Click here for the PDF Version, or
email the Project Associate to subscribe to the Monitor

In this edition:

1. Editorial: Organizing for Disarmament
2. Nuclear Disarmament
3. Nuclear Proliferation
4. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
5. Outer Space
6. Biological and Chemical Weapons
7. Disarmament Machinery
8. Verification and Transparency
9. In Brief: Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons
10. In Brief: Fissile Materials
11. In Brief: Negative Security Assurances
12. In Brief: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
13. In Brief: Missiles
14. In Brief: Terrorism
15. In Brief: Geneva Process on Small Arms
16. In Brief: Health and Arms Proliferation
17. In Brief: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Editorial: Organizing for Disarmament
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

In his opening statement to the panel on international organizations, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte argued that ultimately, “the future of the world lies in the fate of international organization as a global process.”

His introduction to the topics of organizations and organization provides an opportunity to look at the challenges and crises facing disarmament and non-proliferation in a broader context than First Committee discussions usually permit. High Representative Duarte noted, we are “confronting a variety of crises that are aggravated—year after year—by the loss of a sense of common purpose, the rise of mutual mistrust, and the misperceived need to seek security in measures of self-help, rather than cooperative multilateral action, guided by the rule of law.” He also pointed out that one type of challenge generally omitted from a survey of crises is the “challenge of organization, both domestic and international.”

There are parallels to be drawn between international/domestic and civil society organization. The similarities in their strengths and weaknesses show us where we need to focus our attention at all levels and where we need reform. The international organizations High Representative Duarte speaks of build mutual trust and confidence among states through their commitment to a common purpose—peace and security—and through their usefulness—serving as an “institutional memory,” promoting objectives of all states, and educating the younger generation. Civil society organizations can do much of the same, for governments and for citizens. Many offer the vision, support, and practical steps for the development and implementation of international treaties and norms leading to a de-weaponized and just security. Many educate and provide information for a range of audiences—the general public, civil servants, diplomats, etc. And proper civil society organization can bring citizens together in an effective manner to address domestic and international problems. However, international, national, and civil society organizations, and organization, also face similar challenges.

In High Representative Duarte’s analysis, he indicated that the challenge of international and domestic organization is reflected in the struggle to develop appropriate institutional infrastructures—including budgets, offices, laws, policies, and regulations—to implement their commitments. He pointed to narrow mandates and the inability to undertake long-term planning as additional problems. These are also some of the problems of civil society organization and organizations. The infrastructure and capacity for organizing citizens in collective efforts for peace, security, and disarmament has diminished, along with many fundamental principles and purposes that should be at the core of our efforts. Meanwhile many organizations have become increasing atomized—single issue focused—and professionalized, resulting in the exclusion of many people who would otherwise be valuable assets to our work.

In reference to the challenges of organizing for peace and security issues in the United States, Darwin BondGraham, a PhD candidate at the University of California at Santa Barbara, wrote, “Much of the antiwar movement is orchestrated by organizers and groups that look upward at the powers that be in Congress, and that purposefully shape their messaging to appeal to some abstract notion of the ‘mainstream,’ or to the corporate mass media.” He argues that these groups do not learn from or use as their centre the movements that give social organizing its nourishment and backbone, which means the antiwar movement “can only submit a cosmetic fix to an ill-identified problem, and it can accomplish nothing of the structural and systematic social change that the mass of humanity desperately wants.”This critique is similar to High Representative Duarte’s conclusion that what is necessary for the success of international organizations—and international organization—is “a shared commitment to a common purpose, a determination not to sacrifice the principles and ideals of our respective organizations ... and a willingness to learn from the experience of those who preceded us.” Cooperation and community are essential—progress toward disarmament, non-proliferation, peace, and security requires constructive engagement with others, the development and maintenance of critical consciousness, and the capacity to reach our goals, to create and sustain an alternative to the status quo.

High Representative Duarte asserted, “It is quite apparent that despite the turmoil in our world today ... it is in the realm of international organization where some of the greatest progress is possible in fulfilling both disarmament and non-proliferation goals.” Dedication to the common goal of peace and cooperative action to meet this goal are essential—collective action by international and civil society organizations, reached by effective international, national, and civil organization.

Nuclear Disarmament
Marcy Fowler | Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

During First Committee’s thematic debate on nuclear weapons, delegations acknowledged reductions of nuclear weapons but called upon the nuclear weapon states to further decrease their arsenals and comply with their nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligations, in accordance with the 13 practical steps detailed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Delegates from Australia, Canada, and Japan welcomed announcements of reductions by the United Kingdom and France, indicating that the UK plans to reduce its arsenal by 20 per cent and France by one third (for a total of less than 300 warheads). The UK delegation supported these statements, saying that its deep nuclear arsenal cuts had resulted in fewer than 160 “operationally available” warheads, and that it has reduced its deterrence system to a “single nuclear-weapon system.” However the UK did not go as far as to renounce its nuclear weapon system, claiming that the circumstances would not allow it.

