24 August 2006

The Conference on Disarmament this morning was addressed by the Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the context of its discussion of Fissile Material Cut-Off issues. The Conference then resumed its discussion on Transparency in Armaments.

Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said an FMCT foreseen by General Assembly resolutions, the Shannon mandate and the NPT States Parties would include an undertaking not to produce any fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, and not to assist other States in pursuing such activities. Insofar as the production of such material for other legitimate purposes was concerned, it would follow that verification arrangements would need to be such as to meet all the requirements of the undertaking of an FMCT.

In the IAEA Secretariat’s view, Mr. Rauf said, the technical objective of verifying compliance with an FMCT would be to provide assurance against any new production of weapon-usable fissile material, and the diversion of fissile material from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle to nuclear weapon purposes. A number of issues would have to be addressed by States in order to clarify the basic undertaking of the States Parties and the scope of an FMCT verification regime. In a wide range of areas, consideration of the existing safeguards arrangements would ensure that an FMCT verification and IAEA safeguards were implemented in ways that provided the maximum value at minimum cost.

It was the IAEA’s assessment, Mr. Rauf said, that verification of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials would be possible through a verification system quite similar to the one applied for the IAEA safeguards system. The choice of a system to be developed to verify compliance with a fissile material production cut-off treaty was a matter for States to resolve. In this regard, States would have to address questions related to the different levels of assurance as well as the costs involved. The IAEA stood ready to help in the process of further discussions and negotiations in whatever way was considered appropriate by States.

The Conference then moved to informal plenary, during which delegations asked questions. Subsequent to the informal plenary, the Conference returned to its formal plenary session, and resumed its discussion under the agenda item on Transparency in Armaments, under which it heard statements by the representatives of Australia and of the United Kingdom. Both speakers addressed the issue of the prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorised access to and use of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), the illicit proliferation of which among terrorists and non-state actors was a significant threat to global civil aviation and international peace-keeping efforts.

The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be at 3 p.m. this afternoon, when it will continue hearing statements under the item on Transparency in Armaments.

Statement by Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on A Cut-Off of Production of Fissionable Material: Considerations, Requirements, and IAEA Capabilities, said the United Nations General Assembly had adopted Resolution A/RES/48/75/L on 16 December 1993, which, inter alia, requested the IAEA to provide assistance, as requested, for examination of verification arrangements for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). An FMCT foreseen by General Assembly resolutions, the Shannon mandate and the NPT States Parties would include an undertaking not to produce any fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, and not to assist other States in pursuing such activities. Insofar as the production of such material for other legitimate purposes was concerned, it would follow that verification arrangements would need to be such as to meet all the requirements of the undertaking of an FMCT.

In the IAEA Secretariat’s view, Mr. Rauf said, the technical objective of verifying compliance with an FMCT would be to provide assurance against any new production of weapon-usable fissile material, and the diversion of fissile material from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle to nuclear weapon purposes. A number of issues would have to be addressed by States in order to clarify the basic undertaking of the States Parties and the scope of an FMCT verification regime. These issues, as far as verification was concerned, could be reduced to two basic questions: how was the undertaking not to produce fissile material for weapon purposes to be verified, and could the undertaking be verified with a high degree of assurance by simply focusing on verification activities at a core of facilities or should these be comprehensive; and how, and to what extent, should verification ensure that stockpiles for nuclear weapon purposes, where they existed, were not increased, and where they did not exist, were not created thereafter. The way in which States would address these issues would determine: the verification architecture and the scope of activities under the verification system; the ability of the verification organization to provide a high degree of assurance that no activity proscribed by the treaty was being conducted in or by a particular State, particularly through provisions to enable the verification body to detect possible undeclared nuclear facilities and activities, including fissile material production; and the overall costs of the verification system for the States party to an FMCT.

IAEA safeguards were applied under different types of agreements and arrangements: the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had in force voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the IAEA, which covered some or all civilian nuclear material and/or facilities from which the IAEA could select material or facilities for the application of safeguards, Mr. Rauf said. In the three remaining non-NPT States, IAEA safeguards were applied at specific facilities to the facilities themselves or to nuclear material and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. IAEA safeguards were regarded as a cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; they had begun in the 1960s and had continued to evolve, without pause, as new verification responsibilities were assigned, as peaceful nuclear operations increased in size and complexity and as international relations posed new challenges. The legal, technical and administrative arrangements adopted in different States and in different facilities responded to obligations mandated through Safeguards Agreements. In a wide range of areas, consideration of the existing safeguards arrangements would ensure that an FMCT verification and IAEA safeguards were implemented in ways that provided the maximum value at minimum cost.

It was the IAEA’s assessment, Mr. Rauf said, that verification of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials would be possible through a verification system quite similar to the one applied for the IAEA safeguards system. The choice of a system to be developed to verify compliance with a fissile material production cut-off treaty was a matter for States to resolve. In this regard, States would have to address questions related to the different levels of assurance as well as the costs involved. The IAEA stood ready to help in the process of further discussions and negotiations in whatever way was considered appropriate by States.

Statements by delegations on Transparency In Armaments

CAROLINE MILLAR (Australia) said with regards to an issue of vital significance to international security, namely, the prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorised access to and use of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), the illicit proliferation of these latter among terrorists and non-state actors was a significant threat to global civil aviation and international peace-keeping efforts. Encouragingly, many States were countering this threat, recognising the need for effective national controls over the production, storage and transfer of MANPADS. This need was recognised in two consecutive consensus United Nations General Assembly resolutions, in the most recent of which, the General Assembly encouraged States to enact or improve legislation, regulations, procedures and stockpile management practices to exercise effective control over MANPADS. States needed to act on this resolution as a matter of urgency.

The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements for export controls of MANPADS provided very good guidance for what States could do to ensure effective control over the expert and storage of MANPADS. Measures in the Elements included maintaining inventories of weapons and their serial numbers, restricting access to MANPADS-relevant classified information, and storing missiles and firing mechanisms separately. Moreover, exporting States were to satisfy themselves of a recipient States’ willingness and ability to implement effective controls over MANPADS. Implementation of measures such as the Elements could enhance the transparency of the trade in MANPADS, thereby enhancing international peace and security. In discussing MANPADS, there was an opportunity for the Conference on Disarmament to demonstrate that it was an institution capable of addressing the evolving global security environment and concerns of the international community.

FIONA PATERSON (United Kingdom) said with regard to transparency in armaments, it was important to have effective control on the availability of MANPADS. These presented a particular threat if allowed to fall into the hands of undesirable end users. Terrorist groups possessed these systems and had used them to target military and civilian aircraft. Terrorists also continued to seek to gain access to ever more sophisticated systems, and as long as there was leakage from existing stockpiles and diversion from the legitimate trade in these arms, terrorists would continue to acquire and use them. The international community had begun making steady progress toward more effective control of these systems.

The Wassenaar Elements contained clear provisions for the sharing on information on potential receiving governments that were proven to fail to meet the necessary standards in export control guarantees and practices, and non-state entities that were or could be attempting to acquire MANPADS. They also highlighted the urgent need to ensure that MANPADS were properly stored. The Elements were now seen as the key document or the gold standard, and similar practices had now been adopted by an increasing number of regional groupings. It was vital that these standards be fully implemented, putting the need to ensure proper control of MANPADS above commercial considerations. The United Kingdom had this year been working to further develop storage best practice. All members of the Conference should support ongoing work to spread and effectively implement the highest standards of control over these systems.

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