Conference on Disarmament Holds Meeting to Discuss Negative Security Assurances
7 July 2005

The Conference on Disarmament this morning held the last of its four plenary meetings proposed by Conference President, Wegger Strommen of Norway, to discuss the issue of security assurances by nuclear weapon States for those which did not possess nuclear weapon capability. Today's meeting was preceded by three others on nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which, along with negative security assurances (NSA), were identified as the four main issues in the "food for thought" paper submitted at the beginning of the session by Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands.

Today's meeting heard statements from twenty members of the Conference who outlined their Governments' position on the possible creation of an international legally binding instrument to ensure that nuclear weapon States provided security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use their nuclear weapons against them. The discussion also heard views on the possible re-creation of an Ad Hoc committee within the Conference to pursue that issue.

Most of the speakers affirmed that legally binding and unconditional security assurances against the use of threats of use of nuclear weapons should be given to non-nuclear weapon States, as provided for by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Others expressed their views that effective measures to protect non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threats of use of nuclear weapons would not only strengthen international peace and security but also positively contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

While some speakers remained convinced that the main negotiation of legally binding security assurances should take place under the NPT, the majority believed that the negotiations should take place under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament. In that context, a number of references were made to the NPT and its Review Processes, as well as to decisions taken by the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

Other representatives expressed their Government's concern over the recent military doctrines made which they claimed made it possible for nuclear powers to conclude that nuclear weapons were necessary for their protection, and which as a result undermined the NPT, they stated. They added that these doctrines made by nuclear weapon States made it more necessary for non-nuclear weapon States to receive legal assurances and for the discussion on NSA to be pursued in earnest. Another issue echoed in this morning's meeting was that of the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones, which was considered by many to be a valuable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and global, and regional peace and security.

In a concluding statement as outgoing President of the Conference Ambassador Strommen said as a result of the four plenary meetings held, the national views of a great number of Governments were now on record in a systematic manner and the records now showed that there was a strong interest in addressing the real substantive issues which was how it should be at a time when the international community was confronted with new and increasingly dangerous security challenges.

Representatives of South Africa, the United Kingdom, Peru, China, Colombia, Canada, Syria, Malaysia, Italy, Mexico, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Switzerland, France, New Zealand, Algeria, Iran, Australia and Argentina addressed the meeting.

At the onset of the meeting, the President of the Conference expressed the condolences of the members of the Conference to Ambassador Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia for the passing of his wife.

The next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 14 July.

Statements

GLAUDINE MTSHALI (South Africa) said South Africa remained deeply concerned by the continued retention of nuclear weapons and security doctrines that envisaged the use of nuclear weapons and believed that non-nuclear weapon States had the right to be provided with internationally legally binding security assurances under the NPT. It was the belief of South Africa that security assurances rightfully belonged to those States that had foresworn the nuclear weapons option, as opposed to those who still preferred to keep their options open. In South Africa's view, the negotiation of legally binding security assurances should take place under the NPT umbrella within the context of the Strengthened Review Process of the Treaty. South Africa also continued to hold the view that security assurances should be provided in the context of an internationally legally binding instrument, which could either be in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT, or as a protocol of that treaty.

FIONA PATERSON (United Kingdom) said since the United Kingdom ratified the NPT it had set about meeting its disarmament obligations under the Treaty to which it was fully committed and which aimed for creating a safer world free form the dangers of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom gave negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States in its letter to the United Nations Secretary-General in 1995, which was noted in Security Council resolution 984. The United Kingdom remained commited to those security assurances. In addition, the United Kingdom had given legally binding NSAs in treaty form through the protocols it had signed to the nuclear weapon free zone treaties. The United Kingdom fully supported the principle of nuclear weapon free zones and played an active and constructive role as a nuclear weapon State in their development. The United Kingdom believed that these zones could make a valuable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and global, and regional peace and security as long as they were based on arrangements fully arrived at by all the States in the region concerned. For that reason, the United Kingdom had signed and ratified protocols to the zones which covered Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the South Pacific, and continued to work with the ASEAN States to produce an agreed protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. The United Kingdom also continued to support the principle of a Central Asian nuclear free zone. It was the view of the United Kingdom that the 1995 NSA and protocols it had signed provided non-nuclear weapon States the assurance they sought regarding nuclear use.