Delegations also welcomed the reductions discussed by the US and Russian delegations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which will reportedly lead to historically low numbers of nuclear warheads by 2012. However, delegations including Switzerland are concerned that these treaties are set to expire in coming years (START in 2009 and SORT in 2012), and yet no agreements exist to take their place. MERCOSUR acknowledged the nuclear reductions that have taken place, but called on nuclear weapon states to go further. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) agreed, and stressed that “reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.”

The United States elaborated on the steps it has taken in recent years to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in its stockpile. The US delegation said the United States “remains steadfast in its commitment to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons and the amount of nuclear-weapons usable material in the United States and in other countries. Our efforts are a solid contribution to international security and non-proliferation.” Russia’s delegation took a gloomier view of the US-Russian relationship, calling for more initiatives and warning “without progressive movement in this direction, we will not only fail to succeed in duly strengthening the NPT regime, but also in creating an atmosphere of trust … between states.”

Norway’s delegate referred to the Seven Nation Initiative it is spearheading and the Oslo Conference on Achieving a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, held in February, as examples of a broad-based effort to advance the disarmament agenda. The delegations of Australia and Japan highlighted their joint initiative, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. India’s delegation, recalling both the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for nuclear disarmament and the Final Document of the UN’s First Special Session on Disarmament—which called nuclear disarmament the highest arms control priority—said it would introduce resolutions aimed at advancing this agenda, including “Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons” and “Reducing nuclear danger.” NAM stressed, “the importance that efforts aiming at non-proliferation should be parallel to the simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.” NAM also renewed its call for several steps, including a conference “to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers,” which are traditionally included in NAM’s “nuclear disarmament” draft resolution.

Though many states agreed on the cornerstone role of the NPT in nuclear disarmament, they also discussed the importance of other international law decisions and resolution in further strengthening the nuclear disarmament regime. Cuba reiterated “the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice on the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion the negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The delegations of Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Qatar also highlighted the importance of the Court’s advisory opinion, with Nicaragua’s ambassador asserting, the ICJ opinion “continues to be of great importance relating to nuclear disarmament. In that opinion it is established clearly that governments have a legal obligation to conduct in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects and to implement them as soon as possible.”

Some delegations discussed UN General Assembly resolutions introduced annually in the First Committee, including “Nuclear Disarmament,” introduced by NAM; “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” introduced by India—who remains a nuclear armed nation outside of the NPT; and “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” introduced by Japan.

With both the challenges and the positive signs in mind, many states reiterated the importance of the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, as well as the importance of following through with measures agreed upon in previous Review Conferences. The New Agenda resolution “specifically focuses on the NPT” and “seeks to convey a specific message about the importance and need to implement commitments already made on nuclear disarmament,” noting in particular the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Switzerland’s ambassador emphasized the importance of the third NPT Preparatory Committee for setting the stage for the Review Conference. The Republic of Korea’s delegate agreed and stressed that success of the 2010 Review Conference is “crucial for the credibility of the NPT regime.”

The Committee’s general debate concluded on Tuesday with a focus on universality and non-compliance issues involving the NPT. Delegations called on the nuclear weapon states to strengthen their compliance with the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states pointed to non-compliance actions of the nuclear weapon states that may harm the NPT including further nuclear weapon development and qualitative improvements, military doctrines relying on nuclear deterrence, the doctrine of pre-emption, and the “regularization” of “surgical strike” nuclear weapons. Iran said that the United States’ reliance on nuclear deterrence, its creation of a “missile shield” and willingness to “target non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty” damages the Treaty. Several states including Jordan and Oman stressed the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT.

Jim Wurst of the Middle Powers Initiative and John Burroughs of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy contributed to this article.

Nuclear Proliferation
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

Despite the amount of time devoted to discussing nuclear proliferation in the general and thematic debate, few resolutions or decisions of the First Committee directly deal with the issue, aside from those that deal with terrorism and non-state actors. US Secretary of State Paula DeSutter introduced a resolution entitled “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments.” Ms. DeSutter said the resolution goes beyond resolution 60/55 (2005) “in that it also seeks to encourage countries to provide assistance, as appropriate, to build national, regional, and international capacity for the implementation of verification and compliance obligations.”

The only other resolution to deal at least nominally with “proliferation” is the Arab Group’s annual resolution, entitled “The threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.” The resolution, which deals exclusively with Israel, has received some vocal opposition in recent years for failing to address the full scope of proliferation issues in the region. In 2007, the General Assembly adopted the Arab Group’s text as resolution 62/56, with 170 states voting in favour. Introducing the draft resolution on Thursday, A/C.1/63/L.2, an Egyptian representative explained the text remained entirely unchanged except for technical updates. Despite the lack of changes, Egypt invited opposing and abstaining states to change their positions.

Thematic Debate
The First Committee’s discussion on nuclear proliferation issues again focused largely on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). On the DPRK, some statements reflected the recent US agreement to remove the DPRK from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, thereby prompting the DPRK to resume disablement of its nuclear facilities. Discussion on Iran did not break of out of the usual debate between emphasizing the need for compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and relevant agreements versus appeals for political and diplomatic solutions.

