|
First Committee
Monitor
Final Edition
4 November 2009
Download in PDF
| Subscribe
to the Monitor
In this edition:
Editorial:
In pursuit of consensus
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
In his closing remarks, First Committee Chair Ambassador
José Luis Cancela of Uruguay explained that since
the Committee began working this year, delegations have listened
to him say that his main aspiration was the greatest possible
consensus between all delegations. He called for consensus
not as minimal points in agreement to create formulations
more or less repeated every year and not as an imposition
of the powerful over the weak, but consensus as a cornerstone
for building genuine efforts to push forth in this unprecedented
moment for disarmament and non-proliferation.
Most delegations took this call seriously. Sponsors of several
draft resolutions engaged in intensive consultations to garner
consensus on their texts, which sometimes resulted in substantial
modifications to the drafts in order to accommodate concerns
of other delegations. Some of these resolutions included those
on a fissile materials treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions,
transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space,
the International Day against Nuclear Testing, and perhaps
most notably, the arms trade treaty. Not all of these efforts
were successful; the final example had to be adopted by a
recorded vote.
Regardless of their success, these efforts demonstrate that
consensus is not just an outcome but also a process. Consensus
as a process is intended to be cooperative rather than competitive,
to facilitate compromise rather than zero-sum approaches,
and to ensure that the “tyranny of the majority”
cannot silence the concerns of a minority.
Consensus as an outcome offers an aura of unity. It suggests
that the final product is satisfactory to all participants,
which will make its implementation easier, because everyone
involved agrees with it. Yet with some resolutions, it is
not at all clear that consensus demonstrates unity. Delegations
frequently issued explanations of vote on resolutions adopted
by consensus to register remaining concerns they feel were
inadequately addressed in the modifications, or even to withdraw
their participation from the consensus adoption altogether.
Some draft resolutions were so compromised in an effort to
reach consensus that their original supporters had to issue
explanations of vote. At least ten delegations that have been
traditionally strong supporters of developing a robust and
legally-binding arms trade treaty expressed concern with operative
paragraph five (OP5) of the resolution, which mandates the
treaty negotiating conference to be undertaken “on the
basis of consensus”. Even with this concession that
so alarmed some treaty supporters, the draft resolution was
not adopted by consensus.
Why would governments that want a universal arms trade treaty
be concerned about a negotiating conference undertaken on
the basis of consensus? Do they object to equal respect for
all delegations’ concerns and priorities? Do they not
want a treaty that all governments will ratify and implement?
On the contrary, in their explanations of vote these ten
delegations worried that consensus would mean delays or prevention
of negotiation or adoption of the treaty; that it could reduce
the quality of the outcome by leading to the adoption of the
“lowest common denominator”—or to no outcome
at all; and that it will undermine the credibility of the
negotiating process and the treaty by giving all states a
“veto”.
Are these concerns those of powerful countries seeking to
impose their will on the less powerful? This is difficult
to imagine, given that the world’s biggest arms producer
and exporter—the United States—actually demanded
the consensus mandate. Rather, the anxiety over OP5 reflects
a much broader concern with the way consensus is currently
treated in multilateral disarmament diplomacy.
At the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where no substantive
work has occurred since 1998, the rules
of procedure stipulate that the Conference “shall
conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus.”
This has led to a stalemate perpetuated by one delegation
or another using the consensus rule as a veto to block the
commencement of work. In effect, consensus as currently practiced
in the CD avoids tyranny of the majority by empowering a tyranny
of the minority.
Many delegations have grown frustrated with this situation.
They suggest modifications to the CD’s rules of procedure.
Others argue that the problem is not with the rules but with
political will—or with the loss of the art of compromise.
Some argue that the rule of consensus is necessary to protect
national security interests.
This gets to to the real heart of problem, at least in the
context of disarmament negotiating fora. The “national
security interest” is put above all else, but without
discussion on what—or whose—interests these are.
The “national interest,” as it is typically invoked
in this sense, does not refer to the well-being of the general
population but of those managing the military-industrial complex.
Their interests generally dominate discussions at disarmament
fora and block the commencement of work or the adoption of
treaties or outcome documents.
Most of the treaties or issues currently on the disarmament
and arms control table are measures that would—if pursued
in good faith through cooperation and compromise—actually
serve to enhance true national security: the security
of population and sovereignty, security against weapons and
war.
Ambassador Cancela called for consensus as a cornerstone
for building genuine efforts to push forth in this unprecedented
moment for disarmament and non-proliferation. This effort
will require, as Swiss
Ambassador Streuli noted, “a fundamental revision”
of thinking, “taking global security into account.”
In the time leading up to the next CD session and to the
arms trade treaty negotiating conference, governments should
think seriously about what consensus really means, both as
a process and an outcome. Does it mean compromise? Does it
mean tyranny? Or does it afford the opportunity to promote
cooperative approaches to enhancing global security?
Nuclear Disarmament
Jim Wurst | Middle
Powers Initiative
The shift in US policy regarding steps toward nuclear disarmament
was apparent in the voting in First Committee on nuclear disarmament
resolutions. While undoubtedly a positive development, the
voting patterns did throw into sharper relief the objections
by other nuclear weapon possessors, notably those outside
of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) regime.
Since the US joined as a co-sponsor of the Japanese-led “Renewed
determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,”
(A/C.1/64/L.36),
it was a foregone conclusion that the US would vote for the
resolution after opposing it in previous years. With the US
shifting from no to yes, that meant only two countries—India
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—voted
no. On the other hand, France switched from voting yes to
abstaining. The vote was 161 to 2, with 8 abstentions (France,
China, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Cuba).
The resolution has gotten as close to consensus as is possible
for a nuclear disarmament resolution that endorses the NPT.
The resolution is little changed from last year; mostly it
now acknowledges the positive developments since last year
and welcomes “the constructive role” played by
civil society, especially the International Commission on
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, an initiative Japan
co-chairs with Australia.
In the explanation of vote, the French
delegation said it shifted from yes to abstention because
the draft did not offer a full list of disarmament accomplishments.
France
said the draft “would have gained from some improvements,”
notably references to
Security Council Resolution 1887 on nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament and acknowledgment of progress made by France
and the United Kingdom in these regards.
The Indian
delegation said it could not accept the call for India
to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and noted that,
in the context of negotiations over a fissile materials cut-off
treaty, “the question of a moratorium on the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons does not arise.”
The delegations of China and Pakistan said they supported
the goal of the resolution but that some of the provisions
in the draft were unrealistic. Neither was specific on which
provisions. The delegate from the DPRK objected to the inclusion
of references to Security Council resolutions criticizing
the DPRK’s nuclear tests, saying the Council is “irresponsible
and unfair.”
On the other hand, the draft by the New Agenda Coalition
(NAC), “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating
the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,”
(A/C.1/64/L.54)
did not gain the support of the United States this year. The
vote was 165 to 5 with 4 abstentions. Along with the United
States, the delegations of France, DPRK, India, and Israel
also voted against the resolution. Pakistan, the other nuclear
weapon possessor outside the NPT, abstained, as did the United
Kingdom, Bhutan, and Micronesia. The US
delegation said it had “engaged in intense consultations”
with the NAC but that they were “unable to reach agreement
on changes that would have made the resolution acceptable
to the United States.” He did not elaborate on those
problems. The draft calls on the nuclear weapon states to
“accelerate the implementation” of the steps and
on all states to ensure that the results of the 2010 Review
Conference should “contribute significantly to the concrete
implementations of the outcomes of both conferences.”
The same five states voted against the resolution in 2008
and 2007; however, more countries have switched from abstentions
to positive votes. There were six abstentions in 2008 and
13 in 2007. Russia and Latvia switched from abstention to
yes this year. The Russian delegation said it was able to
support the NAC resolution this year, without explaining what
caused the change. With Latvia’s switch, this means
all of non-nuclear Europe is behind the resolution. The resolution
links its agenda closely to the NPT and the decisions of its
1995
and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 13
Practical Steps of 2000.
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)’s “Nuclear Disarmament”
(A/C.1/64/L.48)
did not enjoy that level of support. Based as it is on
NAM summit statements, it goes further than non-NAM countries
can accept. The vote was 112 to 43, with 21 abstentions. (In
2008, the vote was 104-44-21.)
The Iranian draft, “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament
obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,” (A/C.1/64/L.6)
remains divisive. The vote was 105 to 56, with 12 abstentions.
The no votes came from the bulk of the Northern Hemisphere
(plus Australia and New Zealand), as well as Pakistan. China
and India were among the abstainers. Although no one made
an explanation of vote as to why they opposed or abstained
on the draft, in past years delegates complained the draft
focused too heavily on the disarmament obligations under the
NPT at the expense of the other two pillars, non-proliferation
and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The annual draft on “Follow-up to the advisory opinion
of the International
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/64/L.51)
was adopted with essentially the same voting pattern as last
year: 126-29-22
(in 2008, the vote was 118-30-22). Once again, the draft recalled
the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion that there exists an obligation
to negotiate nuclear disarmament and called on states to fulfill
that obligation by “commencing multilateral negotiations
leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.”
The Japanese delegation explained its abstention, noting
that while it supports the ICJ opinion, it believes that the
international community should make incremental steps toward
nuclear disarmament before embarking on multilateral negotiations
on a nuclear weapons convention (NWC), as called for in
L.51. The Norwegian delegation explained that it voted
against the resolution as it has in previous years, arguing
that there will be a need for a NWC at “some point”
but that right now the focus should be on securing a positive
outcome at the 2010
NPT Review Conference and “creating conditions conducive
to eliminating nuclear weapons.”
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this First Committee
debate and voting session is that the United States is ready
to reengage in multilateral disarmament deliberations. Absent
US complaints about the nuclear test ban and fissile material
negotiations, issues raised by the three nuclear weapon possessors
outside the NPT and the DPRK were thrown into sharper relief.
In other sections of the Monitor, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, the fissile materials cut-off treaty,
and de-alerting are discussed. In the first two cases, the
US position on these specific issues has changed dramatically.