ELIZABETH ASTETE RODRIGUEZ (Peru) said Peru considered the NPT to be the basic instrument to reach the goal of nuclear disarmament and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Given the recent evolution of military doctrines made by nuclear weapon States made it more necessary for non-nuclear weapon States to receive legal assurances that those States not use these weapons against them. Through these doctrines it was possible that other these nuclear powers might conclude that nuclear weapons were necessary for their protection, which undermined the NPT. In a statement made last March, the Foreign Minister of Peru said it was an indispensable necessity to carry out the 13 essential steps adopted at the sixth NPT Review Conference in 2000 to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Peru considered that the essential agenda of the Conference on Disarmament was that of NSA. It was also recalled that Peru was a State party to the Tlatelolco Treaty which established a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

HU XIAODI (China) said it was the right of non-nuclear weapon States to seek security assurance from nuclear weapon States. And believed the fundamental solution to the issue of security assurance for non-nuclear weapon States was the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, China believed that the launching of negotiations on an international legal instrument on security assurance for non-nuclear weapon States was a realistic task in the current context of international arms control and disarmament. China supported the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on NSA in accordance with the relevant mandate as contained in the A5 proposal so that it could start substantive work in negotiating an international legal instrument on security assurance for non-nuclear weapon States. China also supported the negotiation of a protocol on security assurance for non-nuclear weapon States within the framework of the NPT. In its statement issue in 1995, China reaffirmed the above position and pledged to provide security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States and had signed all protocols to nuclear weapon free zone treaties which were open for signature.

RAFAEL QUINTERO CUBIDES (Colombia) said despite the differences expressed by a number of States in the Conference on Disarmament they have all agreed that the Conference was the sole forum for negotiation on international disarmament issues and it role was indispensable in that regard. Colombia was convinced of the merits of the multilateral system and had adhered to the international instruments on disarmament and was a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty which established a nuclear free zone in Latin America and granted negative security assurances to countries in the region. Colombia understood the right of non-nuclear weapon States of receiving NSA and believed it was a matter of urgency that the Conference on Disarmament commenced negotiations on the four main issues identified under the A5 proposal, including NSA. Moreover, Colombia appealed to all States to demonstrate flexibility on political will in reaching a programme of work in the Conference.

PAUL MEYER (Canada) recalled that in its opening statement to the 7th NPT Review Conference, Canada stated that it recognized that action was required pursuant to other engagements undertaken in 2000, such as agreement to begin discussions to codify NSA. While Canada's preferred forum for such discussion would be the NPT, given that it considered such assurances as one of the benefits of adherence to the NPT, Canada also recognized that this had long been an issue on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Canada was flexible as to how to address the issue of security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament, whether in a separate ad hoc committee, with the mandate as proposed by the A5 proposal or the "food for thought" non-paper, or combined with the subject of nuclear disarmament, as it had suggested last year.

BASHAR JA'AFARI (Syria) said the delegation of Syria was certain that the NPT remained the most important treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament and the realization of this Treaty was a moral obligation of nuclear weapon States. Since Israel had not acceded to the Treaty, the Middle East had not achieved universality of the NPT; this fact weakened the credibility of the arguments of nuclear weapon States. Syria was of the view that the best guarantee for peace and security was to completely eliminate nuclear weapons and prohibit their production. All States must meet their obligations and reach conclusions through negotiations in that regard. The fact that nuclear weapon States were developing arsenals of nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security. It was a moral and legal obligation of nuclear States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States unconditionally as had been pronounced by the NPT and its review processes.

WAN YUSRI AZNAINIZAM WAN ABDUL RASHID (Malaysia) said Malaysia was of the strong view that pending nuclear disarmament it was imperative to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and in this regard called for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of all States, in particular the non-nuclear weapon States. Given the weakness of unilateral declarations, Malaysia strongly urged that multilateral, legally binding and unconditional assurances against the use of threats of use of nuclear weapons be given to non-nuclear weapon States and firmly believed that effective measures to protect non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threats of use of nuclear weapons would not only strengthen international peace and security but also positively contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament was of paramount concern to Malaysia and it underscored that nuclear disarmament should continue to be the highest priority for the Conference on Disarmament.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said together with its European Union partners, Italy pursued further consideration of security assurances and believed that positive and negative assurances could serve both as an incentive to forego acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and as a deterrent. Italy also believed that the international community should pursue the NSA concept within the framework of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone engagements, which could be extended to additional areas on the basis of arrangements freely entered into force between States of the region concerned. Other elements of flexibility could be explored within the NSA concept itself and more thought could be given to the option of granting NSA on a unilateral, plurilateral or regional basis. Italy could accept the establishment of an ad hoc committee to develop recommendations on how the Conference on Disarmament could more effectively deal with effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

PABLO MACEDO (Mexico) said the Government of Mexico considered one of the essential components of disarmament and the nuclear regime was for nuclear weapon capable States to commit themselves not to use these weapons against non nuclear weapon States as had been recognized by the Security Council itself. The only guarantee in this regard was the prohibition and total elimination of these weapons. Despite the assertion of the International Court of Justice deeming the use of nuclear weapons as a breach of international law, there was the existence of military and security doctrines that considered the use of nuclear weapons on a preemptive basis. Therefore, it was necessary to supplement the nuclear non-proliferation regime through a legally binding instrument to protect non-nuclear weapon States against those which possessed them. In the context of the NPT, Mexico had presented draft protocols that provided secure legal footing for political commitment for nuclear weapon States and had been working towards that for the past twenty years. Mexico was committed to this goal and supported the mandate as presented within the A5 proposal.