Of the Six Party Talks participants, China, Russia, and the United States did not directly address the matter of the DPRK in their thematic debate statements on nuclear weapons. Mr. Im of the Republic of Korea made a generally positive statement, expressing hope in the successful conclusion of the Six Party process.

Ambassador Tarui of Japan, however, described the DPRK nuclear program as a threat to regional and international peace and security, although it emphasized its commitment to the Six Party Talks. The Japanese statement prompted an angry reply from Mr. Kang of the DPRK, in which he said Japan’s participation in the talks was “not necessary at all.”

Without adding much beyond their general statements, Western states, including Australia, Canada, and Japan, continued to express concern over Iran’s nuclear programme and call on it to comply with the relevant resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council. Ambassador Streuli of Switzerland emphasized the only solution was diplomatic and urged Iran to accept the EU3+3 “freeze for freeze” offer, in which Iran would suspend its “proliferation sensitive” nuclear programs in exchange for the suspension of sanctions.

Both the EU and Australia expressed concerns over allegations Syria had attempted to construct an undeclared reactor, prompting Syria to reiterate points from its right of replies made during the general debate.

On general approaches to proliferation, a few delegations took the opportunity to reiterate their basic positions. The EU reiterated its longstanding priorities, which include strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime, discouraging withdrawal from the NPT, tightening export controls, and strengthening measures related to non-state acquisition and use.

On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Dr. Percaya of Indonesia said, “the issue of proliferation should be resolved through political and diplomatic means, and that measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law, relevant conventions, the UN Charter, and should contribute to the promotion of international peace, security and stability.”

Ambassador Gumbi of South Africa warned against any attempt to undermine the authority of the IAEA as “the only internationally recognized competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements.”

General Debate: Iranian and DPRK rebuttals
This week, Iran and the DPRK delivered their general statements, which both delegations used as a platform to rebut concerns expressed over their respective nuclear programmes. Ambassador Alhabib of Iran decried “current prejudicial attempts to restrict the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology,” which in his view “would only undermine one of the basic foundations” of the NPT. He also reiterated Iran’s determination to “exercise” its right to nuclear technology and the fuel cycle. Ambassador Alhabib accused the P5+1 of failing to respond to Iran’s latest proposals for negotiations. He reiterated Iran’s “determination” for negotiations without preconditions, in order to achieve a solution “based on realities, common concerns and obligations.”

In his general statement, Ambassador Sin of the DPRK used pointed rhetoric and focused on the security situation in Northeast Asia from the perspective of the DPRK, broadly reiterating the terms of the six party process. Ambassador Sin did not reciprocate the generally reserved tones of the other Six Party Talks participants (see FCM 2008, No. 1) in his general statement. He accused the United States of engaging in nuclear threats and consolidating its military alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Ildikó Bors | Middle Powers Initiative

During last week’s general and thematic debate on nuclear weapons, many delegations stressed the special importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a constructive instrument in restraining vertical proliferation that can, as the Armenian representative said, “drastically strengthen the NPT system and lead us closer to the rightful objective of a world safe from the scourge of nuclear weapons.”

Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs pointed in his statement to incomplete legal regimes, including the CTBT, and the lack of multilateral legal obligations that contribute to some of today’s crisis. The delegations of Norway and Jordan emphasized that the entry into force of the CTBT is essential for the international regime on non-proliferation to deliver on its objectives and to prevent any possible nuclear arms race. The Pakistani delegation indicated that the prolonged non-entry into force of the Treaty is an evident sign of the progressive erosion of international arms control and non-proliferation structures.

Both the Non-Aligned Movement and the States of Central Asia reaffirmed that improvements in the existing and development of new types of nuclear weapons—as envisaged in the US Nuclear Posture Review—violate the CTBT spirit and the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon states at the time of the Treaty’s conclusion. Oman’s representative called for political will without double standards to be applied to the CTBT’s entry into force.

Representatives of Turkey, Canada, and New Zealand welcomed the new CTBT signatory, Iraq, and five new ratifiers, Colombia, Barbados, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Palau. Japan’s delegation acknowledged India’s commitment to uphold its moratorium on testing. The Chinese delegation committed itself to the early ratification of the Treaty. Delegates of Morocco and Austria noted with satisfaction that in the lead up to the 2010 Review Conference, a new dynamic is taking shape in a more precise manner, which was reflected notably in the declarations of the fourth ministerial meeting on the CTBT.

Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Committee, reported, “we are approaching the universalization and implementation of the CTBT,” and, emphasizing that the ban on nuclear testing is now more necessary then ever, he invited the 2010 NPT Review Conference to contemplate the importance of its further progress. He underlined the Treaty’s potential to act as a catalyst for improvement in areas like reduction of strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons, de-alerting, and achieving a fissile material cut-off treaty. He also asserted, “With the CTBT verification regime, a new standard of transparency has been achieved. It represents a new democracy in the verification of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.”

