Conference on Disarmament Holds Thematic Debate on Nuclear Disarmament

28 February 2006

The Conference on Disarmament today held a thematic debate on assessing the implementation of nuclear disarmament, hearing from the Russian Federation and the United States on their efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals and from other Member States who outlined their priorities within the Conference.

There were calls for the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and the creation of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, as well as demands for more transparency and assurances from nuclear weapon States that nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear weapon States. A number of States said while the figures provided by the United States and the Russian Federation today were welcomed, they were insufficient, and more information and transparency about actual stockpiles was requested.

Speakers also raised the importance of preserving the multilateral framework in the field of disarmament, and condemned the lack of a political will in some capitals which was stopping multilateral fora like the Conference from making progress. Member States also reiterated their support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and urged the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The following States took the floor today: Syria, Italy, Egypt, Russia, Argentina, Iraq on behalf of the Group of 21, Brazil, France, Australia, Japan, the United States, Israel, Sweden, the Netherlands, Mexico, Norway and New Zealand.

At the beginning of the meeting, the President of the Conference, Ambassador Park In-kook of the Republic of Korea, said that the Conference had learned that on Thursday, 23 February, a snow laden roof had collapsed on a market in Russia, killing 56 persons and injuring dozens others. Also, on Saturday, 25 February, a six-story building housing shops had collapsed in Bangladesh, killing at least 19 and injuring more than 50 persons. On behalf of the Conference and on his own behalf, he extended sincere condolences to the families of the victims and to the peoples and Governments of the Russian Federation and Bangladesh.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 2 March. The Conference will continue with its thematic debate on nuclear disarmament, specifically on future nuclear disarmament measures.

Statements

BASHAR JAAFARI (Syria) said that convening this special meeting to discuss nuclear disarmament came after the failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review (NPT) Conference and the World Summit last year to agree on any measures regarding nuclear disarmament in general and the disarmament of nuclear weapons in particular. In view of this worrying retraction, Syria wished to highlight some important realities. In the 1995 NPT Review Conference, States parties had decided to indefinitely extend the treaty in exchange with making the Middle East a nuclear weapon free zone. Between the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, all Arab States which had not acceded to the NPT went ahead and acceded to it. In 2005, the General Assembly, for the twenty-sixth year in a row, adopted a resolution in which it called for establishing a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Despite all these international and regional developments, Israel remained the only State in the Middle East which had not acceded to the NPT and refused to subject its installations to the safeguarding regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the same time, major nuclear weapon States continued to provide Israel with the latest nuclear technology. The NPT s 2000 Review Conference welcomed the accession of all Arab States to the treaty and called on Israel to accede to it and to subject its installations to the IAEA s comprehensive safeguard regime. However, Israel, which had unambiguous support from major nuclear weapon States, continued to reject the will of the international community and dumped its nuclear waste in the Syrian Golan Heights. Syria continued to work with great seriousness in order to render the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. Syria was ready to start comprehensive work on a programme of work of the Conference on the basis of the Five Ambassadors proposal which continued to be the best basis. Nuclear disarmament continued to be Syria’s main priority and establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament was the minimum basis which it could aspire to.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said when the Conference had celebrated its 1000th plenary meeting a few weeks ago, Italy had said that the results achieved in the past by the Conference, especially in the field of weapons of mass destruction, should not be underestimated. Among other things, a halt to the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and the limit to five of the number of countries entitled to keep nuclear arsenals were achieved in Geneva through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On the other hand, nuclear terrorism remained a possible threat. One country had announced its withdrawal from the NPT and declared possession of nuclear weapons, and clandestine nuclear activities had come to the surface. The mixed record so far and the persisting difficulties made Italy believe that unfortunately, a total prohibition of nuclear weapons through a single multilateral engagement was not around the corner. A step-by-step approach was more realistic. It had to be recognized that in the past six years, the international reality had changed. New threats had emerged, international terrorism had shown its tragic potentialities, and nuclear clandestine activities and traffic had brought to the surface the risks that possession of the complete nuclear fuel cycle could entail. This was why Italy welcomed these meetings focused on nuclear disarmament issues and it shared the aspiration of those who advocated more efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. In order to find an understanding on a programme of work in the Conference, Italy supported the establishment of subsidiary bodies, one of which should have the mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. At the same time, negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty remained Italy’s priority in the Conference.

