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First Committee
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5 October 2009
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In this edition:
Editorial:
Time to reframe the debate
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will of WILPF
Heading into another session of the UN General Assembly First
Committee on Disarmament and International Security, the situation
looks a little more positive than last year. Issues related
to disarmament—from nuclear weapons to cluster bombs—have
received increasing attention throughout 2009 from governments,
the media, and the general public. Many high-profile individuals
have called for a nuclear weapon free world; many governments
have ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Civil society
has continued campaigning around these weapons and others—small
arms, antipersonnel landmines, depleted uranium weapons, space
weapons—to prevent their development, modernisation,
production, trade, and stockpiling.
There is a new administration in Washington that appears
interested in active multilateralism. The United States fully
participated in EU3+3 talks with Iran for the first time.
Russian and US officials have been talking about reducing
their arsenals further. The UN Security Council held a presidential
Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on 24
October, coinciding with the sixth Entry Into Force conference
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—which 150 states
have now ratified. Disarmament was a central theme for many
high-level delegates speaking to the UN General Assembly’s
general debate in September, with 80 countries speaking about
disarmament—up from 19 in 2008.
The heightened awareness and activity around disarmament
is encouraging. However, those concerned with concrete movement
toward a more secure and equitable world order with less armaments
and reduced military expenditure need to take the time to
separate the rhetoric from the reality. Now is the time for
action, but it is equally crucial to ensure that the actions
taken in the name of disarmament actually achieve that goal.
With the change in administration in the United States, the
US government and several of its allies have adopted a new
rhetoric on nuclear disarmament. They have begun to espouse
policies for a “nuclear weapon free world” that
do not actually include specific or time-bound steps for disarmament.
In fact, these measures have focused nearly exclusively on
strengthening or demanding new nuclear non-proliferation measures
and commitments from non-nuclear weapon states, while at the
same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on
nuclear disarmament.
The process toward an Arms Trade Treaty faces similar dangers
of co-option by the powerful few who have interests at stake
other than peace, justice, and security. Civil society and
most governments want the ATT to reduce the human costs associated
with the proliferation of conventional arms. However, thus
far discussions have reached a lowest common denominator consensus
only on dealing with illicit trade. Whether or not states
will be able to agree to a treaty that has any real benefit
to human security, by applying humanitarian and human rights
standards to arms transfer decisions, is far from assured.
Civil society and concerned governments need to ensure that
discussions and actions around disarmament and non-proliferation
are clear and balanced. We also need to shift the language
of the debate away from that which focuses on so-called “national
security”—which in reality is the economic security
only of the elite, technologically proficient classes of the
state—to that which focuses on human security. To a
large extent this is already happening in the Arms Trade Treaty
process. For nuclear weapons, it has hardly happened at all
outside of particular segments of civil society.
John Borrie, who works for the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, has looked
closely at the initiatives to ban cluster munitions and
landmines for lessons that could potentially be applied to
the elimination of nuclear weapons. He notes that those working
to abolish cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines reframed
the discourse and acceptability of these weapons in broader
terms than before. Campaigners focused on the human impacts
of the weapons alongside their purported military advantages
and consciously shifted the burden of proof for the continued
acceptability of a weapon onto users and producers. In the
case of nuclear weapons, this means forcing those who want
to keep them to try to make a convincing case for their acceptability
in humanitarian terms, regardless of their purported military
advantage.
Reaching Critical Will asks all delegations to the First
Committee to take the time this year to debate the humanitarian
merits of nuclear weapons. During the thematic debate on nuclear
weapons, it would be extremely useful if delegations would
address the values, perceptions, and interests of nuclear
weapon possession and abolition. Getting away from Cold War
deterrence theories, we are interested in hearing a debate
on the moral, legal, and humanitarian justifications for the
retention or elimination of nuclear weapons.
The First Committee is the place for this debate. All UN
member states can participate. It makes recommendations to
the General Assembly through resolutions related to all issues
of disarmament and international security. Its work feeds
into other disarmament machinery, including the Conference
on Disarmament and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The time is ripe—we are coming out of the UN Security
Council Summit on nuclear issues and heading into the NPT
Review Conference. Having a frank discussion about the reality
of nuclear weapons, without all the rhetoric, would be instrumental
to actually making concrete steps toward true disarmament
and stronger non-proliferation.