Mr. Tóth cited a number of important steps in the establishment of the verification regime: nearly 70% of the International Monitoring System has been certified; by year-end, 250 out of the intended 337 data recording and transmitting facilities will be running; and the Organization has transitioned to the new Global Communications Infrastructure II. As a result, more then 1000 authorized institutions in over 100 countries now have direct access to the generated data, which is useful not just for verification but for life-saving civil and scientific applications, such as tsunami warnings. Mr. Tóth also reported on the CTBO’s first integrated field exercise at the former nuclear weapons test site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, wherein 200 participants conducted on-site inspections, mock negotiations, and technical procedures.

With the expected renaissance of nuclear energy in mind, Mr. Tóth also addressed areas that require further regulation, to ensure a fair and safe system of access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while differentiating between prohibited and permitted nuclear activities. He argued this is another compelling reason to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT, which is the “most visible legal and technical barrier to the development of nuclear weapons.”

After appeals by many delegations, including Austria, Chile, Japan, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Turkey, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Benin, Qatar, South Africa, NAM, Jordan, Switzerland, and MERCOSUR and Associated States, for efforts to facilitate immediate entry into force of the CTBT and for maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests, the First Committee Chair named all Annex II states and urged all of them directly to do their outmost to ratify the Treaty without delay.

New Zealand’s delegation announced it will again co-sponsor the annual CTBT resolution with Mexico and Australia and expressed hope that states will demonstrate their support for the Treaty by voting for the resolution.

Outer Space
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

While thematic debate topics this week did not explicitly include outer space security, several delegations brought the issue into their statements on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Most indicated that the weaponization of outer space or the deployment of ballistic missile “defence” systems would have a destabilizing effect on the international security environment, which many countries, including the United States, cite as the primary reason for lack of progress in nuclear disarmament.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) representative expressed NAM’s continuing concern “over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems and the threat of weaponziation of outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security.” Pointing to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the NAM delegation said it worries that the deployment of a missile “defence” system could trigger an arms race and lead to “further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.”

In his general debate statement, Iran’s Ambassador Alhabib agreed that missile “defence” would impact disarmament, pointing to Russia’s statement from last week that indicated the deployment of missile ‘defense’ in Eastern Europe would negatively affect the disarmament process. Ambassador Alhabib also argued that the US “missile shield” in Eastern Europe is based on “declaratory assessments of hypothetical and artificial threats and in order to get the impossible goal of ‘absolute security’.”

Overall, China’s delegate explained, “International efforts on issues such as nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and prevention [of an] arms race in outer space are mutually reinforcing and complimentary to each other.” He indicated that preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space “is conducive to maintaining global strategic balance and stability,” and will prevent a nuclear arms race.

However, the European Union (EU) delegation insisted, “The question of space activities has no mandatory link with that of other weapons of mass destruction.” The EU representative, Ambassador Danon of France, did agree that the prevention of an arms race in outer space “is an essential condition for the strengthening of strategic stability.” In the context of providing security for space installations, Ambassador Danon said the EU “took note” of the draft treaty that Russia and China submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on preventing the deployment of space weapons. In its remarks on the draft in the CD on 28 February, the EU delegation said work is needed to achieve consensus on definitions and an “effective and robust verification system” for an outer space security treaty and argued, “it is not sufficient to only refer to a possible future additional protocol” as suggested in the draft PPWT. Ambassador Danon also reiterated the EU is working on a “non-binding international code of conduct for space activities,” without giving an indication of when this code will be presented.

The Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) debated international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, where delegations expressed a range of views on the militarization and weaponization of outer space. In his capacity as Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the delegate of the Czech Republic said that while the EU’s proposed code of conduct could help strengthen the “moral aspects” of space activities, the framework established by the United Nations in its 1979 “Moon Agreement” already articulated those activities in a legally-binding manner.

Russia’s delegation to the Fourth Committee warned that turning space into an arena for armed confrontation is unacceptable and suggested the development of a legally-binding document that would regulate all space activities. Pakistan’s representative argued that proper implementation of existing agreements related to outer space security was essential in the interim.

Biological and Chemical Weapons
Ann Lakhdhir | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Chemical Weapons
Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), reported on the current state of affairs in the field of chemical arms control and disarmament and the role of the OPCW. As of 30 September, the OPCW had verified the destruction of more than 28,600 metric tonnes of Category 1 chemical weapons and 915 metric tonnes of Category 2 chemical weapons. The destruction of Category 3 declared chemical weapons has been completed. Extensions for the complete destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons to 2012 have been granted to India, Libya, Russia, and the United States. Albania and an unnamed state party have completed the destruction of their chemical weapons. Russia has completed the destruction of 29% of its Category 1 chemical weapons, the US 55.4%, and India 97%.

Eleven states have yet to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Of these, Iraq and Lebanon have completed the parliamentary procedures necessary under their constitutional processes. Egypt, Israel—which has signed but not ratified—and Syria continue to cite regional security concerns for remaining outside the Convention. Myanmar has signed but not ratified. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has had virtually no contact with the OPCW.

