3 August 2006

The Conference on Disarmament today opened the third and last part of its 2006 session and started a focused, structured debate on the effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Introducing the debate on negative security assurances, the incoming President of the Conference, Ambassador Osmane Camara of Senegal, provided a historical overview of how the issue had been discussed in the past. He said today, a series of plenary meetings were starting to revisit the issue in a more systematic way, and he encouraged delegations to address the nature and scope of this agenda item at this meeting.

Sergei Ordzonikidze, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, said the policy of continuity and coherence, which had been forged by the Presidents of the Conference this year, offered a real opportunity for it to overcome the issues stalling its work. He hoped this unique body could live up to the expectations, especially at this difficult period of time.

Issues raised by speakers included that providing effective negative security assurances, within the framework of a legally binding treaty, was a legal obligation and not only a moral imperative; and that unless negative security assurances were legally binding, they would remain mere diplomatic niceties, leaving the disarmament and non-proliferation regime weak and vulnerable. It was pointed out that both positive and negative security assurances usually had limitations and were conditional. There were varying ideas on whether negative security assurances should be provided only to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) who complied to its rules or to all non-nuclear-weapon States. There were repeated calls for the Conference to establish, in accordance with the relevant mandate as contained in the Five Ambassadors proposal, an Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances so that it could start substantive work in negotiating an international legal instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States within the framework of the NPT. A number of speakers expressed the belief that the issue of negative security assurances would better be taken up within the framework of the NPT and not the Conference on Disarmament.

Speaking at the meeting were representatives of the Russian Federation, Morocco on behalf of the Group of 21, Pakistan, Egypt on behalf of the new Agenda Coalition, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, India, China, Malaysia, Algeria, Senegal, Belarus, Finland on behalf of the European Union, Italy, Germany, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Myanmar and Canada.

At the beginning of the meeting, the President paid tribute to Ambassador Amina Mohamed of Kenya who was leaving Geneva after five and a half years of illustrious work representing her country in the Conference and the United Nations. Most of the speakers also offered words of praise and wishes for a successful future in her new assignment.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 8 August when it will continue its debate on negative security assurances.

Statements

OSMANE CAMARA (Senegal), the Incoming President of the Conference, said that the Conference was today starting a focused, structured debate on agenda item 4, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The President recalled that this issue was included on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament when it was created in 1979, and the Committee had established the Working Group on negative security assurances which annually presented its report to the Committee. In 1984, the Committee was renamed the Conference on Disarmament, and the Working Group had been renamed the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances and it had been renewed every year until 1994 when the Conference could not reach agreement on renewing its work and that of two other Ad Hoc Committees. It was re-established in 1998 when it resumed its work and presented its report to the Conference. Since then, the issues related to negative security assurances had been addressed in the plenary meetings of the Conference. In 2004, there had been informal plenary meetings on all agenda items. A further step forward was taken in 2005 when the Ambassador of Norway held a number of plenary meetings on the four subjects of the agenda of the Conference. Matters on negative security assurances were discussed in July 2005.

Today, a series of plenary meetings were starting to revisit the issue in a more systematic way. Ambassador Camara encouraged delegations to address the nature and scope of this agenda item at this meeting.

SERGEI ORDZHONIKIDZE, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, said the United Nations was in the process of improving its sound system at the Palais des Nations and apologized for the technical problem which caused a delay in the start of the meeting. He recalled that on 21 June, 2006, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had addressed the Conference, underscoring its role in a period when the multilateral disarmament machinery was stalling. The Secretary-General was very committed to, and concerned about, issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. To underscore this commitment, the Secretary-General had sent him a letter in which he said that at this critical time, he hoped the Member States of the Conference would make good use of the Conference to create momentum. The policy of continuity and coherence, which had been forged by the Presidents of the Conference this year, offered a real opportunity for it to overcome the issues stalling its work. He hoped this unique body could live up to the expectations, especially at this difficult period of time.

VALERY LOSHCHININ (Russian Federation) said he would like to give the Conference some brief information on the results of the St. Petersburg Summit of the G8, which concluded two weeks ago, on disarmament issues. Traditionally, the G8 attached importance to the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Under the presidency of Russia, the G8 strove to ensure the continuity of the work of preceding years and to continue support for multilateral efforts, with the United Nations playing an important role, for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After reading out what the G8’s final document said on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and listing proposals by the Russian President to provide services on the nuclear fuel cycle, and by the United States President on a global nuclear energy partnership, Ambassador Loshchinin said the Russian Federation would continue to work together with all interested partners to refine and further develop these proposals.