Reflections
on the UN General Assembly General Debate 2009
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will of WILPF
The UN General Assembly held its general debate from 23–29
September. Many of the same issues that dominated the debate
last year—the converging crises of food insecurity,
climate change, rising poverty, financial collapse—framed
the debate again this year. Due to the Climate Change Summit
held at the UN the day before the general debate began, most
states included their priorities or positions on the climate
in their statements. However, issues related to weapons, disarmament,
and non-proliferation also received much greater attention
than they did in 2008. For example:
• 2008: 19 countries referred to disarmament
• 2009:
80 countries referred to disarmament
• 2008: 19 countries referred to non-proliferation
• 2009:
71 countries referred to non-proliferation
• 2008: 17 countries referred to nuclear weapons
• 2009:
73 countries referred to nuclear weapons
• 2008: 18 countries referred to WMD
• 2009:
28 countries referred to WMD
• 2008: 21 countries referred to conventional arms
• 2009:
31 countries referred to conventional arms
Nuclear weapons
The increased attention to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
was sparked by parallel events such as the UN
Security Council meeting chaired by US President Obama
on 24 September and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty Article XIV Conference held from 24–25
September. Overall, the potential elimination of nuclear weapons
has received renewed interest and focus over the past year
around the world, culminating in its firm placement on the
agenda of many states. The vast majority of the 73 countries
who spoke about nuclear weapons called for their complete
elimination. UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon led the debate, requesting
that 2009 be “the year we agreed to banish the bomb.”
While welcoming the UN
Security Council’s Resolution 1887 on non-proliferation,
many states at the General Assembly recognized the need for
balance. Germany’s
representative noted, “Our clear commitment to ridding
the world of all nuclear weapons is the best way to strengthen
the international non-proliferation regime.” Indonesia’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs argued, “In a truly
democratic world order, the nuclear powers will live by their
commitment to the Non-proliferation Treaty by slashing their
nuclear arsenals and abiding by the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. In turn, we non-nuclear countries continue to refrain
from developing nuclear weapons.” In order to strike
a legally-binding balance, the delegation
from Kazakhstan suggested the development of a universal
“Comprehensive Horizontal and Vertical Nuclear Weapons
Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
Conventional Weapons
Six states highlighted their support an Arms Trade Treaty,
compared with four last year. The low-level attention given
to this initiative does not match the support its resolution
garners in the General Assembly. Similarly, only seven governments
noted their support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions
and five for the Mine Ban Treaty—far from representative
of the attention these two instruments will receive during
the First Committee.
However, 31 governments spoke about small arms and light
weapons this year, up 10 from 2008. Most countries highlighted
the domestic and international instability caused by the illicit
trade and rampant proliferation of small arms. Nigeria’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded the Assembly that
such weapons “become weapons of mass destruction—destroying
lives, property, economies, and dreams— as well as the
undermining of national and regional efforts at development.”
Reducing militarism by reducing military spending
Some high-level officials from governments used the opportunity
to call for an end to globalised militarism and the military-industrial
complex that perpetually undermines peace, security, and development.
Most of these focused on reductions in military spending.
Costa
Rica’s President argued, “the gradual and
progressive reduction of military spending is not only a good
strategy for allocating resources, but also a moral imperative
for developing nations.” He encouraged the international
community to adopt the Costa Rica Consensus, an initiative
that “would create mechanisms to forgive external debt,
and support with international financial resources, developing
countries—poor, or middle-income—that invest more
in environmental protections, education, health, housing,
and sustainable development for their peoples, and less in
arms and soldiers.”
Likewise, the President
of Paraguay argued that most countries routinely “trade
a rifle for a container of vaccine,” always putting
“defence” expenditures above the true interests
of their citizens. Declaring, “Paraguay will not mortgage
its daily bread to dance the daily blind waltz of the warlords,”
he called for disarmament to put an end to the “industry
of death and barbarism” and urged citizens to question
their politicians’ budget priorities. Similarly, the
President of the Marshall Islands called for a new “moral
attitude” toward weapons and war, noting, “Banning
nuclear weapons alone will not remove the root cause of war.
Important as it may be, it does not exert an enduring influence.
People are too ingenious to invent yet other forms of warfare.
The world craves for something much more deep-seated than
pure pragmatism. They yearn for permanent peace that springs
from an inner state supported by a moral attitude.”
Culture peace through multilateralism
Several delegations argued that this moral attitude can best
be found in the promotion of multilateralism. 84 delegations
included references to multilateralism in their statements.
Most focused on the need for equality, inclusion, collectivity,
cooperation, and dialogue throughout the international community.
Perhaps most eloquently, the representative
of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines called for a new multilateralism
in which all states have equal access and equal participation
in order to bring about the changes called for during this
year’s general debate:
We can no longer maintain the illusion of holding hands
in artificial solidarity across the moats and turrets of
structural and systemic inequalities. Modern multilateralism
cannot proceed on the bases of the included and the excluded,
of the political haves and have-nots. Nor can token assimilations
of individual developing countries serve to mask the necessity
for deep structural changes to existing power arrangements.
We urge our brothers and sisters who have gained limited
access to the halls of power to not only be a voice for
their excluded brothers, to not only remember where they
came from, but also to view themselves as the tip of the
spear, the thin edge of the wedge, that will use their newfound
privileges to dismantle these structures from within, even
as we continue to make our presence felt outside the citadels
of stasis and indifference.
