16 May 2006

The Conference on Disarmament today opened a thematic discussion on starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Speakers expressed diverging opinions on the scope of such a treaty and on whether or not negotiations should begin with or without preconditions, in particular with regards to the inclusion of a verification mechanism. One speaker said an FMCT was at the heart of the debate on disarmament, and its centrality could not be denied, but it was not a stand-alone issue, as it was inseparably linked to nuclear disarmament, and negative security issues, among others. Another speaker said that the immediate commencement of negotiations, without preconditions, on an FMCT was an immediate priority. Difficulties that surrounded the implementation of a verification mechanism were understood fully, a speaker said. For that reason, his delegation proposed an incremental approach to verification. First, production of fissile material could be monitored. Subsequently, stockpiles and facilities for containing such material could be included.

The President of the Conference, Ambassador Doru Romulus Costae of Romania, announced the accession of Liechtenstein and Switzerland on 12 May 2006 to Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, thus raising the number of signatories to 20 and fulfilling the conditions for its entry into force six months later, on 12 November 2006. Protocol V dealt with the unexploded and abandoned explosive remnants of war, which, among others, caused indiscriminate suffering, prevented refugees from returning home, and blocked post-construction efforts for renewal and development. The President extended his congratulations to the 20 State parties that had acceded to the protocol and thus ensured its early entry into force.

Today’s meeting was the first plenary in the Conference’s second part of the 2006 session. The next plenary of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 17 May, at 10 a.m., at which time it will resume the general discussion on the topic of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The President said that the Conference would then start hearing specific statements on the definition and scope of such a treaty. On 18 May, the Conference would discuss the issue of stockpiles of fissile material and other relevant issues, and it would take up compliance and verification of the treaty on 19 May.

Statements

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) said a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) was at the heart of the debate on disarmament, and its centrality could not be denied, but it was not a stand-alone issue, as it was inseparably linked to nuclear disarmament, and negative security issues, among others. Absence of an agreed programme of work on these issues had stalled work for the last eight years, and the reason for this needed to be determined. Negotiations on an FMT had not started because of growing and deliberate scuttling of commitment to agreed principles. The impasse had been deepening in the backdrop of the international community’s inability to take decisions in the areas of security and disarmament. There was also a crisis of political will which was hamstrung by fears of some key States that their vital interests were threatened if negotiations on all four issues started. The FMT must address the question of production – past, present and future – in its entirety at both regional and global levels. Owing to the prevalent objective conditions, Pakistan could not envisage or accept a moratorium, since a moratorium should be discussed within the full context of the treaty; would perpetual freeze the asymmetric strategic advantages, and unilateral and bilateral or multilateral moratoria outside the ambit of the treaty would remain unverifiable.

JOHN DUNCAN (United Kingdom) said multilateral arms control and disarmament had been at low ebb since last year, and there had been a worrying and damaging polarisation of attitudes on these issues in the international community. The United Kingdom welcomed the initiative to return the Conference to serious work. The Conference needed to be used purposely if it were to meet key disarmament control initiatives. The immediate commencement of negotiations, without preconditions, on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), was an immediate priority. The United Kingdom was convinced that it was in everyone’s interests to begin negotiations without further delay. The United Kingdom took its commitments to disarmament and non-proliferation seriously, and would continue to stand by those commitments. The United Kingdom held the minimum number of warheads necessary for national security. The United Kingdom would not let last year’s disappointments prevent progress, and was working hard in that direction, whilst fully recognising the right of States to use and benefit from nuclear technology, and would continue to call for strong export controls to combat the spread of nuclear technologies and proliferation.

FRANCOIS RIVASSEAU (France) said, as President-Elect of the Third Conference of the Convention of 1980 on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), he would like to announce that Protocol V of the Convention on Explosive Remnants of War would come into effect on 12 November 2006. This success was a result of the pertinence and validity of the CCW, the only forum in which States had managed to reach consensus over the last few years on a legally-binding instrument limiting conventional weapons. The entry into force of the Protocol would confront States with the issue of its concrete implementation and pose the question of the necessary coordination with other instruments. On a national basis, on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), France had a constant commitment to ensure that such a treaty could be adopted. After being deadlocked for a long time, it was a new chance to ensure that the treaty made progress. Cut-Off appeared today to be mainly a nuclear disarmament treaty. The general position of France was to totally ban the production of fissile material for use as nuclear weapons. The point of the treaty was to quantitatively freeze the maximum level of nuclear material around the world. The Cut-Off was the most effective subject for the Conference’s negotiations, and this should be the next tangible and concrete move forward that should be achieved.