One substantive issue was how to unblock the situation that had developed at the Conference. The G8 supported the Conference on Disarmament and had urged it to start and conclude negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which was the next logical step. This did not mean that the States parties had moved from their positions on what they considered to be their priority areas in the Conference, and they were far from close to agreeing on a balanced programme of work. The Russian Federation was satisfied with the results of the G8 Summit which were important and relevant. They showed the interest of the G8 in finding answers to contemporary challenges on disarmament issues.

MOHAMMED BENJABER (Morocco), speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, said the Group of 21 reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group of 21 reaffirmed the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21 noted with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament, there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties with regard to evolving a common approach acceptable to all had also been pointed out. The Group of 21 considered that the conclusion of such an instrument would be an important step towards achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The obligation of nuclear-weapon States to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, once enshrined in a legally binding instrument, would also help build trust of non-nuclear–weapon States.

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) said Pakistan supported the statement just made by Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, and it endorsed the Group of 21’s call for a ”universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument (which) should be pursued as a matter or urgency”. This was not just a moral imperative but a legal obligation. Negative security assurances were an integral part of the work of the Conference. The support for negative security assurances was based on three elements: elimination of all nuclear weapons was the ultimate security assurance to all States; pending such an elimination, non-nuclear-weapon States must be given negative security assurances; and the negative security assurances should be universal, uniform, unconditional and legally binding. Hence, the need for codification.

The Non Aligned Movement had expressed concern over the development of new types of nuclear weapons and their possible deployment. The geographical scope of the use of nuclear weapons had increased with the expansion of nuclear alliances and provisions for sharing of nuclear weapons and command and control amongst alliance members. There were two declared, and one undeclared, nuclear weapon States. For its part, Pakistan had made a solemn pledge that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. All along, Pakistan had been trying to build consensus around negative security assurances. No issue was riper for negotiations than negative security assurances. By elaborating and codifying unconditional negative security assurances, the Conference would help create a climate of confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States in the present tense international environment, and provide incentives for disarmament and non-proliferation, as noted by the statement of the Non Aligned Movement today. The Conference should quickly plug loopholes in negative security assurances, not widen them. If negative security assurances were not legally binding, they would remain mere diplomatic niceties, leaving the disarmament and non-proliferation regime weak and vulnerable.

AMIN MELEIKA (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, New Zealand and Egypt), noted that the Conference had been unable to fully and satisfactorily fulfil its mandate for the last decade and this had not only brought into question the credibility of the Conference but had also done nothing to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The New Agenda Coalition strongly urged members of the Conference to exert all possible efforts so that concrete work could begin, adding that this would require a degree of compromise from all States. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses – constituted an important foundation in maintaining international peace and security. Achieving the universality of the NPT was indispensable and the Coalition urged India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to it as nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

The New Agenda Coalition was deeply concerned about plans to research the development of new weapons or the modification of existing ones. If nuclear disarmament measures were to gain the confidence of the international community, they had to incorporate the essential elements of irreversibility, verification and transparency. The Coalition’s main objective was a world free of nuclear weapons and the Conference should do its part in this endeavour if it intended to be still relevant.

JOSEPH AYALOGU (Nigeria) said that as long as nuclear weapons existed, they constituted a threat to both the haves and have nots. The only effective and credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The existence of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to international security and also encouraged proliferation. Pending the time that nuclear disarmament was universally achieved, the international community had to find an effective measure to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Providing unconditional, uniform, comprehensive and effective internationally legally binding negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was absolutely necessary for their security. This became important in view of the continued existence of nuclear weapons as well as the emergence of new military doctrines.

Ambassador Ayalogu said that the basic obligations under a negative security assurances treaty would be that nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that had voluntarily given up the nuclear option; in the case of non-compliance, an emergency meeting of the Conference of States parties or the Security Council should be held and they should provide the necessary protection and assistance to that State; and finally, the treaty should have a duration as long as nuclear weapons existed.

MOHAMMED BENJABER (Morocco) said Morocco supported the statement of the Group of 21 on negative security assurances. It was convinced of the need to stop the nuclear arms race and to put in place an international, effective and verifiable disarmament and non-proliferation regime. While waiting for the total and definitive destruction of nuclear weapons, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States had to be ensured. Eleven years after the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it was only fair that non-nuclear-weapon States should ask for the legalization of the commitments made during the 1995 Review and Extension NPT Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Morocco regretted the lack of movement on negative security assurances, which should apply to all State parties to the NPT who had given up their right to nuclear weapons. These negative security assurances could act like urgent confidence building measures and a guarantee of international stability and security. They could also reinforce the legitimacy and efficiency of the NPT which was in crisis. Morocco supported the resolution which the General Assembly adopted annually, reaffirming the need to conclude such a treaty and tackling the contribution that the Conference could make. Such negative security assurances were necessary until nuclear disarmament became universal. Morocco hoped that the Conference could finally reach consensus on common wording that could be included into such a Convention.

