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Reaching Critical
Will's
Guide to the Conference on Disarmament
2009
2009 Session
Part One: 19 January—27 March
Part Two: 18 May—3 July
Part Three: 3 August—18 September
Introduction
The Conference on Disarmament (CD), based in Geneva, Switzerland,
is mandated to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties.
Past successes of the CD include the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The success
of the CD in negotiating these crucial disarmament treaties
depended largely upon the tireless efforts of NGOs, which
have served an immensely important role in an advisory or
technical capacity and in awareness-building and public education
roles.
However, since negotiations on the CTBT concluded in 1996,
the CD has not been able to resume serious substantial work
and critical issues on its agenda have been left unresolved,
much to the peril of international security. The CD has not
even adopted a programme of work since 1999. This means non-government
organization (NGO) attention to this body is needed more than
ever.
In 2007 and 2008, the six rotating presidents of the CD joined
together to collectively submit a “Presidential Draft
Decision,” or “proposed programme of work,”
for the CD member states to consider. Both proposals, which
were virtually the same in content, where met with overwhelming
approval by the majority of the CD’s 65 members. However,
a few key states, including Pakistan, China, and Iran, have
raised objections to the proposals for a variety of reasons
(see this Guide for details).
The next six presidents of the CD are expected to work together
in 2009 to propose a similar compromise programme of work.
NGOs need follow the diplomatic moves in Geneva, engage their
country representatives, and encourage consensus on a programme
of work. In the absence of a programme of work, civil society
needs to pressure its governments to engage in substantive
discussions on the topics on the CD’s agenda and on
the possible reform of the CD’s operating procedures.
This coming year, 2009, is an active year for disarmament
issues. The final preparatory committee for the 2010 nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will meet
in May 2009 in New York. The UN Disarmament Commission will
begin a new three-year cycle in April 2009. The Australian-Japanese-led
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament will hold a series of meetings leading up to the
2010 Review Conference. NGOs are planning events and conferences
throughout 2009 to engage civil society and foster broader
interest in nuclear disarmament issues.
Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom, created this Guide as an advocacy
and learning tool for everyone. In it, you can find a history
of the CD, learn about the items on its agenda, a summary
of the major issues, an overview of the current political
context, and much more.
If you or your organization would like to learn more about
the CD, the issues, or what you can do to engage your representatives,
please contact Reaching Critical Will at info@reachingcriticalwill.org.
In peace,
Ray Acheson, Project Director
Reaching Critical Will
January 2009
General information
about the CD
WHAT: The CD is the world’s sole multilateral
disarmament treaty negotiating body. Decisions are made by
consensus. While the CD is independent of the United Nations,
its secretary is appointed by the UN Secretary-General, it
is required to consider recommendations from the General Assembly,
and it submits reports at least annually to the General Assembly.
WHEN: The CD has three sessions each year. The first
begins in the penultimate week of January and lasts for 10
weeks. The second begins in May and lasts 7 weeks, and the
third in July lasts for 7 weeks.
ACCESS: The CD holds at least one public plenary per
week that it is in session. In 2004, the CD took its first
decision on NGO access, officially formalizing access to open
debates. In addition, the 2004 decision permits NGOs to submit
documents as official documents of the Conference, and allows
NGOs to present their documents (at their own expense) twice
annually in front of the CD chamber.
PRESIDENTS: Each year, the CD has six Presidents (the
P6). For 2009, the P6 will be Viet Nam, Zimbabwe, Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, and Austria. In 2006, the P6 began coordinating
their presidencies to serve the CD more efficiently. This
initiative has led to smoother transitions between monthly
presidential rotations, avoiding duplicitous work, and could
be credited for the steps towards a programme of work that
took place in 2007 and 2008.
NEGOTIATIONS: When the CD is ready to begin negotiating
a treaty, an ad hoc committee with a mandate is established,
and continues meeting until the text is finalized. The meetings
of ad hoc committees are held in private. The whole conference
must agree by consensus to the mandates given to ad hoc committees.
RECENT PAST EFFORTS: In 1994, four ad hoc committees
met: Nuclear Test Ban, Outer Space, Negative Security Assurances,
and Transparency in Armaments. In 1995 and 1996, only one
ad hoc committee met: Nuclear Test Ban. In 1996, the CD completed
the negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In
1998, the CD agreed to a fissile material cut-off negotiating
mandate, but has been unable to establish an ad hoc committee
needed to carry forward negotiations.
