First Committee Monitor

Third Edition
26 October 2009

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In this edition:

• Editorial: Closing the gaps
• Nuclear Disarmament
• Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
• Negative Security Assurances
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
• Missiles and Anti-Missile Systems
• WMD Terrorism
• Outer Space
• Conventional Weapons
• Small Arms and Light Weapons
• Cluster Munitions
• Landmines
• Arms Trade Treaty
• Disarmament and Development
• Disarmament Machinery
• Regional Disarmament and Security

Editorial: Closing the gaps
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

As First Committee headed into its thematic debates on issues not related to weapons of mass destruction, a few delegations highlighted the need for a revival of conventional weapons issues, similar that which has been given to nuclear disarmament.

The need for such a revival was demonstrated throughout the debate on conventional weapons, wherein delegations repeated their standard positions on cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines, lamented the same lack of progress on implementing the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, and called for the same developments they have been requesting for years—stricter controls on the arms trade, increased financial and technical assistance to curb the illicit proliferation in conventional arms, and increased transparency on arms production and holdings and military expenditure, among other things.

In reality, however, the nuclear disarmament agenda is also no further ahead than it was a year ago. While nearly all delegations addressing First Committee this year called for a nuclear weapon free world, the policies of nuclear weapon states have not yet changed, nor have the resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament been altered to make full use of the supposed “revitalization” of the issue.

On the other hand, while much of the conventional weapons agenda continues to languish—a victim of polarised positions pitting concepts of self-defence and territorial integrity against the reduction of armed violence, illicit gun trading, and violations of international humanitarian law—there is a new resolution this year, which, if adopted, will establish the process to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). That said, a strong treaty is still far from assured.

Neither the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) nor the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the ATT actually agreed to any items generally considered requisite for negotiation: 1) identify problems to be solve; 2) identify means by which to solve them; 3) commit to solving the problem; and 4) agree to a formal negotiating process.

The 2008 GGE reached agreement in some form on the first two. Specifically related to the first element, it agreed to language recognizing “that the weapons being traded in the illicit market can be used for terrorist acts, organized crime and other criminal activities.” While dealing with such issues would be a worthy effort in its own right, it falls far short of the goals articulated by civil society and many states, which include, inter alia, applying international humanitarian and human rights standards to arms transfer decisions. Beyond dealing with problems associated with illicit acquisition of arms, proponents of the treaty are also interested in dealing more broadly with problems related to armed conflict. Such goals and objectives seem crucial for an effective ATT. 

Related to the second element, the GGE recognized the need for states to uphold the highest export control standards. The expert group, however, did not come to any agreement on what the scope of such controls might be—i.e. what types of weapons would be regulated, what sort of parameters might apply, or even whether it would be the goal of negotiations to agree to such standards. 

As for the OEWG, after two sessions it was unable to make further progress on refining or elaborating the first two elements. Most notably, it did come to agreement on the third element, in its expression of support “that international action should be taken to address the problem.”1 This opened the way for the now-tabled resolution to establish the formal commencement of negotiations.

However, one must consider what an ATT would look like if it were negotiated on the basis of the present consensus. The key question is, would such a treaty serve the aspirations of those who have desired it most? 

This a potential question for all items on the disarmament and international security agenda today. On what basis can the international community truly make progress in preventing the proliferation—illicit or otherwise dangerous—of any weapons, conventional or of mass destruction? How would it reach consensus, from this starting point, on eliminating any of these weapons or reducing the amount of money spent on them?

During the week, Burkina Faso’s delegation argued that it is vital to develop new security doctrines that are not based on the old ones; to cooperate and act sustainably; to take measures to put a decisive end to chronic conflicts that are the main incentives for acquiring arms; and to eliminate sources of instability throughout the world, including the growing gap between rich and poor. While such a world would certainly lend itself to one where consensus would be less elusive on matters of disarmament and arms control, these cannot be treated as preconditions for any relevant negotiations, agreements, commitments, or initiatives.

The international community must work within the world it has, now, to reduce military spending, control the arms trade and proliferation, and eliminate weapons. This in turn will help foster regional and international stability, lessen the strategic and economic gaps between countries, and consolidate the concept of self-defence with those of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Note
1. See Michael Spies, “Towards a Negotiating Mandate for an Arms Trade Treaty,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 91, Summer 2009. This analysis of the ATT process builds upon that piece.

Nuclear Disarmament
Jim Wurst | Middle Powers Initiative

The thematic debate in First Committee shifted last week to focus on issues other than nuclear disarmament, but the draft resolutions on this subject poured out at the beginning of the week. There is now a clearer view as to how the First Committee will respond to the potential sea change in the debate over nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Of particular interest are the two mostly broadly-supported nuclear disarmament resolutions: the New Agenda Coalition’s “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (A/C.1/64/L.54) and “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/64/L.36), the resolution spearheaded by Japan. Both drafts over the last few years have garnered more support as the sponsors altered the texts and some countries, notably the non-nuclear weapon NATO states, staked out positions away from their nuclear-armed allies.

Much of the anticipation has been over how the Obama administration would view these resolutions and what the sponsors might do to accommodate the new government. Last year, the United States voted against both resolutions, largely based on the texts’ endorsement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the decisions from the 1995 and 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences. In the case of “Renewed determination,” (L.36), the answer was a dramatic change: the US has joined as a co-sponsor.

Neither resolution has changed much from 2008, other than welcoming relevant developments such as the UN Security Council summit. “Renewed determination” did delete language in a preambular paragraph critical of the failure of 2005 NPT Review Conference and replaced it with a positive take on this year’s NPT Preparatory Committee session. Little, however, is changed in the operative paragraphs. This year’s version softens the language on de-alering to call on states to “consider further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.”

The sponsors of the specific de-alerting draft resolution did not table it this year, wanting to avoid putting the US in a position of voting on a policy on which a policy review is still underway. That is not a consideration in the case of the CTBT, where the US has clearly reversed its position on the test ban.

The Non-Aligned Movement’s resolution on “Nuclear Disarmament” (A/C.1/64/L.48) always draws more objections because it is based on NAM declarations as well as the NPT, meaning a number of the initiative endorsed by NAM are rejected by many Northern countries. In introducing the resolution, Myanmar said the draft “focuses on a range of practical ways and means to achieve the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons by different players in different forums.” These ways and means include interim steps such as de-alerting and a legally-binding no first use instrument.

The only draft dedicated specifically to the NPT Review Conference was Iran’s “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”
(A/C.1/64/L.6). As the title implies, the draft recalls the disarmament commitments made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, including the 13 Practical Steps. The last time Iran tabled this resolution in 2007, 53 countries voted against it (15 abstained). The negative votes came Western and Western-aligned states that felt the resolution knocked away the balance among the three pillars of the NPT in favor of only the disarmament pillar.

“Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/64/L.51) is the annual resolution endorsing the ICJ’s 1996 opinion on the use of nuclear weapons. In introducing the draft, Malaysia said the opinion “remains a significant contribution in the field of nuclear disarmament and lends much weight to the moral argument calling for the total elimination of such weapons.” The resolution is “a reaffirmation of our commitment to the multilateral process.”

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Christian Ciobanu | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Ashe Brooks-Cook | Global Security Institute

Addressing the urgency of the security situation in the Middle East, the Egyptian delegation introduced its draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.3, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.” The resolution emphasizes the need for the international community to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East to enhance international peace and security. The text remains unchanged from last year’s resolution, which was adopted without a vote as GA/63/38.

The Thai delegation introduced A/C.1/64/L.23, “Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.” This draft resolution to preserve South-East Asia as a NWFZ and free of all other weapons of mass destruction. It calls on all states parties to the Treaty to resume direct consultations with the five nuclear weapon states to resolve “existing outstanding issues on a number of provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto.”

This resolution was last introduced in 2007, when it was adopted in the General Assembly as GA/62/31 with a vote of 174 in favour, one against (the United States), and five abstentions (France and the United Kingdom, along with Israel, Micronesia, and Palau). The US delegation explained that the matter of consultations are between the nuclear weapon states and the states parties to the Treaty and should not involve “the general membership of the UN”.

Expressing the urgency for “freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” from nuclear weapons, Brazil and New Zealand co-sponsored a draft resolution on “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/64/L.31). This resolution, which is “determined” to pursue the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to contribute to non-proliferation, stresses the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba, and the Antarctic Treaty to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. It encourages all concerned states to work together to bring into force all outstanding NWFZ treaties and to facilitate adherence to all relevant NWFZ treaty protocols.

The language of the draft resolution is similar to last year’s resolution, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority: 161-3-8. The delegations of the United Kingdom, United States, and France voted against the resolution at that time. In a joint statement, they explained their concern over the resolution’s “ambiguity” regarding its relationship to “principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space.” This concern is in reference to the resolution’s call upon states parties and signatories to existing NWFZs “to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.”

Addressing the creation of a NWFZ in Africa, Nigeria, on behalf of the Africa Group, tabled draft resolution A/C.1/64/L33, “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.” The resolution expresses its sponsors’ appreciation to the nuclear weapon states that have signed the Protocols that concern them, and calls upon those that have not yet ratified the relevant Protocols to do so as soon as possible. Noting the Treaty’s entry into force in July 2009, it continues to call upon all African states to sign and ratify the Treaty. This resolution was last tabled in 2007, when it was adopted without a vote.

Negative Security Assurances
Tal Elmatad | Global Security Institute

Only one draft resolution focuses specifically on negative security assurances (NSA). The resolution, A/C.1/64/L.24, entitled, “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,” remains largely unchanged from last year’s text. It stresses the importance of NSAs prior to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on “effective international arrangements” on NSAs.

The resolution notes that within the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on NSAs, though it acknowledges that “difficulties with regard to evolving a common approach acceptable to all have been pointed out.” It recommends that “further intensive efforts” made to finding this common approach and that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) “actively continue with intensive negotiations” on this subject and give consideration “to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.”

Last year, this resolution was adopted by the General Assembly with a vote of 122-1-58, with the United States voting against.

One other draft resolution tabled this year deals with negative security assurances: A/C.1/64/L.20, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.” The draft resolution asks the CD to begin negotiations to reach an agreement “on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances,” and also asked the CD “to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.” Last year this resolution was adopted in the General Assembly with a vote of 121-50-10.

Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Joel S. Van Wagenen | Reaching Critical Will

There is only one draft resolution dealing with the nuclear fuel cycle this year. Nigeria, on behalf of the members of the Group of African States, tabled draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.34, “Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes.” The resolution targets issues related to the disposal of radioactive wastes and intends to contribute to conventions already in place on the matter.

The resolution’s preamble welcomes previous commitments and resolutions from other bodies on the subject, including the establishment of a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste in 1990; the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security in Moscow in 1996; the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2001; and the entry into force of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2001.

Understanding the complications of disposal of spent fuel, this draft resolution attempts to draw attention of states to the dangers of shipments of such materials. The resolution has a multipronged effect, drawing attention to the risks associated with radioactive material as well as focusing on how materials are disposed of, with specific attention paid to the continent of Africa. The resolution highlights the “potential hazards underlying any use of radioactive wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and its implications for regional and international security, in particular for the security of developing countries.”

The resolution asks that all states be mindful of the transfer of radioactive waste and prohibiting dumping any such waste in a way that would infringe upon another state’s sovereignty. Moreover, it requests that the Conference on Disarmament to take nuclear waste into account during negotiations for the prohibition against radiological weapons and include it in the scope of such a convention.

This resolution was last tabled in 2007, when it was adopted in both First Committee and the General Assembly without a vote. After the First Committee vote, the Indian delegation offered an explanation of vote to explain that it is “fully supportive of the central objective of this resolution,” but emphasised that India “places high importance not only on the safety but also on the full utilization of all aspects of the fuel cycle, to derive maximum benefits from it. We consider spent fuel not a waste but a valuable resource, a position that India has been consistently supporting at the IAEA.”

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Daniel Calder | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

This week, several delegations tabled draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.47, “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”. The text bears a strong resemblance to last year’s resolution but required some changes and additions due to certain developments within the past year.

This year’s version welcomes the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that took place on 24 and 25 September 2009 and noted the improved prospects for ratification by several Annex 2 countries. The draft resolution also welcomes, since the last session of the General Assembly, the ratification of the Treaty by Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as the signature by Trinidad and Tobago, as significant steps towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

The third and most significant change to this year’s draft resolution was its address of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear weapon programme. In the 2008 resolution, sponsors called for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner through the framework of the Six Party Talks. Since last year’s resolution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has conducted nuclear tests and withdrew from the Six Party Talks. As a result, this year’s draft has expressed concern about the nuclear tests and urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to re-engage constructively in the Six Party Talks.

Missiles and Anti-Missile Systems
Alicia Godsberg | Federation of American Scientists

During this week’s thematic debates on outer space security, conventional weapons, regional security, and disarmament machinery, several delegations mentioned the subject of missiles and anti-missile systems in their statements.

Cuba’s representative mentioned that at the 15th Summit Conference held by Non-Aligned Movement heads of state or government in Egypt last July, the Movement reiterated its concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space.

The Democratic Republic of Korea’s delegation stated that the attempt over the years by the United States to develop a missile defense system combined with space weapons under the pretext of the threat of ballistic missiles by so called “rogue states” could spark an arms race in outer space.

The DPRK delegate also claimed that the United States, in response to the fictitious missile threat from the DPRK, is planning to devise a new missile defense initiative in the Northeast and “drag south Korea, Japan and other obedient countries into it.” He mentioned the attempts by Japan to launch an early warning satellite combined with a missile defense system “so as to keep surveillance over neighboring countries.” This early-warning satellite would be the “eye of the missile defense system now under deployment by the US and Japan.”