MARKUS REITERER (Austria) speaking on behalf of the European Union and the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, said that they were pleased to hear the announcement by the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament concerning the ratifications by Switzerland and Liechtenstein of Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which allowed for the Protocol to enter into force later this year. It was their firm belief that Protocol V to the CCW, on Explosive Remnants of War, adopted at the Meeting of States Parties in 2003, would significantly reduce the humanitarian risk to civilian populations. The EU called upon all those States that had not yet done so to ratify or accede to the CCW and its Protocols, including Protocol V, as soon as possible.

JURG STREULI (Switzerland) said Switzerland and Liechtenstein had brought the number of parties to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to 20. Its entry into force in 2006 would be an important and positive step for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and for the multilateral and disarmament community as a whole. Switzerland respected the need for non-proliferation, and urged the adoption of a non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for military use. The urgency of a treaty of this kind was highly felt as there was an increasing risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons due to a growing black market in nuclear technologies. Switzerland supported the imposition of a moratorium on such substances. In order not to impede the dynamics that could be forthcoming, Switzerland was ready to begin negotiations with no preconditions.

JUAN MARTABIT (Chile) said that it was essential that the Conference draw up new instruments to address the present realities. A number of situations had gradually undermined the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Chile was convinced that the obligation for remedying the situation fell particularly on nuclear weapons States, those that were parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as non-parties that had shown their nuclear capability. Chile was among those many delegations that were prepared to show flexibility. It had been among the early supporters of the drafting of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), in the framework of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference urgently needed to formulate mechanisms to control nuclear materials. Existing regimes that controlled fissile material were not binding in nature and did not cover the full range of issues. That made it pressing for the Conference to fill that void. Chile understood the difficulties that surrounded the implementation of a verification mechanism. For that reason, Chile proposed an incremental approach to verification. First, production of fissile material could be monitored. Subsequently, stockpiles and facilities for containing such material could be included. Lastly, Chile welcomed the initiative of the Netherlands to organize an open meeting to tackle some of these issues.

GERARDO BUGALLO OTTONE (Spain) said that the attacks of 11 September had made it clear that the only reason why nuclear weapons had not been used by the terrorists was that they had lacked access to them. In that context, while it was regrettable that the Conference had not been able to adopt a programme of work, it was much more serious that it had become divorced from reality. Spain endorsed the statement made on the 30 March by the Ambassador of Austria on behalf of the European Union, which held that the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), without prior conditions, was the number one priority of the Conference and that there could be no justification for its being held hostage to any other disarmament issues.

Taking into account the impossibility of advancing in the negotiation by clusters of related matters, Spain felt that the Conference had to drop the idea of linkage. There was no greater confidence building measure than taking concerted, decisive action to put a limit to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

SARALA FERNANDO (Sri Lanka) said many delegations had held that substantive work on agenda item 1 was pivotal to progress in the Conference this year. The active participation of so many delegations in the debate on nuclear disarmament was a sign for optimism, and signalled continued all-round support for the relevance of the Conference. There was consensus in the international community on the desirability of a long-term process leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The time may have come for the Conference to take at least a tentative step towards a deliberate process, talks about talks as it were on a framework under which the shared objective of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons could be pursued. The Conference needed to show to the international community and to world public opinion that there was a negotiating forum where common concerns about international security and the world disarmament agenda could be articulated, and that this was not an academic value but a negotiating and treaty-making value. Sri Lanka supported a comprehensive international legal regime on banning fissile material production and use, negotiated and adopted as a part of the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda, and considered such a regime as one of the most important barriers against more nuclear weapons, as well as new nuclear weapon States.

KJETIL PAULSEN (Norway) said that it was encouraging that several nuclear weapon States were prepared to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. It was equally discouraging that some non-nuclear weapon States seemed hesitant to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) unless they simultaneously addressed a variety of other issues and concerns. Norway advocated immediate FMCT-negotiations and subsequent commencement of consideration of other important issues as soon as politically possible.

