Conference on Disarmament Discusses Question of a
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
28 June 2005

The Conference on Disarmament today held a meeting to discuss a possible future treaty prohibiting fissile materials, as part of a series of meetings being held in response to the invitation last week by the President of the Conference, Ambassador Wegger Strommen of Norway, to hold four public plenaries to discuss the four main issues identified in the "food for thought" paper submitted at the beginning of the session by Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands.

Twenty government representatives spelled out their countries' positions on negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, otherwise known as the FMCT, inspired by United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75L of December 1993 which called for the "prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

While most of the delegations stressed the importance for negotiations on an FMCT to commence as soon as possible under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament, others outlined the need to reach a consensus on a universally applicable treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material without pre-conditions. A number of representatives also called upon States to declare an immediate moratorium on the production of such material. One of the major points discussed was about existing stockpiles of fissile materials and whether the future treaty should put a cap on these stocks or if it should only halt all future productions of fissile materials.

Representatives of Pakistan, France, South Africa, China, Peru (on behalf of the Latin American countries), Germany, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Egypt, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Republic of Korea, the United States and Malaysia addressed the Conference.

The next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 30 June, when the members will discuss the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Statements

MASSOUD KHAN (Pakistan) said the Conference on Disarmament was passing through a prolonged impasse, which showed no signs of going away due to a lack of political will; contributing to this impasse was the lack of agreement on the drafting of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Among other things, there were differences on the scope of the treaty concerning the definition of fissile materials, whether or not to include existing stocks in the treaty, and the issue of verification. The search for a treaty to ban fissile material had a long history. In 1998, Pakistan had agreed to commence the negotiations on an FMCT and its position remained unchanged. Moreover, Pakistan supported the Shannon mandate and associated itself with the stance of the Group of 21 for the verifiable monitoring of all fissile material.

Pakistan was of the view that the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of an FMCT, he said. Such a treaty must address the issue of fissile material production in its entirety at both regional and national levels and must deal with the past production of fissile material as well. Moreover, the treaty should be referred to as a Fissile Material Treaty, thus omitting the word “cut-off”. Pakistan would not accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material until the conclusion of such a treaty.

JEAN-MICHEL DESPAX (France) said that at the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in New York, the European Union had adopted a common position with concern to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), calling for a universally applicable treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material without pre-conditions and also calling upon all States to declare a moratorium on the production of such material. France and its partners aimed to bring this position to life in the Conference on Disarmament. France had undertaken to work for the negotiation of a treaty within the Conference on Disarmament and called upon those States sharing its view to show a sense of responsibility to commence negotiations in that regard.

France decided in February 1996 to close and dismantle its facilities which produced such fissile material; the only nuclear power to take such a step, he stated. Moreover, in 2004, France re-examined the question of the cut-off treaty, which remained one of the two particularly important elements of nuclear disarmament; the other being the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). France also considered that the initiative presented in the "food for thought" paper put forth by Chris Sanders was promising.

GLAUDINE MTSHALI (South Africa) said the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) was ripe for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament although the proper political backing and leadership was needed during the negotiation process. The belief of South Africa was that a fissile material ban treaty would lead the international community closer to a world free of nuclear weapons. The pronouncements made in the Conference on Disarmament on the FMCT re-assured South Africa that the work done so far had not been in vain. South Africa had lent its full support to activities in the Conference in pursuit of such a treaty.

The hope of South Africa had proved short lived when it was informed that that the United States had concluded in July 2004 a review whose major finding was that an effective verification of a fissile ban treaty was not achievable. South Africa viewed this unilateral conclusion as a major setback and stumbling block in resuming negotiations on a fissile material treaty. Lack of progress towards negotiation of a non-discriminatory multinational, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty was a cause for great concern to South Africa. South Africa believed that a fissile material treaty should cover existing stocks of fissile material, as well as future production. Fundamental differences must be overcome. It was recalled that South Africa had drafted a working paper on the destruction of its limited apartheid nuclear weapons programme and its complete investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency in May 2002, which was circulated to the Conference members at that time.
HU XIAODI (China) said in recent years there had been much discussion in the international community on the creation of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which was among the two major tasks in the nuclear disarmament process – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the FMCT - and that the FMCT aimed to cap their quantitative developments. China also supported the endeavour to accomplish these two tasks of nuclear disarmament and supported the negotiation of an FMCT as part of the comprehensive programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should engage in substantive work on major issues of international security and stability. The relevance of nuclear disarmament, including an FMCT, had become more pronounced. It was recalled that each year the United Nations General Assembly required that the Conference on Disarmament work on these issues.

