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First Committee
Monitor
First Edition
12 October 2009
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In this edition:
Editorial:
The past, present, and future of nuclear weapons
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
The opening week of First Committee’s general debate
has been once again a largely static affair. Though the tone
has been much more positive than in recent years, with most
delegations welcoming the “positive momentum”
created by the renewed interest in establishing a nuclear
weapon free world, little has been proposed in the manner
of concrete action.
This trend did not go unrecognised. The Swiss representative,
Mr.
Anton Thalmann from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued,
“While words and good intentions are needed to create
a positive atmosphere, they alone will not move the disarmament
agenda forward. Real action is needed.” He provided
several concrete examples of real action, including “lessening
of the role of nuclear weapons in national doctrines”
and “reduction of the alert levels of nuclear weapons”.
The Swiss were not the only ones to outline specific steps.
Returning to what Bush-era diplomats dismissed
as “laundry lists of traditional arms control steps,”
US
Under Secretary of State Tauscher cited reducing her country’s
nuclear arsenal, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and negotiating a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty
as necessary undertakings.
Welcoming this return to past commitments, it is important
to note that indeed these steps are past commitments. As a
few delegations pointed out during general debate, there appears
to be a movement by some nuclear weapon states toward expanding
the non-proliferation requirements beyond those stipulated
in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while at the same
time referencing only past commitments to disarmament without
moving toward their implementation. UN
Security Council resolution 1887, adopted on 24 September
at the Council’s Summit
on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, is case
in point.
Actually implementing past commitments is essential to moving
forward. Furthermore, it is imperative for the majority of
UN member states and civil society that the nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament agendas advance together.
In an effort to encourage forward-looking debate on nuclear
disarmament that leads to concrete steps toward abolition,
Reaching Critical Will last week urged delegations to consider
and discuss the humanitarian merits of nuclear weapons, removed
from the rhetoric of military utility. Some have already begun
to engage this topic.
Norway’s representative, Mr.
Steffen Kongstad from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
emphasised, “There can be no doubt that nuclear weapons
are the most inhuman and indiscriminate weapons ever created.
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are essential from
a humanitarian perspective.” He also argued, “advancement
in the field of disarmament and arms control can only be achieved
if states listen to, learn from and include strong voices
from civil society that advocate change. Such advocates for
change must include field-based organisations, women’s
organisations and representatives of the people affected by
the continued stalemate over these issues.”
Speaking out as an organisation that endeavours to prevent
human suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian
law and principles, the International
Committee of the Red Cross addressed the issue of nuclear
weapons for the first time in its statement to the First Committee.
On behalf of the ICRC, Mr. Robert Young argued, “Nuclear
weapons are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable
human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling
their effects in space and time, in the risks of escalation
and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future
generations, indeed, to the survival of humanity.”
Every step on the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda
must be geared toward ensuring the security and survival of
humanity. As High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio
Duarte noted in a speech
on 18 September 2009, the old rationale for nuclear weapons
is neither practical nor realistic. He argued that nuclear
deterrence cannot prevent the use of nuclear weapons, “as
there are countless ways that such deterrence can break down—a
danger that is only compounded by the expanding number of
states that possess such weapons.” He also argued that
pledges of no-first use are insufficient for avoiding the
use of nuclear weapons, since such pledges “implicitly
rationalize the second use of such weapons, even against
cities.”
This demonstrates the need for a new discourse on nuclear
disarmament. The Norwegian
representative argued that important lessons can be learned
from the Convention
on Cluster Munitions and the Mine
Ban Treaty, which “demonstrated that it is possible
to make a real difference to human security by breaking old
habits.” He cited “mobilising political will,
working across traditional groups, and in partnership with
survivors and relevant stakeholders” as imperative for
these and other disarmament instruments.
Reaching Critical Will hopes more delegations will speak
out about nuclear weapons and human security during the thematic
debate on nuclear weapons this week. We look forward to hearing
proposals this week that turn the positive atmosphere into
positive action.
Nuclear Disarmament
Jim Wurst | Middle
Powers Initiative
The optimism on nuclear disarmament engendered by the events
of the last several months was evident in the opening statements
in the First Committee. In general, while delegations praised
the change in policies by the United States and welcomed the
UN
Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament that produced Resolution
1887, the non-nuclear weapon states largely kept their
enthusiasm in check.
Ambassador
Baso Sangqu of South Africa said the events this year
“gave rise to a new optimism” but reminded the
committee of “the experience of the past decade that
saw a reversal by some states of their commitments ... have
contributed to a confidence deficit and skepticism about the
prospects for progress.” Concerning 1887, he said, “While
South Africa is fully supportive of efforts aimed at strengthening
non-proliferation measures, we are nevertheless disappointed
that the same attention has not yet been accorded to the equally
important issue of nuclear disarmament.”
Ambassador
Akio Suda of Japan said, “The world is witnessing
a historic movement of the tide in the area of disarmament”
and called 1887 “a robust and substantial resolution”
that reflected the “shared responsibility” of
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Ambassador
Kim Bong-hyun of the Republic of Korea argued that Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon’s five point plan for nuclear disarmament
and Obama “vision” of a nuclear weapons free world
“revitalized the discussions on nuclear disarmament
on a global scale.” He said he was confident that the
issues “are becoming the focus of the global agenda
of our time.” Deputy
State Secretary of Switzerland Anton Thalmann welcomed
the “positive tone” between the US and Russia
and hoped that “the START follow-on negotiations will
result in a new landmark agreement on deep cuts in strategic
arms.”
That optimism was shared by one of the two major powers.
US
Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher called 1887 “the
historic resolution [that] enshrined our shared commitment
to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and achieved
Security Council agreement on a broad framework for action
to reduce nuclear dangers as we work towards that goal.”
She added, “The United States government has begun taking
concrete steps toward a nuclear weapons free world”
which in the short term “will promote a more secure
and stable international environment.” The comments
by Ambassador
Vitaly Churkin of Russia were more measured. He said recent
steps were “undoubtedly a positive signal.” The
Obama/Medvedev meeting on 23 September has “confirmed
the readiness of the two major nuclear powers to sustain the
lead in the field of real nuclear disarmament,” Churkin
said, “Nevertheless, it is our understanding that the
elimination of nuclear weapons should be a result of gradual
process of general and complete disarmament.”
UN
Security Council Resolution 1887, the nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament resolution adopted unanimously at a Council
summit on 24 September, was a topic of discussion in a
number of addresses. Ambassador Jorge Urbina of Costa Rica
(a Council member), said of the summit, “The leaders
of the major nuclear powers appeared before the international
community and gave the initial impetus to a process that will
dictate the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
This was the first opportunity for governments not on the
Security Council to voice their opinions of 1887. Steffen
Kongstad, Director General from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry,
welcomed the agenda set out in 1887, noting, “our immediate
challenge is to ensure that the upcoming Review Conference
... produces a tangible, substantive and forward-looking outcome.
Norway expects the Review Conference to stake out a clear
path towards irreversible and unequivocal elimination of nuclear
arms. The NPT must agree on specific steps to close any loopholes
in the nuclear non-proliferation and security regimes.”
Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares of Brazil, speaking
for the New
Agenda Coalition, said the Coalition was satisfied with
the “renewed interest in nuclear disarmament on the
part of international leaders” demonstrated by the summit
and added that the resolution “underlines in this regard
the urgent need for concrete, transparent, verifiable and
irreversible steps to realize the goal of a world free of
nuclear weapons.”
However, Egypt and Iran criticized the resolution for going
beyond the NPT consensus. Ambassador
Maged Abdulaziz of Egypt welcomed 1887 because it “stresses
the importance of saving the credibility of the Treaty,”
despite the resolution including “elements which do
not reflect consensus” and not mentioning the establishment
of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. Regardless
of what the resolution says, “the responsibility of
implementation and review of the NPT remains, and will continue
to be, that of its membership alone,” he added. Ambassador
Mohammad Khazaee of Iran said 1887 “went beyond
the provisions of the IAEA Statute and the NPT and introduced
certain provisions which are in clear contradiction with the
letter of the NPT. Since this resolution partly distorted
the language of Article VI of the NPT, legally speaking, it
can not and must not be referred to in any future NPT meetings.”