The Japanese delegation exercised its right of reply to the DPRK’s statement, stressing the importance of stopping the DPRK’s missile development and testing in accordance many UN Security Council resolutions.

Pakistan’s delegation emphasized the significance of regional approaches to arms control, explaining that Pakistan has undertaken relevant confidence-building measures, including notification of missile tests.

Iran’s delegation said it fully supported all non-discriminatory approaches to missiles in all aspects, stating Iran developed an indigenous missile technology because of need. The delegation argued that due to the lack of internationally agreed norms and arrangements, the only way to deal with missiles is to pursue the issue in the framework of the United Nations. Iran’s delegate recalled that the Non-Aligned Movement’s heads of state emphasized the need to keep the issue of missiles in all its aspects on the General Assembly’s agenda and welcomed the conclusion of work in 2008 of the panel of government experts on missiles.

Iran did not table its resolution “Missiles” this year, nor did the sponsors of the resolution entitled “Hague Conduct of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” table theirs.

WMD Terrorism
Rahma Hussein | Reaching Critical Will

This year, one draft resolution and one draft decision have been tabled related to preventing terrorists and non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

The draft resolution, “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,” (A/C.1/64/L.19), aims to promote the implementation of governmental commitments on this subject. It calls on states to join relevant conventions and initiatives and urges cooperation between states and relevant organisations.

Retaining much of the same structure as last year’s draft resolution, which was adopted without a vote, L.19 remains cognisant of an array of international initiatives concerning the issue, such as the Convention of the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This year’s text also takes into consideration new developments, such as the Global Summit on Nuclear Security to be hosted by the United States in 2010, as well as the support for measures to prevent terrorist acquisition of WMD’s contained in the final document of the fifteenth conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement. 

Draft decision A/C.1/64/L.17, “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources,” simply puts the issue on next year’s agenda. A text by this title was last tabled in 2007 as draft resolution that was subsquently adopted by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 62/46. It was intended to maintain support for the International Atomic Energy Agency as a central player in securing sources of radiological materials, to sustain the universalization of existing international instruments, and to promote the expansion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation aimed at enforcing the security of radioactive sources. While it was adopted with a vote, CARICOM tabled amendments (A/C.1/62/L.53) to the draft resolution that extend the focus on the cessation of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of small island developing states. It eventually withdrew these amendments, though it issued an explanation of vote emphasising the importance of this element.

Outer Space
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

Disarmament aspects of outer space was the topic of a thematic debate on 19 October. Many states recognise, as the Sri Lankan representative stressed, that “taking measures to prevent an arms race in outer space is more effective, less complicated and less expensive than taking measures after it has taken off the ground.” The Brazilian ambassador pointed out, “Many of the items on the agenda of this First Committee call upon us to revert or correct dangerous situations that threaten peace and security or even the very existence of this world. The items we are dealing with in this debate, concerning outer space, call for decisions to prevent the breaking of peace in a vast realm while there is still time.”

Perspectives on the way to “prevent the breaking of peace” continued to vary amongst the international community. However, with the newfound cooperation between the European Union and Russian Federation regarding transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) and the much-anticipated statement by the United States, the divergences do not appear nearly as large as last year.

TCBMs vs. treaties?
The European Union, represented by Ambassador Hellgren of Sweden, explained that the EU continues to promote “the elaboration of an international and voluntary set of guidelines” as a “short-term deliverable” for enhancing space security. Ambassador Hellgren highlighted the EU’s draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and announced the EU’s intent to soon reach a widely acceptable text through an extensive consultation process, and to present the results at an ad hoc conference.

The Republic of Korea’s delegation welcomed the EU’s Code of Conduct, remarking that the Korean government believes voluntary TCBMs “could contribute to enhancing satellite safety, reducing uncertainties in the application of dual use space technology, and in turn, increase space security.”

On the other hand, Cuba’s delegation reiterated that TCBMs “are not a substitute for arms control and disarmament measures, or a prerequisite for the application of the latter.” However, it noted, “they can facilitate the achievement of disarmament commitments and measures for their verification.” Likewise, China’s delegation emphasised that “proper and feasible” TCBMs are conducive to maintaining outer space security but cannot take the place of a new legal instrument and should play a complementary role instead.

However, during a side event on “Latest Developments on Space Security and Disarmament” sponsored by UNIDIR and the Secure World Foundation, UNIDIR Director Theresa Hitchens pointed out that TCBMs do not have to be strictly voluntary. Looking to the Law of the Sea Treaty, she argued that TCBMs can be incorporated into legally-binding treaties. She also argued that any legal regime would need to be built upon TCBMs, such as data exchanges and cooperative space situational awareness.

In this vein, the Republic of Korea’s delegate also noted that discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS) are helpful for addressing possible weaknesses in the current outer space legal regime. He noted that TCBMs and the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT), or some other PAROS treaty, are not mutually exclusive.

Likewise, the Russian Federation’s delegation, in outlining all of the different initiatives on space security that it participates in, emphasised the mutually reinforcing nature of voluntary TCBMs and legally-binding PAROS-related treaties, such as the PPWT. Russia’s announcement that all EU states are co-sponsors of its TCBM resolution this year demonstrates a welcome cooperation between initiatives.

US: changing positions on space?
Another encouraging sign was US Ambassador Larson’s statement on space security, in which he announced, “In consultation with allies, the Obama Administration is currently in the process of assessing U.S. space policy, programs, and options for international cooperation in space as part of a comprehensive review of space policy. This review of space cooperation options includes a ‘blank slate’ analysis of the feasibility and desirability of options of effectively verifiable arms control measures that enhance the national security interests of the United States and its allies [emphasis mine].”

Previously, the United States had rejected all arms controls measures on outer space activities. While the outcome of the space policy review is far from assured—this statement is currently the only official statement on space policy since Obama took office—the words are encouraging. Ambassador Larson indicated the US would discuss the presidential review next year at the Conference on Disarmament’s substantive discussions on PAROS.

However, while saying that the US will “seek opportunities to work with other like-minded nations here in the United Nations and in other fora in the furtherance of international norms and standards that can help advance the common good and enhance stability and security in outer space,” Ambassador Larson did continue to stress that that the US “will continue to reject any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in, and acquire data from, space.”

Concrete proposals
A few delegations put forward concrete suggestions for enhancing space security outside of those that are already on the table.

The Cuban delegation suggested: convening an international conference to analyse strict compliance with existing space security agreements; reviewing the current space security legal regime, in light of technological advances; adopting additional multilateral agreements regarding exchange of information; developing international cooperation mechanisms to guarantee equal access to space for peaceful uses for all countries; exchanging information on states’ space policies, including space research and orbital parameters; inviting observers to watch the launching of space objects; demonstrating space and rocket technologies; providing notification of space launches and maneuvers; and consulting on “ambiguous situations”.

