13 June 2006

The Conference on Disarmament today held a structured debate on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, addressing the issue of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.

All speakers acknowledged the growing importance of outer space research and exploration activities – including development of satellite remote sensing capacities – as vital to the economic and security interests of all States. Consequently there was consensus on support for greater transparency and confidence-building measures in the context of outer space activities. However, varying views were presented on the relationship of such measures to a future legally binding agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and what such measures should encompass.

A speaker, challenging delegations that regarded prevention of an arms race in outer space as solely linked to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, said that prevention of an arms race in outer space was not a parasitic issue, but an issue that deserved attention on its own merit. Many speakers agreed that certain measures could be taken right away that could later be incorporated into a legally binding treaty. Several speakers observed that activities in this area should be carried out in cooperation with interested international institutions, including the Committees of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. It was also noted that there were already international instruments that incorporated transparency and confidence-building measures, and such instruments were a good place to start. One speaker said that the first obvious step was to achieve wider adherence to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to which only 98 countries were a party.

Regarding the content of possible measures, a speaker welcomed an instrument that encouraged States to provide advance notice of space launches; make unilateral declarations that they would not flight-test or deploy weapons in outer space; declare moratoria on the production and testing of anti-satellite weapons that caused debris in orbit; and that gave active consideration to establishing minimum exclusion zones around satellites in orbit and other space safety rules. Another speaker had three concerns: free access for all to the peaceful uses of outer space; the need to ensure the security and integrity of satellites in orbit; and the legitimate security interests of States. One speaker recognized that recently a number of countries had implemented such measures on their own initiative, including pledges not to place weapons of any kind in outer space. A speaker said there was nothing wrong with exploring new confidence-building measures, but the Conference was not the venue for such discussions. The practices of the space community evolved as individual capabilities improved, and discussions among States on how to manage those practices were appropriate. Such discussions, however, did not constitute a valid reason for proposing new arms control measures for outer space.

Taking the floor this morning were representatives of Pakistan, Cuba, China, Belarus, Italy, Ireland, Brazil, France, the Russian Federation, the United States, Argentina, Sweden and Australia.

Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference, said that United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan would be in Geneva for the opening of the new Human Rights Council, and it was hoped that he would be able to address the Conference on Wednesday, 21 June. The details, including the meeting of the Conference on that date, remained to be worked out.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 June at 10 a.m. In the plenary to be held on Tuesday, 20 June, high-level representatives, including Ministers, would make statements on behalf of their countries.

Statements

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) said that Pakistan associated itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of 21 on 8 June. Pakistan particularly shared the Group’s concern over the negative implications of development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space. Last year, the United Nations General Assembly had once again recognized the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space. It had invited the Conference to complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, and to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on prevention of an arms race in outer space as early as possible during the 2006 session. The Conference should take that as a deadline.

Space security was an imperative, not an option. In the context of the Conference, some delegations had projected prevention of an arms race in outer space as an issue solely linked to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, demanding removal of that linkage to facilitate negotiations on a fissile material treaty. Prevention of an arms race in outer space was not a parasitic issue, but an issue that deserved attention on its own merit. The objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space was preventative: to stem the induction of space weapons through surveillance and verification. The existing regime – comprising the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1984 Moon Agreement, and the abrogated Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 – had gaping holes that could only be filled by a new legal instrument. Pakistan appreciated the flexibility that had been shown by some countries in 2003 to facilitate agreement on the Five Ambassador’s Initiative (A-5 Proposal) based on a comprehensive and balanced programme of action. Now it was only reasonable to start work within that framework without caveats and diversions.

OSCAR LEON GONZALEZ (Cuba) said that Cuba fully supported the statement on prevention of an arms race in outer space made by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of 21 on 8 June. Cuba felt it was an urgent issue that the Conference was ready to consider and had the technical capacity to achieve. The 10 years of discussion on prevention of an arms race in outer space already undertaken in the Conference meant that, from a technical standpoint, the Conference was closer to an agreement on prevention of an arms race in outer space than on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. In addition, the international community had once again expressed its unmistakable desire that an arms race in outer space be prevented, by adopting General Assembly resolutions 60/54 and 60/66, which were voted by an overwhelming majority in each case.