Thus Iran sent a clear signal that any proposed final document
from the 2010 Review Conference that includes references to
1887 will be opposed by Tehran.
In a move that could have lasting ramifications, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) included nuclear weapons
in its First Committee statement, which is traditionally dedicated
to landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms. Applying
the same standards of indiscriminate effects to nuclear weapons
as the ICRC does to land mines, Robert Young said, “Given
the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, the ICRC, as
a humanitarian organization, goes beyond a purely legal analysis.
Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power.”
Citing the International Court of Justice 1996 advisory opinion
that “the use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian
law,” Young called on all states to fulfill “existing
obligations to pursue negotiations to prohibit and completely
eliminate such weapons.”
Operational
Status of Nuclear Weapon Systems
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
For the past two years in a row, the delegations of Chile,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland (joined by Malaysia
in 2008) introduced a resolution to First Committee on “Decreasing
the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”.
The resolution acknowledges and welcomes all steps that have
been taken to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapon systems
and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to take
further such steps to decrease their operational readiness.
The resolution was adopted in the General Assembly as 62/36
(2007) and 63/41
(2008).
This year, the sponsors will not be tabling the resolution.
While they continue to view the lowering of operational readiness
of nuclear weapon systems as an integral part of the nuclear
disarmament process and fully intend to continue carrying
this issue forward in the General Assembly and other fora,
they are also conscious that nuclear positions are currently
being reviewed in several countries. The sponsors believe
in good faith that momentary restraint in their advocacy will
help to facilitate the inclusion of disarmament-compatible
provisions in these processes and help to maintain a positive
atmosphere for the NPT Review Conference. They expect to be
able to move forward on this issue at the NPT Review Conference
and next year’s First Committee and expect that their
good faith will soon translate into tangible progress.
In the meantime, there will be two side events specifically
on operational status this week. The first, on Wednesday,
14 October, is sponsored by the government of Chile and will
be held in Conference Room E from 1:15–2:45 PM. The
second, on Thursday, 15 October, will include a presentation
of a de-alerting paper by the government of Switzerland. It
will meet in Conference Room 4 from 1:15–2:30 PM. All
UN missions, staff, and NGOs are invited to attend these events
to learn more about the issue.
Nuclear Proliferation
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
The tone of the proliferation debate was somewhat different
this year, with a greatly reduced focus on country-specific
accusations of non-compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation
obligations. This approached followed from that of the UN
Security Council’s Summit on nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament, which President Obama characterized as not
directed at any specific country.
However, the European
Union continued taking a strong line on non-proliferation
in general and Iran in particular, pointedly expressing its
commitment “to act with resolve, using all instruments
and policies at its disposal, to prevent, deter, halt and
if possible eliminate proliferation programs.”
The US
delegation did continue to highlight the importance of
creating “a more secure and stable international environment”
for nuclear disarmament by “enhanc[ing] the nuclear
nonproliferation regime.” For the first time in years,
however, these steps include reductions in its own arsenal,
ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and negotiating
a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty.
However, US
Under Secretary of State Tauscher emphasised the importance
of all countries taking “ownership in an effort to reduce
nuclear threats,” which the US government believes “does
not end with a decision to forgo nuclear weapons and accept
safeguards to demonstrate the sincerity of that decision,”
but rather extends “through the participation in
collective efforts to impede others from crossing the nuclear
threshold [emphasis added].”
A number of delegations argued that states wanting increased
measures to ensure non-proliferation could not impose such
measures without undertaking reciprocal, concrete steps to
eliminate their own nuclear weapons. The New
Agenda Coalition reminded the First Committee, “it
is axiomatic that the only absolute guarantee against the
proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is the complete and
verifiable elimination of those weapons.” The Venezuelan
and Bolivian delegations argued that vertical and horizontal
proliferation must be addressed simultaneously.
Israel
Several delegations, including most from the Middle East,
called on Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards. Most of these delegations
welcomed the resolutions adopted at the IAEA General Conference
on “Application of the IAEA Safeguards in the Middle
East” and “Israeli nuclear capabilities”.
Egyptian
Ambassador Abdulaziz pointed out that despite the 1995
NPT resolution on establishing a nuclear weapon free zone
in the Middle East and despite the IAEA and General Assembly
resolutions on the topic, neither UN
Security Council resolution 1887 nor the Summit at which
it was adopted (except for the Arab member, Libya) made any
reference to Israel’s nuclear programme. He argued that
the double-standard surrounding Israel provokes many questions
“about the sincerity of the international commitment
to a nuclear-weapon-free world” and on whether initiatives
toward such a world “will exempt one State or another
for one reason or another, as they have already accepted that
some States should not join the NPT.”
Iran
The number of delegations expressing concern over Iran’s
nuclear programme was significantly decreased during general
debate this year. Several delegations, including Australia,
China,
Eritrea,
Japan,
and Turkey,
welcomed progress made through the 1 October talks between
the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva and encouraged continued dialogue
in this format. Many delegations urged for a peaceful solution
to the situation through diplomacy, including Oman’s
delegation, which said that such a resolution should respect
Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Several
delegations, including Australia
and New
Zealand, urged Iran to comply with UN Security Council
resolutions and to cooperate with the IAEA. The US delegation
did not mention Iran at all.
However, a few delegations, including Japan
and the European
Union, continued expressing grave concern about the situation,
specially in light of the uranium enrichment facility near
Qom that Iran revealed to the IAEA in September. The European
Union said it is “seriously concerned by Iran’s
continued failure to meet its international obligation”
and declared that the construction “of a covert uranium
enrichment facility in Qom underlines the importance of Iran
reassuring the international community of the exclusively
peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.” The EU delegation
urged Iran to follow-up the 1 October meeting with concrete
measures, including allowing the IAEA to access the Qom facility.
It also urged Iran “to give diplomacy a chance to succeed,”
warning that the evolution of the EU’s relations with
Iran “will depend on it.”
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
On the DPRK, a few delegations remarked on the process, generally
urging a resumption of the Six Party Talks. The New
Agenda Coalition further called on the DPRK to rejoin
NPT and reestablish cooperation with IAEA. Jamaica’s
Ambassador Wolfe urged all states involved in the Six
Party Talks to return to the negotiating table “and
work towards a long-term solution that addresses the concerns
of all parties.” Turkey’s
Ambassador Apakan noted that, as current Chair of the
DPRK Sanctions Committee in the UN Security Council, his delegation
is committed to the full implementation of UNSC resolutions
1718 and 1874, to resolving the issue through diplomatic negotiations,
and to encouraging the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks.
Australia’s
Ambassador Quinlan urged the DPRK to “implement
its commitments to abandon its nuclear weapons program.”
A few delegations maintained a stronger tone, with the European
Union condemning the nuclear test explosions and Japan’s
Ambassador Suda describing the DPRK’s nuclear and
missile tests as a threat to international peace and security.
He urged the DPRK to comply with relevant Security Council
resolutions and for member states to fully implement them.
The Republic
of Korea’s Ambassador Kim reiterated his delegation’s
position that the “DPRK’s nuclear development
cannot be tolerated,” prompting a right of reply from
the DPRK delegation, which argued that the Six Party Talks
were “driven to collapse,” that its missile launches
were an exercise of sovereignty, and that it only possesses
nuclear weapons as a deterrent against US aggression.
Fissile
Materials
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
During First Committee’s general debate, many delegations
highlighted their support for the commencement of negotiations
of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for
nuclear weapons within the Conference
on Disarmament (CD). During 2009, the CD came closer than
ever to beginning this work. In May, it adopted by consensus
a programme
of work that included a fissile materials negotiating
mandate. As Switzerland’s
representative noted, “Not a single delegation objected
to the beginning of negotiations on a treaty banning fissile
material.”