There was today a global surplus of refined fissile material, Mr. Paulsen noted. They knew that terrorists were interested in fissile material both for nuclear explosions and as in-put in radiological weapons. So it was, indeed, a challenge to look even further than an FMCT when they addressed problems related to fissile material. At this stage, Mr. Paulsen said, they did not know how much could be achieved as regarded verifiability of future FMCT provisions. Verification was obviously related to the question of compliance. It was verified that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not operated in accordance with its obligations under the NPT, but when the country announced its withdrawal from the Treaty, they had learned that it was problematic to deal with non-compliance. He would not elaborate on the question now, but the issue certainly had a place on an FMCT agenda.

PAUL MEYER (Canada) said the Conference was tasked with the weighty responsibility to negotiate disarmament agreements aimed at improving the security of the entire international community. The treaties and conventions that the forum had produced in the past had been essential elements of the global regime for non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Today, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty had created a new international norm resulting in a de facto ban on testing, and had also established an effective monitoring network. The next logical step in this strategy was a ban on the further production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Canada believed a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should be the top priority of the Conference. The nature of the FMCT sought remained to be defined during the course of negotiations. An FMCT which proved ultimately to be merely a vague declaratory statement of good intentions about future production did the international community a disservice and would be an indication that there was a lack of seriousness about nuclear non-proliferation arms control and disarmament. A strong FMCT could be invaluable in creating a new international norm against the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. An FMCT was urgently needed today in the face of contemporary international security threats.

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) said Germany looked forward to the upcoming structured debate, focussed on a treaty on the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Germany associated itself with the statement on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) delivered on behalf of the European Union, in which the European Union attached a clear priority to the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an FMCT as a means to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and called again for the immediate commencement of negotiations as well as an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable Treaty. Germany advocated a start of FMCT negotiations without preconditions, and the main aim of negotiations should be to effectively prevent any increase in stocks of nuclear materials for military purposes.

ZDZISLAW RAPACKI (Poland) said the prompt commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) remained the priority of Poland. The objective was clear, there was a need for a norm which would substantively contribute to the nuclear disarmament and which would halt the production of fissile material for military explosive purposes. The treaty could provide the best assurance that, in the long run, nuclear weapons would never be used. It would also provide an important tool in preventing terrorist groups from accessing materials they could use to cause devastations incomparably greater than those of September 11, 2001. The future treaty should not put any additional burden on non-nuclear-weapons States which adhered to the comprehensive safeguards system and Additional Protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The FMCT was much awaited by the international community, and would address not hypothetical but real existing threats to international peace and security.

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said Japan attached great importance to a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) as the priority at the Conference as a measure to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There had been a broad recognition for more than a decade that an FMCT was ripe for negotiation, and it was the opinion of Japan that it had never been riper than at this present time, bearing in mind the need for further strengthening of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and ensuring a safer security environment, and also the potential threats of the diversion of nuclear technology through underground proliferation networks, as well as nuclear weapons or related material falling into the hands of terrorists. It was obvious that fissile material for civil use should not be subject to a production ban under an FMCT. The significance of an FMCT as the next logical step for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was more relevant today than ever before.

VALERY LOSHCHININ (Russian Federation) said that Russia proceeded from the point that the cutting-off and prohibiting of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be the next logical step in strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Russia had terminated the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons over 10 years ago. Russia consistently supported the agreed recommendations of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on elaborating the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Loshchinin said he supported the position of France that the scope of the treaty should not cover existing stocks of fissile materials, since otherwise that would entail, inter alia, establishing a cumbersome verification mechanism, and, accordingly, unacceptably high costs for its maintenance.