Reaching Critical Will, with the assistance of the PeaceWomen
project, tracked all references to peace and security at this
year’s UNGA general debate, focusing on disarmament
and weapons. Two indeces, by country and by topic, are available
online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
PeaceWomen also maintains an index on gender and women, available
online at www.peacewomen.org.
UN Security
Council: Working toward a nuclear weapon free world?
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will of WILPF
On 24 September 2009, US President Obama chaired a UN
Security Council meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. It was a great opportunity for heads of state
from the fifteen members of the Council—including the
five permanent members and nuclear weapon states China, France,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—to make concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament
and lay out the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world.
Unfortunately, these governments instead used the Summit
to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear
weapon states to prove they are not seeking to acquire nuclear
weapons. As UK
Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during his General Assembly
statement: “Britain will insist that the onus on non-nuclear
states is that in future it is for them to prove they are
not developing nuclear weapons.”
Yet at the same time, the five permanent members did not
extend any new commitments for themselves to eliminate nuclear
weapons in compliance with their legal obligation to do so.
There was some very strong rhetoric in favour of nuclear disarmament
from some of the P5. US
President Obama quoted Reagan, saying, “We must
never stop until we see the day when nuclear arms have been
banished from the face of the Earth.” But this rhetoric
was not matched with action-oriented items in the resolution
adopted at the Summit.
Resolution
1887 focused nearly exclusively on strengthening existing
non-proliferation measures and advocating new, more stringent
requirements for proof of non-proliferation, while at the
same time requiring no concrete nuclear disarmament steps
by the nuclear weapon states. The only reference to disarmament
in the operative paragraphs of the resolution simply reiterates
Article VI of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As signatories to the
NPT, the five permanent members of the Security Council are
already bound by this obligation.
The problem with promoting non-proliferation without
disarmament
While President Obama’s vision for a nuclear weapon
free world is commendable and welcome, his rhetoric must match
his government’s policy. Elites in the United States
and its some of its allied states have come to see nuclear
weapons as more of a problem for than a solution to the maintenance
of their hegemonic order. From their perspective, the threat
of more states acquiring nuclear weapons overrides the privileged
position it currently affords the few that have them. The
nuclear powers, therefore, have begun to lead a campaign for
increased non-proliferation and arms control, citing the elimination
of nuclear weapons as their “ultimate” goal but
focusing for the foreseeable future on aggressive measures
they believe are necessary to prevent the emergence of new
nuclear states.
Proving this point, in his statement to the Summit, French
President Sarkozy argued, “we live in the real world,
not a virtual one. We say that we must reduce. President Obama
himself has said that he dreams of a world without nuclear
weapons. [Yet] before our very eyes, two countries are doing
exactly the opposite at this very moment.” He went on
to complain about Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes,
without acknowledging that North Korea has minimal nuclear
capabilities and that Iran has no nuclear weapons nor an immediate
capability to produce them. For Sarkozy, the way to “confer
credibility on our commitment to a future world with fewer
nuclear weapons and, perhaps one day, a world free of nuclear
weapons,” is to “have the courage together to
declare sanctions against countries that violate Security
Council resolutions.”
Disarmament proposals made during the Summit
However, several non-permanent members of the Council made
concrete suggestions on how to move forward in a balanced
manner. Most emphasised the importance of maintaining all
three pillars of the NPT and endorsed some of the non-proliferation
and nuclear energy aspects of the resolution. Others also
made specific proposals regarding disarmament, which did not
make it into the resolution.
1. President
Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica was the only delegate
to the Summit to remind the Council of its commitment under
Article 26 of the UN Charter to promote “the establishment
and maintenance of international peace and security with the
least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and
economic resources.”
2. International
Atomic Energy Agency Director General ElBaradei, President
Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica, and President
Calderón Hinojosa of Mexico argued that in order
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the proliferation
and misuse of other weapon systems must be addressed. ElBaradei
encouraged the UN Security Council to “put more emphasis
on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases
of [nuclear] proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security
imbalances and lack of trust,” while President Arias
Sánchez noted that every day the world spends $3.5
billion on weapons and soldiers and that every year “$42
billion in conventional arms are sold to developing nations,
where weak or non-existent democracies are incapable of satisfying
the most basic needs of their peoples.”
3. President
Mesic of Croatia suggested the international community
should support a multilateral contractual system related to
nuclear arms control and disarmament, “which includes
strict implementation and strengthened verification of contractual
obligations.
4. Austria’s
President Fischer expressed his support for a Nuclear
Weapon Convention “equipped with a sophisticated verification
mechanism.” He noted that in the meantime, the NPT needs
to be strengthened, institutionalized, and universalized.
President Fischer also called on the nuclear weapon states
to reduce their arsenals and for all states to strengthen
trust and confidence through nuclear weapon free zones and
transparency.
