CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HEARS STATEMENT BY EGYPT ON A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

18 May 2006

The Conference on Disarmament this afternoon continued its thematic discussion on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

One speaker, Egypt, took the floor, saying that the treaty should cover stockpiles of fissile material and should contain a strict verification mechanism to be truly effective.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held on Friday, 19 May, at 10 a.m., at which time it will take up the issue of compliance with an FMCT. At 3 p.m., the Conference will meet in open plenary to discuss verification of an FMCT.

Statement

SAMEH SHOUKRY (Egypt) said that the issue of fissile materials was one of the main elements in order to eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons and to supplement and complete the non-proliferation regime. It was also one of the most pressing issues in the Conference, as it was one of its mandates and terms of reference. The ability of the Conference to address the issue would also be proof of its ability to break the deadlock in the Conference.

Egypt expressed its appreciation for the initiative taken by the United States in the morning meeting, which would be carefully reviewed by Cairo. That text could provide a starting point for negotiations in the Conference, taking into account the interests of all parties.

Nuclear disarmament must continue to be one of the first priorities of the Conference, as set out in the final document of the first Special Session on Disarmament SSOD I. Egypt agreed on the need to ban the production of fissile material, but felt that restricting that ban to existing stocks would not contribute to effective nuclear disarmament. It was necessary for the scope of the treaty to cover fissile material that had already been produced, which position was reflected in the Shannon report, Mr. Shoukry observed.

Verifiability of the compliance of all parties was also a necessary measure to ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty. Any verification measures had to be strict and guarantee the terms of the treaty, and should include drawing up lists of all fissile material stockpiles of all States without exception – nuclear weapon States as well as non-nuclear weapons States, including those that were not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – in order to bring those materials under international control. The ban had to be global and comprehensive to ensure its success and effectiveness.