ELISABET BORSIIN BONNIER (Sweden) said some questioned whether a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was still relevant, and whether it was worth the effort to negotiate a treaty if it was unclear whether it would fully meet its non-proliferation and disarmament potential, but Sweden thought that it was in both cases. The basic benefits of an FMCT still remained. The production of fissile material for weapons continued worldwide, and concerns over on-going and potential production remained. Furthermore, existing moratoria were not irreversible, nor were they applied in a transparent and effectively verifiable manner. The wider debate on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the nuclear fuel cycle had influenced thinking on the FMCT. A multilaterally negotiated agreement capping all future production of fissile material for weapons purposes would rather facilitate discussions in other relevant fora on how to tackle the proliferation concerns related to the nuclear fuel cycle in general. The commitment to immediate commencement and early conclusion of FMCT-negotiations should be followed by the adoption of political stances that would make substantive progress possible, and anything less would undermine not only the chances of progress towards an FMCT, but also the credibility of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

TURKEKUL KURTTEKIN (Turkey) said all could agree that the 2006 session of the Conference had begun remarkably well. It was hoped that with this new impetus, the Conference could break the deadlock, and adopt a comprehensive programme of work, which would be not an ends in itself, but a means to the end of making the Conference once more relevant and internationally recognised. This week was dedicated to the issue of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), and Turkey attached great importance to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Turkey remained whole-heartedly committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, and one of the steps which would serve this was the crafting of an FMCT. The immediate commencement of negotiations for a non-discriminatory, universally applicable treaty was vital, without preconditions. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, all States should uphold the moratorium on such fissile materials and other materials for nuclear purposes. Turkey firmly believed that the concept of verification was an important part of any treaty, as verification monitored compliance or lack thereof. Scope also needed to be dealt with. Turkey viewed that neither verification nor scope was a precondition for the negotiations, however.

JOHANNES LANDMAN (Netherlands) welcomed the entry into force of Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on explosive remnants of war. In that regard, he noted that the original instrument was negotiated under the chairmanship of his country.

For the Netherlands, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) constituted the next logical step in the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. It was a vital component of any international non-proliferation treaty. It would put a cap on production and reduce the number of facilities under international safeguards. The Netherlands called for the commencement, without preconditions, of a non-discriminatory treaty on fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices. The Netherlands supported the negotiation of an FMCT within the framework of the A5 and special negotiator proposals. The main purpose would be to put an end to the production of highly enriched plutonium and uranium for nuclear weapons purposes. As a result, all processing plants for such items would have to be shut down or retooled for use for civilian purposes, which would constitute a real safeguard against proliferation.

CHANG DONG-HEE (Republic of Korea) said the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) had been a priority of the international community in the disarmament field since 1993, and numerous calls had been made since then for the initiation of negotiations. However, no substantial progress had been made so far on this important issue. It was the next logical step following the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), not only for nuclear non-proliferation, but also for nuclear disarmament. The CTBT and FMCT were two essential building blocks which strengthened and complemented the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, and would represent significant steps forward as they would place qualitative and quantitative caps on the further expansion of nuclear weapons programmes. The FMCT would additionally help reduce the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. The Republic of Korea continued to place high priority on launching negotiations on the FMCT in the Conference at the earliest possible date, and sincerely hoped that the focussed discussions on the FMCT throughout this week, with the benefit of the participation of an array of experts, would yield fruitful and constructive results, and serve as a solid basis for future deliberations.

MARCELO VALLE FONROUGE (Argentina) said efforts aimed at limiting production of nuclear weapons were always welcome, and Argentina reaffirmed support for an international instrument that was non-discriminatory, multilateral, and verifiable with regards to the production of fissile materials. This would help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and establish a concrete measure towards the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, whilst upholding the natural rights of States. Argentina was of the view that the treaty should not be limited by the exclusion of materials or processes, as otherwise the prohibition of production of materials for nuclear use would be incomplete. Special attention would be paid this week to discussions relating to the inclusion of stocks.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said that Italy identified itself fully with the statement by the European Union of 30 March 2006 on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). He would not repeat today the arguments that made the negotiation of an FMCT a priority for Italy. They had reached a stage where they should go beyond the advocacy of a treaty and rather explore its main features. They welcomed the fact that some delegations had included one or more experts in their delegations and they had appreciated the papers that had already been circulated. Agreeing on the core business of a treaty should be their first endeavour; definitions would be another fundamental part of the process. They were not starting from scratch. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was recognized even by countries not a party to it, was the fundamental term of reference.

For its part, Italy had included, in its delegation, an expert from their country, Prof. Maurizio Martellini of the University of Como, and had already circulated two documents: the first, on the general features of a treaty and which focused on the relevance of an FMCT to prevent nuclear terrorism; the second was more specific and concerned the question of entry into force of a possible treaty.

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