DANGER: No programme of work has been adopted since
1999, putting at risk the future of the CD.
CD Groups
There are a number of groupings among countries within the
CD. Some of these work in cooperation with each other on specific
issues rather than unilaterally. They usually meet at least
once a week when the CD is in session, in a closed, informal
meeting.
Western Group (25)
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States
Group of 21 (33)
Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil,Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba,
DPR Korea, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe
Eastern European Group (6)
Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russian Federation,
Ukraine
Group of One
China often refers to itself as the Group of One
Non-Member Participant States
Every year there are general observers to the CD. They have
the right to attend meetings of the CD ad hoc committees,
and can speak, circulate papers and make contributions, but
cannot deny consensus on any issues. They have to renew their
status as non-member participant states each year, whereas
CD members maintain their status permanently.
CD Agenda
The CD has a permanent agenda, known as the Decalogue, which
addresses the following issues:
- Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- Chemical weapons (removed after the CD completed the
Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992);
- Other weapons of mass destruction;
- Conventional weapons;
- Reduction of military budgets;
- Reduction of armed forces;
- Disarmament and development;
- Disarmament and international security;
- Collateral measures; confidence building measures; effective
verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament
measures, acceptable to all parties; and
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general
and complete disarmament under effective international control.
The Decalogue includes practically all multilateral arms
control and disarmament problems, so a narrower agenda is
adopted each year. Currently, the CD primarily focuses its
attention on the following issues:
- Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- Prevention of nuclear war; including all related matters;
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- Effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons (negative security assurances);
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems
of such weapons, including radiological weapons;
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament; and
- Transparency in armaments.
In recent sessions, some member states have raised the idea
of discussing “new issues” at the CD, including
terrorism, missiles, and man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS), following the rules of procedure (para 41) which
allows for any issue to be brought up at any time.
Brief Chronology
1960. What is now the CD was first known as the Ten
Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNCD), and was formed in
March 1960 in Geneva. The TNCD was made up of five Eastern
Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania,
and the Soviet Union) and five Western Bloc countries (Canada,
France, Italy, the UK, and the US), jointly chaired by the
US and the USSR. During this time, it tried, unsuccessfully,
to attain consensus on the many complex issues facing both
sides on their way to general disarmament. The TNDC’s
failure to reach agreement can be understood in the context
of the strained relations between East and West at the time.
1960-1968. The institution became known as the Eighteen
Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC), jointly chaired by the
US and USSR. The ENDC first convened in March 1961 following
a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1961, making the
addition of eight “non-aligned” states. Parties
of the ENDC were: Burma, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania,
Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States,
and the Soviet Union.
1963. An accomplishment of the ENDC was the negotiation
of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned all nuclear-weapon
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
The US, USSR, and UK are signatories (and also depositories).
It was negotiated in six weeks.
1969-1978. The institution became the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), expanding to 30 members.
1970. The CCD concluded negotiations on the nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which seeks to halt the spread
of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess
them, and prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful
purposes. The NPT became international law in 1970. At that
time there were five nuclear weapon states: US, UK, USSR,
France, and China. Since then, India, Israel, North Korea,
and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons and remain the
only countries outside the Treaty (North Korea ratified the
NPT but later withdrew).
1972. The CCD negotiated the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC), banning the development, production, and
stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. The BTWC
entered into force in 1975 and, as of 2007, has 159 States
Parties and 15 signatories. It builds on the protocols of
the Geneva conventions that first banned the use of gas in
war. It is the first treaty to ban an entire category of mass
destruction weapons. However, the BWC has no verification
provisions. A verification protocol has been under negotiation
since 1995. Hopes of progress during the CD’s 24th session
(13 July 23 - 17 August 2001) were effectively dashed on the
third day with the rejection of the current draft Protocol—the
Chair’s composite text—as were further efforts
to negotiate such an agreement. Current discussions on a BTWC
verification mechanism take place in the framework of annual
meetings of states parties to the BTWC.