The Shannon report adopted in 1995 contained the mandate as negotiating "a non-discriminatory" FMCT; whether this mandate was still applicable today was one of the pressing and most debated issues in the area of disarmament today, he added. China joined the consensus on the resolution on FMCT adopted at the 48th session of the General Assembly and agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should hold negotiations on the basis of the Shannon report. China also held that the FMCT should not incorporate the issue of existing stockpiles. Moreover, the role of verification called for serious reflection by all and for all States to respect the positions of other States. China supported the Conference on Disarmament's efforts to agree on a programme of work, which consisted of substantive work on all nuclear issues so as to revitalize the Conference in order for it to engage in this relevant work.

ELIZABETH ASTETE RODRÍGUEZ (Peru), speaking on behalf of the Latin American countries, said the countries she was representing had renewed their commitment to the mandate granted to the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum – the Conference on Disarmament. The declaration of the nuclear free zone in Latin America represented an important contribution to disarmament in the region. The Latin American States also supported the "food for thought" paper by Ambassador Sanders. In order to reach an agreement on a programme of work, the States accepted and supported the Five Ambassadors proposal. They further accepted the possibility of modifying the Shannon mandate in order to reach the necessary consensus needed to overcome the deadlock in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

VOLKER HEINSBERG (Germany) said ever since the landmark decision by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1993 endorsing the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the mandate for negotiations on an FMCT had been renewed on numerous occasions. However, Germany regretted the fact that the negotiation of such a treaty had never really started in the Conference on Disarmament and believed that such negotiations should start without any pre-conditions. An FMCT would limit and put under an inspection regime the number of nuclear material processing facilities and thus reduce the probability of non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus a cut-off would be a vital element for an effective multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation mechanism that would fill the gap in the existing system. Germany continued to believe that the special coordinators report and the mandate contained therein provided the most concrete basis for a start of negotiations.

While focusing on two of the most contradictory discussions within the scope of the FMCT, he noted that positions diverged with regard to the inclusion of existing stocks of nuclear material. No matter whether stocks were to be included from the beginning or not, it was obvious that the aim of the negotiations should be to effectively prevent an increase in stocks of nuclear materials for military purposes. The second question of verification was closely interlinked with the scope of the treaty. Effective verification was an essential element of any multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaty providing the basis for the building of confidence between Member States, that compliance with the treaties provisions was ensured.

In closing, he said that in line with the common position of the European Union, adopted for the Seventh NPT Review Conference, Germany appealed again to the Conference on Disarmament "for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable FMCT, without preconditions and bearing in mind the special coordinators report and the mandate included therein".

PAUL MEYER (Canada) said the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) within the Conference on Disarmament remained a high Canadian priority for the Conference, and Canada was increasingly impatient for these negotiations to begin. An FMCT would make a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in the face of current concerns, by reducing the supply of fissile material that could be vulnerable to acquisition by terrorists. These were all widely shared goals of the international community. Canada hoped that these negotiation could finally begin soon in the Conference on Disarmament.

Recalling the statement made by the Foreign Minster of Canada in March this year, he noted that the Minister had been convinced that the Shannon mandate remained the best basis for initiating negotiations. The Minister challenged the Conference on Disarmament, stating that Canada would be prepared to put out preferences aside in order to commence a genuine negotiation and asked others to demonstrate a similar flexibility so that work could begin. It was also recalled that the Canadian delegation made a suggestion last May on how to begin consideration of the complex and often highly technical issues regarding the FMCT, even prior to the start of negotiations. This was to establish an FMCT Experts Group, which would provide a valuable forum in which to initiate consideration of a number of key issues for an FMCT, such as scope and verification.