The European Union representative said it will continue to give assistance to those states which request it in implementing the CWC. The MERCOSUR delegation said it is essential for the states that remain outside the CWC to join. The Non-Aligned Movement suggested the creation of an international support network for CWC to be prepared to help victims.

Representatives of the Republic of Korea, Norway, Jordan, and Eritrea spoke of the importance of the CWC. Australia’s representative welcomed the consensus report of the Second Review Conference of the CWC but said “the difficult negotiating environment prevented constructive discussion of the many challenges facing the CWC, and thus agreement by States Parties on how to deal with them.” Lithuania’s delegation focused on chemical weapons that have been dumped into the world’s seas, explaining that in excess of 50,000 tons of chemical warfare munitions containing highly active toxins have been dumped into the Baltic Sea. Disturbance of the Baltic seabed may trigger an economic, security, and environmental disaster for the littoral states.

Biological Weapons
Ambassador Georgi Avramchev, Chair of the 2008 meetings of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), reported on those meetings. He said the Sixth Review Conference was a turning point, resolving many of the issues that had bitterly divided States Parties since 2001. It provided an update mechanism for the Convention’s confidence-building measures, required states parties to nominate a national point of contact, and agreed on various measures to improve national implementation. It established an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the BTWC to provide support to states parties in implementing the Convention itself and the decisions of the review conferences.

Under consideration at the meeting of states parties in August 2008 were measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins; and oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption or development of codes of conduct to prevent misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research. For daily reports from this meeting, see www.bwpp.org.

The Non-Aligned Movement stressed the need for universal adherence to the BTWC and for international cooperation for peaceful uses of biotechnology. Norway’s ambassador stressed the importance of the intercessional program and the ISU. He said enhanced partnership among states parties and with civil society is a pre-condition for success. MERCOSUR’s representative explained that MERCOSUR member and associated states are free from biological and chemical weapons. The Declaration of the South American Zone of Peace forbids the placement, development, production possession, deployment, testing, and use of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

The Non-Aligned Movement introduced resolution A/C.1/63/L.25 entitled “Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,” which contains only two technical up-dates in PP.1 and OP.4. The Hungarian delegation introduced A/C.1/63/L.11 on the BTWC, which is also based on the previous text and has been updated to reflect recent developments, including new ratifications and the ISU. Neither of these resolutions has yet been circulated.

On 23 October, a panel discussion on “Biological Incidents,” the development of a biological incident database in the context of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, will meet in Conference Room 3, 1:15–2:30pm.

Disarmament Machinery
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Tim Caughly, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, delivered a presentation on behalf of the Secretary-General, Sergei Ordzhonikidze. Mr. Caughley said the CD may be lacking in results but it is not moribund. High-level participation and the introduction of the draft treaty on space weapons had a “positive and energizing impact in raising both the political and public profile of the CD.” He welcomed the coordination of the six presidents over the past few years and congratulated Viet Nam for “securing early cohesion among next year’s six Presidents.” Mr. Caughly also applauded the seven coordinators, though he noted that some delegations were reluctant to give them formal status—which is neither envisaged nor ruled out by the Rules of Procedure—and would have preferred the establishment of subsidiary bodies—which are envisaged but not explicitly required by the Rules of Procedure.

Not all CD member states agree that fissile materials is the only issue ripe for negotiation in the CD. This week, the Indian delegation said there is heavy burden on the CD to make progress on nuclear disarmament. MERCOSUR said it is “disturbing” that the CD has not established a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament. Turkey’s representative argued that CD/1840 is a good deal, though he suggested the CD could perhaps make parallel advances on negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Pakistan’s ambassador said that the proposal presented in 2007 and 2008 in the CD “negated the principle of equal security for all, served interests of few states and undermined the agreed basis for negotiations of a verifiable fissile material treaty.”

Noting the debate between a “balanced” programme of work and the practicality of taking up four issues simultaneously, Mr. Caughly appreciated that Russia and China introduced their draft treaty on space weapons with a research rather than a negotiating mandate, demonstrating their flexibility toward establishing a programme of work. He said it is tempting to ask if the CD “should treat its annual schedule activities as its programme of work and focus on individual mandates for the key activities covered by such a schedule, taking them forward initially, in the absence of agreement on any subsidiary forum, in informal or formal sessions of the Plenary.” He suggested, “This would not necessarily overcome the problem of linkages, but it might serve to make them less institutional.” Mr. Caughly also noted that while some states have questioned the efficacy of regional groupings in the CD, “there is nothing to prevent the emergence of a cross regional approach to finding solutions to the CD’s current impasse.”

Other machinery
A few delegations lamented the failure of the UN Disarmament Commission, including Oman, Jordan, and Morocco. CARICOM, India, Jordan, Morocco, and Nepal called for the establishment of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Verification and Transparency
Danny Thiemann | Global Security Institute

Verification
In his report on “Follow-up of resolutions and decisions adopted by the First Committee,” High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duate gave a stern reminder of an alarming trend: the number of member states who submitted views on verification issues went down from 17 to 4 between the 60th and 63rd sessions of the General Assembly.