1977. The CCD negotiated the Environmental Modification
Convention, banning all significant hostile use of environmental
modification techniques. This Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques entered into force in 1977 and attempts to inhibit
the development of new types of warfare.
1979. The Committee on Disarmament was established
as a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of
the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978.
1982-1989. The General Assembly’s second special
session on disarmament was held in 1982, which prompted the
CD to continue negotiating a draft comprehensive programme
of disarmament. At the end of the CD’s session in 1989,
however, it suspended work on the programme “until the
circumstances were more propitious for progress.”
1983. The re-named Conference on Disarmament (CD) grew
to 38 members.
1992. The CD negotiated the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). The CWC was opened for signature in 1993, and entered
into force in April 1997. It has 182 States Parties, including
the US, Russia, and China. It bans the “development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons”
(earlier agreements only banned the use). The treaty contains
an extensive list of banned chemicals and precursors and provides
for an elaborate and intrusive verification regime as well
as a secretariat, the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
1994. Four ad hoc committees met on Nuclear Test Ban,
Outer Space, Negative Security Assurances, and Transparency
in Armaments.
1995 and 1996. Only one ad hoc committee met, on the
Nuclear Test Ban. In 1996, the CD expanded its membership
to 61.
1996. The CD negotiated the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), banning nuclear weapons test explosions or
any other nuclear explosions. The final negotiations were
difficult, and divisive issues remained until the end. Nevertheless,
the CTBT was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly
in Resolution A/RES/50/245 on 10 September 1996 and opened
for signature on 24 September. The CTBT has been signed by
177 countries and ratified by 141. It requires ten more ratifications,
from the states listed in Annex II of
the Treaty, to enter into force.
1998. The CD appointed ad hoc committees on negative
security assurances and a fissile material cut-off treaty,
and it appointed special coordinators to deal with issues
related to prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS),
a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and transparency
in armaments. In addition, it appointed three reform coordinators
to review the agenda, consider membership expansion, and improve
the CD’s functions. The Conference considered adopting
five new members—Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia,
and Tunisia—but failed to reach consensus. Work on the
other reform areas did not make
much progress.
1999. The CD approved the 1998 proposal for expansion,
and membership of the CD expanded to its current level of
65 countries. However, the Conference failed to agree on a
programme of work, and the ad hoc committees on fissile materials
and negative security assurances were not reconvened.
1999-2002. The US opposed any negotiating mandate
on PAROS or nuclear disarmament, while China opposed negotiating
a fissile material treaty without negotiations on PAROS. The
CD appointed three special coordinators to examine its agenda,
improve its functioning, and consider membership. Failing
to find consensus on these issues, the three coordinators
recommended that the CD reappoint special coordinators for
these issues in 2002.
2002. The Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Columbia,
and Sweden, in what became known as the A5 proposal, proposed
the establishment of four ad hoc committees—two to negotiate
a fissile material treaty and negative security assurances
and two to discuss PAROS and nuclear disarmament—and
for special coordinators to seek the views of states on new
types of weapons of mass destruction, a comprehensive programme
of disarmament, and transparency in armaments. Despite enjoying
widespread support, this proposal ultimately did not succeed
in breaking the impasse, yet is still frequently referenced
in discussions on a programme of work.
2003. Although the A5 proposal was updated and received
more support, including from China, the CD closed without
agreeing on a programme of work.
2004. The CD engaged in informal plenaries to assist
its work, however it was ultimately unable to reach agreement
on a programme of work. It did, however, reach consensus on
formalizing and enhancing NGO access and participation in
the CD.
2005. The President of the CD in March circulated a
“food for thought” non-paper, based on the A5
proposal, establishing ad hoc committees for each of the CD’s
four priority issues and providing for negotiations on a fissile
materials treaty. The final session’s President circulated
a similar paper. Neither proposal gained consensus.
2006. The six Presidents of the CD for the year, Poland,
Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal
and Slovakia, decided to cooperate closely in order to assure
continuity by consecutive Presidents and named themselves
the “P6”. They appointed a group of states to
act as “Friends of Presidents” to assist the P6
throughout the year in informal consultations on gaining consensus
on a programme of work and on improving the CD’s methods
of work. The Presidents encouraged the submission of working
papers, proposals, and ideas from delegations and NGOs in
a thematic timetable for the year. In May, the US tabled a
draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and draft mandate
for its negotiation, which, in its refusal to specifically
note issues of verification and compliance (the US delegation
frequently argues “the so-called effective verification
of an FMCT cannot be achieved”) was unsatisfactory to
the rest of the CD. While the CD saw the most substantive
discussions and submissions of working papers in years, it
was still unable to agree on a programme of work or to begin
negotiations on a fissile materials treaty.