AMINA MOHAMED (Kenya) said Kenya fully aligned itself with the view expressed by Morocco on behalf of the Group of 21. The elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As long as these weapons continued to exist, they would continue to pose a threat to international peace and security and survival. While the best assurance against the nuclear threat was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the legitimate interest of nuclear-weapon States to provide credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States had been recognized. Nuclear-weapon States should engage in good faith negotiations so as to reach a satisfactory agreement. Kenya called for urgent measures to be taken to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States.

Ambassador Mohamed said in bidding farewell to the Conference, she wished to note that it had been a sobering and enriching experience. She left with the satisfaction that States parties had collectively begun to take the future back into their own hands, especially at this time of extreme tension.

ANTON VASILIEV (Russian Federation) , reading a statement on behalf of VALERY LOSHCHININ (Russian Federation), said in order to assist a compromise on the Conference on Disarmament’s programme of work, the Russian Federation would be ready not to object to the consensus based on the last version of the Five Ambassadors initiative (CD/1693/Rev.1). In this context, the Russian Federation would not be against the proposal to establish the Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on the issue of assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation realized the significance of this problem for many countries and was prepared to attend to their concerns. Russia would be ready to move towards elaboration of a global negative assurances agreement, provided, obviously, that it would take into consideration its military doctrine and the national security concept. The issue of security assurances was particularly important within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While encouraging efforts to create new nuclear weapon free zones, Russia viewed them in the light of the task of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional security.

The Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate venue to work on security assurances since it was a unique multilateral disarmament forum. In the past, during the years of activities of its Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances, the Conference had accumulated a significant intellectual experience on this issue. Development of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT was an essential instrument of strengthening security and stability in the world, and Russia would continue its active work to assure progress in this direction.

JAYANT PRASAD (India) said India had long held the view that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and nuclear disarmament remained India’s foreign policy concern. Pending nuclear disarmament, measures were needed to reduce the nuclear danger, including the threat of accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear-weapon States had consistently sought effective international arrangements to assure themselves against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While considering the issue of effective international arrangements for assuring non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Conference must also consider the related and complementary proposals on reaching an understanding on no-first use of nuclear weapons and negotiating a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Besides its other benefits, such as rendering nuclear weapons redundant and reducing their salience for military strategy, such a convention would reinforce security assurances.

India’s nuclear doctrine was based on a posture of no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. India respected the choice of a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. India had consistently supported the proposal for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee under this agenda item in the Conference to negotiate, with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or thereat of use of nuclear weapons. India was committed to working with other members of the Conference to seek ways to begin substantive work on all the core issues on its agenda, in a manner that took into account concerns and priorities of all Member States and secured their support.

CHENG JINGYE (China) said providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was an important issue in the field of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and was also a main issue on the agenda of the Conference. Regrettably, non-nuclear-weapon States had not been provided by nuclear-weapon States with unconditional security assurances of no-use of nuclear weapons, and the negotiations on an international legal instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States had not yet been launched. At the same time, some tendencies in the international security situation were disturbing. The development of following pre-emptive nuclear strategy, emphasizing nuclear weapons role in national security policy and establishing nuclear strike plans targeting non-nuclear-weapon States had made the proper settlement of the issue of negative security issues much more prominent. Non-nuclear-weapon States were fully justified in demanding not to be threatened by nuclear weapons and insisting that the relevant assurances be given in a legally-binding form. Early commencement of negotiations on negative security assurances remained a realistic task in the current context of international arms control and disarmament.

Ever since the first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China had committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time and under any circumstances. China supported that the Conference on Disarmament establish, in accordance with the relevant mandate as contained in the Five Ambassadors proposal, an Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances so that it could start substantive work in negotiating an international legal instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

HSU KING BEE (Malaysia) said Malaysia reiterated the need for multilateral, legally binding and unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States. Effective measures to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would not only strengthen international peace and security but would also positively contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus it was also in the interest of nuclear-weapon States to address the issue of negative security assurances comprehensively. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were positive steps towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and limiting nuclear proliferation geographically. It was in this regard that Malaysia, together with other members of the Association of South East Asian nations, had created the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the 1997 Bangkok Treaty.