The second week of discussion in First Committee also revealed fundamental differences between states on the ability and role of verification in strengthening international security. The European Union and its supporters advocated voluntary measures while other states dissented and argued for systematic and binding resolutions. Ambassador Danon of France, on behalf of the EU, highlighted its work “to secure transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure” to support further progress in disarmament. He noted that the EU considers the Additional Protocols to be an integral part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards system and argued that adherence to it should be considered an essential means of verifying the fulfillment of states’ obligations under Article III of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Turkey’s delegation likewise argued for voluntary measures, supporting “in principle” the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone in the Middle East. Turkey cited the agreements between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as an example of the positive developments that can be achieved via voluntary verification efforts. Switzerland’s Ambassador Streuli also concluded his remarks on this issue by highlighting the positive roles of other states’ voluntary measures, referring to France and the United Kingdom’s placement of excess fissile materials under international safeguards.

The delegations of the United States and Mexico, however, argued that voluntary measures are not sufficient. Mexico’s representative asserted that transparency should be “systematic, not voluntary.” Ms. Paula DeSutter, US Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, also highlighted the importance of systematically implementing verification and compliance obligations. She announced that the US delegation would be tabling its resolution entitled “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments,” which is based on its 2005 resolution of the same name. (See Nuclear Proliferation for more information.)

The United Arab Emirates agreed transparency and verification are important but stressed verification standards are sometimes unfairly imposed on some states while not on others. The UAE argued the IAEA needs to continue to be an independent body in order to retain its legitimacy. The IAEA representative, Gustavo Zlauvinen, also talked about the limits of verification. He noted that states give information first and the IAEA verifies later. He said independent verification will likely become more important in the future, emphasizing that the IAEA will need a robust tool box and legal authority to carry out inspections. He also noted that the IAEA is not universal, as many states have not concluded steps towards ratifying the Additional Protocol.

Transparency
Recognizing that some nuclear weapon states have taken positive steps to increase the transparency of their nuclear arsenals and doctrines, the delegations of Australia, Switzerland, and New Zealand called for increased transparency in these areas. New Zealand Ambassador Mackay emphasized transparency as an area where the NPT “should be able to make substantive progress during the current review cycle.” He highlighted the New Agenda Coalition’s support for “ideas on systematised nuclear accounting within the NPT as a way to increase transparency,” explaining, “A reporting mechanism regarding national arsenals would be a substantive confidence building measure if nuclear weapon States were to provide, for example, further clarity as to the current status of their holdings, as well as future plans for down-sizing and the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in national and regional security doctrines.” Mexico’s delegation also called for a legally-binding reporting mechanism, while the European Union suggested the “establishment of confidence and transparency measures by the nuclear powers.”

In Brief: Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

• Switzerland introduced a draft resolution, based on resolution 62/36 (2007), on deceasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, co-sponsored by Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Sweden. Switzerland explained, “The draft resolution acknowledges and welcomes all steps that have been taken in this direction. It calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to take further such steps to decrease operational readiness.”
• India introduced an unchanged draft resolution on reducing nuclear dangers, which continues to highlight the “unacceptable risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons” through the “hair-trigger posture of nuclear forces.” The resolution will continue to call for de-alerting and a review of nuclear doctrines.
• New Zealand advocated for de-alerting, stating such a step would provide confidence to the non-nuclear weapon states that the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines is not expanding.
• Indonesia said the nuclear weapon states should de-alert and deactivate their nuclear weapons immediately as an interim disarmament step.
• The sponsors of resolution 62/36, along with new sponsor Malaysia, facilitated a panel discussion on 17 October on overcoming the political obstacles to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Pitteloud of Switzerland described the debate this year as more substantive than the largely semantic discussion last year. Ambassador Labbé of Chile argued that the fundamental element behind the argument for de-alerting is that nuclear weapons were created to be used, and have been used, as a result of a rational process in which alternatives were considered.
  • Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists reported that as of mid-2008 there were 1239 warheads on alert in Russia and 1098 in the United States. In his remarks, he expressed concern over the development of the Prompt Global Strike mission within the United States, noting that it is incompatible with de-alerting because it relies on maintaining alert forces.
  • Alexander Pikaev of the Institute of Economy and International Relations painted a gloomy picture of the state of US-Russia strategic relations, but said de-alerting could ease some military concerns.
  • John Hallam of Nuclear Flashpoints urged a number of steps be taken including improving support for General Assembly resolutions that deal with de-alerting,; urging nuclear weapon states to revise their nuclear doctrines; and pushing to include language on de-alerting in the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
  • Steven Starr of Physicians for Social Responsibility described the catastrophic climatic consequences that would result from a global nuclear conflict.
  • Ira Helfand of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War described projected US casualties that would result from a Russian nuclear attack on the United States.

Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will contributed to this article.