Regrettably, the Conference was unable to implement its programme
before the end of the 2009 session, primarily due to reservations
by the Pakistani delegation. The programme of work will not
carry over to the 2010 session, so the CD will have to begin
anew in January.
For the first time since 2006, the Canadian delegation has
tabled a resolution to First Committee on a fissile materials
treaty, A/C.1/64/L.1.
The draft resolution simply urges the CD to start negotiations
on the treaty early in 2010, “with a view to reaching
consensus on its text as soon as possible.”
However, it appears that the draft resolution is facing opposition
from a few delegations who want it to reflect the entirety
of the CD’s programme of work rather than focusing on
negotiations of a fissile materials treaty. Further, some
delegations reportedly object to the preambular paragraph
welcoming current moratoriums on the production of fissile
materials for weapons purposes.
According to the International
Panel on Fissile Materials, only India, Israel, and Pakistan
are believed to be currently producing fissile material for
use in weapons. Both India and Pakistan are constructing new
weapons-related fissile material production facilities.
During general debate, Indian
Ambassador Rao noted that his government “is willing
to join only a non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated
and internationally verifiable FMCT as and when it is included
in the Conference on Disarmament, provided our security interests
are fully addressed.” He emphasised, “India is
a nuclear weapon state and a responsible member of the world
community, and would approach these negotiations as such.”
Pakistan’s delegation has not yet addressed First Committee.
However, in a press
release from Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and in statements
by Pakistan’s Ambassador to the CD, Zamir Akram, the
government argued that the equitable and non-discriminatory
promotion of all states’ security interests must be
explicitly referenced in any document adopted by the CD—which
it claimed to find lacking in the framework
for implementing the programme of work—but curiously
not in the programme of work itself. During one plenary meeting
of the CD, Ambassador
Akram argued, “the special security interests of
non-nuclear-weapon states, that do not belong to a military
alliance or enjoy a security umbrella, deserve special consideration-even
in procedural matters, so that they are in a better place
to protect their interests.”
Other delegations to the CD argued that the implementation
framework is not a policy issue but a practical one that does
not affect national security interests. The novelty of Pakistan’s
argument, that minute procedural details impact security—not
just of Pakistan but of all non-nuclear weapon states—has
not been lost on other delegations.
During that same CD plenary, Mr.
James O’Shea of Ireland commented that as a non-nuclear
weapon state, Ireland does not seek any special treatment
in procedural issues. During another plenary, UK Ambassador
John Duncan emphasised that all CD member states supported
the programme of work, which was in fact the policy issue,
and now the Conference was dealing with modalities, not policies.
Furthermore, US
Ambassador Garold Larson and others argued that “serious
national security concerns” would be addressed during
the course of negotiations and that the adoption of a procedural
framework is not the time to worry about security.
Considered important for both nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, a fissile materials treaty has been on the UN’s
agenda since 1957. More recently, from 2000–2003, First
Committee adopted without a vote a resolution urging the Conference
on Disarmament to adopt a programme of work that included
the “immediate commencement of negotiations” of
a fissile materials treaty. The last time the General Assembly
expressed support for this treaty was in 2004, when it adopted
resolution 59/81 by a vote,
with 179 states in favour, the United States and Palau opposed,
and with Israel and the United Kingdom abstaining.
In 2006, the Canadian delegation introduced a resolution
calling for the immediate start of negotiations on a fissile
materials treaty in the CD, “with the goal of restoring
consensus within the First Committee around this issue.”
However, during consultations, the delegation found that governments’
views on the “conditions under which those negotiations
should start” varied widely. The Canadians withdrew
the resolution, explaining
that a resolution that did not meet with consensus in the
First Committee might not “provide an appropriate signal
to the CD”. They did not table the resolution in 2007
or 2008.
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
Daniel Calder | NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
With President Barack Obama’s recent support for the
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and his active pursuit to have
the United States ratify it, the First Committee saw member
states addressing the CTBT with a renewed sense of optimism
and determination for its entry into force. On 6 October,
the US
delegation reiterated its position on the CTBT, stating,
“the Obama Administration will pursue ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its entry into force,
so that nuclear testing remains a distant memory.” Many
delegations, including those of Kazakhstan,
Indonesia,
New
Zealand, Tanzania,
and Colombia
acknowledged the importance of this development in the first
week of general debate.
Along with President Obama’s support for the CTBT,
the recent Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty held on the 24
and 25 of September 2009 was viewed as another positive step
for the CTBT. At the Conference, a final declaration was adopted,
promoting the entry into force of the CTBT and offering measures
for doing so. In its address, the delegation
of Lao People’s Democratic Republic stated, “The
Lao PDR sees the Final Declaration ... as a firm commitment
of the international community to accelerate the ratification
process in order to promote the entry into force of the Treaty
at the earliest possible date, thus ridding the world of nuclear
weapon test explosions.” Along with Lao PDR, the delegations
of Japan,
Kenya,
South
Africa, Tanzania,
and Kazakhstan
viewed the Conference as productive and advantageous for promoting
the entry into force of the CTBT.
Along with praising the recent developments that have reinforced
the CTBT, delegations continued to stress the CTBT as a cornerstone
for nuclear disarmament. Brazil’s
representative classified the CTBT as a major factor in
strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation
regime, while the delegation of South
Africa stated, “the long outstanding entry-into-force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continues to
weaken the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and undermines
the international community’s quest for a world free
of nuclear weapons.” The classification of the CTBT
as an essential tool for nuclear disarmament was echoed by
numerous member states including Japan,
Bulgaria,
Canada,
and Serbia.
Despite promising developments on the CTBT, the opening week
of the First Committee was still marked by certain reservations
and obstacles, as exemplified by the remarks made by the delegations
of Israel and Egypt. Israel,
while supporting the CTBT, expressed the need to bridge several
current gaps, specifically within the Middle East, while moving
towards CTBT’s entry into force. Israel’s representative
called for universal commitment to not carry out nuclear test
explosions and the completion of the CTBT verification regime
and all other International Monitoring System stations. At
the same time, the delegation
of Egypt stated that although Egypt had signed the CTBT,
the defiance by Israel to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) prevents Egypt from fully ratifying the CTBT
because doing so “would only result in widening the
steep gap in commitments undertaken by States member to the
NPT and States outside the Treaty which enjoy unlimited freedom
in the nuclear area.” The arguments made by both Israel
and Egypt underscored the reality that the entry into force
of the CTBT continues to be delayed by multiple member states.
Currently, of the 44 Annex II countries required to ratify
the CTBT to enter it into force, nine countries—India,
Pakistan, North Korea, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
and the United States—continue to hold out.
While the nine Annex II countries prevent entry into force
of the CTBT, progress may still have occurred in the opening
week of the First Committee, as measured by the increased
dialogue on the CTBT by the Annex II non-ratifying countries.
Last year, out of the seven non-ratifying Annex II countries
that addressed the First Committee in the opening week, only
Indonesia spoke about the CTBT. This year, Indonesia once
again expressed its support for the CTBT, but this time, did
not do it alone. As noted before, the US delegation reiterated
President Obama’s desire to ratify the treaty. The delegation
of China stated that the international community needed
to work to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT.
And while Israel and Egypt displayed some reservations with
certain aspects of the CTBT, both states expressed support
for the Treaty and a need for its eventual entry into force.
The two remaining Annex II counties that spoke, Iran and India,
did not discuss the CTBT. Therefore, five out of the seven
non-ratifying Annex II countries addressing the First Committee
in the opening week mentioned the CTBT. The increased dialogue
on the CTBT may indicate a willingness among member states
to further deliberate on the CTBT in the upcoming weeks and
work towards its ratification by all states.
Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones
Christian Ciobanu | NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Ashe Brooks-Cook | Global
Security Institute
During First Committee’s general debate, many delegates
discussed the importance of nuclear
weapon free zones (NWFZs) within the context of nuclear
non-proliferation, regional security, and negative security
assurances. With two new NWFZs entering into force during
2009 and with the Second Conference of State Parties and Signatories
to NWFZ Treaties in 2010, many delegations took the opportunity
to welcome their contributions to international peace and
security.Representatives from the Non-Aligned
Movement, New
Agenda Coalition, the African
Group, and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) all reflected the importance
of NWFZs. The New Agenda Coalition mentioned that 116 countries
are members of NWFZs and argued that these zones will vastly
improve regional security and contribute to strengthening
nuclear non-proliferation. The Non-Aligned Movement reminded
delegates that NWFZs could improve efforts toward disarmament.