Cuba wondered whether there was any delegation that opposed a complete prohibition on the placement of any weapons in outer space and, if not, how could a weapon free outer space be guaranteed? The answer to those questions was an important place to start. The ways for designing measures could vary, including elaborating a new treaty, or adopting a protocol to existing regimes, as Sweden had suggested. Certain measures could be taken right away that could later be incorporated into a legally binding treaty. For example, those countries that had the technological capacity to work in outer space should officially declare that they would never place any kind of weapon in outer space. That could be manifested by a declaration, recognized by the General Assembly and then later codified in a convention. There could also be a mechanism for showing that countries had no plans or intentions for placing such weapons in outer space. Included in the draft treaty should be sections on transparency and confidence-building measures. For example, each State party should agree to provide information on its space programmes, declaring the placement of its installations and launch sites, its plans and purposes of future launches. The legal instrument to be negotiated had to include a verification mechanism to ensure compliance by States parties.

JUNAN ZHANG (China) said that it should be stressed that as an interim measure, transparency and confidence-building measures could serve as a starting point and supplement to negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, but they could not replace such a legal instrument. Transparency and confidence-building measures could take the form of a unilateral commitment, a multilateral agreement, or a provision of a treaty. The Conference’s discussion on this issue should be linked to the negotiations on a new international legal instrument on outer space. Transparency and confidence-building measures should be regarded as part of the treaty so as to have more practical significance.

Owing to the complex nature of the security interests of all countries, as well as to technical and financial constraints of verification, it was currently extremely difficult to negotiate a verification provision. For the time being, the Conference could put on hold the verification issue until conditions were ripe and negotiate a treaty without verification provisions. Transparency and confidence-building measures could supplement a new treaty, with final legal language on those areas worked out through the joint efforts of all parties. For its part, China’s space activities had proceeded with a high degree of transparency. China had acceded to the Registration Convention and provided data on its space launching activities as required.

SERGEI ALEINIK (Belarus) said that Belarus believed that new confidence-building measures in outer space should be aimed in the first place at further strengthening already existing international legal tools in the field of space law. Belarus was convinced that in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of work, all drafting activities in this area should be carried out in close cooperation with all interested international institutions, including the First and Fourth Committees of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Conference on Disarmament.

Currently many States, research institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations actively supported the idea of the adoption of codes of conduct on strengthening security in outer space. It was frequently underlined that if there were a lack of consensus between key powers concerning the possibility of beginning negotiations on a draft treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, approval of a universal code of conduct on confidence-building measures in space sphere was the most feasible solution. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account that by their nature those codes of conduct were not legally binding. In that connection, Belarus believed that real space security could only be achieved by the adoption of a universal treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons in outer space. Belarus believed that a step-by-step strategy in the sphere of strengthening space security would prove successful only if all States with space potential refrained from space weaponization and steadily moved towards the adoption of legally binding tools guaranteeing a total ban on the emplacement of weapons in outer space.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said that the more the international community became dependent on outer space for its economic, scientific, security and developmental needs, the more important it was to operate in a safe and secure space environment. The danger presented by space debris in a possible hostile scenario was an additional source of major concern. Little progress, however, had been made in many years, notably on scope and basic definitions of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Italy felt that the Conference’s deliberations could not evolve in a vacuum. As mentioned by other delegations, Italy believed that the dialogue between the various bodies with an interest in outer space should be enhanced, in particular the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The first obvious step was a wider adherence to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It had been recalled that only 98 countries had joined that Treaty so far and that not all Conference members were party to it. It was high time that that lacuna was filled. Several delegations had also mentioned the possibility of establishing a moratorium on placement of weapons in outer space. Such a unilateral undertaking could be examined as a possible confidence-building measure that could propitiate further progress. Finally, in its statement last week, the European Union Presidency had mentioned that transparency measures on the launching of objects into space was fundamental to space security and in that connection it underlined the role of the Hague International Code of Conduct. In fact, the Hague International Code of Conduct already contemplated annual declarations, pre-launch notifications, and international observers on launch sites for ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. Those measures of transparency and space confidence were relevant to the Conference deliberations and complementary to an improved discipline in space management.