In Brief: Fissile Materials
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

• Pakistan expressed support for “negotiation of a verifiable treaty on fissile material in the Conference on Disarmament.” Pakistan further reiterated its view that the treaty must also include past, present, and future production to avoid, inter alia, “freezing regional asymmetries.”
• The European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom called for the adoption of the compromise programme of work in document CD/1840, which would allow negotiations to commence on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.
• MERCOSUR described the impasse of FMCT negotiations as “disquieting” and Canada described the prospects for negotiations starting as “dishearteningly dim.”
• The Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Switzerland also made calls for the commencement of FMCT negotiations.

In Brief: Negative Security Assurances
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

• Bangladesh, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates called for negative security assurances (NSAs).
• The Non-Aligned Movement, MERCOSUR, Algeria, Jordan, and Libya called for legally-binding NSAs.
• South Africa said NSAs “rightfully belong to those States that have foresworn the nuclear-weapons option.”
• Cuba said it is essential that nuclear weapon states “unconditionally guarantee that they will neither use or threaten to use [nuclear] weapons.”
• South Africa, Russia, and Pakistan emphasized that NSAs were a key element of the 1995 extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Russia said it considers security assurances to NPT non-nuclear weapon states “a core principle for strengthening the regime of the Treaty.”
• Russia reaffirmed its NSAs to Mongolia and said it has provided such assurances to more than 100 states that are members of the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties.
• Russia said it stands “for the soonest development of an international convention on assurances” that would “take into account reservations regarding the situations when nuclear weapons may be used in accordance with military doctrines of nuclear powers.”
• Russia supported the idea of re-establishing the Conference on Disarmament’s ad hoc committee on NSAs with a negotiating mandate.
• Pakistan criticized the “emergence of doctrines envisaging the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon States” and reiterated its declaration not to use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state.
• China reiterated its unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon free zones.
• The United Kingdom emphasized its commitment to the negative and positive security assurances it has given to non-nuclear weapon states noted in UNSC resolution 984 (1995).
• The United Kingdom said that NSAs are best guaranteed through protocols annexed to nuclear weapon free zone treaties.

Madeline Woo of Reaching Critical Will contributed to this article.

In Brief: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

• Austria promoted its proposal to multilateralize the nuclear fuel cycle and said it would submit a more detailed outline of its proposal to the IAEA soon.
• The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) defended the right to nuclear energy and the fuel cycle as “one of the fundamental objectives of the [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].” The NAM also stated “each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.”

In Brief: Missiles
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

• Iran announced it would introduced a resolution on missiles, co-sponsored by Egypt and Indonesia, following up on the report of Third Panel of Governmental Experts on the topic. Iran said it was pleased with the Panel’s session, which it described as serious and constructive, repeating its assessment of the Panel’s first session.
• The Chair of the Third Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles presented his report to the First Committee. The Panel, which convened pursuant to resolution 59/67 (2004), released it report, A/63/176, in July. The Panel concluded the UN should provide a more structure and effective mechanism to continue deliberations and build consensus on the increasingly complex issue. The Panel agreed a step-by-step approach was needed but could not reach agreement on any particular set of actions. Possible steps could include:
  • developing a common understanding on missiles and how they impact global and regional security;
  • refining export controls;
  • improving reporting to UN mechanisms;
  • broadly engagingly in efforts to peacefully settle disputes; and
  • developing voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures.
• The EU reaffirmed its view that Missile Technology Control Regime and Hague Code of Conduct are the best tools to combat missile proliferation and that it would like to examine “new ways of reinforcing the campaign against missile proliferation.” The EU also expressed concern over the number of missile tests conducted over the past year that were conducted outside of existing transparency and notification schemes, especially those conducted by Iran.

In Brief: Terrorism
Michael Kennedy | Global Security Institute

Terrorist Acquisition of WMDs

• Many states, among them Nicaragua, Morocco, Benin, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, South Africa, and the European Union once again highlighted their concern over the possibility of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists.
• The European Union made note of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s contributions to counter-terrorism through activities that make it easier for states to detect and respond to illegal trafficking in nuclear material.
• As with last week, some member states, including Jordan, South Africa, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) stressed that the only way to ensure no terrorist actors acquire WMDs is through the elimination of nuclear weapons.
• At the same time, both NAM and Cuba stressed the need for the Security Council to ensure that no measure it adopts impedes on the UN Charter, General Assembly, or other international organizations. NAM cautioned against the Security Council’s “continuing practice” of deciding legislative requirements for member states in adopting the body’s resolutions.
• NAM asked that all deliberations regarding terrorist acquisition of WMDs be inclusive and take into account the views of all member states.
• As in previous years, India stated that it will table a resolution entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs.” The resolution highlights the concern of the international community in fighting terrorism and calls for a multilateral and global response to terrorism. In a slight update to the measure, it will take into account the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism that was launched in 2006. The resolution has not yet been circulated.
• NAM welcomed the consensus support last year of General Assembly Resolution 62/33, “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”

Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540

• The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) emphasized its continued role in aiding developing countries comply with 1540 through capacity-building and sharing of best practices and technology.
• CARICOM also underlined its efforts to assure full implementation of the resolution and noted that Caribbean states have complied with the 1540 Committee.
• Jordan pointed out that effective implementation of resolution 1540 requires international coordination and cooperation in order to disseminate technology and information.
• Benin declared that the principles embodied in resolution 1540 should be extended in concrete form towards a treaty.