2007. The next six Presidents continued to work closely
together and engaged in intensive consultations with member
states between and during CD sessions. The CD came very close
to adopting a programme of work, contained in documents L.1
and CRP.5 and CRP.6, which called for negotiations on a fissile
materials and substantive discussions on the other three priority
issues. Only three states—China, Iran, and Pakistan—visibly
withheld their support for the comprehensive package tabled
by the Presidents, though it is believed China and Iran would
not continue to object if Pakistan agreed to the programme.
2008. The P6 submitted a Presidential Draft Decision
essentially compiling and refining the contents of L.1, CRP.5,
and CRP.6. The majority of member states gave their support
to the new proposed programme of work, CD/1840, indicating
their readiness to adopt it. However, a few key states, including
Pakistan, China, and Iran, continued to raise objections for
a variety of reasons (see the Summary of Critical Issues for
details).
Summary of Critical
Issues
CD/1840 - Presidential Draft Decision
In 2008, the six Presidents of the CD tabled a draft decision
(CD/1840) outlining a comprehensive programme of work, which
was developed based on consultations with member states. The
draft decision “decides, without prejudice to future
work and negotiations on its agenda items,” to appoint
four Ambassadors as coordinators to preside over:
• substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament
and the prevention of nuclear war;
• negotiations, without any preconditions, on a non-discriminatory
and multilateral treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices;
• substantive discussions dealing with issues related
to Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; and
• substantive discussions dealing with appropriate
international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon
states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
(negative security assurances).
While the majority of CD member states have expressed their
support for this document, many have also noted its many imperfections.
Some delegations would like to see negotiations start simultaneously
on all four core issues, while others think this would be
impossible. Most delegations would like the mandate for negotiations
on a fissile materials treaty to include specific references
to existing stocks and verifiability (see Fissile Materials
for more information).
The content of CD/1840 is virtually identical to the proposed
programme of work from 2007 contained in documents L.1, CRP.5,
and CRP.6. It builds on the Five Ambassadors’ Initiative
(A5) from 2002, which called for the establishment of four
ad hoc committments on the four core issues contained in CD/1840.
Resources and links for more information
CD/1840
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/1session/CD1840.pdf
Statements on CD/1840 in the 2008 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html#p6
Fissile Materials
Fissile materials are the ingredients used to make nuclear
weapons: highly enriched uranium and plutonium. For more information
on fissile materials, please see www.fissilematerials.org.
In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus
a resolution recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory,
multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Early on, the issue of existing stocks blocked consensus on
the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
in the CD. Some states, such as those belonging to the Non-Aligned
Movement, believe that a cut-off level should include fissile
materials already produced and stockpiled. Others, such as
the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, favour a future-production
cut-off. Some states also think an FMCT should include management
of existing fissile material, not only a ban on production.
On 25 January 1994, the CD appointed a Special Coordinator,
Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to seek the views of
member states on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate
the type of FMCT requested by the UN General Assembly. In
March 1995, the resulting “Shannon Mandate” proposed
that an ad hoc committee, charged to pursue the negotiations,
would settle the issue of existing stocks and other issues.
All of the states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) endorsed the immediate commencement
and early conclusion of FMCT negotiations at the 1995 and
2000 NPT Review Conferences. The negotiation of an FMCT was
agreed as one of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference (for more information, see
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nptindex1.html).
For several years, China and Russia insisted that starting
work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (see
below) be linked to starting work on an FMCT. In August 2003,
China and Russia broke from this position, agreeing to go
forth with FMCT negotiations based on the Shannon Mandate.
The United States did not announce its position on an FMCT
until July 2004, when Ambassador Sanders declared that while
the US supported negotiations on an FMCT, it did not believe
that such a treaty would be verifiable. This position is contrary
to the 16 UN Disarmament Commission principles of verification
published in 1988, as well as a US National Academy of study
in 2005, which indicated that a verifiable FMCT would be expensive,
but achievable. This change in US policy appears more politically
driven than scientifically sound.