MARY WHELAN (Ireland) said that space played an ever larger and important role in the daily lives of all countries, and that Ireland was increasingly dependent on services provided from outer space. In addition, Ireland acknowledged that Earth observation provided a level of assurance concerning the conduct and intentions of States that was essential to the maintenance of global security. Accordingly, Ireland had consistently said that it would like to see the Conference embark without delay on a process that could lead to an agreement to prohibit the weaponization of outer space. However, pending progress on such an initiative, Ireland believed that there were a number of measures that could be taken to increase transparency in space activities and otherwise to build confidence in the peaceful intentions of all space-faring States.

Ireland in particular welcomed suggestions that States be encouraged to provide advance notice of space launches; States declare unilaterally that they would not flight-test or deploy weapons in outer space; States declare moratoria on the production and testing of anti-satellite weapons that caused debris in orbit; and active consideration be given to establishing – by a code of conduct or otherwise – a requirement to observe minimum exclusion zones around satellites in orbit and other space safety rules. Ireland suspected that work by all parties on such ideas could serve to foster an environment of trust that would be conducive to the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on prevention of an arms race in outer space itself.

CARLOS ANTONIO DA ROCHA PARANHOS (Brazil) said that prevention of an arms race in outer space was a subject to which Brazil attached great importance. In that sense, Brazil favored the establishment in the Conference of an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with that issue, in accordance with the revised Five Ambassadors’ proposal.

Since the inception of its space research activities 40 years ago, Brazil had been firmly motivated by peaceful purposes and had oriented its initiatives towards applications that met society’s needs and demands. Space research and exploration activities represented key areas of interest in Brazil in light of the huge extent and territory of its coastline, its Amazonian forest, with scarcely populated areas, and the diversity of its climate. In particular, applications in the field of satellite remote sensing had proved to be of crucial importance to Brazil. International cooperation had been a vital component in the planning and implementation of space activities in Brazil, which had bilateral cooperation programmes with Argentina, France, Germany, the United States, and the European Space Agency, as well as with China, India, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The National Policy on the Development of Space Activities established the major principles, objectives and guidelines for Brazilian space activities. Brazil was of the view that research for peaceful purposes in outer space was in the common interest of the progress of mankind and that outer space should be kept free of weapons.

MIKAEL GRIFFON (France) said that human activities more and more relied on space activities. The position of the European Union matched that of France, which had undertaken activities on this issue since the 1980s in the present forum. For France, the prevention of the weaponization of outer space was an essential issue for international security. It was in nobody’s interest to open that Pandora’s Box. No State had the capability to maintain complete dominance in that area and the result would be to create an arms race that would be disastrous for all. The three important issues in France’s view were free access for all to the peaceful uses of outer space; the need to ensure the security and integrity of satellites in orbit; and the legitimate security interests of States.

The linkage that existed in the Conference in its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space was in many ways an artificial one. France believed that the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space, and others besides, should be reviewed independently of other issues under consideration in the Conference.