5. Viet
Nam’s President Nguyen Minh Triet called for bilateral,
multilateral, and unilateral plans for “early and substantial
reductions of nuclear stockpiles” and for negative security
assurances; “an early commencement of negotiations on
an international nuclear disarmament agreement in which those
countries having largest nuclear arsenals must take a leading
role in nuclear disarmament;” and urged nuclear weapon
states to support the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
6. China’s
President Hu recommended that all nuclear weapon states
should fulfill their Article VI obligations; publicly undertake
not to seek the permanent possession of nuclear weapons;”
continue their nuclear reductions; abandon nuclear deterrence
policies based on first use of nuclear weapons; and commit
to firm, unconditional, legally-binding negative security
assurances. He also suggested the international community
develop “a viable long-term plan composed of phased
actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete
prohibition of nuclear weapons;” and refrain from double-standards
in non-proliferation.
7. Japan’s
Prime Minister Hatoyama called on nuclear weapon states
to reduce their arsenals and to disclose information on their
arsenals in the interests of confidence-building to create
a “virtuous cycle for further nuclear disarmament.”
8. Turkey’s
Prime Minister Erdogan called on nuclear weapon states
to uphold their “unequivocal undertaking” to “accomplish
the total elimination of nuclear weapons” by building
on Article VI of the NPT and the 13 practical steps agreed
upon in 2000.
9. Both Turkey
and Libya’s
representatives called for the establishment of a nuclear
weapon free zone in the Middle East.
10. Ambassador
Shalgham of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also suggested
that the IAEA inspect all states, including those possessing
nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, Resolution 1887 does not reflect any of these
suggestions, even though the above states were consulted on
the draft text before the Summit. Though the resolution is
non-binding, its content will likely be cited in particular
by those who gain the most by promoting non-proliferation
as disarmament—the P5 nuclear powers—but also
by many other governments who look to UN bodies to help guide
their policies. Its mere existence makes it a reference point
for intergovernmental debate about non-proliferation and disarmament
for the near future, which is especially unfortunate as the
General Assembly heads into First Committee and as the US
administration prepares its Nuclear Posture Review.
Not all hope is lost. Delegations to the First Committee
should emphasise in their general and thematic statements
the importance of matching 1887’s strong non-proliferation
suggestions with equally strong and concrete disarmament measures.
This would help reframe the intergovernmental debate in a
balanced way, illuminating the possibilities for equity and
fairness in the international system and inspiring interactive
dialogue.
Report on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Conference
Ray Acheson, Rahma Hussein, and Joanna Hruskoci | Reaching
Critical Will of WILPF
The biennial Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Article XIV Conference on 24–25
September 2009 was held amidst a focus of international attention
spurred by the UN
Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. In his opening remarks to the CTBT Conference,
UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed the need to seize
the new momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons,
saying, “Let us make history by making the need for
this conference history.”
The Conference is held to help facilitate the Treaty’s
entry into force. Opened for signature in 1996, the CTBT still
awaits nine essential ratifications before it enters into
force. The nine hold outs, the so-called “Annex II”
states for their listing in Annex II of the Treaty, are China,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States.
Statements by non-ratifying states
For the first time in thirteen years, the US
delegation attended the Conference, led by Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. She explained that the administration
would work towards US ratification of the Treaty and urged
other Annex II states to move forward with ratification as
well.
Several other non-ratifying states spoke. China’s
delegation said it is “the Treaty’s consistent
supporter and abides by its commitment to moratorium on nuclear
test.” Indonesia’s
delegation, while remaining cognisant of its indispensable
role in ratifying the Treaty, held “firm the view that
the qualitative development of all nuclear weapons must stop,
and therefore seek universal adherence to the CTBT, first
and foremost, by all Nuclear Weapon States.” [Emphasis
added]
Israel’s
ambassador reiterated his government’s “unequivocal
support” for the Treaty but said that the CTBT verification
regime and International Data Center needs to be completed
and tested to a greater degree, “necessary for entry
into force”. He also indicated that Israel’s ratification
is at least partially contingent on its admittance to the
CTBTO’s Middle East and South Asia regional grouping
or its Executive Council—which has been blocked so far
by other CTBTO states.
Egypt’s
ambassador explained that while Egypt was among the first
states to sign the CTBT, its existence was in part motivated
by the adoption of the NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference
package that included the resolution on establishing a nuclear
weapon free zone in the Middle East. He indicated that the
implementation of this resolution would “open the doors
for a new horizon to the CTBT.”
Moving toward entry into force
While numerous States warmly welcomed and stated they were
encouraged by the participation of United States in both the
CTBT Conference and the UNSC Special Session, the representative
of Ireland also notably urged states, “not to wait for
the US to act but to show leadership themselves in moving
to a world where the testing of nuclear devices is unacceptable.”
