rev.1,
does not contain operative paragraph 2, which requested member states
“refrain from using armaments and ammunitions containing depleted
uranium until studies to determine the effects of such armaments
and ammunitions on human health and the environment are completed.”
The deletion of this paragraph means the resolution now only requests
the UN Secretary-General “seek the views of Member States
and relevant international organizations on the effects of the use
of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium,”
and “submit a report on this subject to the General Assembly
at its sixty-third session.” Though the revised text is significantly
less substantive than the original, the deletion of this paragraph
was key to its adoption—and was instrumental for dividing
NATO member states.
Of the 26 NATO countries, only five voted against the resolution.
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States rejected it, along
with the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, but Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, and Turkey abstained, while Germany and Italy voted in favour.
This is not the first time NATO has been divided over this issue.
In 2001, the governments of many NATO countries called
for urgent investigations into the use of depleted uranium (DU)
in weapons in Bosnia and Kosovo after soldiers from nine countries
reported developing leukaemia, and the UN found radioactive contamination
at sites where DU weapons were used. At the time, the US, Germany,
the UK, Spain, and Turkey argued they found no evidence of a link
between DU and increased cancer rates among peacekeepers serving
in the region, but Italy, France, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and
Portugal expressed apprehension and called for further investigation
of the issue. The Secretary General of NATO established an Ad
Hoc Committee on Depleted Uranium, which concluded
in November 2001 that “at present there is no scientific link
established between DU and health complaints.”
In March 2007, citing among other reasons the precautionary
principle, Belgium became the first country to ban
the manufacture, use, storage, sale, acquisition, supply, and transfer
of DU ammunitions and armour in its territory. Belgium is not a
user of DU, but US DU shipments travel regularly through its port
of Antwerp. Unfortunately, Belgium abstained from L.18/Rev.1. In
a general statement before voting commenced, Cuba's Rodolfo Benítez
Verson expressed regret that certain states did not vote in favour—not
because they necessarily disagreed with the text, but because they
felt they needed to show political solidarity to their respective
alignments.
Indonesia's
delegate, speaking on behalf of the NAM to present the revised
text before the vote, argued, “There is not yet a clear understanding
of the full impact that fine particles of DU may have on the human
body,” and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the World
Health Organization, and the UN
Environment Programme “have all stated that more research
is needed with respect to the immediate and/or long-term health
or environmental effects of DU munitions.” He also indicated
that L.18/Rev.1 “excludes controversial issues that were introduced
in a previous
resolution on this issue to the First Committee.” However,
in her explanation of vote before the vote, Ambassador Rocca of
the US
insisted that L.18/Rev.1 ignores scientific evidence on the subject,
and encouraged delegations to “wisely defeat” the resolution
as they did in 2002. Fortunately, delegates ignored this call, and
adopted
the resolution with 122 in favour, 6 against, and 35 abstentions.
The NAM, encouraged that the issue is now inscribed on the First
Committee's agenda, intends to return with a stronger resolution
in the sixty-third session.
For more information on DU, please see the International
Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons website, and RCW's DU
resources.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching
Critical Will
Conventional Weapons
During the final week of the First Committee, thematic debate on
Conventional Weapons was completed and voting commenced on relevant
resolutions.
Member states including the Republic
of Korea, Sierra
Leone, Lithuania,
New
Zealand, Pakistan,
Sweden,
Cuba,
Israel,
Bolivia,
and China spoke this week on the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW), with many extolling its virtues as a cornerstone
of conventional arms control. Earlier in the session, the European
Union and the Office for Disarmament Affairs announced their
joint initiative to promote the universality of the CCW (see Conventional
Weapons Week 2). In November 2007, the First Meeting of States
party to the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War will be held
in Geneva in November 2007, and should, according to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, “produce clear guidelines
for how all States Parties should proceed with the recording, retention
and transmission of information required by the Protocol, and for
it to establish an operational framework for addressing the massive
problem of existing ERW.” Sweden,
who again introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.32
on the CCW on behalf of some 40 co-sponsors, summarized the new
changes to the resolution from past years as continuing “to
express support for the CCW, with particular focus on the universalization
of the Convention and its Protocol(s) … [and] to follow up
on the Third Review Conference.” L.32 was adopted without
a vote, as it has been in years past.
This year, a main point of discussion on cluster munitions included
whether an international instrument should be negotiated within
the CCW or through the Oslo Process, which began last year in Norway—in
the final week alone, nine member states made statements on this
question. Canada,
joined by a number of other states, “see[s] no contradiction
in engaging in these two processes concurrently. Quite the opposite.
As the membership within the two processes is not identical, more
countries will be engaged by pursuing the Oslo Process and the work
in the CCW in parallel.” The EU,
however, believes that cluster munitions should remain withi |