Malaysia believed that negative security assurances was one of the important issues that the Conference and other disarmament fora should resolve since it was a key factor in the agreement to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pending agreement on a programme of work, the Conference could begin discussions on key issues concerning negative security assurances.

IDRISS JAZAIRY (Algeria) said Algeria associated itself with the statement by the Group of 21. He would like to address three issues today: the foundation of the legitimacy of negative security assurances; the limited nature of the current assurances; and the requests of Algeria in order to compliment the current regime with new assurances. Concerning the foundation of legitimacy of negative security assurances, it was the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive sufficient responses to their security concerns against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was not charity, this was the ethical, legal and political commitment which fell on the shoulders of nuclear-weapon States in exchange for the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to forsake the right to have such weapons indefinitely. These safeguards were only provisional, as the true safety was the total and final elimination of these weapons as nuclear-weapon States had committed to do. Today, there were very serious developments which opened the way to the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and left issues very vague.

Today, the very limited nature of the present safeguards were insufficient to respond to the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. The positive security assurances provided by the General Assembly did not respond sufficiently to these worries. Also, the negative security assurances made through other General Assembly resolutions were very limited; they were unilateral declarations without any nature of legal commitment, with the exception of China. As for the assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free zones, not all parts of the world were covered by these. In this light, one could not overlook the situation in the Middle East, in light of the current crisis, which was the result of the flagrant aggression by Israel on Palestine and Lebanon. Israel was using internationally banned weapons in this aggression. Israel was the only State in the Middle East which had not acceded to the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This led him to his third point, Algeria’s requests for steps to complete the current system of assurances. Current negotiations between the super powers and other States on limiting the threats of proliferation addressed the question of negative security assurances and safeguards bilaterally. Perhaps, providing negative security assurances in the framework of an international agreement was better that piecemeal. The Conference on Disarmament remained the best forum to establish a legally binding instrument in which nuclear-weapon States would refrain from threat or use of weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The Five Ambassadors proposal was an excellent basis for ensuring the security assurances of all parties. These negative security assurances were but one step towards criminalizing the utilization of these weapons of terror which were a threat to international peace and security and to mankind.

OUSMANE CAMARA (Senegal) said Senegal agreed with Group of 21 statement that the best and most effective security assurance remained nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. What was needed was a strong political will commensurate with the security that all countries sought. The unilateral statements on positive and negative assurances made in 1995 were of great importance, but they were limited by the conditions to which they were subjected. New requirements of international peace and security needed new thinking that guaranteed security to non-nuclear-weapon States in today’s reality. New commitments of equal or greater force to the commitments of 1995 should be developed. Various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on negative security assurances could serve as an inspiration for this discussion. Senegal supported re-establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances to start negotiations on this important issue within the framework of the agreed programme of work.

IVAN GRINEVICH (Belarus) said Belarus was among the first States to have voluntarily renounced the possibility of having nuclear weapons. The proliferation of the use of such weapons, particularly under the conditions of the growing terrorism threat, was amongst the most serious challenges to international peace. Belarus supported the appeal of the G8 for States to observe their commitments under the International Atomic Energy Agency and to take effective measures to ensure that nuclear technology and other nuclear issues were not transferred. Belarus confirmed its commitment. Belarus did not have nuclear weapons and it attached great importance to the provision of legally binding assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. Belarus had suffered greatly as a result of the Chernobyl.

TEEMU SEPPONEN (Finland), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said the European Union welcomed this focused structured debate dedicated to the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This issue remained important on the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Positive and negative security assurances could play an important role, and could serve as an incentive to forego the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and a deterrent. The European Union acknowledged the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones which could enhance regional and global peace and security and were a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence. In conclusion, the European Union stood ready to contribute to the deliberations on the issue of negative security assurances.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) supported the statement made by the Presidency of the European Union and welcomed the possibility of revising again the issue of negative security assurances at the Conference. Italy was eager to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty immediately because it believed that the issue of nuclear fissile material was the most urgent nuclear disarmament/non-proliferation matter which needed to be disciplined today. Several delegations were of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament was not the appropriate venue for dealing with negative security assurances and considered the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) a more appropriate forum. Italy tended to share this point of view since it believed that only NPT non-nuclear-weapon States in compliance with the treaty could benefit from these assurances. Several options were in front of the world. First of all, the framework: should it be the Conference on Disarmament or the NPT. Second, the nature of a commitment: should it be a fully fledged multilateral treaty, which in any case would have the nature of a declaration of intentions, the enhancement of the concept through nuclear weapon free zones, strengthening the existing United Nations Security resolutions, or other bilateral and plurilateral options.