Indeed, if the eight other Annex II states ratified the Treaty
without waiting for the United States, they would isolate
the United States as the sole outlier. Governments should
in fact be wary of the process leading to US ratification
of the Treaty and take note of some of internal dynamics at
play. All current Washington discourse indicates that the
price of US ratification will be high—too high.
During the Conference, several delegations pointed to the
value of the CTBT in halting the modernization of existing
nuclear weapons, as well as serving a valuable role in the
prevention of the qualitative development of new weapons and
delivery systems. Indeed, this is a core value and intent
of the Treaty. However, the deals being discussed in the US
Senate point towards the possible exchange of CTBT ratification
for modernization of the US nuclear arsenal and sustaining
related infrastructure indefinitely.
In its statement
to the CTBT Conference, WILPF called on all Annex II states
to ratify the Treaty, but cautioned that there is such a thing
as a price too high for ratification. Any deals given in trade
for ratification will only serve to undermine the Treaty and
cannot be accepted.
The entry into force of the CTBT would constitute an important
step towards an equitable and secure nuclear free world envisioned
by the vast majority of the world’s citizens and governments.
The CTBT provides measures both to determine compliance with
the Treaty (ie. to detect nuclear tests) and to remedy any
situation of non-compliance. It is thus one of the best tools
the international community currently has at its disposal
to establish a process of complete nuclear disarmament. The
Treaty should thus be ratified without undermining the Treaty’s
goals of preventing the development of new or “better”
nuclear weapons.
Towards a Fissile
Materials Treaty
Zia Mian | Program
on Science and Global Security, Princeton
University
Fissile materials are the key elements for nuclear weapons.
The simple fission weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki
60 years ago used highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium
respectively. The far more powerful thermonuclear (hydrogen
bomb) weapons in the arsenals of most nuclear armed states
today typically contain both these fissile materials. Controlling
these materials has long been seen as central to nuclear disarmament,
halting proliferation and, more recently, to reducing the
risk of nuclear terrorism.
Controlling Fissile Materials
The effort to control access to nuclear-weapon materials is
as old as the effort to make nuclear weapons. During the “Manhattan
Project” to build the atomic bomb, it was proposed that
the United States try to acquire control of the world’s
uranium supplies to stop any other state from having access
to the raw material from which fissile materials can be produced.
In January 1946, in its first General Assembly resolution,
the United Nations established an Atomic Energy Commission
“to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of
atomic energy.” The Atomic Energy Commission’s
first annual report, issued in December 1946, argued that
“effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective
control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and
their nuclear fuel derivatives.” However, there was
little progress at the time, largely because of the Cold War.
The UN General Assembly took the initiative again in November
1957, proposing a treaty that would include: a) “the
cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons
purposes;” b) “the complete devotion of future
production of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes
under effective international control;” and c) “the
reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a program of
transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under international
supervision, of stocks of fissionable materials from weapons
uses to non-weapons uses.”
Once again, little progress resulted.
With the end of the Cold War, the UN was able to return to
this agenda. In December 1993, the GA adopted a resolution
calling for negotiation of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral,
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.”
In March 1995, the Geneva-based Conference
on Disarmament (CD), the permanent multilateral body for
negotiating arms treaties, agreed to these terms as the basis
for negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
But many states made clear their concerns about the scope
of a possible treaty, including whether and how the treaty
would deal with the past and future production of fissile
materials, and the management and reduction of existing stockpiles.
Put simply, the nuclear weapon states sought to keep their
existing stocks of fissile materials outside the scope of
the treaty, while many non-nuclear states wanted the treaty
to include a mechanism to reduce these stocks. This conflict
was settled by an agreement that even though the status and
future of existing stockpiles was not explicitly mentioned
as part of the mandate for the talks, states could raise the
issue during the negotiations. But in the CD, work on all
issues, including the FMCT, stalled.
The commitment to a treaty banning the production of fissile
materials for weapons was reaffirmed by NPT states at the
2000
NPT Review Conference. The CD was urged to agree on a
programme of work which included an FMCT that would take into
consideration “both nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation objectives” and to adopt a schedule
that involved “the immediate commencement of negotiations
on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five
years.”
But talks still have not started. Originally, a key block
was a dispute between the US and some other countries, notably
China, over talks on both nuclear disarmament and prevention
of an arms race in space alongside any FMCT negotiations.
The US opposed talks on anything other than an FMCT. In 2003,
five
CD Ambassadors proposed that work on an FMCT proceed in
parallel with work on three other issues: talks on 1. a treaty
banning nuclear threats directed at non-nuclear weapon states
(“negative security assurances” or NSA), and the
establishment of ad hoc committees to discuss 2. nuclear disarmament
and 3. preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS). This
failed to break the logjam.