The Canadian delegation also made several concrete suggestions toward developing an “encompassing approach to space security that includes not only addressing environmental, commercial and civil dimensions of space, but also its military and national security dimensions.” These proposals included: a ban on the placement of weapons in space; the prohibition of the testing and use of weapons on satellites so as to damage or destroy them; and the prohibition of the use of satellites themselves as weapons.”

Several other delegations submitted proposals during the past year to the UN Secretary-General, which are compiled two reports, A/64/138 and A/64/138/Add.1.

Side events
UNIDIR Director Theresea Hitchens discussed in particular Russia and Canada’s proposals during the side event “Latest Developments on Space Security and Disarmament”. She noted that there have been serious efforts around developing TCBMs, even in bilateral discussions between the US and Russia, but these have not factored into political discussions in the CD or COPUOUS. While there is widespread agreement in the technical community, and growing awareness in political community, of the types of measures required to improve transparency, several obstacles remain. She indicated these include: differences among states in linkage between TCBMs and negotiation of PPWT; questions of venue for work on TCBMs, whether it would be COPUOS, the CD, a Group of Governmental Experts, or the establishment of a International Civil Aviation Authority for space; the “how” of technical data exchange, given that satellite operators use different data sets and formats, models for predicting orbital paths, and definitions of close approach; military secrecy; and legal liability for accidental crashes. Dr. Hitchens also highlighted the ongoing efforts by commercial operators to develop a data centre for sharing orbital data amongst themselves, which they have begun without waiting for governments to get involved.

During a side event last week entitled “Strengthening Space Security,” sponsored by the Global Security Institute and the Government of Canada, John Streinbruner and Nancy Gallagher of the University of Maryland presented their new report, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. Dr. Streinbruner stressed that the previous US administration’s “aspiration” for total space dominance is not feasible, justifiable, or realistic given the physics of space and the enormous cost of the technology. He said it is imperative that the new administration reverse the thirty-year US policy against developing a legal regime on outer space security. Dr. Gallagher suggested a “reassurance” based approach to space security that incorporates elements of arms control, environmental, and debris-limiting measures. She argued that none of the current proposals is comprehensive and suggested that states start with committing to several “guiding principles”—support for the Outer Space Treaty, for no weapons in space, and for no force against space objects that are being used peacefully.

Draft resolutions
Neither of the two annual resolutions on this subject have changed substantially from last year. However, Russia’s “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space,” A/C.1/64/L.40, is for the first time co-sponsored by all the countries of the European Union. The resolution, which seeks to encourage states to submit concrete proposals on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures, adds a preambular paragraph “Noting further the presentation by the European Union of a draft code of conduct for outer space activities.” The operational portion of the resolution also calls this year for the UN Secretary-General to submit a final report on this subject next year, with an annex including all of the proposals to date.

The delegation of Sri Lanka introduced the resolution on “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” A/C.1/64/L.25, which includes three changes. Preambular paragraph 17 recognises “that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Conference on Disarmament,” rather than specifically of an ad hoc committee. While small, this change reflects a certain flexibility toward the changing circumstances in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where this year a programme of work was adopted that included a working group on PAROS rather than an ad hoc committee.

The resolution’s preamble also adds two new paragraphs, taking note of China and Russia’s draft treaty and the decision of the CD to establish “for its 2009 session a working group to discuss, substantially, without limitation, all issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” The operative portions of the resolution remain the same.

Conventional Weapons
Ruben Reike | Global Action to Prevent War

In last week’s thematic debate on conventional weapons, governments agreed that conventional weapons continue to pose a grave threat to international security, fuelling many conflicts, inhibiting development, and taking the lives of scores of people. Several delegations articulated the urgent need to strengthen common efforts to end the devastating impact that conventional weapons can have on civilians throughout the world. Ambassador Im Han-taek of the Republic of Korea stated, “The destructive power of conventional weapons may not surpass that of weapons of mass destruction, but their humanitarian and development implications require just as much attention as those of WMDs by the international community”. Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom referred to conventional weapons as “the real world weapons of mass destruction”, urging states to address the proliferation and misuse of conventional weapons.

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols
Many governments emphasized the importance of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in addressing humanitarian concerns and realizing the principles of international humanitarian law. They also expressed hope that the CCW will eventually achieve universal support. As Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao of India said, “The CCW Convention remains the only forum of a universal character that brings together all the main users and producers of major conventional weapons, thus ensuring that the instruments that emerge have greater prospects of making a meaningful impact on the ground.” The Republic of Korea and other governments expressed their appreciation for the dynamic character of the CCW, which is able, through the adoption of new protocols, to effectively respond to new developments in weapons technology as well as the changing nature of armed conflict in general.

Sweden, Pakistan, Switzerland, and Lithuania introduced draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.37, “Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.” The draft resolution expresses support for the CCW as an important international humanitarian law instrument, and calls upon all states to become party to the CCW. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of the universalization of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, and welcomes the commitment of states parties to Protocol V “to the effective and efficient implementation of the protocol and the implementation of the decisions by the First and Second Conferences of the High Contracting Parties establishing a comprehensive framework for exchange of information and cooperation.” Last year, the resolution was adopted without a vote.

While the European Union stressed the importance of Protocol V, welcoming the recent adoption of its Plan of Action on Victim Assistance, the United Kingdom expressed its disappointment that negotiations on the prohibition of cluster munitions within the framework of the CCW did not progress (see Cluster Munitions for more information).

Ammunition
Regarding ammunition and surpluses in conventional ammunition stockpiles, draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.44, entitled “Problems Arising from the Accumulation of Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles in Surplus,” was introduced by Germany and France, sponsored by 47 states. The draft resolution is a straight-forward follow-up of the 2008 version, encouraging “all interested States to assess, on a voluntary basis, whether, in conformity with their legitimate security needs, parts of their stockpiles of conventional ammunition should be considered to be in surplus, and recognizes that the security of such stockpiles must be taken into consideration and that appropriate controls with regard to the security and safety of stockpiles of conventional ammunition are indispensible at the national level in order to eliminate the risk of explosion, pollution or diversion”. The draft further calls on states to consider the destruction of their surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, to assist interested states in eliminating stockpile surpluses, to contribute to the development of UN technical guidelines for stockpile management, and to improve their national stockpile management capacity.  On behalf of the EU, Ambassador Magnus Hellgren of Sweden stressed that the EU fully supports the aforementioned goals.

Transparency in Armaments and the UN Register on Conventional Arms
Several governments agreed that transparency in armaments, and thus the UN Register on Conventional Arms, are important instruments in building confidence among states, fostering cooperation, and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and security. Delegations expressed their conviction that the enhancement of transparency in military matters would, in turn, contribute to international peace and security as well as the prevention of conflicts. Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina presented the report of a Group of Governmental Experts on the UN Register, stating, “the Register is the only global transparency instrument on conventional arms transfers, and thus plays an important role to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms, enhance confidence, promote stability and increase international peace and security”. The European Union, India, and other governments also expressed their conviction that the UN Register is an important instrument of confidence-building.