The ASEAN
representative reminded the Committee that Article 1 of
ASEAN’s Charter stipulates that Southeast Asia will
be preserved as a nuclear weapon free zone and free of all
other weapons of mass destruction, noting that all NWFZs “contribute
significantly to strengthening global nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation efforts.” The delegations of Thailand,
Indonesia, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia,
and Cambodia expressed their commitments of maintaining the
SEANWFZ.
The African
Group affirmed its support of the Pelindaba Treaty, which
entered into force in July 2009, establishing African as a
zone free of nuclear weapons. The Group noted that the Pelindaba
Treaty helped increased regional security in Africa.
The delegations of Brazil,
Russia,
Jamaica,
Bangladesh,
Kazakhstan,
Philippines,
Mongolia,
and Myanmar
professed their support of the new Central Asian NWFZ, the
other NWFZ to enter into force during 2009. Kazakhstan’s
delegation declared that the entry into force of the Central
Asian NWFZ will play an important role in efforts to strengthen
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Kazakhstan also
claimed that this new NWFZ would play a pivotal role in nuclear
non-proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and negative security
assurances.
Emphasizing the need for regional security in the Middle East,
the delegations of Egypt,
Jordan,
Sudan,
Venezuela,
Bangladesh,
Philippines,
the United
Arab Emirates, Iran,
and the Non-Aligned
Movement called for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle
East. These delegates urged member states to implement the
1995 resolution on the Middle East from the NPT Review and
Extension Conference, upon which the indefinite extension
of the NPT was based. Many of these delegations also criticized
Israel’s position on the Middle Eastern NWFZ and its
refusal to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards.
Mongolia’s
delegation highlighted the first meeting of focal points
of NWFZs, held in Mongolia last April, which was held to build
momentum for promoting a nuclear weapon free world across
the globe. Pointing out that Mongolia is geographically unable
to join a regional NWFZ and so declared itself to have nuclear
weapon free status, the delegation noted that this decision
did not weaken Mongolia’s security but rather strengthened
it.
Convinced of the need to expand NWFZs to other regions, the
Brazilian
delegation will introduce a joint resolution with New
Zealand on creating a NWFZ in the Southern Hemisphere.
ASEAN
announced that Thailand will be introducing the traditional
resolution on SEANWFZ, which encourages states parties to
work constructively toward ensuring the succession of nuclear
weapon states to the Treaty’s protocol.
Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Joel S. Van Wagenen | Reaching
Critical Will
The Russian
delegation provided an update on its proposal for an International
Uranium Enrichment Centre in Agarsk, indicating that Armenia
has joined and that Ukraine is completing the accession procedure.
This effort is intended to construct a mechanism of fuel supply
assurances in the event of market disruptions.
Establishment of international fuel supply guarantees constitutes
what many consider to be a first step in multilateralising
the nuclear fuel cycle, but the idea faced a setback in June
amid continued concerns from developing states. The IAEA Board
of Governors failed to find consensus on either of two proposals
for establishment of an international fuel bank, including
Russia’s proposal.
According to the Acronym
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, western delegates,
such as US representative Geoffrey Pyatt, argued the proposals
would facilitate expanded access to nuclear technology. In
contrast, developing nations have tended to oppose the plan,
fearing that it would encroach on their access to nuclear
technology. India was particularly vocal in its opposition
to the plans. Other prominent developing nations that have
expressed opposition include Brazil and South Africa.
Negative Security
Assurances
Tal Elmatad | Global
Security Institute
In hopes of capitalizing on the new momentum within the nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue, several delegations
expressed their desire to see strengthened and expanded negative
security assurances (NSAs). NSAs articulate guarantees that
nuclear weapon states will not use their nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states.
With the nuclear weapons states continuing to see total nuclear
disarmament as a distant goal, many delegations—including
the Non-Aligned
Movement—expressed the view that NSAs represent
the next best guarantee of security for the non-nuclear weapon
states (NNWS). However, most delegates emphasised that the
best security assurance against the use of nuclear weapons
is their total elimination.
Several delegations, including but not limited to the African
Group, Brazil,
China,
Myanmar,
and Qatar, articulated the importance establishing legally-binding
negative security assurances.
The delegations of Brazil
and Kazakhstan,
among others, highlighted nuclear
weapon free zones (NWFZs) as a means to encourage nuclear
weapon states to commit to legally-binding NSAs. Brazil’s
ambassador urged for the expansion of NWFZs as a means
to encourage nuclear powers to commit to NSAs, while Kazakhstan’s
representative specifically noted that the creation of
the Central Asian NWFZ represented an opportunity to encourage
the creation of NSAs between it and its large nuclear neighbors.
China’s
Ambassador Qun requested other nuclear weapon states to
abandon their policies of first use of nuclear weapons, reaffirming
its own policy of no first use and no use against non-nuclear
weapon states. Similarly, India’s
Ambassador Rao also emphasized that all nuclear weapon
states should adopt the policy of no use against non-nuclear
weapon states, as well negotiate no-first use agreements.
Bangladesh’s
representative argued that the existence of NSAs is a
cornerstone of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
framework and that its advancement is necessary for the success
of a universal NPT regime. Benin’s
representative elaborated on this point, arguing that
the existence of NSAs would diminish the risk of proliferation
between nations, while the delegate
from Belarus noted that NSAs are effective confidence-building
measures. Myanmar’s
delegation argued that the failure to create and enforce
viable NSAs diminished the value of the NPT to non-nuclear
weapon states.
Outer Space
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
During the general debate, several delegations highlighted
outer space security as a priority for their governments.
Some argued that preventing an arms race in outer space requires
new legal instruments; others advocated instead of voluntary
confidence-building measures.
The Russian
delegation announced it will once again table its draft
resolution to First Committee on the development of transparency
and confidence-building measures in outer space. In accordance
with last year’s resolution on this subject, the UN
Secretary-General compiled two reports, A/64/138
and A/64/138/Add.1.
The reports contain concrete proposals on transparency and
confidence-building measures in outer space, submitted by
Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic on
behalf of the European Union, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Qatar, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, and Ukraine.
During the general debate, Canada’s
Amassador Grinius noted that since the Outer Space Treaty,
“aerospace technologies have advanced to the point where
conventional weapons on Earth are capable of destroying satellites
in orbit” and that “orbital conventional weapons
could also soon be developed to attack targets on Earth or
engage space objects in transit above the Earth.” Citing
the dangers of debris that would result from such “engagement,”
Ambassador Grinius called on the international community to
start work on “banning the placement of weapons in outer
space, prohibiting the testing and use of weapons on satellites
so as to damage or destroy them and banning the use of satellites
themselves as weapons.”
Ambassador Grinius expressed hope this work could be taken
up in the Conference on Disarmament through a discussion mandate
on space security issues. To this end, Russian
Ambassador Churkin highlighted the draft
treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer
space, tabled by Russia and China at the Conference
on Disarmament in 2008. Both the Chinese
and Russian delegations expressed hope that substantive discussions
on their draft treaty would begin soon.
Myanmar’s
ambassador welcomed the Russia-China draft treaty, advocating
for a “comprehensive treaty on Outer Space prohibiting
testing, deployment and use of weapons,” and an interim
prohibition on the threat or use of force against outer space
objects. India’s
Ambassador Rao expressed his delegation’s support
for efforts to “strengthen the international legal framework
to ensure the safety and security of space assets and to prevent
the weaponization of space.” The representative
of Belarus called for the creation of legally-binding
norms against weapons in space and the ambassador
of Venezuela called for strengthening of the international
legal regime to eliminate the risk of militarisation of outer
space and to promote space only for the benefit of humanity.