In March 2007, the six CD presidents proposed
that a way forward could be to appoint four coordinators who
would preside over parallel talks on NSA, nuclear disarmament,
PAROS, and FMCT. However, only the FMCT talks would aim at
producing a legally-binding treaty. There would only be “substantive
discussions,” i.e. talks about talks, on the other issues.
In May 2009, the CD finally reached consensus on a similar
formulation and adopted its first programme
of work in a decade. However, it was unable to reach agreement
on implementing the programme of work and did not actually
begin negotiations before the end of its 2009 session. The
effort to organise and start talks will begin again in early
2010.
Faced with the impasse at the Conference on Disarmament,
some states and civil society groups have proposed changing
the rules of procedure of the CD, including easing the consensus
process, and others have suggested looking for an alternative
venue, perhaps direct talks among nuclear weapons states.
The advantages of the CD are that it is the only forum in
which all nine nuclear weapon states are members and have
chosen to participate and have agreed on the rules. Going
outside it may permit states that are reluctant to begin talks
or reach agreement on an FMCT, like Pakistan and Israel, the
opportunity simply not to participate.
The Minimum Goals of an FMCT
Given the intense disputes between states over starting talks,
it is difficult to predict the structure of any possible FMCT.
It is easier to consider what could be the minimal requirements
for an FMCT, one that did no more than formalize existing
policies and practices. This of course falls short of a comprehensive
FMCT that most states and civil society groups wish to see,
but would be better than nothing.
A minimal FMCT could aim to prohibit production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or nuclear-explosive purposes
by all parties. This would serve to formalize the existing
production moratoria among the NPT nuclear weapons states
and, if they became parties, the non-NPT nuclear-armed states.
This would place all states in the same position as the non-nuclear
weapons states in the NPT as regards production of fissile
materials for weapons.
How an FMCT could include existing stocks
Some states and many in civil society are concerned that a
limited FMCT focused only on ending future production for
weapons may serve to stabilize the existing situation of nuclear
armed states holding large stocks of fissile materials. They
also seek to ensure that nuclear arsenals could not grow by
tapping into existing stocks of fissile materials that currently
are not in weapons.
The International
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), an independent group
of arms-control and non-proliferation experts from both nuclear-weapon
and non-nuclear weapon states, has proposed a draft treaty
that seeks to address some of these concerns. The draft treaty
has as its basic undertakings:
1. Each State Party undertakes not to produce, acquire or
transfer fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
2. Each State Party undertakes either to promptly disable
and decommission and, when feasible, dismantle its fissile-material
production facilities, or to reconfigure and use these facilities
only for peaceful or military non-explosive purposes.
3. Each State Party undertakes not to use for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear-explosive devices fissile materials:
i. In its civilian nuclear sector
ii. Declared as excess for all military purposes
iii. Declared for use in military reactors.
4. Each State Party undertakes that any reduction in its
stockpile of nuclear weapons will result in a declaration
of the fissile material recovered from those weapons as excess
for weapon purposes.
5. Each State Party undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards
to verify these obligations.
This approach bars the use for weapons of civilian fissile
materials, material declared excess, and military reactor
fuel reserves. It would not compel reduction of nuclear weapons
or weapons-usable stocks, but it provides a mechanism for
bringing under safeguards material that becomes excess due
to reductions in warheads and stocks dedicated for weapons
use. In this way, it further the irreversibility of the disarmament
process. As progress on disarmament proceeds, the nuclear
weapon and nuclear naval complexes would shrink, and the FMCT
monitoring system would converge with the NPT monitoring system
and lead in time to a non-discriminatory set of safeguards
that applied equally to all states in a nuclear weapon free
world.
A fissile material treaty that imposed a requirement of reduction
and elimination of materials in warheads and dedicated stocks
would directly entail disarmament, and indeed would constitute
the core of an abolition regime.
Could an FMCT be Verifiable?
From 2004 to 2008, the Bush administration argued that ‘effective
verification’ of an FMCT cannot be achieved. A draft
FMCT provided by the US to the CD in 2006 contained no provision
for verification. The Obama administration’s decision
to pursue a verifiable FMCT overcame that particular blockage
and the CD agreed to begin work on a verifiable FMCT in May
2009 (though, as noted above, it did not begin work before
the end of the session).
IPFM has argued that an FMCT could be verifiable, and at
reasonable cost. All the civilian activities in the nuclear
weapons states would be subject to the same IAEA safeguards
used in non-nuclear weapon states. These safeguards would
also address the problems of ensuring that fissile materials
were not diverted from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons
programs and that there were no undeclared fissile-material
production activities.
The additional verification challenges would be to determine:
1. that weapon material production facilities were shut down
or decommissioned; 2. that fissile material declared excess,
but still in weapon-components, was not diverted to weapons
purposes; and 3. that material was not diverted from naval
fuel to nuclear weapon purposes. These could be achieved using
techniques developed from 1996-2002 as part of the Trilateral
Initiative, an arrangement made among the US, Russia and the
IAEA, that sought to establish the principles for IAEA safeguarding
of classified forms of fissile material from weapons.