The Netherlands introduced draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.50 on “Transparency in Armaments,” which is sponsored by 73 states. The draft resolution deals with the UN Register on Conventional Arms, supporting the view that it contributes to an enhanced level of transparency and thereby to confidence-building among states. It further articulates the hope that the UN Register will eventually achieve universal participation, and invites “Member States in a position to do so to provide additional information on transfers of small arms and light weapons on the basis of the optional standardized reporting form.” Several delegations, including Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States expressed their disappointment that the GGE on the UN Register was unable to reach consensus on the inclusion of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as a separate category. The United Kingdom called this “a missed opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the UN Register”, and the European Union reaffirmed that “the inclusion of SALW as a separate category remains a priority for the EU”.

MANPADS
Regarding man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), the European Union stressed that it “continues to support efforts aimed at preventing the illicit transfer of and unauthorized use of MANPADS, including through the implementation of the annual General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus.”

For draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.29, “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels,” see the Regional Disarmament and Security report.

Small Arms and Light Weapons
Alun Howard | International Action Network on Small Arms

Most states speaking during the thematic debate on conventional arms commented upon the terrible consequences of small arms proliferation, proving that the UN small arms process remains a First Committee priority. It is a priority despite the greater significance of resolutions on cluster munitions, anti-personnel mines, and the Arms Trade Treaty this year, and the fact that 2009 was an “off year” for the process.

Perhaps the “off year” explains the generally unspecific nature of many statements, though it was encouraging to see Democratic Republic of the Congo address First Committee for the first time since 2003, providing details of its efforts to reduce armed violence. Similarly, the delegation of the Maldives made its first statement to First Committee during the general debate, which included a plea for greater action to prevent diversion of small arms to organised crime. The delegation noted that some organised crime and terrorist organisations have “greater resources and means than some of the small states.”

A few delegations lamented what they see as the limited scope of the UN small arms process. MERCOSUR and Associated States complained that the UN Programme of Action on small arms is not legally-binding and does not adequately cover ammunition, while the Norwegian delegation complained about the slow progress made since 2001. Others expressed disappointment with the recent failure of small arms to be included as an eighth category within the UN Register on Conventional Arms, a measure that could improve transparency.

Many states highlighted the link between small arms control and sustainable development and the problems of small arms proliferation undermining achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Highly relevant in this regard is the ongoing initiative started by Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. The European Union encouraged states to “incorporate actions aiming to eliminate illicit small arms and light weapons and to prevent armed violence into their national security, development and poverty reduction plans and strategies.”

This year’s “omnibus” resolution on small arms was introduced by South Africa on behalf of regular co-authors Colombia and Japan. Containing only technical updates from last year’s landmark resolution, South Africa hopes this resolution can be adopted with consensus The draft resolution is very similar to last year’s, confirming 14-18 June 2010 as the next Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) to monitor implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action (PoA). It also reaffirms the 2011 open-ended meeting of Governmental Experts and the 2012 review conference. It encourages states to submit their reports on implementing the PoA and also the International Tracing Instrument, implementation of which will be considered during the BMS. One potentially interesting addition from last year is a request for states to develop common positions before the BMS.

When delegations mentioned the 2010 BMS, it was generally in vague supportive terms. Some noted that the thematic approach adopted at the 2008 BMS had been successful and could be tried again. Mexico, whose ambassador has been designated Chair of the BMS, announced it would promote broad dialogue through a process of consultations beforehand.

Mali, on behalf of ECOWAS, introduced its regular resolution on “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them.” The text remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote.

A review of the past year, and recommendations for the BMS, were the two themes of the NGO presentation on 23 October by Rebecca Peters, Director of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). The statement placed an emphasis on being able to measure success or failure in improving small arms control. As affirmed by the above draft resolutions, civil society is a key partner in implementing small arms control, and several states made this explicit in their comments to First Committee, with Gabon thanking IANSA by name.

Mark Marge of the International Action Network on Small Arms contributed to this article.

Cluster Munitions
Allison Pytlak | Religions for Peace on behalf of the Cluster Munition Coalition

This year, Ireland and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic tabled draft resolution A/C.1.64/L.16 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). This is an administrative and procedural resolution on cluster munitions that provides the mandate under which the UN Secretary-General can act as the depository of the CCM. It also requests that the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, undertake necessary preparations to convene the First Meeting of States Parties following the Convention’s entry into force. Lao PDR, the most heavily cluster munition-affected country in the world, has offered to host this first Meeting of States Parties. This reference to the meeting is the only addition to General Assembly resolution 63/71 on cluster munitions, which was adopted without a vote last year.

The thematic debate on cluster munitions reflected the on-going and real debate between supporters of the CCM and those states who still believe that a cluster munitions protocol under the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) represents a better solution. At present, the discussion in the CCW has not been able to produce a result acceptable to all. The states who spoke in favour of a CCW solution include China, India, Israel, and the Republic of Korea. They all expressed a similar argument—that a CCW solution will include the major producers and users of the weapon and that the CCW “strikes a balance between military and humanitarian concerns,” as explained by China. Significantly, Israel did acknowledge that a “new norm” on cluster munition use is developing, although it prefers the CCW path.

However, widespread support for the CCM was evident from the large number of delegations that applauded it as a success. A few signatories do support the CCW process, hoping it may produce an outcome that would promote “hand in hand the same objective of eliminating cluster munitions,” as stated by Japan. The delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Japan, the Non-Aligned Movement, Netherlands, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom all made reference to the two processes. The European Union stated, “We would expect such an instrument to make a significant contribution from the humanitarian point of view and contain an immediate prohibition, whether on the use, production or transfer of cluster munitions.” The Netherlands’ delegate echoed this, urging that a “Sixth Protocol should make significant contribution to addressing the humanitarian consequences of cluster munitions, contain an immediate prohibition and be compatible with the CCM.” Slovenia’s delegation encouraged states to “strengthen their efforts within CCW to reach common understanding” that could be complementary to the CCM. Turkey has been engaged in both processes and its delegation did note that a new protocol may not overlap entirely with the CCM but efforts in that direction will likely intensify.

Momentum on the Convention is swift and in less than a year it has already collected 100 signatories and 23 ratifications. Only seven more ratifications are needed to trigger entry into force. This domestic process is well underway in Canada, Indonesia, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, and the United Kingdom. These countries, among others, provided updates on their processes during First Committee. The Chilean delegation announced that its country will host a preparatory meeting for first Meeting of States Parties in late April 2010.