De-alerting is more integrated in the overall strategic planning
of the United States, therefore the matter is still unsettled—though
the US delegation gave the sponsors of the de-alerting resolution
indications that the sponsors’ momentary restraint in
advocacy on this issue will help facilitate the inclusion
of disarmament-compatible provisions in the nuclear posture
review process.
“Nuclear disarmament” is more than eliminating
nuclear weapons: there are a range of interim steps—some
more likely than others—that are affected by perceptions
of how nuclear disarmament fits into the grand vision of general
and complete disarmament; and what disarmament means to a
country with tens of thousands of weapons as opposed to a
country with tens of them. The most destructive weapons in
human history are part of a huge machine of gears within gears.
Some of the sand that has been thrown in those gears over
the past decade has been cleaned out, but there are still
a number of actors out there with buckets of sand. 2009 has
been a good start.
Nuclear Proliferation
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
In the final First Committee before the parties to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) review the implementation of the Treaty and
its past conferences, the international community demonstrated
increased divisions on a perennial issue at the core of contemporary
proliferation concerns: freeing the Middle East of nuclear
weapons. On 27 October, First Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.1/64/L.4,
the annual resolution sponsored by the members of the League
of Arab States entitled “The risk of proliferation in
the Middle East,” with a vote of 164-5-6.
The United States and Israel, along with the US associated
states of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, voted
against the resolution, while Australia, Cameroon, Canada,
Cote d’Ivoire, and India abstained.
A separate vote was taken on preambular paragraph six, which
recognises that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference called upon all non-parties to join the Treaty
and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
on all their nuclear activities. This paragraph was retained
with a vote of 163-4-6,
with the United States, Israel, India, and Palau voting against
it and Bhutan, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, and Pakistan abstaining.
Before the vote, the European Union explained that it would
vote in favour of the resolution but it does not support the
references to resolution GC(53)/RES/17,
entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities,” adopted
by the IAEA General Conference in September, noting that all
EU member states voted against it. However, the EU statement
reiterated its commitment to the full implementation of the
1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East and urged for the establishment
of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery.
In its explanation of vote, the
US delegation, as in recent years, argued that L.4
“fails to meet the fundamental tests of fairness and
balance.” Ambassador
Larson said the resolution focuses on a single country,
“omitting any reference to other issues related to nuclear
proliferation in the region,” an indirect reference
to Iran. However, he did reiterate “the longstanding
position of the United States in support of universal adherence
to the NPT,” which is a primary objective of L.4.
The Canadian
delegation also criticised the resolution for singling
out Israel without mentioning Iran, arguing the resolution
should “not only call for all states in the region to
accede and unequivocally adhere to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, but it should also call for these states
to comply fully with all of their obligations.” Switzerland’s
delegation also argued that the resolution only mentions
part of the risk of proliferation in the Middle East, but
voted in favour to show the importance it attaches to full
implementation of all NPT obligations by all member states
of the region. New
Zealand’s delegation voted in favour, but expressed
hope that the resolution’s “lack of balance will
be able to be addressed in future years.” Australia’s
delegation found the same fault with the text but abstained.
Israel’s delegation went much further, arguing that
the current situation in the Middle East “warrants the
question of whether L.4 has any connection to reality.”
It argued that adopting this resolution does not serve the
objective of curbing proliferation in the region and urged
member states to vote against it. Syria’s delegation
retorted that Israel aims to “misguide” First
Committee through unfounded claims, pointing out Israel’s
non-accession to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
Aside from this specific resolution, where the proper balance
of finger pointing at Israel and Iran dominated the explanations
of vote, the tone of the nuclear proliferation debate in First
Committee was somewhat different this year. Most states placed
less focus on country-specific accusations of non-compliance
with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations. This approached
followed from that of the UN Security Council’s Summit
on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which President
Obama characterized as not directed at any specific country.
However, the European Union continued taking a hard line
on non-proliferation in general and Iran in particular, pointedly
expressing its commitment “to act with resolve, using
all instruments and policies at its disposal, to prevent,
deter, halt and if possible eliminate proliferation programs.”
Some of these include “resolute action in response to
proliferation crises, in particular in Iran and the DPRK,”
“determination of the consequences of a State Party’s
non-compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations,”
and “adoption of national criminal sanctions against
acts of proliferation, including proliferation financing.”
France in particular focused on nuclear proliferation its
statements, arguing that that non-proliferation must come
before disarmament. During the thematic debate, French Ambassador
Danon argued that the “crises of proliferation are now
the greatest threat to international peace and security”
and that their resolution is necessary to create a safe international
context in order to pursue nuclear reductions. He called for
the international community be “united and resolute”
and “rigorous with those who violate international [non-proliferation]
norms.”
However, a number of delegations argued that states wanting
increased measures to ensure non-proliferation could not impose
such measures without undertaking reciprocal, concrete steps
to eliminate their own nuclear weapons. The New Agenda Coalition
reminded the First Committee, “it is axiomatic that
the only absolute guarantee against the proliferation and
use of nuclear weapons is the complete and verifiable elimination
of those weapons.” The delegations of Venezuela, Bolivia,
Switzerland, and Morocco also highlighted the link between
disarmament and non-proliferation.
The US delegation described them as “two sides of the
same coin,” though US Under Secretary of State Tauscher
also stressed the importance of all countries taking “ownership
in an effort to reduce nuclear threats,” which the US
government believes “does not end with a decision to
forgo nuclear weapons and accept safeguards to demonstrate
the sincerity of that decision,” but rather extends
“through the participation in collective efforts to
impede others from crossing the nuclear threshold [emphasis
added].”
This approach of promoting an aggressive campaign for increased
non-proliferation obligations for states that do not possess
nuclear weapons while indefinitely postponing any concrete
measures on disarmament is not in keeping with the recognition
that disarmament and non-proliferation are “two sides
of the same coin.”
Operational
Status on Nuclear Weapon Systems
Lori Sims | Global
Action to Prevent War
In an effort to facilitate positive steps toward reducing
the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems leading
up to the 2010
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference,
the sponsors of de-alerting resolutions from 2007 and 2008
decided not to table the resolution this year. The Chilean,
New
Zealand, and Swiss
delegations acknowledged that the sponsors were aware
that many states are currently undergoing nuclear review processes
and explained that their decision to postpone the resolution
by one year will further constructive engagement on the topic
by those states. The Swiss
delegation emphasised that the resolution’s co-sponsors
would continue to engage the nuclear weapon states toward
concrete progress on the objective of the resolution at the
NPT Review Conference and that they intend to table the resolution
again next year in First Committee.
The resolution, sponsored by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Sweden, Switzerland and Malaysia, acknowledges and welcomes
all steps that have been taken to reduce the alert status
of nuclear weapon systems and calls on all nuclear weapon
states to take further steps to decrease operational readiness.
The General Assembly adopted resolution 62/36
(2007) and
63/41 (2008) by an overwhelming majority; only France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States voted against both
resolutions.
This year, however, the United States for the first time
co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.36,
entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination
of nuclear weapons.” Among other things, L.36
“calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to take measures
to reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch
of nuclear weapons and to also consider further reducing the
operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that
promote international stability and security.”
During First Committee, the delegations from Switzerland
and Chile also hosted side events on de-alerting. Speakers
highlighted the importance of decreasing operational status
by focusing on the dangers of accidental or unauthorized use
of nuclear weapons at the Chilean-sponsored event on 14 October.
Speakers also noted the catastrophic environmental impact
of nuclear war and offered policy suggestions for decreasing
operational readiness.
The Swiss delegation, along with the EastWest Institute,
co-sponsored an event on 15 October highlighting Reframing
Nuclear De-Alert, a report on topics discussed at
a conference in Switzerland earlier this year. The report,
supported by the Swiss and New Zealand governments and prepared
by the EastWest Institute, explores the relationship between
de-alerting and disarmament and addresses the current operational
readiness of US and Russian arsenals.
Fissile
Materials
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
For the first time since 2004, First Committee adopted a
resolution specifically on a treaty banning the production
of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. On 29 October,
the Committee adopted without a vote A/C.1/64/L.1/Rev.1,
entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile materials
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Introducing the revised resolution, the
Canadian delegation noted that “the international
community will speak again today with one voice in support
of the commencement of negotiations on this vital international
security instrument which, as the draft resolution notes,
would make a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation.”
The revised version of the resolution contains several substantive
changes. The preamble no longer recalls UN
Security Council Resolution 1887 but instead notes “the
support to the Conference
on Disarmament of the
Security Council summit”. It also welcomes the “consensus
adoption” of the CD’s programme
of work in 2009, adding the word “consensus”.
It also describes the programme of work as being “without
prejudice to any past, present or future position.”
Furthermore, the preamble drops the paragraph welcoming the
decisions of several states to establish moratoriums on producing
fissile materials for weapons purposes. Operative paragraph
one drops the call for negotiations to be conducted “with
a view to reaching consensus on its text as soon as possible.”
Three delegations provided explanations of their positions
after the vote.
Pakistan’s delegation emphasised that its support
for the resolution is without prejudice to its belief that
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should adopt a holistic
approach to its agenda rather than a piecemeal approach such
as that laid out in CD/1864,
the 2009 programme of work. The Pakistani delegate also reiterated
the importance for a fissile materials treaty to be a genuine
disarmament measure and not a limited non-proliferation instrument,
announcing that his delegation is ready to work toward such
a treaty that also takes into account its “legitimate
security concerns”. The Iranian delegation likewise
explained that it supports the “reactivation”
of the CD on a balanced programme of work “responsive
to the priorities of all member states” and that it
will “never accept” a limited non-proliferation
fissile materials treaty.