Many delegations have argued that specific references to matters
such as verification and existing stocks in the negotiation
mandate is crucial, worried that if negotiations begin “without
any preconditions,” as described in CD/1840, these issues
are sure to be rejected during negotiations by key players
such as the United States. Pakistan in particular has argued
this, pointing out that if an FMCT does not include existing
stocks or verification, it will freeze or accentuate asymmetries
between the nuclear weapons possessors—especially between
Pakistan and India—and thus undermine regional “strategic
balance” and international security. The US-India deal,
which allows India to import nuclear fuel from the US and
other Nuclear Suppliers Group states for its energy reactors,
freeing up its own indigenously-produced materials for military
purposes, further exacerbates Pakistan’s concerns about
an FMCT.
Refuting the oft-heard argument that insisting on the inclusion
of verification in the negotiating mandate acts as a precondition
to negotiations, Egypt has argued that the veto on its inclusion
is the real precondition—and an incomprehensible one,
given how important verification is to states in all other
situations.
Resources and links for more information
Statements in the 2008 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html#fmct
Working Papers in the CD
Canada, 2007: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers07/canada
working paper FMCT.pdf
2006 Working Papers: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers06/index.html
Shannon Mandate
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html
Perspectives in the 2008 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM08/final.html#fissile
NGO Resources
Institute for Science and International Security: http://www.isis-online.org/
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against
Proliferation: http://www.inesap.org/
International Panel on Fissile Materials: http://www.fissilematerials.org/
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/fissmat.html
Outer Space
An ad hoc committee began work in 1985 to examine outer space
arms control issues, including the current legal framework.
The main space security issue, prevention of an arms race
in outer space (PAROS), has been blocked in the CD, primarily
because the US delegation believes “there is no arms
race in outer space” and that it would be a waste of
time to concentrate efforts on preventing one, and that existing
legal regimes for outer space activities (ie. the Outer Space
Treaty) are adequate to handle any space security issues.
The PAROS ad hoc committee has not met since 1994.
China and Russia have traditionally maintained that the early
establishment of an ad hoc committee is necessary to start
substantive work on PAROS, with a view to concluding a more
effective international treaty on this issue at an early date.
They have submitted numerous papers on relevant issues, including
verification aspects and existing international legal instruments.
In 2007, they revised and submitted their PAROS working paper
CD/1679 for the third time. During 2007 and 2008, substantive
discussions were held on the PAROS in the CD, which resulted
in calls for a treaty to prevent the placement of weapons
in outer space (PPW) rather than a treaty on PAROS, in order
to escape the “linguistic and philosophical debate”
associated with the term PAROS. The discussions also produced
interest in developing “best practices” or “rules
of the road” for safe and responsible space operations,
and transparency and confidence-building measures that could
complement future international legal instruments regarding
space security.
On 12 February 2008, Russia and China introduced a draft PPW
treaty to the CD. Introducing the text, Russia’s Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov explained the draft treaty is designed
“to eliminate existing lacunas in international space
law, create conditions for further exploration and use of
space, preserve costly space property, and strengthen general
security and arms control.” The draft treaty specificies
that states parties would undertake not to place in orbit
“any objects carrying any kind of weapons,” not
to install them on
celestial bodies or other space structures, not to use or
threaten to use force against outer space objects, and not
to encourage any other parties to do so.
Outside of the CD, several developments both fostering and
undermining space security have occurred. In January 2007,
China tested an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own
ageing weather satellites. The United States, while condemning
the test, forged ahead with several space and missile defence
projects with dual-use capabilities and tested its own anti-satellite
weapon in February 2008. The United States has also signed
preliminary agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland
to build missile defence bases in their
countries as “defence” against Iran. Russia has
condemned these plans, correctly pointing out that Iran does
not possess nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and arguing that US missile defence in Europe is
aimed at “containing” Russia.