Terrorism and Chemical Weapons

• The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)’s Director-General outlined that national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention will close loopholes that might allow terrorists to obtain chemical weapons. He noted that the OPCW’s role was recognized in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Bio-Terrorism

• Australia highlighted the need for states to strengthen implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to prevent against states becoming safe havens for bio-terrorist activities.
• Australia hopes that both the BTWC and CWC will hold an important place in the efforts to reduce and eliminate the threat of bio-terrorism.

Nuclear Waste Transport

• Haiti, speaking on behalf of CARICOM, voiced the continued concern of the Caribbean nations regarding transportation of nuclear waste, including as it relates to the prospect of a terrorist attack on shipments, an event that would threaten the survival of the Caribbean states. CARICOM encouraged member states to halt their use of the Caribbean Sea as means of transporting their waste.

In Brief: Geneva Process on Small Arms
Eleanor Andrews | Quaker United Nations Office

• Moderated by Eric Berman, of the Small Arms Survey, and David Atwood, of the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva, Tuesday, 14 October’s lunchtime side event was part of the Geneva Process on Small Arms’ larger effort to bridge the gap (alternatively called a gulf and a nexus) between Geneva and New York, building broader ownership of the work on implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms.
• The meeting was attended by some 48 people representing Geneva- and New York-based diplomats whose countries are members of the Geneva Process, UNODA, and a range of non-governmental organizations.
• Participants weighed in on lessons learned from July’s Biennial Meeting of States 3 (BMS 3); successful strategies included “shadow diplomacy”; cooperation among governments, NGOs, and academia; and the appointment of facilitators from both New York and Geneva.
• Early preparation focused the BMS on a limited number of topics: international cooperation and assistance and national capacity-building; illicit brokering; stockpile management and surplus disposal, and the International Tracing Instrument. This approach was designed to foster more meaningful debate. Early preparation for the meeting helped create consensus around some issues, as there was more time to digest them and develop agreement.
• The preparation also yielded an outcome document, the legitimacy of which was the subject of only limited objection.
  With Geneva as the center of SALW work, bringing in the New York counterparts helps provide new perspectives and tools. The responsibility is with New York delegates to stay appraised of Geneva’s work, but Geneva actors must also learn to translate their creative and substantive work into a message that works in New York’s more political setting.
• The structural organization of New York and the tendency for interested parties to work in regional groupings has made collaboration more difficult. However, participants widely praised the Germany-chaired Group of Interested States as a framework for engagement and recommended its use in future.
• An outline of the upcoming meetings highlighted the need to maintain the present momentum and to think about how each of the meetings would help prepare the ground for those that follow.

In Brief: Health and Arms Transfers
Bruce Millar | International Action Network on Small Arms

• On 13 October, the Control Arms Campaign hosted a panel discussion on health and arms transfers. The event was reduced from 60 to 30 minutes by the overrunning of a previous event.
• A panel of four health experts chaired by Dr. Diego Zavala of Amnesty USA presented a session on the impact of arms transfers on public health.
• All speakers emphasized the hugely negative impact small arms and light weapons violence has on domestic health services and the need for a global instrument, such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
• France confirmed its support for an ATT and welcomed the involvement of civil society. The European Union will launch a joint action in support of an ATT and asks other states to voice their support for an ATT.

In Brief: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Sandra Fong | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

• 29 delegations referenced nuclear weapon free zones in their interventions, including the European Union, the Arab Group, MERCOSUR and Associated States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the States of Central Asia.
• Jordan, Iran, Palestine, European Union, Non-Aligned Movement, Russia, Kuwait, UAE, Turkey, Bangladesh, and Egypt called for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East
• Jordan, Kuwait and NAM called on Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
• Egypt introduced the resolution on the “Establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone region in the Middle East” as contained in document L.1, adding that it is the same text as Resolution 62/18, adopted last year and has only been technically updated.
• Russia supported the establishment of NWFZ in Central Asia.
• The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) welcomed the establishment of the signing of the Treaty on a NWFZ in Central Asia in 2006 and reiterated that in the context of NWFZ, it is essential that nuclear weapon states provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the Zone. NAM also called on states parties and signatories to the treaties of NWFZs to implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies, and other interested states.
• Russia stated that it considers the establishment of NWFZs as an efficient measure of strengthening the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation and enhancing the level of regional and international security. Russia supports further development of such zones. Russia also stated that its reservation to protocols to the NWFZ treaties cover only exceptional situations and that it conforms with universally accepted norms of international law. Russia also respects the nuclear weapons free status of Mongolia.
• MERCOSUR announced that together with New Zealand, it will submit again this year the draft resolution “Nuclear weapon free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas”
.

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008