The delegation of Israel also joined consensus on L.1/Rev.1,
albeit with caveats. It argued that a fissile materials cut-off
treaty would not address the issue of the “poor track
record of compliance” with international disarmament
and non-proliferation treaties in the Middle East. It urged
the international community to focus its efforts “first
and foremost on ensuring compliance with existing obligations”
and on finding the “appropriate balance” on meeting
the global demand for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
the need to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Overall, most delegations seem supportive of negotiations
commencing on a fissile materials treaty next year in the
CD. Unfortunately, not only was the CD unable to implement
its programme before the end of the 2009 session, but that
document will not carry over to the 2010 session—meaning
the CD will have to negotiate a new programme of work starting
in January.
Representatives from Austria, the current CD president, and
Bangladesh, the first of six rotating presidents in 2010,
announced that they will be engaged in intersessional consultations
in the hopes of reaching agreement on a programme of work
early next year. Some delegations’ statements, including
Pakistan’s and Iran’s explanations of vote, indicate
that they are looking for quite a different work programme
than that formulated in CD/1864—specifically, one that
includes balanced action on all four of the CD’s core
issues. However, other delegations find this approach unacceptable,
arguing that governments do not have the capacity or will
to negotiate on all four issues at once.
The Indian and Pakistani delegations have both indicated
concern over their national security interests being respected
in the course of FMCT negotiations and in any final product.
According to the
International Panel on Fissile Materials, only India,
Israel, and Pakistan are believed to be currently producing
fissile material for use in weapons. Both India and Pakistan
are constructing new weapons-related fissile material production
facilities.
Other delegations have questioned their concerns regarding
a fissile materials treaty. Australian
Ambassador Millar blamed this “calculation by a
very few that stopping the production of fissile materials
for nuclear weapons may not be in their security interests”
for preventing the commencement of FMCT negotiations. She
advocated for “engagement at political levels outside
the CD to convince hold-out states that stopping the production
of fissile materials for nuclear weapons enhances the security
of all.”
On 28 October, representatives from the International
Panel of Fissile Materials presented their new report,
Global
Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament,
to First Committee during a lunchtime side event. The panelists
gave an overview of the current production and stockpiles
of fissile materials for weapons purposes; outlined the importance
of official declarations of such materials and the possibility
of verifying these declarations; the process for verified
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and recovery of their fissile
materials; and the connections between a fissile materials
treaty, nuclear power, and nuclear disarmament.
The Panel’s report makes it clear that a ban on fissile
material production for weapons purposes is useful for building
transparency and confidence, for facilitating nuclear arms
reductions, for preventing nuclear proliferation, and for
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As these are
the stated objectives of the overwhelming majority of delegations
at First Committee this year, it would seem that it would
be in every government’s best interest to negotiate
a strong and robust treaty that bans all future production
for weapons and brings under safeguards all existing fissile
material in civilian stockpiles as well as military stockpiles
that have been declared as excess for weapon purposes.
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
Christian Ciobanu and Daniel Calder | NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
On 30 October, First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.47/Rev.1,
“Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty” with
175 in favour, one opposed (Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea) and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, and Syria).
Out of the nine Annex II signatories, whose ratification is
required for it to gain entry into force, all but the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea voted in favour of the treaty.
In a sweeping change from last year, the US delegation
voted in favour of the resolution and for the first time,
all five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5)
joined as co-sponsors.
In a separate vote on operative
paragraph 5 (OP5) of the draft resolution, 166 states
voted
in favour, one opposed it (DPRK), and five abstained (Cuba,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Syria, and Iran). The delegations of
the
DPRK, Israel, Syria, Pakistan, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela,
and Australia and New Zealand provided explanations of their
votes.
The DPRK
delegation explained that it voted against the resolution
because it does not recognize Security Council Resolutions
1718 and 1875,
which are referenced in OP5. The Cuban and Venezuelan delegations
argued that this paragraph draws away from the technical nature
of this resolution. They further argued that the UN Security
Council is known to be of limited composition, where major
powers can undertake political maneuvers that lead to double-standards.
The Iranian delegation said it abstained on OP5 because for
the first time, the resolution’s co-sponsors did not
undertake transparent consultations on changes to the text.
Prior to voting on
L.47/Rev.1, the European Union and Morocco on behalf of
the co-chairs of the sixth CTBT Article XIV Conference cited
the renewed US commitment to seeking ratification of the CTBT
as providing much-needed impetus for the Treaty’s entry
into force. The Australian and New Zealand delegations together
affirmed that the P5’s decisions to support the CTBT
will send a powerful affirmation of the CTBT’s importance
in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
However, First Committee still heard reservations about the
CTBT by a few delegations. The delegation
of Israel argued that the Treaty’s verification
system must be completed before the Treaty can enter into
force. Egypt’s
delegation stated that Israel’s refusal to join
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prevents Egypt from ratifying
the CTBT, because doing so “would only result in widening
the steep gap in commitments undertaken by States member to
the NPT and States outside the Treaty which enjoy unlimited
freedom in the nuclear area.”
International
Day Against Nuclear Testing
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
On 30 October, First Committee also adopted Kazakhstan’s
resolution, “International Day against Nuclear Testing,”
(A/C.1/64/L.14/Rev.1).
The resolution was originally entitled “International
Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” establishing
this day on 29 August, though several civil organisations
and governments argued that such a day would be better served
in October, when schools, parliaments, the UN, and NGOs are
in full swing. The revised text now establishes 29 August
as a day “devoted to public awareness and education
about the effects of nuclear tests and the need for their
cessation.”
Right before First Committee took action on this draft resolution,
the delegations of Kazakhstan, India, and Egypt made oral
revisions. Kazakhstan changed “nuclear tests”
to “nuclear test explosions and other all other nuclear
explosions,” in keeping with established language. The
Indian delegation, arguing that the resolution has less to
do with nuclear disarmament than it originally did, suggested
the addition of “as a means of achieving the goal of
a nuclear weapon free world” to the end of operative
paragraph one (OP1). The Egyptian delegation welcomed this
amendment but suggested it be changed to “a step towards”
rather than “a means to achieving,” arguing that
there are more crucial steps to achieving a nuclear weapon
free world.
After a brief back-and-forth between the two delegations,
the Committee decided to go with “... effects of nuclear
test explosions and other nuclear explosions, as one of the
means of achieving a nuclear weapon free world.”
Before the vote, the European Union expressed its support
for L.14/Rev.1
as orally amended, noting that while it is hesitant about
creating another international day, it hopes that this day
will increase attention given to CTBT and speed up its entry
into force. After the vote, the
Swiss delegation said it joined consensus though it is
skeptical of the resolution’s usefulness and value given
that it is limited only to nuclear tests and that there has
been a “multiplication” of international days,
reducing each one’s visibility.
Negative Security
Assurances
Tal Elmatad | Global
Security Institute
On 27 October, First Committee adopted the draft resolution
titled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/64/L.24)
with a vote of 119-0-58.
While the resolution gained nine more votes in favour this
year, it also earned three more abstentions. However, this
year’s voting was different in one major respect. The
US delegation, which has for the previous three years voted
against the adoption of this resolution, opted to abstain
this year. The
US delegation issued an explanation of vote, noting that
while “it has objections to certain provisions in this
resolution” and does not believe that the resolution
accurately reflects the situation in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD), the US did support the CD’s
programme of work this year, CD/1864,
which included the establishment of a working group on
negative security assurances (NSAs). In order to emphasis
its support for CD/1864 while still registering its misgivings
about the resolution, the US delegation abstained on L.24.
While the aforementioned resolution was the only one dedicated
specifically to the topic of NSAs, the principles behind the
draft resolution on a “Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/64/L.20)
are also important to the NSA discussion. The implementation
of such a convention would amount to a universal and legally-binding
NSA. However, the
vote on L.20 was far less favourable than that on
L.24, with 110 votes for the resolution, 50 against, and
11 abstentions. The resolution requests the CD to commence
negotiations on such a convention.
The Australian delegation issued the only explanation of
vote on L.20. It voted against the resolution, but argued
that this does not diminish Australia’s commitment to
the “long-term” goal of nuclear weapon free world.
While the voting results and statements during the thematic
debate indicate wide support for NSAs in principle, there
still remains much to be desired as far as substantive progress
on this issue.
During this year’s First Committee, many delegations
expressed the view that pending the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons, NSAs represent the next best guarantee of
security for the non-nuclear weapon states. Several delegations,
including but not limited to the African Group, Brazil, China,
Myanmar, and Qatar, articulated the importance establishing
legally-binding NSAs. The delegations of Brazil and Kazakhstan,
among others, highlighted nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)
as a means to encourage nuclear weapon states to commit to
legally-binding NSAs.
Bangladesh’s representative argued that NSAs are a
cornerstone of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
framework and that their advancement is necessary for the
success of a universal NPT regime. Similarly, Myanmar’s
delegation argued that the failure to create and enforce viable
NSAs diminished the value of the NPT to non-nuclear weapon
states. Benin’s representative argued that the existence
of NSAs would diminish the risk of proliferation between nations.
The European Union agreed, noting that NSAs act as incentive
for nations to forgo weapons of mass destruction.
Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones
Christian Ciobanu | NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Ashe Brooks-Cook | Global
Security Institute
On 27 October, First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.3
entitled “Establishment of a Nuclear Free Weapon Zone
in the Region of the Middle East” without a vote. The
resolution, also adopted without a vote last year as GA/63/38,
emphasises the need for the international community to establish
a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East to enhance
international peace and security. It also calls upon all countries
of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment
of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
Although First Committee adopted the resolution without the
vote, it held a recorded vote
on operative paragraph three of the resolution, which
takes note of the IAEA General Conference resolution concerning
the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. 166
states voted in favour and three (Israel, India, and Cote
d’Ivoire) abstained. Israel argued that the development
of NWFZs should emanate from parties in the region through
direct negotiations and that this will not be achieved if
states in the region fail to demonstrate corresponding political
will. While it objected to the reference to the IAEA resolution,
it did not wish to block consensus on the resolution because
Israel subscribes to the “vision” of a NWFZ in
the Middle East.