Noting the importance of the peaceful uses of outer space,
Ukraine’s
Ambassador Sergeyev called on states to “refrain
from taking actions likely to undermine” space security.
Acknowledging the legally-binding measures that have been
proposed, the European
Union argued, “pragmatic and voluntary confidence-building
and transparency measures would allow relatively rapid subscription
by as many countries as possible and could bring effective
security benefits in the short term.” The EU representative
highlighted its draft
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
This code was approved by the Council of the European Union
on 8 December 2008. According to the EU
representative who introduced it to the Conference on
Disarmament in February 2009, it is not intended to be a legally-binding
document nor does it seek to replace other initiatives. Its
main purpose is to strengthen existing UN treaties and principles
on space security and to codify new best practices, including
measures of notification and consultation. It does not include
“any provision concerning the specific question of non-placement
of weapons in outer space,” nor does it oppose any initiatives
dealing with this issue but rather insists “on the importance
to ‘take all measures in order to prevent space from
becoming an area of conflict.’”
Missiles
and Anti-Missile Systems
Alicia Godsberg | Federation
of American Scientists
During the first week of general debate in the First Committee,
nine out of 86 statements made some mention of missiles or
anti-missile systems, which—despite the importance of
the issue—is actually an increase over the past two
years.
In his opening remarks, the High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte stated
that recent years have brought the “early first steps
of a long process of creating multilateral norms for missiles,”
adding that much work on the subject remains to be done. The
vast majority of delegations who referenced missiles discussed
the proliferation of missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems
generally. The only comments on specific missile programmes
came from Israel’s
delegation, which mentioned Iran’s programme, and
Japan’s
delegation, which described the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s missile tests as a “serious
threat” to peace and security.
Stemming the Proliferation of Missiles
The delegations of the European
Union, the Russian
Federation, Singapore,
Turkey,
and the United
States all mentioned the threat of the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and/or the need to stem such proliferation.
This year, only two delegations referenced the Hague
Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)—those
of the European Union and Turkey. The EU delegate reiterated
the Union’s support for the Code, while Turkey’s
delegate described the Code as “a practical step towards
an internationally accepted legal framework” for dealing
with ballistic missile proliferation.
The EU delegation also reiterated its support for the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), while Singapore’s
delegation stated that it takes seriously its responsibility
to maintain tight export controls as one of the busiest shipment
hubs in the world and mentioned its participation in the MTCR
as a concrete demonstration of its commitment to non-proliferation.
The Russian
delegation made an appeal for the third year in a row
to universalize the Treaty
on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty). In 2007,
the US and Russian delegations issued a joint
statement calling for interested countries to discuss
the possibility of internationalizing the Treaty, “though
the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the
destruction of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated
programs.”
The US
delegation generally and briefly stated that it was working
on stemming the proliferation of ballistic missiles but did
not mention the 2007 joint statement on the INF Treaty.
India’s
ambassador called for a discussion of the possession and
use of missiles, adding that issues related to the possession
and use of missiles should be addressed through a comprehensive
global process “based on the principle of equal and
legitimate security.”
Similarly, the EU delegation expressed interest in an examination
of further multilateral steps to prevent the threat of missile
proliferation and to promote disarmament in the missile field.
In this context, the EU delegation made mention of its 2008
proposal to start consultations on a treaty banning short
and intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles.
Ballistic Missile Defenses
The delegations of Indonesia,
the Russian
Federation, and Venezuela
mentioned ballistic missile defense systems (BMD). Indonesia’s
Ambassador Natalegawa commended the decision of the United
States to scrap plans for a missile defense system in Europe,
adding that this move would augment the “conducive atmosphere
in the US-Russia strategic relationship” and help prevent
a nuclear arms race in Europe.
Delegates from Venezuela and the Russian Federation both
voiced concern over BMD systems that would create security
concerns for other states. Russia’s Ambassador Churkin
went further, arguing that such systems “substantially
complicate the process in the field of nuclear disarmament,”
as strategic defensive and offensive weapons are “inseparably
linked.” He noted that the Russian government does not
reject anti-ballistic missile systems as such, but believes
such systems should take into account the interests of all
states. Ambassador Churkin explained that Russia prioritizes
a joint analysis of existing risks in the field and working
out political and diplomatic responses to those risks.
Biological
and Chemical Weapons
Ann Lakhdhir and William True | NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Few states addressed either biological or chemical weapons
during the opening week of general debate this year. However,
those who did were supportive of both the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC).
The delegations of the European
Union, the Non-Aligned
Movement, and Association
of South East Asian Nations, along with those of Thailand
and Bulgaria,
reiterated the importance of both Conventions as core instruments
in combating weapons of mass destruction.
Biological Weapons
The BTWC was negotiated in 1972 and entered into force in
1975. It prohibits the use of biological or toxin weapons
and also their development, production and stockpiling. It
has no verification protocol and no organization that could
conduct an investigation of use, in contrast to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. For several years, under the Chairmanship
of Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary, countries tried to develop
guidelines and procedures to implement the BTWC. When the
US declined further participation this effort ended.
The Sixth
Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006 decided to hold
four sets of annual meetings prior to the Seventh Review Conference
in 2011. Each set of annual meetings were to include a one
week Meeting of Experts, followed by a one week Meeting of
States Parties.
Ambassador
Marius Grinius of Canada chairs the annual meetings in
2009. During First Committe’s general debate, Ambassador
Grinius noted, “Advances in biotechnology and the rise
of terrorism also create new challenges to our collective
security. This was the impetus for this year’s inter-sessional
theme of international assistance and cooperation on disease
surveillance so that we may strengthen the Convention and
enhance the use of biology for peaceful purposes.”
Ambassador Marty M. Natalegawa of Indonesia, speaking on
behalf of the Non-Aligned
Movement, lauded the inter-sessional work process agreed
upon at the 2006 Review Conference. The NAM also reiterated
its call for an effective and verifiable BTWC and for “strengthening
the Convention through multilateral negotiations for a legally
binding protocol and universal adherence to the Convention.”
Similarly, the Bulgarian
delegation called for the development of a compliance
verification mechanism and offered its support for efforts
in that direction.
Ambassador Magnus Hellgren of Sweden, speaking on behalf
of the European
Union, expressed the EU’s commitment to “develop
measures to verify compliance with the BTWC,” noting,
“The Review Conference in 2011 will be an important
opportunity to further strengthen the implementation of the
Treaty.”
Chemical Weapons
The CWC was negotiated in 1993 and entered into force in 1997.
The Treaty has the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to implement
the CWC.
The South
African representative emphasized the challenges facing
the CWC, which is currently undertaking the process of appointing
the new Director-General of the OPCW. He noted, “These
challenges include the fact that one of the major possessor
State Parties has already indicated that it would not be meeting
the final 2012 destruction deadline, which has the potential
to do serious harm to the CWC.”
The Non-Aligned
Movement also expressed concern that one major possessor
has indicated it will not meet the deadline, and urged possessor
states parties to accelerate their destruction operations
and ensure that “any eventuality where the final deadline
is not met should be addressed in a manner that does not undermine
the Convention.” The delegation of the Philippines called
on states to meet the extended deadlines set by the Conference
of State Parties, and encouraged states not party to the CWC
to sign and ratify post-haste.
The European
Union emphasized the importance of the CWC, stating that
it is “unique among disarmament and non-proliferation
treaties by completely banning in a verifiable way an entire
class of weapons of mass destruction.”
Conventional
Weapons
Lori Sims | Global
Action to Prevent War
In his opening statement, High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte highlighted
the recent work on regulating conventional weapons. “We
have witnessed slow but steady efforts to establish and strengthen
the rule of law with respect to conventional arms,”
he noted.
In addition to support of various conventional weapon-regulating
instruments, many states expressed concern over the global
impact of conventional weapons and the need to address them
with international and regional cooperation. Ambassador
Dell Higgie of New Zealand noted, “The impact of
[conventional] weapons is felt deeply, on a daily basis, in
many areas of the world. The international community must
accord priority to meeting the challenges posed by conventional
weapons.”