A few positive steps have happened outside of the CD. In 2007,
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the
General Assembly adopted debris mitigation guidelines and
several states submitted proposals on space security to the
Secretary-General pursuant to GA resolution 61/75. Substantive
discussions on PAROS were included in the CD’s proposed
programme of work in 2007 and 2008. Since 2004, the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has held seminars
in the CD chamber on space security issues. These conferences
have generated food for thought, and promoted informal, confidence-building
dialogues.
The European Union is currently drafting a voluntary code
of conduct for outer space activities, expected to be released
in early 2009. In April 2008, the Global Network Against Weapons
and Nuclear Power in Space and the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom co-founded the “PAROS Working
Group” to raise awareness at a grassroots level of space
security issues and relevant UN processes.
Resources and links for more information
Statements in the 2008 CD Session
http:///www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html#paros
China-Russia draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons
in outer space
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html#space
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org
/legal/paros/wgroup/PAROS-PPWT-factsheet.pdf
Perspectives in the 2008 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM08/final.html#space
NGO Resources
Global Network against Nuclear Weapons and Power in Space:
http://www.space4peace.org/
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html
PAROS Working Group: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/wgroup.html
Space Security Index: http://www.spacesecurity.org/
Western States Legal Foundation: http://www.wslfweb.org/
Nuclear Disarmament
Many members of the CD have openly expressed their wish that
the CD undertake multilateral negotiations in this area. The
states made calls at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to establish
a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament.
Article VI of the NPT requires the five recgonized nuclear
weapon states to “pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to ... nuclear disarmament,”
and in 1996, the International Court of Justice found that
the nuclear weapon states have an obligation to negotiate
and complete a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. A Model
Nuclear Weapon Convention, developed by nuclear disarmament
experts and analysts, has been submitted to the NPT and the
General Assembly by member states, and has also been submitted
by NGOs as an official document of the CD. In 1995, the General
Assembly adopted resolution 50/70P, which called on the CD
to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a phased programme
of nuclear disarmament and eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons within a timebound
framework. NATO and European states opposed this resolution;
Russia abstained.
Unfortunately, the CD has never established a subsidiary body
to deal with nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapon states claim
reductions in nuclear arms should be carried out directly
by the states that possess them, in view of the many complexities
involved. In contrast, many non-nuclear weapon states argue,
as Egypt did in 2007, that the “emphasis on arms control
and the bilateral efforts ... cannot be regarded as alternative
to the implementation of the commitment contained in Article
VI … We would like to reiterate the centrality of the
13 practical steps [outlined in 2000 Review Conference of
the NPT to implement Article VI] which in our view, represent
an internationally endorsed roadmap to fulfill the obligation
of nuclear disarmament.”
Nuclear disarmament was included as a topic for substantive
discussion in the 2008 proposed programme of work.
Resources and links for more information
Statements in the 2008 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html#nd
Perspectives in the 2008 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM08/final.html#disarmament
NGO Resources
Abolition 2000: http://
www.abolition2000.org/
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy: http://www.acronym.org.uk/
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy: http://www.lcnp.org/
Middle Powers Initiative: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/index.html
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/
Western States Legal Foundation: http://www.wslfweb.org/
Negative Security Assurances
Negative security assurances (NSAs) constitute promises from
nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states that they
will not use nuclear weapons against them. Currently, the
only assurances that exist are not legally-binding, such as
unilateral declarations contained within nuclear weapon free
zone treaty protocols and in Security Council Resolution 984
(1995).
The Non-Aligned members of the CD (the G-21) increased their
demands for a legally-binding instrument after the completion
of the CTBT negotiations and the extension of the NPT in 1995.
Most non-nuclear weapon states continue to demand legally-binding
assurances, although the context remains a debate. Some states
argue legally-binding assurances should be negotiated at the
CD; others, such as those in the New Agenda Coalition, argue
that NSAs should only be given to and by states parties to
the NPT. In 2007, New Zealand argued there are many complications
in negotiating legally-binding NSAs in the CD, such as “the
potential conferring of the status of Nuclear Weapons States
on all of the States that possess nuclear weapons” if
they are bound to give legally-binding assurances under a
treaty.
The NSA ad hoc committee, while re-established in 1998, has
not yet met. Substantive discussions on NSAs were included
in the 2008 proposed programme of work.