In introducing the resolution before the vote, the Egyptian
delegation explained that in view of the positive atmosphere,
Egypt is determined to move forward with addressing challenges
in the Middle East region, especially those emanating from
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It also noted that operative
paragraph three simply includes a factual reference to the
IAEA General Conference resolution on safeguards in the Middle
East.
First Committee also adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.23
entitled “Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Free
Weapon Zones” with a vote
of 172 in favour, 5 abstentions (France and the United States,
along with Israel, Micronesia, and Marshall Islands) and 0
against. The US voted against the resolution the last time
it was tabled in First Committee.
France, the Russian Federation, India, and the United Kingdom
offered explanations of vote on this resolution. The French
delegation said it is ready to continue on the path to ratifying
the Bangkok Treaty’s protocols and is pleased to see
that this year’s resolution reflects the readiness of
the Treaty’s states parties to continue consultations
with nuclear weapon states. While it abstained from the resolution,
the Russian delegation, which gave a similar explanation of
vote looking forward to renewed consultations with the Treaty’s
states parties, voted in favour of the resolution. The
UK delegation, which also voted in favour of the resolution,
welcomed
L.23’s encouragement for the renewal of constulations
but expressed regret that the ASEAN states parties “did
not conduct consultations in accordance with the UNDC 1999
guidelines [on NWFZs] before signing this Treaty.” The
UK delegation explained that the five nuclear weapon states
are still awaiting a formal response to their non-paper issued
to the ASEAN states on 4 September 2002.
First Committee also adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.33
entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”
without a vote. Spain, India, France, and United Kingdom issued
explanations of vote on L.33. The
Indian delegation conveyed its unambiguous assurance that
it will respect the status of the Treaty. France and the UK
issued a joint statement indicating they have signed all of
the Treaty’s relevant protocols. The Spanish delegation,
however, noted that while it supports the Treaty it has decided
not to join Protocol 3 because it does not contain anything
on nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation that Spain has
not already adopted and implemented and because Spain has
been denuclearised since 1976.
168 delegations voted
in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.31
entitled “Nuclear-weapon free southern hemisphere and
adjacent areas.” Five states abstained and three—the
United Kingdom, United States, and France—opposed the
resolution. Prior to voting the entire resolution, 165 states
voted in favour of operative
paragraph seven, while two abstained, and six voted against
the paragraph.
Expressing its support for NWFZs in general, the Russian
delegation explained that it does not they can expand beyond
beyond their legally-established borders into the global ocean.
The UK,
US, and French delegations delivered a joint explanation
of vote, arguing that it is “contradictory to propose
simultaneously the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone that would be composed largely of the high seas and yet
to say that it would be fully consistent with applicable principles
and rules of international law relating to the freedom of
the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space,
including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.” The delegations explained that they therefore
continue to question “whether the real goal of this
draft resolution is in fact the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone covering the high seas,” arguing that this ambiguity
has not been sufficiently clarified.
On 2 November, First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.46/Rev.1
entitled “Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories
of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia”
with
a vote of 159 in favour and 6 abstentions—the United
States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Syria, and Israel.
The US, UK, France, and Russia abstained because the preamble
of the resolution makes references documents that they did
not participate in the negotiation of, such as the Final Document
of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in 2009.
The resolution, procedural in nature, decides to convene
the Conference in New York on 30 April 2010 to consider ways
and means to enhance consultations and cooperation among all
participating and interested states and agencies to facilitate
the implementation of the treaties and strengthen the nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The delegation of
Belarus, which voted in favour of the resolution, said that
it agreed with the arguments of those delegations that abstained
and believes that if it is possible to take elements out of
a draft resolution that make it impossible to adopt by consensus,
especially when the resolution is procedural, then such elements
should be deleted.
The Syrian delegation introduced amendments to the resolution
in document A/C.1/64/L.55,
which called for the deletion of the words “particularly
in the Middle East, through agreements freely arrived at among
the States of the region concerned, in accordance with the
provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session
of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles
adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999”
in L.47/Rev.1’s fourth preambular paragraph. When introducing
these amendments, the Syrian delegation argued that this reference
to the Middle East is ambiguous and would actually weaken
other resolutions on the Middle East, impeding the creation
of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Iran and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea voiced their support for this amendment,
but the Egyptian delegation argued that in fact the construction
in L.47/Rev.1 uses agreed upon language that is consistent
with Egypt’s approach to the issue and that has been
used consistently in other fora.
Syria’s amendments were rejected with a vote
of four in favour (Syria, Iran, DPRK, and Algeria), 103
against, and 22 abstentions.
Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Joel S. Van Wagenen | Reaching
Critical Will
First Committee adopted the only draft resolution dealing
with the nuclear fuel cycle by consensus. The African Group
tabled draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.34,
“Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes,”
which urges states to remain cognisant of the movements of
spent fuel and how it is disposed. The resolution appeals
to all member states to become party to the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and Management and
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which entered
into force on 18 June 2001. The resolution further requests
the Conference on Disarmament to take nuclear waste into account
during negotiations for the prohibition against radiological
weapons and include it in the scope of such a convention.
The nuclear fuel cycle received minimal attention during
First Committee this year. The
Russian delegation provided an update on its proposal
for an International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Agarsk,
indicating that Armenia has joined and that Ukraine is completing
the accession procedure. This effort is intended to construct
a mechanism of fuel supply assurances in the event of market
disruptions.
The European
Union indicated that it continues to support multilateral
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and stated that it had
pledged 25 million euro toward the establishment of a nuclear
fuel bank under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices.
Establishment of international fuel supply guarantees constitutes
what many consider to be a first step in multilateralising
the nuclear fuel cycle, but the idea faced a setback in June
amid continued concerns from developing states. The IAEA Board
of Governors failed to find consensus on either of two proposals
for establishment of an international fuel bank, including
Russia’s proposal.
During First Committee, developing states continued to voice
their concerns. South
Africa’s delegation stressed, “what is required
is a non-discriminatory approach that would assure a reliable
supply of nuclear fuel, whilst fully respecting the choices
of States and protecting their inalienable right to pursue
peaceful nuclear activities, consistent with their non-proliferation
obligations.” Other states, including many of those
of the Non-Aligned
Movement, cautioned each country’s fuel cycle and
energy policies should be respected and should not face “undue
restrictions”.
During a panel discussion organised by the International
Panel of Fissile Materials, Harold Feiveson, one of the
lead authors of the Panel’s latest report, Global
Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament,
focused on the problems posed by civilian nuclear power in
a disarmed world. He concluded that to prevent a “nuclear
breakout” in a world free of nuclear weapons, the most
stable situation is a world without nuclear power and without
any left over fissile materials, especially in depositories
under national control. He argued that the most unstable situation
would be a world were states have closed fuel cycles, which
includes reprocessing plants and enrichment plants under national
control.
Biological
and Chemical Weapons
Ann Lakhdhir | NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Biological and Toxin Weapons
On 28 October, First Committee adopted without a vote A/C.1/64/L.15,
the draft resolution on the “Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”
(BTWC). The resolution calls on states parties to the Convention
to participate in the implementation of the decisions reached
at the Sixth
Review Conference in 2006. Each year there has been a
meeting of experts, and another of States parties. This year
the meeting of experts focused on responses to any outbreaks
of disease whether occurring naturally or not. Several states
indicated the value of these meetings. There will also be
a meeting of States parties in Geneva in December 2009 and
further meetings each year prior to the Seventh Review Conference
in 2011.
Because in earlier statements both the European
Union and the Non-Aligned
Movement stressed the need for the BTWC to have a verification
protocol, there is likely to be further discussion of how
this might be achieved prior to the 2011 Review Conference
and at the Conference.
Ambassador
Marius Grinius of Canada, the Chair of the BTWC meetings
in 2009, stressed the urgency of an action-based outcome at
the meeting of states parties to the BTWC in December that
in particular enhances the participation in confidence-building
measures.
Much work on biological and chemical weapons since 1967 has
been done by the Harvard-Sussex
Program, directed by Mathew Meselson at Harvard and Julian
Perry Robinson at Sussex. There is much on the Harvard Sussex
web site, including an article by Meselson in the January
15, 2009 issue of Nature on “Your
Inbox, Mr. President” on greater oversight of the
US biodefence program, estimated at about $50 billion. It
also advocates possible use of the procedures it employs to
ensure compliance with the BTWC—to increase awareness
of the need for improved oversight and to facilitate the development
of international measures for enhanced exchange and transparency
regarding implementation of the convention.
On the site there is also a draft
convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Developing, Producing Acquiring Stockpiling, Retaining,
Transferring or Using Biological and Chemical Weapons.
Chemical Weapons
On 28 October, First Committee adopted without a vote, A/C.1/64/L.35,
on “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction” (CWC). It stresses
the importance of implementing the Convention and the importance
of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in verifying compliance
with the provisions. During the general debate, the
European Union also emphasised the importance of the CWC,
stating that it is “unique among disarmament and non-proliferation
treaties by completely banning in a verifiable way an entire
class of weapons of mass destruction.”
First Committee also adopted without a vote A/C.1/64/L.19,
“Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction,” which applies to chemical and
biological weapons as well as to nuclear. It calls for early
ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and for states to strengthen
national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction.
In its explanation of vote on L.19,
Pakistan’s delegate commented that his country supports
the objective of the resolution but is concerned that the
fear of non-state actors aquiring WMD might become an excuse
for discrimination against selective countries. The delegation
argued that implementation of the CWC, among other international
agreements, can help prevent the treat of non-state actor
acquisition of WMD.
However, as long as chemical weapons exist, the risk of their
acquisition by non-state actors—and their use by anyone—also
still exists. In explaining its support for L.35,
the Iranian delegation reiterated its concern that a major
possessor state has indicated it would not be able to destroy
its stockpile within the extended deadline set by the CWC.
In earlier discussion, the US delegation indicated its intention
to destroy all its stocks by 2012 and the Russian Federation
implied that it too would meet the goal.