Italy’s priority was and remained the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, but, having in mind the interest of many delegations for the issue of negative security assurances, it was ready to consider all possible ways to accommodate such an interest. It was ready to consider the option that was more appropriate to allow the Conference to get down to substantive work.

ALBRECHT VON WITTKE (Germany) said Germany fully subscribed to the statement made today by the Presidency of the European Union on negative security assurances. Germany considered negative security assurances as an important issue which should be pursued without further delay, and it welcomed any effort in this regard. Unilateral security assurances and so-called positive security assurances were important first steps, but not sufficient since it was the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to receive security assurances, according to Security Council resolution 984 (1995). It was no surprise that the issue of security assurances had been at the heart of the NPT since the treaty’s inception.

The Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor conferences had for a long time tried to deal in substance with the issue of negative security assurances. Germany supported paragraph one of the Five Ambassadors proposal for a comprehensive programme of work for the Conference (CD/1693/Rev.1), which proposed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument. Germany was flexible as to how exactly address the issue of security assurances in the Conference and requested other States to show the same flexibility to enable the Conference to arrive at the necessary consensus.

CHANG DONG-HEE (Republic of Korea) said nuclear weapon States should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that faithfully met their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other safeguards obligations. Such security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States would likely further strengthen the non-proliferation regime as they would further dissuade States from acquiring nuclear weapons and they would be conducive to building confidence among States parties. The Republic of Korea also understood that there was a divergence of views over whether the Conference was the right venue to pursue this issue. The Republic of Korea believed that it was necessary for the Conference to look into this issue in a comprehensive manner, taking into account both the necessity of providing security assurances and the evolving political realities. The Conference should go the extra mile to find a formula under which it could begin negotiations at an early date.

JURG STREULI (Switzerland) said he would like to speak about four issues linked to negative security assurances. First, it was clear that Security Council resolutions, agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones and declarations by nuclear-weapon States were accompanied by reservations on the part of those nuclear-weapon States to use nuclear weapons under certain circumstances. Consequently, Switzerland believed that these negative security assurances given to States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) to be insufficient. Second, the decision by certain States parties to the NPT to allocate funds for the development of nuclear arms made the adoption of a legally binding treaty on negative security assurances even more essential. Third, Switzerland supported in general the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, Switzerland believed that countries, which like itself were located outside nuclear-weapon-free zones and which had never owned nuclear weapons, could not benefit from negative security assurances within the framework of such regional zones, and therefore they were faced with unequal treatment. And fourth, there was also the difficult and complication issue of negative security assurances provided by States which were not party to the NPT but which were assumed to be nuclear-weapon States.

In conclusion, Switzerland believed that non-nuclear-weapon States which were States parties to the NPT had a legitimate right to commitments from nuclear-weapon States. It was also clear that only States fully in compliance with the NPT could get these negative security assurances. The most appropriate forum for negotiating such a convention would be the Conference on Disarmament which was the only multilateral forum which had among its members the nuclear-weapon States and those States assumed to have nuclear weapons.

U NYUNT SWE (Myanmar) said Myanmar fully associated itself with the statement of the Group of 21. Myanmar believed that nuclear disarmament should be accorded the highest priority on the international agenda for arms control and disarmament. Myanmar reiterated its call for full implementation of the 13 practical steps outlined in the final document of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. However, an objective assessment of the implementation of these benchmarks showed virtually no progress. Pending, the achievement of this goal, it was imperative that nuclear-weapon States put in place effective measures for prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war among themselves and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Agreement on negative security assurances would guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and would enhance international security. States parties to the NPT which had voluntarily given up the nuclear weapon option had the legitimate right to receive such security assurances, and Myanmar strongly favoured a legally binding international instrument on security assurances. There was an urgent need to reach early agreement on such effective international arrangements.

PAUL MEYER (Canada) said the P6 (Six Presidents) structured discussions had demonstrated the extent to which the members of the Conference on Disarmament were committed to undertaking real substantive work in the Conference. The discussions had also provided a glimpse of a new path forward. It had become increasingly clear that there was a strong interest in seeing the Conference negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continue discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As such, it seemed that the time was right to do just that - launch negotiations on an FMCT without preconditions – and continue discussions on the two other issues. As for where Canada thought the issue of security assurances could fit within this construct, it believed that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be the best and most logical forum for discussion of security assurances, as they were a key benefit of adherence to the treaty for non-nuclear-weapon States. Nonetheless, in the spirit of compromise and constructive engagement, Canada could accept consideration of security assurances within the context of the Conference.

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008