LEONID SKOTNIKOV (Russian Federation) said in order to assist a compromise in the Conference on Disarmament on its programme of work, the Russian Federation would be ready not to object to the consensus based on the last version of the A5 initiative. In this context, the Russian Federation would not be against the proposal, formulated in it, to establish the Conference on Disarmament ad hoc committee on the issue of assurances for the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Russian Federation would also be ready to support consensus based on the "food for thought" non-paper, including the proposed, mandate for work on security assurances. The Russian Federation would also be ready to move towards elaboration of a global negative assurances agreement, provided that it would take into consideration its military doctrine and the national security concept. It was recalled that in 1995 the Russian Federation, along with other nuclear powers, co-sponsored the United Nations Security Council resolution, which provided positive security assurances, as well as took note of national statements of the nuclear States on negative assurances. While encouraging efforts to create new nuclear weapon free zones, the Russian Federation viewed them in light of the task of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional security. The Russian Federation believed that the most appropriate venue to work on security assurances was the Conference on Disarmament since it was a unique multilateral disarmament forum.

PARK IN-KOOK (Republic of Korea) said while the Republic of Korea stood firmly behind international non-proliferation endeavors against nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and agreed that they must be enhanced and strengthened, it believed that these efforts will work best when they addressed the cause of proliferation. The international community must redouble its efforts to alleviate security concerns that had prevented certain States from joining the NPT and caused others to clandestinely pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. The Republic of Korea believed that nuclear weapon States should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States that faithfully met their NPT and other safeguards obligations. At the same time, the Republic of Korea also recognized the value of providing enhanced security assurances and other incentives to those States parties that voluntarily accepted additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the parameters of the NPT. The Republic of Korea supported that the Conference on Disarmament addressed the issue of security assurances under a formula, which reflected the necessities of providing security assurances and evolving strategic and political realities, and believed that the formula contained in the "food for thought" non-paper fulfilled these requirements.

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) noted that at the beginning of the last General Assembly of the United Nations, twenty countries sponsored a resolution on security assurances with 118 voting in favour and none against, an effort which Pakistan had been spearheading since 1990. It was also recalled that security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States were an obligation arising directly form the United Nations Charter. It was the view of Pakistan that what was needed was universal and legally binding assurances, which was not merely a moral imperative, but a legal obligation. New security doctrines expounded the possible use of nuclear weapons, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Security Council. Moreover, NATO proclamations were potentially inconsistent with the pledges made by its constituent nuclear weapon States. The Non-Aligned Movement had been expressing its serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons was being considered. It had consistently underlined that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States should be pursued. It was recalled that Secretary-General Kofi Annan had urged nuclear weapons States to reaffirm their commitment and give NSA to non-nuclear weapon States. It was due to the efforts of Pakistan and other countries that they were able to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on NSA in 1998 although that Committee could not continue its work after the nuclear tests that year. For its part, Pakistan had made a solemn pledge that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon State. The negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament and its ad hoc committee dealing with NSA could help reach an agreement. A legally binding instrument on NSA would be a major confidence building measure and cold help reduce nuclear threat.

JURG STREULI (Switzerland) said following NSA were made they were generally accompanied by reservations by nuclear States and in practice this implied that nuclear States did not fully prohibit the threat or use of such weapons. Switzerland considered that the NSA provided by these States were insufficient. The funding of nuclear weapons also made the adoption of NSA even more essential. While supporting the implementation of nuclear free zones, Switzerland believed that counties outside these nuclear free zones like their own could not enjoy the NSA provided under regional agreements and were therefore faced with unequal treatment. There was also a difficult a complex question of NSA for States not party to the NPT. Switzerland believed that non-nuclear States not party to the NPT had a legal right to receive assurances from States which possessed nuclear weapons; this measure would reinforce the non-proliferation regime and enforce the universality of the NPT. Switzerland also believed that the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum where discussion on NSA should be held.