During the thematic debate on other weapons of mass destruction,
Ambassador
Pfirter, Director-General of the OPCW, indicated that
the Russian Federation and the United States had destroyed
40.1% and 65.5% of their chemical weapon stockpiles, respectively.
The OPCW Executive Council is considering a proposal that
requires the Chairman of the Council to “engage in informal
consultations with all interested delegations on how, and
when, to initiate formal deliberations of the Council about
the feasibility of the revised deadlines of 2012 being met
by possessor states and to report to the Council at its next
session.” The government of Libya has asked for an extension
of its deadline for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical
weapons stockpile. Albania is the fourth possessor state that
is yet to complete the destruction of its stocks.
However, Ambassador Pfirter described the CWC as a success
story in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. Noting
that membership is nearly universal, stockpile destruction
is under way or completed in many countries, and that Israel
and Egypt, two non-states parties, have engaged in dialogue
with the OPCW.
WMD Terrorism
Rahma Hussein | Reaching
Critical Will
At its 64th session, First Committee adopted one draft resolution
and one draft decision related to the acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists and non-state actors.
As in previous years, First Committee adopted without a vote
draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.19,
“Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction.” Pakistan’s delegation issued
the sole explanation of vote.
Expressing its support for the overall objective of the resolution,
Pakistan’s delegation contended that the professed threat
of terrorist and non-state acquisition of such materials should
not become a pretext for discrimination against selected countries.
He urged for the implementation of existing treaty regimes,
such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), as a preferred method of effectively
addressing threats as they arise. However, during the thematic
debate on WMD, the
delegation of the Russian Federation argued that countering
terrorist attempts to obtain chemical weapons requires a different
and specific set of instruments apart from those established
in the CWC, since terrorists and non-state actors are not
bound by the same international and legal obligations that
state actors are to adhere to.First Committee also adopted
without a vote the French draft decision A/C.1/64/L.17,
“Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive
material and its sources.” The decision simply places
the matter on next year’s agenda. A 2007 resolution
of the same name was intended to maintain support for the
International Atomic Energy Agency as a central player in
securing sources of radiological materials, to sustain the
universalisation of existing international instruments, and
to promote the expansion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation
aimed at enforcing the security of radioactive sources.
Through the course of this year’s First Committee session,
several delegations, including those of Japan,
Israel, the Republic
of Korea, and Turkey,
placed particular importance on strengthening the safety and
security of nuclear facilities and ensuring that safeguards
are enforced to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear
materials. Representatives of
Australia, Morocco,
the Republic
of Korea, Cameroon,
and the European
Union, among many others, urged the Committee that possible
means of ensuring the protection of nuclear sites should further
be explored.
As a result, many countries commended US President Obama’s
plan to host a Global Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. The
Summit—which aims to develop collaborative steps to
secure vulnerable materials, combat smuggling, as well as
to deter, detect, and prevent attempts of acquisition by terrorists—may
alleviate the concerns of some delegations.
Ambassador Im of the Republic of Korea said his delegation
hopes that the Nuclear Security Summit “will be an occasion
to mobilize the will of global leaders to tackle the threat
of nuclear terrorism and proliferation of nuclear materials.”
On behalf of Thailand,
Mrs. Chaimongkol expressed her country’s hope that the
“Summit will lead to concrete outcomes on measures to
secure vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear materials from theft
and boost global cooperation to combat the trafficking of
atomic materials and technologies.”
Many delegations referenced the implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls
on states to “adopt and enforce effective laws which
prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery,” as sufficient
means to prevent terrorists and non-state actors from acquiring
nuclear weapons and related materials.
Several delegates, including Ambassador Natalegawa of Indonesia,
who spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), underscored that the “most effective
way of preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD is through
the total elimination of such weapons.”
Missiles
and Anti-Missile Systems
Alicia Godsberg | Federation
of American Scientists
This year’s session of First Committee opened with
encouraging remarks on the subject of missiles and anti-missile
systems by Sergio Duarte, High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs, but ended without
any resolutions on the subject. Previous years have seen some
activity on the subject, including a resolution entitled “Missiles”
adopted in 2008 and 2006, and a draft decision by the same
name adopted in 2007 and 2005. Additionally, a resolution
on the Hague
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)
had been adopted in both 2005 and 2008.
Missiles
While several delegations mentioned the threat of the proliferation
of ballistic missiles and/or the need to stem such proliferation,
only four delegations referenced the HCOC—those of the
European
Union, Turkey,
Lebanon, and Norway.
The EU and Norway reiterated their support for the Code and
the EU called for its universalization. Turkey’s
delegate described the Code as a step toward and an internationally-accepted
legal framework for dealing with the proliferation of ballistic
missiles. Lebanon’s
representative indicated it is in the process of adopting
a resolution that will permit the country to join the HCOC.
The delegations of
India, Iran, and the EU
mentioned the need for multilateral steps to prevent the proliferation
of missiles and for dialogue on the possession and use of
missiles. In this context, the European
Union made mention of its 2008 proposal to start consultations
on a treaty banning short and intermediate range ground-to-ground
missiles.
Only a few delegations mentioned export controls for missiles
and related technologies this year. The EU reiterated its
support for the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Singapore’s
delegation mentioned its participation in the MTCR as
a concrete demonstration of its commitment to non-proliferation
as one of the busiest shipping hubs in the world.
The
Russian delegation made an appeal for the third year in
a row to universalize the Treaty on Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty). The
US delegation generally and briefly stated that it was
working on stemming the proliferation of ballistic missiles
but did not mention the 2007
joint statement on the INF Treaty. The US and Russia elaborated
on their missile disarmament successes related to the INF
and Russia mentioned its desire to “substantially lower
... the number of strategic delivery vehicles— ICBM,
SLBM, and heavy bombers” in the follow-on treaty to
START I currently being negotiated.
Only a few comments in the general debate were made relating
to missile programmes of specific countries. The delegations
of Israel
and the EU
mentioned Iran’s missile programme as a threat to
regional and international peace and security, while Japan’s
delegation called the DPRK’s missile tests a “serious
threat” to peace and security. The EU strongly condemned
the DPRK’s launch of a long-range missile in April 2009,
saying that the launch constituted a clear breach of UN
Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006) and strongly urged
the DPRK to refrain from any launch using ballistic missile
technology.
The delegation
of Palestine mentioned the need to uphold the principles
of international humanitarian law in the disarmament process;
in this context, he argued, the use of conventional weapons
that have “indiscriminate and excessive effects,”
including flachette missiles, must be addressed. Pakistan’s
ambassador expressed his country’s concern over
the growing strategic imbalance in South Asia, including the
recent introduction into the region of nuclear submarines
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. He emphasized the
significance of regional approaches to arms control, explaining
that Pakistan has undertaken relevant confidence-building
measures, including notification of missile tests.
Anti-Missile Systems
Ballistic missile defenses (BMD) also received minimal attention
during this year’s First Committee. The
Non-Aligned Movement pointed to the US abrogation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as creating new challenges to
strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in
outer space, but later commended the US decision to scrap
plans for a missile defense system in Europe.
Delegates from Venezuela
and the
Russian Federation voiced concern over BMD systems that
would create security concerns for other states. Russia’s
ambassador aruged that such systems “substantially complicate
the process in the field of nuclear disarmament,” as
strategic defensive and offensive weapons are “inseparably
linked”. Ambassador Churkin explained that Russia prioritizes
a joint analysis of existing risks in the field of BMD and
working out political and diplomatic responses to those risks.
The Democratic
Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s delegation stated that
the US has used the threat of ballistic missiles by so-called
“rogue states” as a pretext over the years to
develop a BMD system that could spark an arms race in outer
space. The DPRK delegate also claimed that the United States
is using this “fictitious” threat to devise a
new missile defense initiative with South Korea, Japan and
“other obedient countries”.
Conclusion
In short, the First Committee this year saw no substantive
work on the issue of missiles and anti-missile systems. While
concern over missile proliferation, ballistic missile defense
systems, and the missile programs of certain countries were
expressed by several delegations, no concrete measures were
taken this year to address these concerns.
Outer Space
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
This year’s First Committee demonstrated that perspectives
on the way to promote security in outer space and prevent
an arms race therein continue to vary among the international
community. However, with the newfound cooperation between
the European Union and Russian Federation regarding transparency
and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) and the upcoming
“blank slate” review of US space policy by the
US government, the divergences do not appear nearly as large
as last year. This progress was reflected in the voting on
the two draft resolutions related to disarmament aspects of
outer space security.
On 28 October, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.25,
“Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” by
a
vote of 176 in favour, none against, and two abstentions.
The United States, which had voted against this resolution
since 2005, switched its vote to an abstention. Israel maintained
its abstention from previous years.
On 29 October, the Committee adopted A/C.1/64/L.40,
“Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities,” without a vote. All EU member states
co-sponsored the resolution for the first time.The
US delegation stated that it would not participate in
the vote, explaining that its space policy was currently under
review. US Ambassador Larson said that the United States “In
consultation with [its] allies … is currently in the
process of assessing options for international cooperation
in space as a part of a comprehensive review of [its] national
space policy.” This review will include a “blank
slate” analysis of the “feasibility and desirability
of options for TCBMs that enhance spaceflight safety and advance
the national security interests of the United States and its
allies, as well as of all spacefaring nations.”
While this shift in vote by the US delegation is an important
step toward progress in enhancing space security, the safety
of space objects and the prevention of an arms race in outer
space is far from assured. In its thematic debate statement,
the US
delegation actually described this blank slate analysis
as also applying to “effectively verifiable arms control
measures,” not just TCBMs. However, it also continued
to stress that that the US “will continue to reject
any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States
to operate in, and acquire data from, space.” The fact
that it was able to say this before completing it space policy
review is troubling—for the past 30 years, the US government
has considered any arms control measure to be a limitation
on its right to operate in space. Also troubling is the fact
that the
US Strategic Command now describes its components and
personnel as “Leaders in Strategic Deterrence and Preeminent
Global Warfighters in Space and Cyberspace”.