Resources and links for more information
Statements in the 2008 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html#nsa
Perspectives in the 2008 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM08/final.html#nsa
NGO Resources
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/issues.html#NSA
Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC):
http://www.vertic.org/
Radiological Weapons
The CD also has on its agenda the negotiation of a ban on
radiological weapons, a new type of weapon of mass destruction
that could disperse radioactive materials without a nuclear
explosion. Such weapons could include waste material from
non-military nuclear applications such as spent reactor fuel.
In 1979, the United States and Soviet Union jointly submitted
to the CD major elements of a treaty banning the development,
production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons.
Conclusion of a multilateral treaty within the CD has been
held up because no such weapons presently exist and because
of questions about verifiability. Some states also insist
that, under this agenda item, discussions be held on a treaty
to ban attacks against nuclear facilities.
Radiological weapons are currently not being discussed in
the CD. While there is no treaty banning radiologial weapons,
a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which entered
into force in 2001, includes provisions for the management,
storage, and transportation of radioactive waste from civilian
and military reactors. In addition, the General Assembly adopted
a RW resolution for the first time at its 60th session in
2005, on “Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism.”
In 2007, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/62/46 on
“Preventing the acquisition by terrorists
of radioactive materials and sources.”
Resources and links for more information
NGO Resources
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War:
http://www.ippnw.org/
Physicians for Social Responsibility: http://www.psr.org/
Nuclear Policy Research Institute: http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/
Transparency in Armaments
In 1991, the General Assembly adopted resolution 46/36-L,
entitled “Transparency in Armaments,” which promoted
openness and transparency in the field of military matters.
One consequence of the resolution was the establishment of
the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The resolution also
requested the CD take up the issue of transparency in armaments
(TIA), and specifically asked the CD to address interrelated
issues arising from the excessive and destabilizing accumulation
of arms. No time frame was attached to the CD’s work.
The CD added TIA to its agenda in 1992, the first new agenda
item in over ten years. TIA was also the CD’s first
agenda item related to conventional arms control. Since the
topic was new to the CD, member states decided to conduct
a year of informal meetings as a way of introducing the CD
to the subject. In 1993, the CD established the TIA ad hoc
committee, which began working to develop practical means
for increasing openness and transparency in military matters.
In 1994, the CD made little progress on this issue, and in
1995,
the ad hoc committee was unable to reconvene. An experts group
met in 1997 and there was agreement to promote transparency
but not to expand the reporting requirements. The ad hoc committee
has not been reestablished in the years since then.
There is often a resolution on TIA tabled in and adopted by
the General Assembly, from which a small group of Non-Aligned
states regularly abstain because the UN Register does not
include weapons of mass destruction. The Register also does
not require a comprehensive accounting of armament or military
spending overall—which would be a potentially positive
first step in meeting the Security Council’s obligations
under Article 26 of the UN Charter.
Resources and links for more information
UN Transparency in Armaments
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/untia/index.html
UN Register on Conventional Arms
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html
NGO Resources
Arms Trade Resource Center: http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/index.html
RCW’s Model Nuclear Inventory: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/pubs/Inventory07.html
NGO Participation
Civil society can help activate the CD by staying informed,
spreading the word, and engaging with their representatives
in the government.
Write to your Minister of Foreign Affairs or the CD—send
letters and position papers, urging the CD to work toward
disarmament. Also send a copy of yoru letter to your Ambassador
in New York and Geneva. For a full listing, see the Governmental
Contact Database: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/govcontacts/govindex.html
Make an appointment to speak with a representative at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or equivalent in your country;
encourage the Foreign Minister to attend the Conference to
publicly urge CD members to agree on a programme of work so
that productive negotiations can begin.
Attend the CD meetings in Geneva, meet with your representatives
personally to explain the critical issues, draw attention
to the problems, and encourage your representative to pressure
their colleagues to achieve a successful outcome.
Monitor the CD sessions through the Reaching Critical Will
website, and react to what your government does or does
not say. Subscribe to RCW’s free weekly email reports
on the CD by emailing info[at]reachingcriticalwill.org
with “subscribe cdreport” in the subject line.
Write letters to the editor or start your own media
to publicize your view and your government’s policies
in the CD; encourage your fellow citizens to engage with the
issues, too.