A side event about the Convention on 21 October was attended by representatives from a total of 59 countries; eighteen of which have not yet signed the Convention. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte addressed the meeting, urging all UN member states to sign and ratify the Convention without delay. Malawi and FYR Macedonia ratified the Convention most recently on 7 and 8 October respectively; their delegations made special announcements of this accomplishment. Representatives from Ireland, Indonesia, Croatia, Zambia, Norway, Spain, and Belgium gave statements during the event. Panelists included representatives of the UN Development Programme, Lao PDR, the Cluster Munition Coalition, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Landmines
Allison Pytlak | Religions for Peace on behalf of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Switzerland, in its capacity as the current President of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT; also known as the Ottawa Convention), together with Australia and Jordan, tabled the draft resolution A/C.1.64/L.53 on the “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.” The resolution reaffirms the determination to put to an end the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines (APMs) and the need to ensure victim assistance. Switzerland’s delegation asked for broad support for the resolution, adding, “We would particularly appreciate the support of countries that have not ratified the Convention, but that are prepared to support its noble humanitarian purpose.”

The delegations of Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe provided technical updates on treaty implementation—or difficulties in meeting treaty obligations. Slovenia’s International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) has conducted clearance and victim assistance operations for ten years, and will now expand its programs to other issues. The representative from Thailand declared that in order to reach its extended mine clearance deadline, it will continue to need international assistance and support as well as mobilize internal resources. The representatives from Zimbabwe and Senegal stated similar concerns. Perhaps the most welcome statement came from the United Kingdom who announced that it has contracted a demining company to begin clearance in the Falkland Islands. This comes after receiving a clearance extension request last year, despite having been a signatory since the treaty entered into force ten years ago.

Many states not party to the MBT stated clear support for its humanitarian vision but, disappointingly, went on to repeat the same tired arguments for not joining. Cuba’s delegation reiterated its belief that anti-personnel landmines will secure its borders, presumably from the world’s military superpower the United States. The Indian government also feels that landmines play an “important role” in its defence and that complete elimination of the weapon will only be facilitated by the “availability of militarily effective, non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies.” China’s delegation pointed out its long history in providing financial aid, equipment and training for humanitarian demining but for reasons of “regional instability” feels it is still not able to join the Treaty. The Republic of Korea is also a contributor to demining and victim assistance but will not become a state party.

Civil society was very active on this issue throughout the week. Representatives from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) coordinated lobbying appointments with over two dozen delegations, aiming to ensure the most effective Review Conference possible.

A side event on the Mine Ban Treaty was convened on Friday, 23 October by the Government of Switzerland and the ICBL, in cooperation with the governments of Norway and Colombia. During the subsequent discussion, an Egyptian representative stated that due to “obvious reasons” it is not a state party; they lack resources to clear its landmines within the timeframe of the Mine Ban Treaty. Mr. Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch and the ICBL responded that cooperation and assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty is among the strongest in history and pointed to Egyptian statements that have indicated other reasons for not signing.

This response can be supported by a strong track record of real assistance over the last ten years. In their 19 October statement, the European Union pointed out that its member states have given over €1.5 billion in financial support to mine action over the last decade, which represents almost half the world’s overall contribution in that same period. What must be stressed, however, is that there needs to be a coordinated approach for effective mine action and victim assistance. This will be a subject of high priority at the upcoming Cartagena Summit for a Mine Free World. “It is our belief that international cooperation, especially in terms of technical and financial assistance, will further enable affected States Parties to overcome the challenges of mine action,” explained Thailand’s delegation, a point of view seconded by many others.

Arms Trade Treaty
Alun Howard | International Action Network on Small Arms

Just three years after the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was first mentioned in First Committee, a timeline for its creation looks certain to be established. Following the decision by the United States on 14 October to reverse its previous policies and support the draft ATT resolution L.38, statements during the thematic debate assumed that the resolution would be adopted, so that negotiations for the treaty would begin next year in preparation for the proposed UN Conference in 2012.

Most of the statements focussed on two areas—the type of ATT that might be negotiated and concerns over the proposed rules of procedure for the 2012 UN Conference.

The draft resolution requires the 2012 UN Conference to develop a treaty with the “highest possible common international standards,” and some states made references to what this could mean. Senegal’s statement was one of the most detailed, with recommendations on the types of arms to be covered, a full range of activities to be covered, and detailed parameters on international law. But there were wide divergences in other statements. The Netherlands’ delegate referred to “highest” standards, but the EU statement, for example, referred only to achieving “common standards” without mentioning “highest possible,” nor did it specify what these might involve, except preventing diversion to the illicit market. Canada’s delegation shared this goal, but further argued an ATT should be based on existing international law. Delegates from Australia, Mexico, and the Philippines went further, supporting an ATT preventing abuse of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Some of the more sceptical states were more restrictive, often stressing the right of states to obtain weapons for self-defence and viewing a future ATT as being for preventing diversion of arms to the illicit market only. Indonesia’s delegate stressed the need for standards to be non-discriminatory, a phrase commonly interpreted as an attempt to rule out criteria on human rights grounds or even international humanitarian law. In an uncommonly detailed statement, the Indonesian delegation also stressed that an ATT should reaffirm the states’ rights to territorial integrity. A number of states, including Israel and the African Group, highlighted the importance of an ATT to prevent terrorist acquisition of conventional arms. However, several states from the Global South stressed the importance for the major arms exporters to increase their responsibility for conventional arms proliferation.

Without specifying what it would want to see in a possible treaty, the US delegation focused more on process, noting that the five weeks of work scheduled before the negotiating conference is “very little time”. Ambassador Mahley called on all delegations to “recognize the enormous responsibility of using the scarce available time to utmost effectiveness” and refrain from delivering “repetitive, vacuous and substance-free general statements.” He argued for all participants to “use each day to put forward for serious consideration and review substantive proposals, not of what should be excluded from a legally-binding document, but of what should be included to establish the high standards and effective implementation that will be required for a successful product.”

The draft resolution requires decisions at the 2012 UN Conference to be determined on the basis of consensus, which has proven controversial. The US delegation argued, “Consensus is a crucial concept for the United States, to ensure the high standards necessary in an effective outcome to our future deliberations. It is not, nor should others hope it to be, an excuse for avoiding hard choices or real, deliberative controls.” Many delegations that have previously abstained on ATT resolutions, including China and India, also highlighted the necessity of consensus, though others, including Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand, cautioned against its misuse and urged states to “strive for consensus” but not to allow it to undermine the potential treaty. Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan, Chair of the ATT Open-Ended Working Group, expressed optimism on the rules of procedure. In his view, the ATT process has carefully moved forward in mutual understanding, and he hoped it would continue like this, towards a strong treaty.

Two civil society presentations on 23 October also stressed the desperate need for a strong treaty, what ‘strong’ would mean, and why a consensus decision-making procedure might wreck chances for a strong treaty. Bibiane Aningina Tshefu, a Congolese campaigner from Women as Partners for Peace in Africa, spoke about the need for an ATT, while Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang, a Philippines campaigner from Non-Violence International SE Asia, provided the view of the international NGO Steering Committee for an ATT.