The rest of the international community, however, is coming
together in its recognition that action is needed to preserve
the peaceful use of outer space. While the debate between
those supporting TCBMs and those supporting a legally-binding
treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
or prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT)
continued this year, some delegations emphasised that these
approaches are not mutually exclusive. The Republic
of Korea and the Russian
Federation highlighted the importance of both tracks in
their thematic debate statements and the delegation
of Canada made several concrete suggestions toward developing
an “encompassing approach to space security that includes
not only addressing environmental, commercial and civil dimensions
of space, but also its military and national security dimensions.”
These proposals included: a ban on the placement of weapons
in space; the prohibition of the testing and use of weapons
on satellites so as to damage or destroy them; and the prohibition
of the use of satellites themselves as weapons.”
During a side event on “Latest Developments on Space
Security and Disarmament” sponsored by the UN
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Secure
World Foundation, UNIDIR Director Theresa Hitchens pointed
out that TCBMs do not have to be strictly voluntary. Looking
to the Law of
the Sea Treaty, she argued that TCBMs can be incorporated
into legally-binding treaties. She also argued that any legal
regime would need to be built upon TCBMs, such as data exchanges
and cooperative space situational awareness.
Many delegations in general also continued to recognise,
as the Sri
Lankan representative stressed, that “taking measures
to prevent an arms race in outer space is more effective,
less complicated and less expensive than taking measures after
it has taken off the ground.” Many highlighted the changes
in aerospace technology and use of space that make the current
space legal regime insufficient to preserve the security of
space objects. Given the increasingly complex situation in
outer space, commercial space operators have begun to develop
a data centre for sharing orbital data amongst themselves,
without waiting for governments to take the lead.
The 2010 session of the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) session is the next chance for governments
to consider the disarmament aspects of outer space. All CD
members, including the United States, support the inclusion
of PAROS discussions in the CD’s programme of work.
Governments should use this opportunity to compare the proposed
measures for space security and look at their feasibility
and possible reconciliation; to look at the industry data
centre and consider working with these commercial space operators
as a step to improve their own space situational awareness;
and to make an effort to include non-space-faring and emerging
space-faring states in their discussions.
Conventional
Weapons
Ruben Reike | Global
Action to Prevent War
Throughout the 64th session of First Committee, governments
agreed that conventional weapons have a devastating impact
on scores of civilians across the globe and reaffirmed the
international community’s commitment to address the
threat of conventional weapons with priority. Ambassador Dell
Higgie of New Zealand stated, “the impact of conventional
weapons is felt deeply, on a daily basis, in many areas of
the world,” and thus requires immediate steps by the
international community. Likewise, Ambassador
Im Han-taek of the Republic of Korea argued, “The
destructive power of conventional weapons may not surpass
that of weapons of mass destruction, but their humanitarian
and development implications require just as much attention
as those of WMDs by the international community.” Delegates
frequently emphasised the negative impact of conventional
weapons on development issues.
In the final week, First Committee adopted three resolutions
relating to the field of conventional weapons.
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
On 29 October, First Committee adopted without a vote draft
resolution A/C.1/64/L.37,
“Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.”
The resolution was tabled by Sweden, Pakistan, Switzerland,
and Lithuania. It expresses support for the CCW as an important
international humanitarian law instrument, calling upon all
states to become party to the Convention.
During its explanation of vote on another resolution, dealing
with the Convention on Cluster Munitions (A/C.1/64/L.16),
Israel’s delegation praised the CCW as an important
instrument to address humanitarian purposes and stated that
the CCW remains the most relevant forum to discuss issues
regarding conventional weapons, including cluster munitions.
Delegations from Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and others
supported the view that a protocol on cluster munitions should
be negotiated within and not outside of the CCW. Norway’s
delegation, however, stressed that while it will continue
to support the CCW, the CCW should not deal with issues that
are dealt with elsewhere, as is the case with cluster munitions.
The Libyan delegation, which joined consensus on L.37,
noted that its support for the resolution does not mean it
supports all of the Convention’s protocols. It argued
that the protocols do not deal with issues in sufficient depth,
especially the protocol on landmines, which does not deal
with mines laid during World War II.
Ammunition
The issue of surpluses in ammunition stockpiles was addressed
in draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.44,
“Problems Arising from the Accumulation of Conventional
Ammunition Stockpiles in Surplus,” which was introduced
by Germany and France and co-sponsored by 47 states. Delegations
adopted the resolution without a vote. The resolution recognises
the threat that can arise from ammunition surpluses and calls
on states to consider the destruction of their surplus stockpiles
of conventional ammunition, to assist interested states in
eliminating stockpile surpluses, to contribute to the development
of UN technical guidelines for stockpile management, and to
improve their national stockpile management capacity. In an
explanation of vote after the vote, the delegation of Venezuela
stated that there is widespread consensus that certain problems
arise from ammunition stockpiles in surplus. The delegation
maintained, however, that it is up to each individual state
to determine when ammunition stockpiles are in surplus. Moreover,
the delegation pointed at the importance that marking can
have in preventing illicit trade in ammunition, arguing that
the main producers of ammunition bear the primary responsibility
in this regard.
Transparency in armaments and the UN Register
of Conventional Weapons
Draft resolution
A/C.1/64/L.50 on “Transparency in armaments,”
introduced by the Netherlands and co-sponsored by 73 states,
was adopted with a 150-0-22
vote. The resolution deals with the UN
Register on Conventional Arms, supporting the view that
it contributes to an enhanced level of transparency and thereby
to confidence-building among states. Giving an explanation
of their abstentions on behalf of the Arab League, the Sudanese
delegation reaffirmed the general value of the UN Register
as a confidence-building instrument. According to the Arab
League, however, the UN Register should operate along three
core principles, namely balance, transparency, and comprehensiveness.
Currently, it criticised, only half of the UN member states
make data available to the UN Register. Furthermore, it argued
that the UN Register’s scope is very limited, as it
ignores nuclear weapons and other WMD. Hence, the Arab League
stated that the UN Register does not respond to the Arab League’s
security concerns, which are largely determined by the special
situation in the Middle East. In its own separate explanation
of vote, the Syrian delegation supported the position of the
Arab League, explaining that the draft resolution does not
take into account the special situation in the Middle East,
with Israel possessing nuclear weapons and other WMD.
During the thematic debate on conventional weapons, the European
Union,
India, and other governments expressed their conviction
that the UN Register is an important instrument of confidence-building.
Ambassador
Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina presented the report
of a Group of Governmental Experts on the UN Register, stating,
“the Register is the only global transparency instrument
on conventional arms transfers, and thus plays an important
role to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations
of conventional arms, enhance confidence, promote stability
and increase international peace and security.”
Small Arms
and Light Weapons
Mark Marge | International
Action Network on Small Arms
The noise generated by more contentious resolutions drowned
out a major historical moment on 29 October, when the United
States voted in support of the annual ‘omnibus’
small arms resolution,
A/C.1/64/L.42/Rev.1, after three consecutive years of
voting ‘no’. The support of the world’s
largest importer, exporter, and stockpiler of small arms strengthens
the renewed sense of purpose felt in the UN small arms process,
especially now that we are in ‘phase II’ of that
process.
The term ‘phase II’ of the UN small arms process
was widely used by the diplomats speaking at the special meeting
of the Group of Interested States (GIS) and the Geneva Process
on 21 October. ‘Phase I’ lasted from the 2001
agreement of the Programme of Action through the 2006 conference
reviewing the process. This phase was characterised by an
increasing awareness of the problem and the creation of National
Commissions in many countries to help coordinate strategies
to reduce the impact of small arms proliferation. The second
phase, leading to the next review conference in 2012, must
now focus on measuring the scale of the problem and hopefully
producing substantial reductions in gun violence.
These might seem modest goals, but they are close to being
agreed globally, and many regions and national initiatives
are already underway to work towards them. The positive outcome
of the 2008 Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) has set the standard,
and with the US in support, the 2010 BMS can achieve more,
as Rebecca Peters, IANSA Director, stressed in her presentation
to First Committee on 23 October.
Even with US support, the ‘omnibus’ resolution
did not pass with the hoped-for consensus. Iran demanded votes
on two paragraphs and abstained on both. Iran’s abstention
on operative
paragraph 4 was expected, for this affirmed the result
of the 2008 BMS, which Iran uniquely opposed. However, its
abstaining on
operative paragraph 15 reveals a continuing ambivalence
regarding the UN process on small arms, for this paragraph
mandates the group of experts meeting in 2011, intended to
maintain momentum for the process between the 2010 BMS and
the 2012 Review Conference. Having expressed its unhappiness
with these paragraphs, Iran’s delegation proceeded to
vote in support of the resolution as a whole, which was adopted
with 177 ‘yes’ votes and no abstentions or
‘no’ votes.
The two other small arms resolutions were adopted by consensus.
The regular resolution on “Assistance to States for
curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons
and collecting them,” A/C.1/64/L.5,
in support of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, was
co-sponsored by more states than ever before, according to
Mali, the principal author. This expressed the growing international
support for states lacking capacity and resources to properly
address the problem. For resolution
A/C.1/64/L.44 on surplus ammunition stockpiles , Venezuela’s
delegation registered an explanation of vote stressing the
importance of marking of ammunition on manufacture, as a measure
to help prevent diversion for state stockpiles at a later
date (see the report on Conventional Weapons for details).
In each First Committee since the failed 2006 Review Conference,
the UN small arms process has picked up steam. This session
was no exception; with the strength of statements made at
this First Committee and with US support for the small arms
process, civil society campaigners are optimistic about progress
in reducing the gun violence “which threaten[s] the
rule of law and democratic governance in many countries and
fuel the spread of international terrorism,” in the
words of the Deputy
Prime Minister of Jamaica at the high-level summit of
the General Assembly.