TIM CAUGHLEY (New Zealand) said New Zealand attached high importance to beginning negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and it had done so for many years. He was mentioning the time element for two reasons. First, when the Shannon mandate was so painstakingly and cleverly developed and accepted by the Conference in 1995, it had explicitly envisaged that such a treaty would have a verification mechanism, a matter of fundamental importance. Second, in the ten years that had lapsed since then, there was no doubt that the stocks of fissile materials of some of the States that possessed them had grown, perhaps significantly. Given this passage of time, he questioned if States could afford to entertain the possibility that the mandate covering negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty could exclude existing stocks as well as being devoid of specificity on verification. He also noted that the search for consensus in the Conference would also entail treatment of nuclear disarmament in a manner that fell well short of the negotiation of the effective measures that were part of the obligations under article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In weighing the acceptability of the food for thought non-paper as a basis for compromise on the work programme, New Zealand urged the nuclear weapons States to reflect very carefully on the vast, unreciprocated ground that had already been ceded in this drawn out and increasingly untenable dynamic in the Conference.

JOHN FREEMAN (United Kingdom) said the negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) had been a long-standing goal and would answer the aspirations of the international community; to negotiate such a treaty would be a valuable contribution to the issue of nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of an FMCT further remained a key aspiration of the international community since it envisaged benefits to all and would set the stage for a further reduction in fissile materials and nuclear threats in the future. The FMCT was ripe for negotiation.

The failed successive efforts to reach a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament was a matter of deep regret to the United Kingdom, he said. The United Kingdom welcomed the "food for thought" paper put forth by Ambassador Chris Sanders, which was a positive and promising contribution to finding a way forward. The United Kingdom was of the view that nothing should be ruled out of discussions for negotiation on the FMCT and there should be a focus on overcoming the difficulties. Moreover, the “food for thought” paper provided a real chance of moving forward on a programme of work, including as a priority the negotiation on an FMCT.

LEONID SKOTNIKOV (Russian Federation) said Russia proceeded from the point that cutting off and prohibiting production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be the next logical step in strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Russia had terminated the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons over 10 years ago. Russia also consistently supported the agreed recommendations of the 1995 and the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences on elaborating the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. He expected that through the joint efforts of all Member States, the Conference would be able to reach a compromise on a balanced programme of work. Russia's approach to basic elements of the eventual treaty included that the treaty should provide for a ban on future production of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium for the purposes of nuclear weapons; prohibit assistance in or encouragement of production of these materials by other States; and prohibit transfer of fissile materials from civil to military cycles for the purposes of nuclear weapons. The treaty would not prohibit production of fissile materials for any purposes other than making nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, and it would not cover existing stocks of fissile materials. The Treaty would also be of unlimited duration.

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) had been long anticipated. Japan therefore strongly requested the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Of the main issues, Japan believed that FMCT was by far the most mature priority for negotiation. The Conference should tackle FMCT based on its merit, and it should be de-linked from other issues. Conclusion of FMCT would be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan was flexible on the mandate of the FMCT as long as negotiations were conducted without preconditions, including on the issue of verification. Japan opposed any mandate that precluded the possibility of the inclusion of verification in the final outcome. Japan considered that an effective verification system was essential for a FMCT, and IAEA safeguard measures would provide a good basis for the consideration of a future verification system for the FMCT.

RAFFAELE DE BENEDICTIS (Italy) said a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was an instrument of nuclear arms limitation that would also strengthen non-proliferation. For Italy, the FMCT was the first priority at the Conference on Disarmament. It was also a priority for the European Union. The EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction indicated the objective to pursue an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Underlining the urgency of these negotiations, he said that an FMCT would "cut off" the production of the most dangerous nuclear fissile materials, those destined to nuclear explosions. The whole international community would benefit from such an agreement. It was the view of Italy that for the operational purposes of the Conference, an Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference should negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The scope and verification of this treaty would be among the matters to be addressed in the negotiations without preconditions.