There would also need to be a system of managed access for
inspectors to nuclear weapons sites and military reactor fuel
facilities, such that host states could protect sensitive
information while allowing inspectors to ensure that there
was no covert fissile material production. Similar practices
were successfully developed as part of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. These could all be negotiated as part of the FMCT,
or developed in parallel by the IAEA with states as was the
case with the safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In sum, the verification of an FMCT need not be much more
difficult than verifying the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Conclusion
A verified fissile materials treaty that banned future production
for weapons and brought under safeguarded all existing stocks
outside weapons or reserved for weapons would be very much
worth having. Along with the CTBT, it would help accustom
nuclear possessor states to universal regimes with intrusive
verification. In addition to restraining arms racing in South
Asia, such a treaty would help build a stable framework for
reduction and elimination of warheads and fissile material
stocks; meet a key NPT commitment; institutionalize one of
the basic pillars of a nuclear weapons-free world; and help
secure fissile materials worldwide.
Resources
A
Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty : A Treaty Banning the Production
of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices (with article-by-article explanations),
September 2009
Global
Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a
Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, September 2008
Banning
the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country
Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff)
Treaty Companion Volume to Global Fissile Material Report
2008, October 2008
Zia Mian is a research scientist and the director of the
Program on Science and Global Security’s Project on
Peace and Security in South Asia. He is a member of the core
staff of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (www.fissilematerials.org).
This article, written in a personal capacity, originally appeared
as “Towards a Fissile Material Treaty,” Disarmament
Times, Summer 2007. Used with permission. Updates have been
provided by the author. The recommendations section did not
appear in the original.
A Mine-Free
World: Mission Possible
Sylvie Brigot | International
Campaign to Ban Landmines
When we started campaigning for a ban on antipersonnel landmines
in the early 1990s, it was common to hear that a mine-free
world was a utopian dream, that a ban on a commonly used weapon
was impossible, that mine clearance would take centuries,
that mine victim assistance was too broad an issue to be tackled
effectively, or that stockpile destruction would cost too
much.
A decade of Mine
Ban Treaty implementation proved this was wrong. A ban
was possible and the humanitarian crisis caused by antipersonnel
mines is being effectively addressed. Ten years after the
entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, 80% of the world’s
states have joined it, trade of antipersonnel mines is almost
non-existent, use has dropped very dramatically, funding is
at record levels, and a large amount of land is being cleared
annually and returned to productive use.
We believe a mine-free world in our life time is a Mission
Possible. But there is still a lot to be done. People still
fall victim to landmines every day. Mine survivors are still
among the most impoverished groups in every society, they
still struggle to make their voices heard and to have their
basic rights respected. For mine survivors, for mine-affected
communities, the credibility of the Treaty rests on what difference
it makes to their lives.
The Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World (Second
Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty) will take place
in Colombia in the week of 30 November 2009. The Summit is
the time for states to clearly show their determination to
live up to the commitments they have made to survivors, their
families, and communities still living in the fields of death.
It is an opportunity to revitalize and reinvigorate our work
on the Treaty while recommitting ourselves to the road ahead.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines encourages all
states to:
Come. Participate in the Cartagena Summit at the highest
level possible: Head of State/Government, State Secretary,
or ministerial level. Such high level participation will show
that the states continue to place a high priority on ridding
the world of antipersonnel mines and that they will give full
political support to the outcome of the Summit.
Share. Announce in Cartagena significant recent accomplishments
made on any of the Treaty obligations, or towards joining
the Mine Ban Treaty. In this way, it will be clear that states’
efforts are continuing at full pace and that the Treaty is
heading in the right direction.
Commit. Arrive in Cartagena with a pledge to undertake
one or more actions in the coming years to move toward fulfilling
specific Treaty obligations or joining the Treaty, or supporting
other states in their efforts to do so. This will demonstrate
states’ long-term and serious commitment to the Treaty.
Care. Stay passionate and fully committed to the Treaty
until the promise of a mine-free world becomes a reality.
Voting in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution
on the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty is a public sign
of support for the goal of eliminating the suffering caused
by antipersonnel mines. The International Campaign to
Ban Landmines calls on all states, party or not party to the
treaty, to express their support at the time of the vote.
For states not party, voting in favour of the resolution can
be a step toward the eventual elimination of all antipersonnel
mines.
Indeed, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have
voted in favour of the resolution in previous years. Even
countries that do not feel ready to accede now can take this
proactive step. Such expression of support would be particularly
significant in this pivotal year marking ten years of the
treaty’s entry into force at the Cartagena Summit.
The Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World will be a special
moment in the life of the Mine Ban Treaty and we – governments
and civil society alike – must do all we can to ensure
a successful outcome. This starts in New York with a vote
in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution on the Mine
Ban Treaty. It continues in Cartagena, where we must lay out
a clear path towards a world without antipersonnel landmines
and with full respect for the rights of mine survivors. We
firmly believe that such a world is achievable with enough
creativity, energy, and resources.
Sylvie Brigot is Executive Director of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines.
The Convention
on Cluster Munitions: Rapidly Entering into Force
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace
In December 2008, the Convention
on Cluster Munitions (CCM) opened for signature. Considered
the most significant disarmament treaty in more than a decade,
the CCM created a new global norm with far reaching impact
and a strong humanitarian focus. Less than one year later,
it is expected that the Convention will soon enter into force
and begin changing lives as an important and transformative
piece of international law.
The fundamental provision of the treaty is its ban on the
use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions.
This makes it illegal for every country that joins the Convention
to use cluster munitions or engage in any production or trade
of the weapon. At the centre of the agreement is a strong
and clear definition of what a cluster munition is. This is
a definition that includes all weapons with explosive sub-munitions,
thereby placing a prohibition on an entire category of weapons—a
noteworthy achievement, comparable to the bans on anti-personnel
landmines, and chemical and biological weapons.
The CCM also sets the highest standard to date in international
law for assistance to victims, defined as all persons directly
impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families
and communities. Furthermore, states parties are obliged to
provide assistance to cluster munition victims including medical
care, rehabilitation, and psychological support and to assist
social and economic inclusion. By requiring nations to destroy
all stockpiles within eight years and to clear contaminated
land within ten, there exists the means to prevent future
incidents and new victims.
The Convention came about through a close collaboration between
states, international organizations, and civil society. States
attempted to address the problem of clusters through the traditional
disarmament forum, the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but this failed. More progressive
states then reverted to a fast-track diplomatic process called
the “Oslo Process” that enabled substantial progress
in a short amount of time. They focused on achieving a treaty
that put humanitarian concerns and human security first, turning
the traditional definition of security on its head.
The Convention will have an impact even on those who have
not signed, in two distinct ways. First, states parties must
tell their partners in joint operations of their treaty obligations
and discourage their non-signatory partners from using cluster
bombs. To illustrate, consider that while many NATO states
have signed this agreement, some have not. The implication
is that these states may now have to work alone in missions
where they foresee cluster bombing to be a possibility, or
pull out of joint NATO training exercises because they operate
on fundamentally different rules of engagement from their
allies. Second, the ban reinforces a stigma on the use of
this weapon; they have been branded as inhumane and indiscriminate.
This has been publicly acknowledged even by those states who
have not engaged in the Oslo process. That these same states
continue to pursue a solution to address this weapon in the
CCW—albeit a less stringent solution—is further
evidence that few continue to see this weapon as an acceptable
and viable option.
The Convention currently has 100 signatories. 21 states have
already ratified it, and we are confident that the 30 ratifications
which are needed in total for it to enter into force will
be obtained by the end of the year. This means that the Convention
could potentially enter into force by mid-2010, less than
two years after it opened for signature—a remarkable
accomplishment!
In addition to a swift entry into force, there are other early
accomplishments to take note of. Consider that a total of
the 35 countries that have previously used, produced, stockpiled,
or exported cluster munitions have signed the Convention and
are now committed to never engage in those activities again.
Fourteen of the countries that have been affected by cluster
munitions have signed, including some of those most severely
contaminated, such as Afghanistan, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, and Lebanon. Over the past year, Spain has completely
destroyed its stockpiles, and others have started, including
Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
and the United Kingdom. And since 2006, unilateral moratoriums
on use— and some also on production and transfer—have
been declared by Norway, Hungary, Netherlands, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, and Spain. Others have begun the processes for national
ban legislation.
The United Nations has always been an integral supporter of
the Convention and now plays an increasingly important role
as its depositary. During the opening days of the 2009 UN
General Assembly, Cyprus and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
signed the treaty in New York, while high-level representatives
from Burundi, France, Malta, and Uruguay deposited their respective
instruments of ratification. Another opportunity to sign or
ratify in a public way will be on 21 October, when the UN
Development Programme hosts a special side event for this
purpose. We urge all governments to participate on the 21st
by signing or ratifying at that time, or delivering updates
on the status of the Convention in their countries. It is
also an opportunity to learn more about the practical procedures
related to signature and ratification that are especially
relevant to diplomats based in New York. Such openness and
transparency will be a vital part of the Convention’s
future success.
We look forward to hearing positive statements of support
from all governments throughout this year’s First Committee
meetings. Together, we have accomplished much in a short amount
of time but also know that the real work is only now beginning.
To ensure that the strong words of the treaty’s text
are translated into even stronger actions will require determination
and continued partnership between the United Nations, governments,
international organizations, and civil society.
Allison Pytlak is the Disarmament Program Coordinator
of Religions for Peace.
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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