Many delegations expressed their support and commitment to
the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its importance
to international humanitarian law, including those of the
European
Union, the Non-Aligned
Movement, Switzerland,
Bulgaria,
Israel,
New
Zealand, India,
and Canada.
The CCW, currently in its 26th year, restricts or prohibits
the use of conventional weapons that are deemed excessively
cruel or indiscriminate. Indonesia’s Ambassador Natalegawa,
speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, encouraged
states to become parties to the CCW and to its Protocol on
Explosive Remnants of War, an instrument requiring each party
to an armed conflict to remove remnants of war to reduce civilian
harm.
The General Assembly adopted resolution
46/36 L in 1991, which requested the UN Secretary-General
to establish the UN
Register on Conventional Arms. The Register aims to increase
transparency on military holdings and relevant policies and
to record data on international arms transfers of conventional
weapons. The delegates from the European
Union and Congo
emphasised the importance of transparency in conventional
weapons trading and encouraged states to be more transparent
in military expenditures. Turkey’s
delegation offered support for the Register as well, calling
it “an important transparency and confidence building
measure.” In his statement, High
Representative Duarte encouraged more states to submit
information to the Register, arguing, “Additional efforts
are also needed to improve transparency in armaments—as
illustrated last year by the lowest-ever level of national
reporting to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.”
The latest Secretary-General reports on the Register, A/64/135
and A/64/135/Add.1,
include information from only 74 countries so far—down
from 85 at this same time in 2008.
Small
Arms and Light Weapons
Joe Thwaites | Quaker
United Nations Office
During the general debate of the First Committee, almost
all delegations made reference to small arms and light weapons
(SALW). Many referred to the negative security, humanitarian,
social, economic, and environmental impacts of illicit proliferation
of SALW. Jamaica’s
Ambassador Wolfe noted estimates that small arms kill
at least 300,000 people a year in both conflict and non-conflict
situations, while Bulgaria’s
representative put the figure at half a million. Many
countries highlighted the links between illegal trading in
SALW and trafficking of various kinds, including drugs, as
well as terrorism and organized crime. Both Mali
and Tanzania’s
delegations spoke about how proliferation of SALW undermines
peacekeeping and peace-building efforts.
Seven countries referred to SALW as effectively ‘weapons
of mass destruction’, with Thailand’s
Ambassador Sinhaseni noting that “though small in
size, [SALW] continue to cause massive destruction”
since “they are much more common and widespread than
WMD.” Lesotho’s
Ambassador Ramafole stated that as a small developing
country, SALW represent a “more of a threat than weapons
of mass destruction”.
Most member states reaffirmed their commitment to the UN
Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its
Aspects, agreed in 2001. The Non-Aligned
Movement, African
Group, and Association
of South East Asian Nations all called for increased technical
and financial support to developing countries to enable them
to fully implement the PoA. Norway’s
representative expressed frustration that the PoA “had
not lived up to any humanitarian expectations,” stating
that it was “high time to take a more critical look
at whether the present PoA provides the best framework to
address the humanitarian and developmental challenges posed
by small arms.”
Most delegations expressed their satisfaction with the outcome
of the third
Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) in 2008 and their hopes
for a successful outcome from the fourth BMS to be held in
June 2010. The delegations of Colombia,
Japan,
and South
Africa announced their annual SALW omnibus resolution
and urged all states to support it, with South Africa’s
Ambassador Sangqu welcoming “constructive consultations”
on the draft text and expressing hope that it can be adopted
by consensus.
Other comments and proposals on SALW included the call from
Jamaica’s
delegation to incorporate ammunition in the PoA, which,
as the Dominican
Republic’s representative pointed out, is “intrinsically
linked to the issue of illicit arms trafficking.” The
delegations of Brazil,
Senegal,
Kyrgyzstan, and Niger,
inter alia, called for an international legally-binding
instrument to identify and track SALW. Kenya’s
Ambassador Muburi-Muita spoke of the need to address the
root causes of demand for SALW, while Sudan’s
ambassador highlighted the responsibility of arms manufacturers
in supplying SALW. The Republic
of Korea’s Ambassador Kim noted with disappointment
the failure of the Group
of Governmental Experts on Transparency in Armaments to
reach agreement on whether to include SALW as an eighth category
in the UN
Register of Conventional Arms.
Cluster
Munitions
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace on behalf of the Cluster
Munition Coalition
If the prevailing attitude throughout the general debate
of the First Committee was one of renewed energy and hope,
the Convention
on Cluster Munitions (CCM) can certainly be cited as among
those developments contributing to this goodwill. Nearly four
dozen governments gave mention to the issue of cluster munitions
during this past week, most of which welcomed the new Convention
as an instrument of humanitarian law or gave updates on the
Convention’s status within their own domestic legislative
processes.
The delegations of Tanzania,
Switzerland,
South
Africa, Lesotho,
and New
Zealand were among those who confirmed that steps are
being taken to ratify the Convention. The government
of Jamaica is also moving in this direction and “remains
optimistic that the Convention will inspire further confidence
in the disarmament agenda.”
Only eight more ratifications are needed for the Convention
to enter into force, and some delegations are already looking
forward to the First Meeting of States Parties. The Lao
People’s Democratic Republic re-stated its offer
to host the meeting, which is significant as it is the country
most affected by cluster bombs. Additionally, the Laotian
delegation announced that it will present a draft resolution
on the Convention to the First Committee together with Ireland.
Looking ahead to implementation, Switzerland’s
delegation stated that it will be “important to
build on past experiences” and expressed “hope
that the first meeting of States Parties in Lao PDR will be
able to set up the structures needed for the implementation
of the CCM’s provisions.” The representative from
the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) identified a variety
of ways in which states can already begin this work, including
planning for stockpile destruction, adopting implementing
legislation, and identifying resources.
Indonesia’s
delegation announced that it will organize a “Regional
Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention
on Cluster Munitions” in Bali next month. It is being
co-sponsored with the governments of Germany, Norway, Austria,
Australia, the UN Development Programme, and the ICRC.
Of course, there are still those governments who prefer to
address the issue within the framework of the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW). This would be done through
the development of a new protocol, which has been under discussion
for quite some time and still eludes consensus. The Republic
of Korea’s delegation regretted the status of CCW
discussions and still believes that a solution including suppliers
and users of the weapon would “have a significant impact
on the ground.” Israel’s
delegate closely echoed this sentiment and Ukraine’s
noted that such a protocol would constitute a balance between
“military and humanitarian concerns”. Bulgaria,
which has signed the Convention, is still supportive of the
need for a consensus-based CCW protocol. Canada
and Japan
are also signatories to the Convention but support CCW discussions.
Lesotho’s
delegation called on all governments to participate in
the upcoming UNDP-hosted side event on the Convention scheduled
for 21 October and congratulated those who signed and ratified
during September’s Treaty Event. October’s side
event will be a key occasion to deposit instruments of signature
or ratification, give updates, and learn more. It is rare
that such a clear opportunity for active and humanitarian
disarmament presents itself and we ask that all governments
answer this call with commitment and good conscience.
Landmines
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace
Statements made during the General Debate on the subject
of anti-personnel landmines were largely substantive and reflected
the great strides that have been made towards the implementation
and universalization of the Mine
Ban Treaty (MBT) in the ten years since it entered into
force. While some may see this as a solved issue, there is
in reality much to be learned from the successes of this Convention,
particularly now as state parties to the Treaty prepare to
meet for its second
Review Conference in Colombia in late November.
South Africa recently hosted an African Union Conference
on anti-personnel mines from 9–11 September 2009. The
first aim of the Conference was to assess developments in
Africa since the 2004 Conference and update the Common
African Position on Anti-Personnel Landmines. A second
goal was to prepare for the Second Review Conference.
Ukraine’s
delegation declared that it has only been able to destroy
a third of its stockpiles in accordance with its deadline
under the Convention and through its own resources. It explained
that dialogue with the European Commission towards support
for complete stockpile destruction has been renewed and noted
the role that the United
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has played in “launching
cooperation”. Turkey’s
delegation announced it is pursuing its stockpile destruction
commitments. It also addressed the issue of relations with
non-state actors, emphasizing that the Convention’s
obligations “apply only to State Parties and that their
consent is necessary when engagement with non-state actors
is contemplated within the context of the Convention.”