MARY WHELAN (Ireland) said Ireland considered the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to be a crucial step on the path to nuclear disarmament although it was concerned that, despite all the work and analysis that had taken place, the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to resume negotiations on such a treaty. Over the years, this issue had been at the heart of various initiatives to get the Conference on Disarmament back to work. While the Conference on Disarmament had been deadlocked on a Programme of Work, newer and more daunting challenges had emerged in relation to fissile material and related issues.

Ireland urged the Conference to put renewed energy into overcoming the obstacles to achieving a resumption of negotiations on FMCT, she added. Ireland further considered the fissile material issue to be sufficiently ripe and urgent for the Conference on Disarmament to proceed in good faith towards a timely outcome. The investment which had already been made, politically and technically, by Members of the Conference should be consolidated.

NAÉLA GABR (Egypt) said there were many principles that should be taken into consideration when negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT ) and nuclear disarmament must remain a main priority for the Conference on Disarmament. Member States must fulfil their responsibility to reach complete nuclear disarmament. In view of Egypt's continued support for disarmament, it had presented several initiatives in that regard, including a proposed programme of work presented on behalf of the Group of 21 and a draft mandate for the Conference on Disarmament, which took into consideration the various concerns of the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Egypt had also adopted the General Assembly resolution setting the goal of creating the FMCT.

Egypt reaffirmed its position that a ban on fissile materials would not be effective if it was solely to ban the future production of fissile material and believed that it should include existing stockpiles of fissile materials as well; the position of Egypt on this matter was reflected in Ambassador Shannon’s report. The verification of compliance by all parties of the existence of fissile material was considered a cornerstone for the FMCT. Egypt was of the view that there should be a complete and comprehensive inventory for all counties taking into account such material so as to ensure that this material was monitored internationally and in a legal manner.

JÜRG STREULI (Switzerland) said Switzerland stressed the need for all States to respect the prohibition of the production fissile material and supported the calls to set up an Ad Hoc Committee for negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty within the Conference on Disarmament. Switzerland also supported the treaty to include elements of verification and was prepared to initiate negotiations without any preconditions.

PAUL VAN RHIJN (Netherlands) said the Netherlands attached the greatest importance to a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and was ready to start negotiations on the basis of the Five Ambassadors proposal and the report of the Special Coordinator. The Netherlands was convinced that an FMCT would serve the security interests of all members of the Conference on Disarmament, both from the perspective of nuclear disarmament and for reasons of promoting nuclear non-proliferation. Negotiations on a number of issues related to nuclear disarmament – and first and foremost on a FMCT – would in the view of the Netherlands, after some eight years of inactivity, constitute the next logical step for the Conference on Disarmament to start working on.

Over the past years the Netherlands had been working consistently, in an informal process, in order to keep the FMCT alive in Geneva, he added, and it was considering organizing another meeting in September, where the Conference on Disarmament would discuss the possibilities and impossibilities of verification of such a treaty. The Netherlands strongly encouraged and looked forward to the participation of experts, in particular from the United States.

MAGNUS HELLGREN (Sweden) stated that the continued existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the gravest challenges to common security. Recent developments had put an increased focus on the nuclear fuel cycle, including the need to create incentives for States to voluntarily forego the national development of the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the fuel cycle. New approaches were needed, but past commitments must also be fulfilled. Although several nuclear weapon States had declared unilateral moratoria on fissile material for weapons, the production had not ceased worldwide. The need remained for a multilateral treaty to assure that production of such material cease completely, permanently, transparently and verifiably.

Sweden would be ready to start to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty immediately on the basis of either the A5 proposal – the Shannon mandate – or the informal "food for thought" paper, he added. Moreover, Sweden strongly believed that verification was technically feasible and politically desirable and it was of the view that the International Atomic Energy Agency should be entrusted with this task. The scope of the Treaty should include all weapons grade materials. The threat of terrorism also suggested that the Conference on Disarmament should contemplate inclusion of certain weapon-usable materials of somewhat lower purity. Solutions to the issue of nuclear submarine fuel could also be found. Furthermore, the issue of existing stockpiles must be addressed.