Cluster
Munitions
Thomas Nash | Cluster
Munition Coalition
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace
Topping off a highly positive First Committee for the Convention
on Cluster Munitions, draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.16
was adopted by consensus on 28 October. The resolution, presented
by the governments of Ireland and Lao People’s Democratic
Republic (Lao PDR), welcomes the offer by Lao PDR to host
the first Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) after the Convention
enters into force and requests that the Secretary-General,
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, undertake
necessary preparations to convene the 1MSP. Less substantive
resolutions than this one have been put to the vote in First
Committee in the past, so this unanimous decision was a significant
result. It is a testimony to the diplomatic skills of the
Irish and Lao teams that shepherded the resolution through.
A very limited group of states—Egypt, India,
Russia, Israel, Singapore and the Republic of Korea—offered
statements to explain their position on the resolution, clarifying
that joining consensus on the resolution does not in any way
equate support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
and comes only from its procedural nature. Most of these explanations
of vote also included strong language regarding the status
of the CCM and the process taken to negotiate it, which was
characterized as having been done outside of the UN framework.
This procedural criticism and the inevitable debate on the
efforts in the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to “complement”
the CCM appeared throughout the general and thematic debates
in First Committee again this year, as well as in the explanations
of vote. However, this argument seemed rather hollow in comparison
with past years’ discussions—perhaps because so
far, negotiations in the CCW context have not yielded results.
Many pro-CCM states set out very firm requirements for any
new agreement in the CCW, describing the CCM as a relevant,
“state of the art” instrument, to borrow a phrase
from Canada.
In particular, the criticism of the process as “non-UN”
seemed to miss the mark, with the UN hosting a side event
on the CCM on 21 October and the UN Secretary-General, as
depositary, receiving a mandate by consensus through L.16
to convene the First Meeting of States Parties.
When the corresponding draft resolution was adopted last
year, the explanations of vote spoke very little about the
CCM’s status as a non-UN Convention. It is regrettable
that these states have chosen to focus on this point of questionable
relevance instead of reassuring the world that they too feel
strongly about the humanitarian suffering caused by this weapon
and are committed to ending it. Happily, it seems that this
already small group of opposing states is dwindling—ten
states gave an explanation of vote last year, compared to
six this year. It will only grow smaller in time, as the stigma
on the use of the weapon deepens.
While it may be true that right now some of the world’s
major users and producers sit outside of the Convention, the
majority of former possessors, producers, and users of the
weapon are on board, including 20 out of the 28 countries
in the world’s most powerful military alliance, NATO.
No viable alternative to the CCM has been articulated by any
state that satisfies the needs of the affected and ensures
that there will be no new victims ever again. The CCM is rapidly
nearing entry into force and many states—including many
allies of those outside the ban—have already begun to
destroy stockpiles and implement its obligations. The focus
now will turn to the Convention’s pending 30th ratification,
which allow the Convention to enter into force, as well as
to the preparations for the historic First Meeting of States
Parties. The impact of the Convention is being felt and its
momentum will not be stopped.
Landmines
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace on behalf of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines
On 29 October, First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.53,
“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction.” The annual resolution,
which reaffirms the determination to put to an end the suffering
caused by anti-personnel mines (APMs) and the need to ensure
victim assistance, passed by a vote of 158-0-18.
Those who abstained included Cuba, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan,
Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Russian Federation, Syria, the United States, Uzbekistan,
and Vietnam. Sixteen of these are affected by APMs, as are
three out of the sixteen who were absent during voting. Nine
delegations—Azerbaijan, Cuba, Morocco, Libya, Egypt,
Russia, Pakistan, Singapore, and India—provided
explanations of their vote, which is less than the thirteen
who did so last year.
The Russian Federation abstained because it is not part of
the Mine
Ban Treaty (MBT, or Ottawa Convention) and against so-called
“parallel processes” that lead to treaties not
under the aegis of the UN. The Russian delegation argued that
the problem of APMs should have been addressed through the
framework of the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons. It explained, however,
that Russia does support the humanitarian goals of the Treaty
and is therefore ready to give implementation assistance in
this regard. Moreover, Russia has agreed to participate in
the Second Review
Conference of the MBT scheduled for 29 November–4
December in Cartegena de Indias, Colombia, which is the first
time it will participate as an observer in official treaty
meetings since 2003.
The Egyptian delegation abstained due to the particularly
“unbalanced” nature of the MBT, calling it limited
and dependent on donor states for success in implementation.
The representative noted that the Treaty does not call on
those who have actually laid the mines to remove them, arguing
that this weakness is what has kept the biggest producers
from acceding. The delegation pointed to the moratorium that
Egypt has in place.
The Pakistani delegation claimed that issues of border defence
are what prevent it from acceding to the Treaty. Until viable
alternatives become available, use of APMs are still important
to their defence strategy. The delegate assured the Committee
that there has never been a humanitarian crisis within Pakistan
that was caused by APM use and that the government of Pakistan
will ensure they never become a cause of civilian casualties,
either in Pakistan or elsewhere in the world.
Other abstainers gave similar explanations of vote, arguing
either that the Treaty cannot be considered universal because
of its method of negotiation or citing self-defence requirements
as obstacles to their accession to the Treaty.
According to diplomatic sources, the US delegation intends
to observe the Cartagena Summit from afar, even if they decide
to not officially and physically participate as observers
at the meeting. These sources also noted that the US still
chooses to remain outside of the Treaty despite not using
landmines in 18 years because it has difficulty with some
of the articles of the Treaty, specifically those dealing
with clearance obligations.
It is curious why governments that put moratoriums in place
or have not used the weapons in over a decade continue to
resist signing a Treaty that two-thirds of the world endorses.
If these states are openly in agreement with the aims of the
Treaty, voting in favour of the non-binding resolution on
the subject would be a simple and undemanding way to demonstrate
this support. It would be very much in line with the funding
and other assistance many of them already provide. Therefore,
all UN member states including those who will not be coming
to Cartagena, are strongly encouraged to vote favourably when
the resolution resurfaces in the context of the General Assembly
this December.
Arms Trade Treaty
Mark Marge | International
Action Network on Small Arms
On behalf of the hundreds of millions of people in West Africa,
vote for the
ATT resolution. This was the message of the Nigerian delegation,
on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). In the end, the
vote was overwhelmingly positive, with 153 states voting
‘yes’, 19 abstaining, and only Zimbabwe voting
‘no’. Superficially, this resembled the voting
from last year; except that the US government reversed its
previous policy on the treaty and voted in favour of the resolution.
That decision was momentous, as the United States is the world’s
largest supplier of conventional weapons, accounting last
year for almost 70% of global arms sales.
The two previous ATT resolutions, in 2006
and 2008,
maintained a discussion within the UN for a treaty to regulate
the international trade in conventional arms. Now a clear
process for negotiating a treaty has been agreed, with a conference
in 2012 supported by preparatory committees during 2010–2011.
This is a major step, as the Indian
delegation pointed out when explaining its abstention.
However, the vast majority of states supported such a step.
The smooth passage of the resolution as a whole hides considerable
controversy on the details, as can be seen from the 25 explanations
of votes, several times the number for any other resolution
this year. The controversy centred on the possible rules of
procedure for the 2012 negotiating conference. In the end,
a compromise, coupled with intensive behind-the-scenes advocacy,
reportedly prevented a paragraph vote.
The revised language is in operative paragraph 5. It had
previously stated that decisions at the conference would be
“taken on the basis of consensus”. To some supporter
states, and most civil society organisations, this suggested
a procedure requiring unanimity for all decisions. The new
language requires the conference to be “undertaken ...
on the basis of consensus”.
Some pro-ATT states raised concerns about the risk of consensus,
which has resulted in paralysis during other disarmament negotiations
and fora. The delegation from Trinidad and Tobago stated it
did not interpret ‘consensus’ to mean a process
providing a veto to any state. Within the European Union,
several delegations expressed concern about interpreting ‘consensus’
too narrowly, including those of Austria, Germany,
Ireland, Netherlands, and Portugal.
The states that routinely abstain on ATT resolutions universally
took a different view, at least through their explanations
of votes. India,
Russia,
Venezuela, and some Arab States (including Egypt) expressed
concern that the process had moved to negotiations without
a guarantee that each step would be taken by consensus. These
states also expressed concern about transforming the remaining
budgeted sessions of the open-ended working group into preparatory
committees for the 2012 negotiating conference. In its explanation
for voting against the resolution, the delegation of Zimbabwe
argued that the rush to negotiate an ATT despite the lack
of consensus on any elements of a potential treaty shows that
this treaty will be selectively applied, politicised, and
subject to abuse by certain powers.
The US delegation supported the resolution so long as it
contained the provision that the 2012 conference would be
undertaken on the basis of consensus. The UK ambassador, implicitly
supporting the decision to build bridges with the US, admitted
that to some states, the bridge had gone too far. But in any
case the point is now moot. The resolution has been adopted,
creating an ambitious timetable to create a “strong
and robust” ATT, creating international standards to
prevent conventional arms contributing to armed conflict,
the displacement of people, organized crime and terrorism,
thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security,
stability and sustainable social and economic development.
As several delegations emphasised, the world needs an ATT
with strong provisions on international human rights and humanitarian
law.
First Committee has agreed to a timetable to develop a treaty.
The type of treaty, and whether it will be strong and robust,
remains to be determined. But in the words of Nobel
Laureate President Arias of Costa Rica, speaking at a
high-level meeting of the UN Security Council on 24 September,
the UN “fails in its historic mission every day that
it turns a blind eye to the rampant arms race.”
Disarmament and
Development
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace
First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.10,
“Relationship between disarmament and development,”
without a vote this year—though the US and French delegations
indicated before the vote that they would not be participating
again this year. The United Kingdom, however, voted in favour
this year, after not participating in 2008. All three share
the objection that to call the relationship between disarmament
and development symbiotic is not correct and oversimplifies
a complex dynamic.
This annual resolution was again introduced by the Non-Aligned
Movement. It regards the relationship between disarmament
and development as “symbiotic” and stresses the
central role of the United Nations in properly addressing
these challenges. Specifically, L.10
urges the international community to “devote part
of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament
and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development.”