To promote more detailed thinking on an ATT, several side events were organised by members of the Control Arms Campaign. On 19 October, Oxfam International joined with the Mission for Sierra Leone to organise a discussion on how a strong ATT would support peacebuilding. A highlight of this event was the first public statement from the UN Development Programme on the benefits of an ATT. On 22 October, the IANSA Women’s Network launched a briefing paper on the ATT and women, peace, and security, at a side event co-hosted with the Mission of Norway. The event focussed on the links between a strong ATT and implementation of UN Security Council resolutions relating to women, peace and security. Finally, on 23 October, the documentary ‘Silent Army’ was screened and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children & Armed Conflict responded to questions about how an ATT could help prevent the phenomenon of child soldiers.

From statements during the thematic debates this week, it is clear that most states still need to think in detail on what they would want an ATT to look like. As the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 7 co-authors of the resolution, said, “The question is not whether regulation of the arms trade should pay due regard to [various issues including international human rights and humanitarian law]. The question is how we can, via an arms trade treaty, ensure that we live up to these responsibilities.”

Disarmament and Development
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

Several interrelated issues—disarmament, military expenditure, and armed violence—were linked with development during thematic debate statements on conventional weapons and on other disarmament measures and international security.

Military spending and development
Tanzania’s delegation decried that military expenditure is on the rise and questioned whether this is a product of heightened tensions in the world or the result of a vicious spiral of an arms race. He noted that either way, it does not make sense when millions of people are trapped in poverty and dying of curable diseases. He issued a strong call for a review of these priorities, as did Cuba’s delegation, which contrasted rising military spending with the current economic, food, and energy crises. The Cuban delegation reiterated its proposal for the creation of a UN-administered fund, into which at least half of all military expenditure is allocated for economic and social development.

Likewise, the European Union argued that the increase in global military expenditure over the past decade demonstrates the need for increased transparency in military spending and an effective UN mechanism for reporting such expenditure. The EU looks forward to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on this subject, which is mandated to examine the implementation of the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditure in 2010.

Several delegations, including those of Turkey, expressed their support for this instrument and urged other states to submit data to it regularly. The standardized reporting format covers expenditures on personnel, operations, and maintenance, procurements, and construction and on research and development. Many delegates, including those from Germany, argued that transparency in military expenditure would help build confidence, reduce military spending, and foster regional and international stability.

Germany and Romania introduced draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.43, entitled “Objective Information on Military Matters, including Transparency of Military Expenditures,” which is sponsored by more than 60 states. The biennial draft resolution is a follow-up of the 2007 version, calling upon member states to report annually to the Secretary-General their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year. The draft resolution, as Ambassador Hellmut Hoffmann of Germany emphasized, further encourages “Member States to provide their views and suggestions on how to improve the reporting system.”

Disarmament and development
The Cuban delegation reiterated its support the Plan of Action adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987, including allocating part of the resources freed by way of disarmament efforts to development.

Last year, this resolution was adopted without a vote in the General Assembly. In the First Committee, a vote was called though no states voted against it and only one abstained. The United States and United Kingdom did not participate in the vote due to their contrary views on the link between disarmament and development. France abstained, noting that while such a link exists, it is not “symbiotic” as the resolution describes.

Armed violence and development
Representatives from the European Union, Finland, Kenya, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, SICA and Mexico, expressed their support for the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence. The Dutch delegation emphasised that the relationship between armed violence and development is “a complicated and mutually reinforcing, unfortunately negative relationship with devastating effects in many parts of the world.” The representative for SICA and Mexico argued that a reduction of armed violence leads to socio-economic development.

The Swiss delegation explained that the Declaration is meant to raise consciousness about the issue, develop responses to the problem, and improve the prospects for sustainable development. There are currently 108 signatories to the Declaration. The Swiss delegate encouraged all states to study the Secretary-General’s report on promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence (A/64/228) and to actively participate in its follow-up.

Delegations engaged in a thematic debate on disarmament machinery on Friday, 23 October. On behalf of the European Union, Ambassador Hellgren of Sweden argued, “While there is room for improvements the existing disarmament machinery continues to have the potential to fulfil its functions.” He argued that what is needed is “political will, good faith, trust and the willingness of States to fully comply with obligations and commitments agreed.”

The Norwegian delegation was more skeptical. Representative Hilde Hanne Skorpen argued, “In recent years we have regrettably witnessed that key multilateral bodies have struggled to live up to our expectations, or even worse, been completely paralysed.”

Austria’s delegation also introduced draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.41, “Report of the Conference on Disarmament.” The resolution is similar to those of previous years, but is updated to reflect the developments of the 2009 session. It requests the incoming CD president to undertake consultations during the intersessional period and to make relevant recommendations. It also requests all CD member states to cooperate with the current and successive presidents “in their efforts to guide the Conference to the commencement of substantive work, including negotiations, in its 2010 session.”

Norway’s representative argued that if the CD continues not to deliver in 2010, “we should ask ourselves whether this institution in its existing format serves our interests.” She called for implementation of working methods that “do not allow countries to single-handedly bring work to a standstill.” The Brazilian ambassador argued that on the contrary, the events in the CD this year “reveal that the immobility that persisted for a number of years was not due to the working conditions of the organ,” but rather to political will.

Ms. Skorpen of Norway also argued that the CD should not be defined as the “sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum” when more than 120 UN member states are excluded from its processes. The European Union, describing the CD as the “single permanent forum available to the international community for disarmamentnegotiations,” reiterated its call for the CD to be enlarged.

Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
Ambassador Andrzej Towpik of Poland, the current Chair of the UNDC, noted that the body has not seen any progress since 1999 and that its latest session in April only brought “mixed results”. He suggested the UNDC invite experts for discussions at plenary meetings and that it should undertake “periodic critical self-assessment and—if found necessary—improvement and adjustment of its methods of work.”

Draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.52, “Report on the Disarmament Commission,” recommends the UNDC continue the consideration of its three substantive agenda items in 2010 and requests the UNDC meet from 29 March–13 April 2010.

First Committee
The European Union suggested that First Committee “should foster a common understanding of the current threats to peace and security and enable the international community to address them effectively in all relevant bodies.” Norway’s representative agreed that this is the purpose of First Committee, but argued, “It is clearly not evident that the Committee has succeeded in this task.” She warned that if First Committee cannot fulfill this mandate, “we will continue to experience that other institutions, such as the UN Security Council, will assume increased responsibility for disarmament and non-proliferation issues.”

In order to increase the effectiveness of First Committee, Norway’s representative suggested: limiting the habit of seeking co-sponsorship for resolutions—which uses a lot of time and energy—to only new introduced resolutions; establishing a practice wherein once a resolution has been adopted “it will stand unless otherwise decided,” which would reduce the number of repetitive resolutions and make more time for substantive discussions; and not simply tabling resolutions with identical texts year after year without taking into account “emerging new political opportunities to move the disarmament agenda forward.”

Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV)
The Norwegian delegation advocated for the convening of SSOD IV, “provided that we can agree on adjusting our multilateral negotiating bodies to better respond to the window of opportunity that is now emerging.”

Draft decision A/C.1/64/L.9, “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,” once again simply seeks to include this issue in the provisional agenda of next year’s session.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Only the Canadian delegation referred to the NPT in the context of the disarmament machinery debate, highlighting the “modest level of support it currently receives” from the UN and its states parties. Representative Geoff Gartshore compared the NPT’s reliance on only one full-time staff person from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’s three-person Implementation Support Unit and the Chemical Weapons Convention’s much larger OPCW. He highlighted Canada’s working paper to the NPT’s third Preparatory Committee, which sets out three cost-neutral proposals: hold shorter, more focused annual general conferences; creating a standing bureau comprised of previous and current chairs; and establishing a support unit to enhance administrative capacity.

Regional Disarmament and Security
Lori Sims | Global Action to Prevent War
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

Representatives from the UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament addressed the First Committee on 22 October. Ms. Anges Marcaillou, Chief of the Regional Disarmament Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, expressed the importance of regional collaboration and regional program design, stating, “Maximizing our impact relies upon building upon our strengths, forging stronger partnerships and moving gradually from projects to strategic programs.” In response to her presentation, the representative from Gabon also highlighted the importance of pragmatic, comparative programs, and the need to involve citizens and administrations, as they are the primary recipients of these programs.

Recognizing the need for effective programs, several representatives described the challenge of encouraging programmatic improvements with budgetary constraints and lack of resources. The representative from Togo expressed concern with the lack of financing available to put good intentions into practice. The representatives from the Regional Centres in Latin America, Asia, and Africa listed financing and budgets in their top concerns. The representative from the Asia Regional Centre admitted the lack of a concrete yearly plan due to “the unforeseen availability of funds.”

The representatives from the Regional Centre in Africa and from Gabon updated First Committee on regional security activities within Africa including regional and sub-regional meetings in Gabon and Regional Centre revitalization programs including capacity-building, training, and legal assistance programs. Gabon tabled A/C.1/64/L.27, “Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa,” encouraging all states to “further peace, stability and sustainable developments in the sub-region.”

The text has changed somewhat from last year. The preamble adds a paragraph reaffirming “that the purpose of the Standing Advisory Committee is to conduct reconstruction and confidence-building activities in Central Africa among its member States, including through confidence-building and arms limitation measures.” Operative paragraph 2 reaffirms the importance of “disarmament and arms limitation programmes in central Africa carried out by the States of the subregion with the support of the United Nations, the African Union, and other international partners,” whereas last year’s version reaffirmed the importance of “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes” and encouraged the UN Peacebuilding Commission to “support efforts for the political stabilization and reconstruction of post-conflict societies.”

This year’s resolution welcomes the adoption of the Code of Conduct for the Defence and Security Forces in Central Africa on 8 May 2009. It also welcomes the adoption of the Libreville Declaration, which calls on members of the Committee to contribute to the Special Trust Fund for the Committee.

Nepal tabled A/C.1/64/L.45, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.” In his statement, Mr. Amrit Bahadur Rai of Nepal stressed the importance of regional dialogue noting, “Engagement and confidence building measures are some of the essential elements for creating [a] conducive environment for disarmament and non-proliferation.”

The resolution includes a few updates from last year. The new text adds a preambular paragraph recalling the Regional Centre’s mandate “of providing, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asia-Pacific region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament.” While the resolution continues to call for voluntary donations, it does not include the request it did last year for the Secretary-General to provide money from the biennial regular budget starting in 2010–2011 nor to provide support until this budget is approved.

Peru, on behalf of Latin American and Caribbean States, tabled A/C.1/64/L.22, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America.” The draft adds a new preambular paragraph reaffirming the Centre’s mandate “to provide, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities of the Member States of the region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, and for the promotion of economic and social development.” Rather than expressing “deep concern” about the Centre’s financial situation and calling for the Secretary-General to provide funding from the bienniel regular budget starting in 2010–2011, this year’s text simply expresses its appreciation for the financial contributions to the Centre and continues to appeal for voluntary contributions.

Both of these resolutions were adopted without a vote last year, but the delegations of the United States and United Kingdom did not participate in either vote and “disassociated” from consensus. In their joint explanation, the US and UK delegations argued, “funding for these centers should come from voluntary regional contributions, as it has since they were created.”

The African Group tabled A/C.1/64/L.32, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa,” which contains a number of updates from last year. This year’s preamble adds one paragraph taking note of the Centre’s revitalization “and the progress made in order to widen the scope of its activities relating to peace and disarmament in the implementation of the recommendations made by the Consultative Mechanism for the Reorganization of the Regional Centre established by resolution 60/86 of 8 December 2005” and another welcoming “the timely implementation by the Secretary-General of its resolution 62/216 of 22 December 2007 concerning the future work programme of the Regional Centre, as well as its staffing and funding.” The resolution remains deeply concerns that voluntary funds to Centre have not been made, but it now also welcomes the successful revitalization of the Centre “through the strengthening of its financial and human capacities”. It continues to urge all states and organisations to make voluntary contributions to strengthen the work of the Centre.

The Non-Aligned Movement once again tabled draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.11, “United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament,” which remains unchanged from last year when it was adopted without a vote. The resolution “appeals to member states in each region and those that are able to do so, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives.”

Malta, along with 40 other Euro-Mediterranean states, tabled draft resolution A/C.1/64/L.49, “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”. The representative from Algeria, a co-sponsor of A/C.1/64/L.49, expressed the collective will of the co-sponsors to promote the principles of dialogue, solidarity, and partnership in the region. The only change to this year’s text is that it welcomes the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. Otherwise unchanged, the text calls upon all states of the region to adhere to multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to disarmament and non-proliferation; promote transparency on all military matters; and to cooperate in combating terrorism.

Last year this resolution was adopted without a vote, though the Libyan delegation disassociated itself from consensus, explaining that it did not take part in the Paris summit and complaining that participation was limited to those states bordering on the Mediterranean.

A/C.1/64/L.28, “Regional disarmament,” tabled by Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Turkey, remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote. It affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complimentary and should be pursued simultaneously. It also encourages the promotion of confidence-building measures to ease regional tensions.

A/C.1/64/L.30, “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context,” remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote. Among other things, the resolution reaffirms the UNDC’s recommendations on the issue and emphasizes the need for confidence-building measures to “be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments.”

A/C.1/64/L.29, “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels,” is also unchanged from last year’s resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 175-1-2 in the General Assembly. It requests the Conference on Disarmament (CD) “to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control.” India voted against the resolution because it believes the CD should only negotiate global instruments; that the UN Disarmament Commission has already adopted recommendations for regional disarmament; and “the idea of preservation of a balance in defence capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context is both unrealistic and unacceptable to our delegation.”

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