JEAN-MICHEL DESPAX (France) said at the seventh NPT Review Conference held in New York earlier this year, the European Union spoke with a single voice on the issue of NSA. The position of France was in favor of a regional approach on this question through the creation of nuclear free zones. Trying to find solutions to regional tensions were needed in order to make progress on regional security. France had participated actively in the drafting of agreed guidelines and ratified all relevant protocols pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation. Among other things, France encouraged African countries, which had not yet done so, to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty so that it could enter into force. France also entered into discussion with the Central Asian States on the constitution of a nuclear weapon free zone in that region. Moreover, France was supportive of regional approaches as had been demonstrated by its participation in regional seminars. It was the view of France that the "food for thought" proposal did clearly call for a discussion mandate on NSA, which it welcomed. In that context, France would not object to pursuing the matter of NSA within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

TIM CAUGHLEY (New Zealand) said New Zealand has long believed that those States that had formally renounced nuclear weapons should be accorded legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States that they will not be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. New Zealand worked hard to ensure that such a commitment was included in the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. It was the belief of New Zealand that legally binding NSA would be both beneficial in the current security environment in restoring trust and also instrumental in stifling any nefarious impulse to proliferate. In this regard, New Zealand envisaged that the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on NSA in the context of the NPT would build upon the negative security assurances provided in Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and the declarations made by the nuclear weapon States in United Nations Security Council resolution 984. At the same time, agreement on a single instrument would necessarily entail making it clear that NSA would not be unconditional, bringing to bear a further layer of accountability for non-nuclear weapon States in regard to their non-proliferation obligations.

IDRISS JAZAIRY (Algeria) said the question of NSA was extremely important, not only for States which did not posses nuclear weapons, but for humankind in its entirety. Non-nuclear States had the right to receive unconditional assurances that nuclear weapon States would not use these weapons against them. The threat lied in the proliferation of weapons falling into the hands of unreasonable entities; this was a well-recognized danger, as was the possibility of nuclear States to use these weapons to bring pressure to bear upon other States. Full and comprehensive disarmament was the only real assurance; pending this achievement, it did seem necessary for nuclear weapons States to provide international legally binding guarantees, which was a fair interim recompense for non-nuclear weapon States for their concessions entered into by them. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of July 1996, underlined that the threat or use of force of nuclear weapons was unlawful and the United Nations General Assembly also stated in its session of 1961 that the use of these weapons was contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter to which it presented a direct breach. Algeria was of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament could contribute greatly on the question of NSA and hoped the establishment of the ad hoc committee, in that connection, would take place within the Conference.

HAMID ESLAMIZAD (Iran) stated that contrary to the expectations of the international community reflected in the consensus final document of the NPT Review Conference of 2000, the role of nuclear weapons was not diminished in the security policies of some nuclear weapons States and military alliances. It was recalled that the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT in the course of the 2005 Review Conference stressed that it was the legitimate right of States that had given up the nuclear weapon option to receive security assurances and called for the negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances. This was a position to which Iran fully subscribed. Moreover, the position of Iran was that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee that there would be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; that non-nuclear weapon States should be effectively assured by nuclear weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapons States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

CRAIG MACLACHLAN (Australia) said Australia continued to work for effective multilateral approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. And will continue to support pragmatic initiatives that dealt effectively with threats to collective security and which complemented broader multilateral efforts. Along with 60 other nations, Australia had engaged fully in the Proliferation Security Initiative, for example. It was recalled that the Australia Group marked its 20th anniversary this year. Australia convened the first meeting of 15 nations in Brussels in response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran. At the Australia Group Plenary held at Sydney earlier this year, participants focused on key issues, including terrorism. The Group participants remained firmly commited to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

ALICIA DE HOZ (Argentina) said Argentina was convinced that NSA would make a positive contribution to international peace and security. Argentina reiterated its appeal to the P5 members of the Security Council to fully comply with agreements entered into on nuclear non-proliferation, above all the NPT, and other legally binding instruments to enhance the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Argentina urged nuclear weapon States to grant more effective assurances to non-nuclear weapon States that they would never use these weapons against them. Argentina also called on States parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty on a nuclear safe zone for Latin America to recommit themselves to the provisions of that instrument which would be an important measure for disarmament in the region.

WEGGER CHRISTIAN STROMMEN, President of the Conference on Disarmament, in a concluding statement as outgoing President of the Conference said he regretted to report that he had received no indications from any delegation that the Conference was closer to a resolution with regard to a programme of work. He recalled that four weeks ago he encouraged the members of the Conference on Disarmament to make statements on nuclear disarmament, fissile material cut-off, outer space, security assurances and "new issues" in order to facilitate a more orderly debate. As a result, the national views of a great number of Governments were now on record in a systematic manner. Moreover, the records now showed that there was a strong interest in addressing the real substantive issues which was how it should be at a time when the international community was confronted with new and increasingly dangerous security challenges. A broad range of issues was expressed, suggestions and proposals were made and positions were explained, all of which deserved further attention.

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