It makes a direct reference to achieving the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) and encourages the international community “to
make reference to the contribution that disarmament could
provide in meeting them when it reviews its progress towards
this purpose in 2009, as well as to make greater efforts to
integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities.”
In its explanation of vote, the UK
delegation welcomed the “mainstreaming of disarmament
issues in development policy,” noting that this is particularly
important in the field of conventional weapons and in practices
of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). However,
the UK explained that it still does not believe that there
is an “automatic link” between the two concepts
and that L.10 does not “explain fully the complexity
of this relationship.”
The French delegation explained that it acknowledges the
connection between disarmament and development, particularly
in post-conflict areas. It argued that disarmament is a prerequisite
for development after a conflict, but contested the notion
of a symbiotic relationship between the two subjects. It questioned
whether or not the impact of development on disarmament is
as certain as the inverse. They further argued that to assume
the resources from military expenditure are diverted from
disarmament alone is simplistic, as is the assumption that
resources given to peacekeeping or aid after a natural disaster
also promote development.
First Committee also adopted without a vote draft resolution
A/C.1/64/L.43
“Objective information on military matters, including
transparency of military expenditures.” This biennial
resolution calls on member states to report annually to the
Secretary-General on their military expenditures for the last
fiscal year. It was introduced by Germany and Romania and
sponsored by more than 60 states. It reinforces the importance
of the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures,
currently under-utilized. The Instrument was established in
1980, by UN General Assembly resolution 35/142
B, “Reduction of military budgets” and could
be a strong tool for building confidence and trust between
nations.
The passage of both resolutions without a vote is indicative
of the level of importance that an increasing number of governments
are affording this topic. During the 2009 First Committee
meetings, a record number of references were made to this
subject and in a variety of contexts. This included links
to the proliferation and impact of small arms and light weapons,
the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence, military spending,
the Millennium Development Goals, and Article 26 of the UN
Charter. Symbiotic or not, the paradigm is becoming well-established
and appearing more often in dialogue. Hopefully, this will
translate to the issue being well-established in practice.
Disarmament
Machinery
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
This year’s First Committee discussion on disarmament
machinery was lackluster at best. Very few delegations commented
on any of the machinery, aside from welcoming the Conference
on Disarmament (CD)’s adoption of a programme
of work in 2009. Some of these also acknowledged the CD’s
failure to implement this programme. Very few offered any
critique of the current state of affairs, let alone substantive
suggestions for improvement.
Aside from the Chair of the UN
Disarmament Commission, only the
Non-Aligned Movement, the African
Group, and Norway
even referred to the body. Similarly, only the European
Union and
Norway discussed the operation of First
Committee and only Canada
referred to the weakness of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s institutional machinery.
Despite general dissatisfaction with many aspects of all multilateral
disarmament machinery, only the African
Group, Non-Aligned
Movement, and Norway
called for the convening of the Fourth
Special Session on Disarmament to address the situation.
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
The Norwegian
delegation was the most critical of the so-called “sole
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum,” arguing
that if the CD continues not to deliver in 2010, “we
should ask ourselves whether this institution in its existing
format serves our interests.” It called for implementation
of working methods that “do not allow countries to single-handedly
bring work to a standstill” and for reconsideration
of the exclusion of 120 UN member states from its processes.
Similarly,
New Zealand’s ambassador argued, “This is
not the time for rigid rules of procedure to be allowed to
frustrate the international community’s expectations
of progress.”
Other delegations, including those of Pakistan, Iran, and
Brazil,
emphasised the importance of upholding the CD’s rules
of procedure and working methods, arguing that the problem
is not the machinery itself but political will. In addition,
Turkey’s delegation put on record in its explanation
of vote on draft resolution
A/C.1/64/L.41, “Report of the Conference on Disarmament,”
that while it supports the resolution it does not support
the resolution’s reference to the importance of “continuing
consultations on the question of the expansion of the Conference
membership.”
L.41 was adopted without a vote on 30 October. This consensus
was only possible after the co-sponsors agreed to a oral revision
of preambular paragraph seven, deleting the words “with
appreciation” from the sentence, “Acknowledging
with appreciation the support of the United Nations Security
Council summit on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
held on 24 September 2009, to the work of the Conference on
Disarmament.”
The delegation of Bangladesh, as the incoming CD president,
announced that it will conduct consultations during the intersessional
period that it will take into account all relevant proposals
in an attempt to reach consensus on work programme during
first few weeks of the 2010 session. In its explanation of
vote, the Iranian delegation emphasised the importance of
developing a programme of work in which “balance and
equilibrium are observed and the rules of procedure fully
respected.”
Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
Very few delegations even mentioned the UNDC, a clear indication
of the general view on its continued relevance. Indeed, Norway’s
representative characterized the UNDC as “even worse”
than the CD, pointing out that while it is supposed to act
as the UN’s deliberative forum on disarmament, “very
few experts from capitals bother to attend the UNDC regular
sessions.” Ambassador
Andrzej Towpik of Poland, the current Chair of the UNDC,
noted that the body has not seen any progress since 1999 and
that its latest session in April only brought “mixed
results”. He suggested the UNDC invite experts for discussions
at plenary meetings and that it should undertake “periodic
critical self-assessment and—if found necessary—improvement
and adjustment of its methods of work.”
Draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.52,
“Report of the Disarmament Commission,” was adopted
without a vote on 28 October. The US delegation announced
before action was taken that it would not participate in the
vote on L.52. No other delegations commented on the resolution.
First Committee
Norway’s
delegation also criticized First Committee for not fulfilling
its mandate of fostering “a common understanding of
the current threats to peace and security and enable the international
community to address them effectively in all relevant bodies,”
as formulated by the European
Union. In order to increase the effectiveness of First
Committee, Norway’s
representative suggested: limiting the habit of seeking
co-sponsorship for resolutions—which uses a lot of time
and energy—to only new introduced resolutions; establishing
a practice wherein once a resolution has been adopted “it
will stand unless otherwise decided,” which would reduce
the number of repetitive resolutions and make more time for
substantive discussions; and not simply tabling resolutions
with identical texts year after year without taking into account
“emerging new political opportunities to move the disarmament
agenda forward.”
Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV)
The Non-Aligned
Movement and the African
Group urged reconvening the open-ended working group to
consider the objectives and agenda of the Fourth
Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD
IV). The Norwegian
delegation also advocated for the convening of SSOD IV,
“provided that we can agree on adjusting our multilateral
negotiating bodies to better respond to the window of opportunity
that is now emerging.”
Draft decision A/C.1/64/L.9,
“Convening of the fourth special session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament,” was adopted without
a vote on 30 October.
Regional
Disarmament and Security
Lori Sims | Global
Action to Prevent War
Several delegations referenced issues related to regional
disarmament and security during this year’s First Committee
session. Many voiced support for regional security initiatives,
including the UN’s Regional Centres for disarmament
and regional diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and
cooperation. Several delegations also voiced concern about
national military bases on extraterritorial soil, especially
US bases in Latin America. Many delegations, including those
currently involved in regional security and economic arrangements
and those party to nuclear weapon free zones, supported the
view that regional security and disarmament measures help
foster global security.
First Committee adopted by consensus several draft resolutions
related to regional disarmament and security.
A/C.1/64/L.11,
“United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament”:
Tabled by the Non-Aligned Movement, the representative acknowledged
the resolution, which encourages everyone to make voluntary
contributions to the UN Regional Centres for disarmament,
would promote security and “further understanding and
cooperation in the realm of peace.”
A/C.1/64/L.22,
“United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament
and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean”
and A/C.1/64/L.45,
“United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Asia and the Pacific”: While the US and UK delegations
“disassociated” from consensus on these two resolutions
last year because they called for funding from the UN regular
budget, this year the resolutions only appealed for voluntary
contributions. A/C.1/64/L.32/Rev.2,
“United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Africa” was also adopted without reservations this
year.
A/C.1/64/L.27,
“Regional confidence-building measures: activities of
the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security
Questions in Central Africa”: The representative from
Gabon, the lead sponsor, emphasized the need for increased
confidence-building measures in the region, including sustainable
development, and reaffirmed measures already implemented in
Central Africa, including “disarmament and arms limitation
programmes.”
A/C.1/64/L.28,
“Regional disarmament”: The delegation of Pakistan,
a co-sponsor, noted the resolution takes into account processes
and linkages between regional disarmament and enhanced security
and emphasized the need for sustained efforts to achieve the
resolution’s objectives.
A/C.1/64/L.30,
“Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional
context”: The representative from Pakistan, one of the
sponsors, acknowledged the resolution was driven by the recognition
of value of confidence-building measures, and will create
an environment necessary for arms control and disarmament.
The representative from Afghanistan also expressed his government’s
support of the resolution.
A/C.1/64/L.49,
“Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean
region”: While adopted by consensus, Iran’s delegation
explained that it would not participate in the action because
it feels that given the present situation in Palestine, the
resolution lacks realism.
One resolution dealing with regional disarmament and security,
A/C.1/64/L.29,
“Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional
levels,” was adopted by a recorded vote of 173-1-2.
Bhutan and Russia abstained while India
voted against the resolution. In its explanation of vote,
the Russian delegation pointed out that L.29 notes the “relevance
and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.”
Russia sees the CFE Treaty as “hopelessly out of date”
and not accurately reflective of the reality in Europe and
argued that it could not vote in favour of the resolution
because it does not mention the need for states in Europe
to adopt the amended CFE Treaty or to draft another agreement.
The
Indian delegation explained that it voted against the
resolution because it requests the Conference on Disarmament
to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as
a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control,
which in India’s view have already negotiated and adopted
by consensus by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1993. Furthermore,
it argued, “the security concerns of States extend beyond
narrowly defined regions. Consequently, the notion of preservation
of a balance in defence capabilities in the regional or subregional
context is both unrealistic and unacceptable to our delegation.”
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache
Productions ©2008
| 