Moving Forward
Short of resolving the major political, military, and geostrategic
conflicts through the establishment of a new world order founded
on a culture of peace and justice, reform of the CD’s
working methods could provide an opportunity to overcome the
ten year deadlock and move forward on pressing issues of disarmament
and international security. Civil society should pressure
their governments to seriously discuss and creatively resolve
the challenges posed by the CD’s rules of procedures
and its traditions.
During both the CD and First Committee in 2008, many delegations
called for reform of the CD’s working methods in order
to overcome the deadlock. Pointing to the rule of consensus
as the main procedural sticking point, the representatives
from New Zealand, Canada, and Chile in particular have called
for reconsideration of this rule. New Zealand has argued that
the CD has a number of safeguards built into it at every level
of work: consensus is needed to adopt a programme of work,
to agree on a particular outcome of that work,
to adopt any instrument the CD negotiates, and finally, all
states then have the sovereign right to decide whether or
not they are going to become party to the instrument.
New Zealand and Canada have suggested the rule of consensus
should not be applied to procedural issues such as adopting
a programme of work. Although not specifically referring to
the stalemate in the CD, the Canadian ambassador has cited
the adoption of the final document of the UN Programme of
Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons biennial meeting in
2008 by vote rather than consensus as “a precedent which
the UN might wish to invoke more generally in order to advance
near-universally agreed objectives.”
Unfortunately, not everyone agrees that consensus is the problem
nor that it should be put aside when trying to adopt a programme
of work. Venezuela’s ambassador to the CD has argued
that the rule of consensus is a “useful tool for enabling
debate and debate is the path toward truth.” He argued
that the problem is abuse of the rule to prevent debate from
taking place. Pakistan has also argued that the abuse of consensus
occurs when there are attempts by some to “shift goalposts,”
referring to the United States’ rejection of the Shannon
Mandate on an FMCT. Pakistan and Egypt’s ambassadors
have also resisted the idea of limiting the rule of consensus
to “substantive” issues, arguing that the programme
of work is a substantive issue and that the rule of consensus
conforms with the principle of equal security.
Unfortunately, because there is no agreement on this issue,
changing the use of consensus in the CD would be a difficult
task. Rule 18 of the CD’s rules of procedures explicitly
states, “The Conference shall conduct its work and adopt
its decisions by consensus.” Rule 47 states any amendment
to the rules of procedure can be made by decision of the Conference—which
would also have to be exercised by consensus, in conformity
with rule 18.
However, delegates to the CD need to seriously consider this
option as a creative way out of the deadlock. At the very
least, removing this procedural barrier to adopting a programme
of work would help expose more of the political posturing
and real positions of some governments whose actions do not
reflect their words. Other reforms to the CD’s methods
of work could be considered along the way. In his farewell
speech to the CD in 2008, the ambassador of Chile argued that
the time has come for reconsidering a variety of issues in
order to help overcome the impasse in the CD, including the
composition of the CD’s agenda; the method for adopting
decisions; the group systems; the informal mechanisms; requests
for expansion of the membership; and appropriate participation
of civil society.
Now is the time for CD reform. Many governments have noted
that the success of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and
the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines indicate
the CD is no longer functioning as the “sole multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum of the international community”.
Norway has spoken very strongly against this assumption, pointing
out, “The CD with its 65 member states is far from universal,
and a credible and relevant multilateral negotiating body
should be open to any country.... if the
CD remains paralysed, there will be stronger calls for considering
optional avenues in order to move the disarmament agenda forward.”
Reaching Critical
Will Resources on the Conference on Disarmament
RCW monitors and collects all statements delivered to the
CD and posts them on our website at
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches09/index.html
We offer a free, weekly reporting service for all those interested
in the CD. These reports are available through an email subscription
service, and are posted on our website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches09/reports.html
You can find all press releases from the United Nations at
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/press09/pressindex.html
We also offer a very useful Summary of Statements By Topic
each year, available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches09/topics.html
This booklet, the Reaching Critical Will Guide to the CD,
can be found online in PDF at
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdbook2009.pdf
Other background information on the Conference can be found
at
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/basicinfo/basicinfoindex.html
Governmental Contact Information for Permanent Missions in
Geneva is at
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/govcontacts/govindex.html
All CD Resources can be found at
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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