VALERY LOSHCHININ (Russian Federation) said that, in Russia’s view, the best way to address the issue of the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, or the use or threat of force against outer space objects would be to draft a treaty that would fill the existing gaps in international outer space law. Transparency and confidence-building measures could form an integral part of that treaty. Relevant proposals, albeit general, were contained in document CD/1679, prepared jointly by Russia and China. In discussions on prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference from 2003-2005, some delegations noted that work on confidence-building measures as a first simple step could contribute to moving forward on all areas to do with prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Transparency and confidence-building measures had already been incorporated in a number of international agreements on outer space, which provided for, inter alia, informing the Secretary-General, as well as the public, and the international scientific community of the nature, conduct and results of activities in outer space; providing data on the launch of space objects; and cooperation in the joint management of emerging problems in the area. Recently interest in transparency and confidence-building measures had grown noticeably and a number of countries had implemented such measures on their own initiative. In 2004 Russia was the first to make a pledge not to place weapons of any kind in outer space. Elaboration of transparency and confidence-building measures neither hampered the work on the Treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, nor diverted attention from it. On the contrary, it contributed to the process. Transparency and confidence-building measures could, for a certain period of time, compensate for the lack of verification measures in the new treaty.

JOHN MOHANCO (United States) said that the United States was more convinced than ever that issues relating to the supposed weaponization of space definitely did not command consensus in the Conference. The United States was one of the principal movers behind the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which it continued to fully support. That important treaty had served the international community well for four decades, during which human beings had travelled to the Moon and learned to function continuously aboard space stations, and the use of space-based remote sensing and communications satellites had increased exponentially. Those developments had happened at least in part because of the freedom to conduct defence-related activities in space, so long as those activities were consistent with the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. None of the great developments in space would have occurred without the driving requirements of national security; certainly the great boon of satellite-based navigation and timing never would have been pursued if military space activities had been banned.

The United States delegation had reviewed carefully the paper on transparency and confidence-building measures that China had Russia had put forward as CD/1778. There was nothing wrong with exploring new confidence-building measures, but the Conference was not the venue for such discussions. The practices of the space community evolved as individual capabilities improved, and discussions among States on how to manage those practices were appropriate. Such discussions, however, did not constitute a valid reason for proposing new arms control measures for outer space. The United States did not have any weapons in space, nor did it have plans to build such weapons. On the other hand, the high value of space systems long had led the United States to study the potential of space-related weapons to protect its satellites from potential future attacks, whether from the surface or from other spacecraft. As long as the potential for such attacks remained, the United States Government would continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons could play in protecting its assets.

MARCELO VALLE FONROUGE (Argentina) considered confidence-building measures as one of the cornerstones for the stability and security of outer space. Argentina supported the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference to study basic principles, confidence-building measures and the drafting of an instrument capable of preventing the weaponization of outer space. In that regard, the mandate on prevention of an arms race in outer space set out in the Five Ambassadors’ proposal and the food for thought document circulated by Ambassador Sanders, were a good basis on which to begin.

For Argentina, it was essential that any instrument contemplated should not place an obstacle to the access of all to peaceful uses of outer space, including access to space for socio-economic development. In that connection, Argentina had developed its National Space Plan, 1997-2008, in a civil, transparent, and predictable manner.

LARS HÖSTBECK (Sweden) said that Sweden favoured the negotiation of a clear-cut prohibition of the weaponization of outer space. However, such a treaty would probably take many years to negotiate. The discussions last week on the technical and legal aspects of such a treaty proved that much work remained and that the political consensus to initiate real negotiations in the Conference on that issue unfortunately did not exist today.

Work on further confidence-building measures in outer space could be carried forward in several forums: within the United Nations and its Committees, including the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space, as well as in the context of the Conference. Any future treaty on the non-weaponization of outer space would need to include confidence-building measure provisions. But the discussions on such measures should not necessarily be viewed as a precursor to the elaboration of a future treaty – they would also in themselves serve important purposes. As pointed out in working paper CD/1778, the unilateral or joint commitment by States not to place weapons and to prevent an arms race in outer space was probably the most important such confidence-building measure.

CRAIG MACLACHLAN (Australia) said that he wished to inform colleagues that the Australian Mission would be hosting a seminar in this chamber on Friday, 16 June, from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. on the topic of the proliferation of man-portable air defence systems. An information note on the seminar would be circulated to members.

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