PARK IN-KOOK (Republic of Korea) said at the current stage where the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been adopted, the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) were the next logical step in the accomplishment of the common goal enshrined in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The FMCT was not only important for non-proliferation, but it also served as a precursor to disarmament. Therefore the Republic of Korea had placed a high priority on beginning negotiations on the FMCT in the Conference at the earliest possible date and also called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the FMCT.

Concerning the scope of the treaty, the Republic of Korea was of the view that a viable solution needed to be explored to resolve differences with respect to the past production of fissile materials. In this regard, it saw merit in the South African proposal in which nuclear weapons materials already declared as excess could be included in the starting inventory when the FMCT entered into force. The delegation of the Republic of Korea was willing to start the FMCT negotiations on the basis of any reasonable formula, including the "food for thought" paper that could garner widespread support from the Conference on Disarmament Member States. Moreover, legal issues, such as the entry into force, should be carefully addressed in the light of the experiences gained in the ratification process of the CTBT. Lastly, in order to ensure the universality and effectiveness of the FMCT, it would be essential to secure the participation of all non-parties to the NPT, as well as all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

THOMAS CYNKIN (United States) said terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, coupled with the risk that terrorists could acquire such weapons, remained one of the greatest security challenges of the 21st century. States had experienced difficulty in finding a way to use some of the traditional multilateral tools to meet today's challenges. Governments around the world had begun to utilize new tools and strengthen existing tools to narrow the gap between real threats and the action needed to confront them. On 17 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors had decided to create a Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification. The idea to create such a committee began with President Bush’s overall proposal to strengthen the IAEA and the nuclear proliferation regime. To respond to concerns about illicit activities of proliferation networks, the United Nations Security Council in April 2004 unanimously adopted resolution 1540. The United State looked forward to working together with all States to fulfil this resolution and stood ready to provide assistance where needed. Moreover, on 20 June, the United States and the European Union reiterated their common commitment to meet the pre-eminent threats of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) by undertaking a joint work programme comprised of several initiatives. The Proliferation Security Initiative was another project aimed at building national capacities to act with speed and effectiveness and in partnership to stop the proliferation of WMDs.

The Conference on Disarmament had the potential to be part of the action, but it did not seem likely that the Conference would live up to that potential. The Conference on Disarmament must move beyond the Cold War era and move on to current issues. One of these issues was the international ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines; another was on the ban on fissile material production for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The history of the Conference on Disarmament strongly suggested that proposals did not present common solutions to common threats. The delegation of the United States agreed that the current stalemate was based on the lack of political will in several capitals to negotiate treaty law. The United State would continue to support initiatives for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as well as to strengthen international peace and security.

WAN YUSRI WAN RASHID (Malaysia) said the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constituted much more of a threat than a protection for the future of the human race. Prolonged existence of nuclear stockpiles and the ongoing development of new types of nuclear weapons needed to be urgently addressed as they posed threats to international peace and stability and increased the possibility of nuclear war. Malaysia strongly believed that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon States had the responsibility to undertake measures aimed at halting further proliferation of their nuclear arsenals and should cease research on qualitative improvement and development of new types of nuclear weapons.

Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, Malaysia was strongly of the view that the FMCT negotiations constituted one of the next essential steps in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the break out of nuclear war, he stated. Moreover, Malaysia was strongly of the view that negotiations on a FMCT should include existing stockpiles and verification. In this regard, it urged the Conference to establish as soon as possible an Ad Hoc Committee on FMCT together with the establishment of the other three Ad Hoc Committees as proposed in the A5 proposal, namely on nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances.

Rights of Reply

MASSOUD KHAN (Pakistan), while referring to the statement made by the United Kingdom on the commencement of negotiations and with reference to existing stockpiles of fissile material, said such a position as expressed by the speaker would be counter-intuitive to the work towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

JOHN FREEMAN (United Kingdom) said his statement was not directed specifically at Pakistan, yet emphasized that no solutions would be found if more time was spent on defining the problems rather than searching for those solutions.

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