Cambodia’s
delegation announced that as of August 2009 it has removed
2 million mines from its territory and has integrated demining
into its national agenda by way of the Millennium
Development Goals and the Rectangular Strategy of the
Government. Serbia’s
delegation announced that it will fulfill its clearance
obligations by the end of 2009.
The Non-Aligned
Movement called on states that have used anti-personnel
landmines in past conflicts to cooperate by providing mine
action support that includes information, maps, technical
assistance, compensation, and financial aid. Japan’s
delegation stated that it is ready to strengthen its assistance
through international cooperation. Zambia’s
delegation expressed appreciation for the assistance that
has enabled the completion of its National Landmine Survey
but noted on-going challenges to meet the needs of survivors
and complete demining.
All states, including those who have not yet joined the Convention,
are strongly encouraged to vote for the annual resolution
“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Landmines and on their Destruction” as introduced by
the representative of Switzerland. This is a non-binding way
to show support for the humanitarian aims of Convention.
It was evident that many delegations have high expectations
for a productive Review Conference was evident. The statement
from Colombia
outlined the priorities for the conference which include victim
assistance, addressing new methods of production, and stronger
global condemnation when use occurs. The delegations of Colombia
and others stressed the importance of broad participation
in Cartagena. A briefing on this landmark treaty will take
place on 23 October, sponsored by the Government of Switzerland
and the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, in co-operation with the Governments
of Norway and Colombia.
Arms Trade Treaty
Bruce Millar and Mark Marge | International
Action Network on Small Arms
During this year’s general debate, vigorous discussions
continued on an Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT), which is intended to better regulate
the international flow of conventional arms. Statements on
the ATT were mostly supportive, urging the international community
to agree to a legally-binding instrument that is in line with
states’ existing obligations under international law.
Delegations frequently made references to the consensual outcome
of this year’s two sessions of the ongoing Open-Ended
Working Group (OEWG).
Many delegations expressed support for negotiations to begin
next year on an ATT, including New
Zealand, whose representative emphasized the “strong
humanitarian dividends that would flow globally from a comprehensive
and legally-binding Arms Trade Treaty.” Similarly, expressing
the urgency of moving discussions forward, South
Africa’s representative said, “Any further
delay ... will see continual human rights violations and abuses,
the destruction and displacement of innocent lives, as well
as the oppression of humankind.” The representative
of the International
Committee of the Red Cross spoke of the “untold
suffering among civilians” caused by the proliferation
and misuse of conventional arms.
However, not all delegations are as keen to move quickly
on negotiations. Egypt’s
representative argued that beginning negotiations this
soon would be a “premature leap aimed at concluding
the mentioned treaty without basing such a move on a consensual
basis.” Kazakhstan’s
representative stressed the need for “consensual
decisions accepted by all member states.”
On Thursday, 8 October the United Kingdom tabled a draft
resolution titled, “The arms trade treaty”, a
follow up to Resolution
61/89 and Resolution
63/240 adopted in 2006 and 2008, respectively.
Co-authored by Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland,
Japan, and Kenya, the draft resolution sets out a clear timeline
and mandate for negotiating a treaty. It proposes that the
remaining four 1-week sessions of the OEWG in 2010 and 2011
become Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) for a negotiating
Conference on the ATT in 2012. An additional PrepCom is proposed
in 2012, to determine procedural matters for the Conference.
The draft resolution provides a strong negotiating mandate
for the Conference, and at this stage does not pre-empt the
PrepComs by imposing any procedural restrictions. In preambular
paragraphs, the draft resolution reaffirms respect for international
law, especially international human rights and humanitarian
law. It also acknowledges the rights of states to transfer
arms for their own defence and their right to regulate internal
transfers within their own territory. These preambular provisions
provide guidance for the content of a possible ATT.
During the general debate, Norway’s
representative reminded the Committee that “the
successful conclusion of an ATT will depend on the active
participation of civil society.”
Civil society support for an ATT was clearly visible during
the week, as the Control
Arms campaign organised several events highlighting issues
that a strong and effective ATT would address. On 6 October,
Amnesty International held a lunch time event titled, “How
can an Arms Trade Treaty deliver real security?”, co-sponsored
by the Permanent mission of Cote D’Ivoire and the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The event highlighted the link
between growths of arms transfers and increasing incidences
of human rights abuses as reported by the UN and Amnesty International.
On 7 October, the United Nations University, the Permanent
Mission of the Netherlands and Oxfam International held an
event titled “Dying
for Action: Why We Need An Arms Trade Treaty Now”.
The event was streamed live on the Internet and featured a
Q&A session with questions submitted electronically in
real time, including from campaigners in Afghanistan and Kenya.
The event marked the launch of a new report Dying
for Action - decision time for an effective Arms Trade Treaty,
launched by Oxfam International and 11 other NGOs.
Disarmament
and Development
Allison Pytlak | Religions
for Peace
The unprecedented number of general debate statements on
disarmament and development illustrated what may be the only
positive aspect to the global financial downturn of the past
year—that the need to curb excessive military spending
can no longer go unchecked in the face of widespread poverty
and rising challenges to development.
As Nigeria’s
Ambassador Ogwu stated, “less than one percent of
what the world spends every year on weapons [was] required
to put every child into school by the year 2000. Yet this
did not happen. The International Community cannot watch this
development to continue unabated. Consequently the need to
reverse this negative trend has become one of the greatest
challenges to the International Community today.”
Nearly two dozen delegations made clear references to this
subject while others referred to the impact that a variety
of weapons have on economic development in their countries
and regions. “Given that we are two-thirds of the way
to the MDGs, many wonder when the international community
will ever achieve these goals, when, for example, military
expenditures for 2008 increased by 4% and amounted to some
US $1.464 trillion,” stated the representative
of the Holy See.
Many other delegations also drew attention to the link between
military spending and meeting the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The representative
from Cuba stated that just 10% of global military spending
in 2008 would be enough to achieve the MDGs, and that this
amount is 15 times greater than what is given in total international
development aid. Costa
Rica’s delegation, which regularly champions this
subject at the United Nations, invoked the idea of human security
and called for the “voice of reason” against an
“insane arms race”.
A clear solution does not yet exist. Within the UN framework,
Article
26 of the UN Charter could be the most obvious method
to address these inequalities. It gives the Security Council
the responsibility for creating a plan for regulating armaments
and reducing military expenditure. The UN
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Sergio Duarte,
and the representatives of Benin
and Costa
Rica, referred to last November’s Security Council
debate on Article 26 in their speeches. Ambassador
Urbina of Costa Rica welcomed all dialogue on Article
26, noting that it was the Costa Rican government that helped
restore life to this article by hosting the UN
Security Council debate. Quoting Costa Rican president
Oscar Arias Sanchez, he noted that Article 26 provides “the
words that uphold this institution,” because a world
“where all resources are used only to ensure the welfare
of its people” was the “dream of the founders”
of the United Nations.
Mr. Duarte also made the connection between military spending
and armed violence, which is the subject of a report that
the UN Secretary-General has recently published (A/64/228).
The Swiss
and Kenyan
delegations both congratulated the report for identifying
an “emerging problem that undermines development.”
Switzerland’s delegation re-affirmed its work under
the Geneva
Declaration on Armed Violence to achieve a greater recognition
of the impact that armed violence has on development.
It is regrettable that while very many delegations have made
it clear that this is an area of high priority, those who
spend the most on militaries and armaments chose to remain
silent. It is hoped that they will choose to make comment
in the upcoming sessions.
Disarmament
Machinery
Ray Acheson | Reaching
Critical Will
As in previous years, many delegations to First Committee
emphasised the importance of multilateralism for all aspects
of the disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control agenda.
Speaking on behalf of the European
Union, Ambassador Hellgren of Sweden noted that these
issues encompass “joint security interests for all”
and require a combined effort by the international community.
Several delegations, including those of China,
the Dominican
Republic, the Philippines,
and the Russian
Federation urged governments to put collective security
above individual interests.
While support for multilateralism remains strong, some delegations
were frank about their disappointment in existing multilateral
disarmament machinery. The Mr.
Kongstad of Norway noted that the current structure of
this machinery was established in 1978 and that the “world
has changed profoundly since then.” Describing the Conference
on Disarmament and the UN
Disarmament Commission as dysfunctional, he emphasised
the need for the international community to “agree on
adjusting our multilateral deliberative and negotiating bodies
to better respond to the window of opportunities which is
now emerging.” Failing this, he warned, “we will
continue to see that other bodies, like the UN Security Council,
assume responsibility for matters related to disarmament and
non-proliferation.”
One of the solutions Mr. Kongstad suggested is deeper engagement
with civil society. He argued, “The active participation
of civil society and non-governmental organisations is crucial
in order to raise awareness and provide substantial contributions
to the discussions. Their expertise and experience are much
needed in our quest to develop new instruments in the field
of disarmament.” Several delegations, including those
of New Zealand and Canada, have in the past argued for this
in the context of the CD.
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Many delegations welcomed the CD’s adoption of a programme
of work during its 2009 session but lamented the fact that
it was unable to implement its own programme. Most of these
delegations, including those of ASEAN,
the European
Union, the New
Agenda Coalition, and the Russian
Federation, limited their comments to expressions of hope
that the CD would engage in substantive work early in 2010.
Bulgaria’s delegation, which will be one of the six
rotating presidents of the CD’s 2010 session, articulated
its commitment to getting the Conference back to work.
However, the Norwegian
representative reminded First Committee that the CD has
been paralysed for more than ten years. He also noted the
paradox that while the CD is charged with negotiating global,
legally-binding treaties, more than 120 countries are not
allowed to participate while at the same time any of its members
“can single-handedly bring it to a standstill.”
Thailand’s delegation, which is an observer at the CD,
expressed hope that it would become more inclusive. Japan’s
Ambassador Suda noted that the CD’s current predicament
“is a puzzling situation that no one outside the CD
can understand.”
Lamenting the stalemate, New
Zealand’s Ambassador Higgie argued, “This
is not the time for rigid rules of procedure to be allowed
to frustrate the international community’s expectations
of progress.” Likewise, US
Under Secretary of State Tauscher urged the CD “not
to get bogged down in procedural motions and objections to
halt FMCT negotiations when the Conference reconvenes in January.”
She declared, “the Conference has been idle too long;
it’s time we got back to work.”
UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
Very few delegations even mentioned the UNDC, a clear indication
of the general view on its continued relevance. Indeed, Norway’s
representative characterized the UNDC as “even worse”
than the CD, pointing out that while it is supposed to act
as the UN’s deliberative forum on disarmament, “very
few experts from capitals bother to attend the UNDC regular
sessions.”
Other delegations limited their comments to broad, generalized
statements. The Non-Aligned
Movement expressed disappointment that the body did not
reach agreement on recommendations for its cycle ending in
April 2008, but did not mention anything about the cycle that
began in April 2009. The African
Group called upon all states “to show flexibility
and adequate political will to create the atmosphere sufficiently
favourable to consensus during the forthcoming cycle of negotiations.”
In April 2009, the UNDC’s
new cycle agreed to focus on three agenda items: a) elements
for a draft resolution on the declaration of a fourth Disarmament
Decade; b) recommendations for achieving the objectives of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
and c) practical confidence-building measures in the field
of conventional weapons. The Commission began work on the
first two of these items, but did not yet complete the draft
declaration for the disarmament decade, which should begin
in 2010.
Fourth Special Session
A few delegations, including the Non-Aligned
Movement and the African Group, urged the reconvening
of the open-ended working group to consider the objectives
and agenda of the Fourth
Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD
IV). The Non-Aligned Movement said it will table its annual
resolution on convening SSOD IV. The Norwegian
delegate noted that with the struggles of the CD and UNDC,
his government “sees the wisdom” of convening
SSOD IV.
Regional
Security
Lori Sims | Global
Action to Prevent War
Several delegations referenced issues related to regional
security and disarmament during this year’s general
debate. Representative
Amrit Bahadur Rai of Nepal highlighted the importance
of regional collaboration to address disarmament and weapons
control, noting, “As a host country of the United
Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia
and the Pacific, Nepal strongly supports regional initiatives
and arrangements that complement to the broader goals of disarmament
and non-proliferation at a global level.” Many states
echoed Representative Rai’s words, voicing support for
regional security initiatives including the UN’s Regional
Centres for disarmament, regional diplomacy, and cooperation.
Several delegations also voiced concern for national military
bases on extraterritorial soil.
Jamaica's
delegation offered full support for the work of Regional
Centres, particularly the work done in Latin
America to address illicit trade of small arms and light
weapons. Representative
Ertugrul Apakan of Turkey also expressed support for the
activities of the Regional Centres, “which encourage
regional dialogue for furthering openness, transparency and
confidence building.” Nepal and India’s
delegations both welcomed the Centre in Kathmandu, and, noting
the need for increased resources to meet responsibilities,
encouraged states to generously contribute to that Centre
and the Regional Centres program in general. Nepal has plans
to introduce a resolution on the Kathmandu Centre’s
developments during this session. Tanzania’s
delegation requested that the African
Regional Centre be more proactive in its network and partnership
expansion activities.
Other regional security issues raised in statements shared
a common theme of regional dialogues and collaboration. Several
delegations included updates on regional security activities
including those of Mali,
the Dominican
Republic, and Serbia.
Mali is convening a conference on regional security and development
and the Dominican Republic reported on its efforts to combat
illicit conventional weapons trade across its border with
Haiti. In its statement, the Serbian delegation updated the
General Assembly on its regional security efforts, including
the creation of the Implementation Programme against Proliferation
and Terrorism (IPACT) with other Western Balkan states and
its de-mining efforts on the Serbia-Croatia border.
The Cuban
and Bolivian delegations expressed concern with new United
States military bases in Latin America, arguing that the removal
and relocation of these bases would be necessary for international
peace and security. Several states also raised issues with
extraterritorial military bases during the General Debate
of the 64th session of the General Assembly in September.
President
Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías of Venezuela stated,
“Military bases are a threat to the possible peace in
Colombia and in South America.” Bolivia's
President Evo Morales Ayma echoed these sentiments, stating
the presence of military bases inhibited regional peace and
security.
WMD Terrorism
Rahma Hussein | Reaching
Critical Will
Several delegations during the first week of general debate
reiterated their interest in developing a coherent and multilateral
strategy to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
by non-state actors and terrorists groups, which they still
view as serious threats to international peace and security.
Several delegations, including those of Japan,
Israel,
the Republic
of Korea, and Turkey,
placed particular importance on strengthening the safety and
security of nuclear facilities and ensuring that safeguards
are enforced to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear
materials.
Japan’s
Ambassador Suda noted, “in order to decrease the
risk of proliferation and terrorists getting their hands on
nuclear material, states utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes should adhere to the highest level of standards in
each area of nuclear safeguards, security and safety.”
Turkey’s
Ambassador Apakan stated that new measures should be developed
in order “to combat illicit trade in sensitive nuclear
equipment and technology.” He also called for “adherence
to and effective implementation of two important conventions
namely the Convention
on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.”
The implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls
on states to “adopt and enforce effective laws which
prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery,” was referenced
by many delegates as sufficient means to prevent terrorists
and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons and related
materials.
Thailand’s
delegation welcomed the open-ended meeting of the 1540
Committee, which was held to promote the resolution’s
effective implementation.
Besides several references to 1540, several delegates also
expressed their commitment to international conventions such
as the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention
on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the
Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The aforementioned
conventions and initiative accentuate the need for states
to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear
terrorism-related offenses, employ measures to protect fissile
materials and nuclear stockpiles, and emphasize the significance
of international cooperation in this regard.
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