SAMEH SHOUKRY (Egypt) said the continuation of the stalemate in the Conference was a source of main concern for Egypt, especially at a time when the size and seriousness of security challenges faced regionally and internationally were increasing. Egypt, like many other countries, sought to preserve the multilateral framework in the field of disarmament, and continued to see the Conference as the only multilateral body for negotiating disarmament issues. The real problem in the Conference was the lack of a true political will in some countries. Such positions could not go along at the same time with calls to end the stalemate in the Conference by selectively dealing with some issues of disarmament. Any real movement in the Conference could only be achieved if the interests and priorities of all parties were taken into account equally. This was the basis of any multilateral negotiations. Also, there must be an end to the efforts to circumvent the agenda or pass over it. Nuclear disarmament remained a priority for Egypt regionally and internationally. As long as there were nuclear weapons, the world would not be able to achieve peace and stability. Egypt was disappointed that the Conference had failed to heed the call of the NPT Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Egypt was convinced of the importance of the NPT as an essential factor in the field of disarmament. Arab countries had rejected the nuclear option by acceding to the NPT and they supported a nuclear free Middle East zone. The NPT had called on Israel to accede to the NPT and to put its installations under the safeguard regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Therefore, Egypt believed in the importance of taking all practical steps to ensure the universalization of the NPT.

VALERY LOSCHININ (Russia) said Russia had said it would not reject the Five Ambassadors proposal provided that consensus could be found on its basis. Russia also did not reject the proposed mandate of work on nuclear disarmament in the Conference. Russia understood the importance of this issue for the international community and confirmed its commitment to article 6 of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Implementation of the obligations of the State to reduce its nuclear arsenal was being carried out by Russia in the light of agreements with the United States and also unilaterally. The figures showed that in the area of nuclear disarmament, a substantial process was taking place. The reduction of Russia’s nuclear arsenal was a very technical, very complex and very expensive process which was continuing on a regular basis. At present, compared to 1991, the total number of nuclear weapons and stockpiles had been reduced by more than five fold in the Russian Federation. The non-strategic nuclear arsenal in Russia had been reduced four fold since 1999. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ensured the preeminence of nuclear disarmament and weapon controls and this was a considerable step by Russia to ensure its obligations under the NPT. Russia’s steps towards nuclear disarmament were accompanied by the structural changes necessary. Russia attached particular importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which it had ratified. This treaty could help to strengthen the irreversibility of continuing reductions of nuclear arsenals and it was important to international security and to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia remained interested in strengthening the NPT and remained committed to its obligations under article 6 of the treaty. The NPT remained an irreplaceable component of international peace and security. New challenges and threats to it must be resolved on the basis of the NPT itself. Russia called on all States to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

MARCELO VALLE FONROUGE (Argentina) said nuclear weapon States should reflect the objectives of nuclear disarmament. This should take place within the relevant nuclear fora, while agreements at the bilateral level were also welcome. Argentina hoped that greater efforts would be made. A series of practical steps to fully eliminate nuclear weapons included calls for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and starting immediate negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. States were urged to take the necessary steps to ensure the universalization of the CTBT and Argentina repeated the importance of the moratorium on nuclear tests. Establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament within the Conference was a move forward towards compliance with article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Establishment of a body on negative guarantees so that States that renounced nuclear weapons could be ensured that nuclear weapon States would not use these weapons against them would be an important step forward.

BAHA AL-SHIBIB (Iraq), speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, said the G21 welcomed the initiative by the six Presidents of the 2006 session of the Conference to hold structured debates on the items of the agenda. The issue of nuclear disarmament was of particular importance to the G21. The G21 regretted the lack of agreement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the 2005 World Summit as well as other disarmament fora. The G21 considered that the mere existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or the threat of their use represented a continuous threat to humanity. The Group emphasized that nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority for the Conference. The G21 States parties to the NPT deeply regretted the lack of political will that prevented the 2005 Review Conference from achieving substantive results. The Group called upon all States to fully comply with their commitments regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and to refrain from any act that might lead to a new nuclear arms race, such as the development of new nuclear weapons or new types of nuclear weapons or their modernization. In conclusion, the G21 statement said the Group was concerned over the continuing impasse in the Conference and called once again for the necessary political will to enable the Conference to resume substantive work with the immediate establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the pressing issue of nuclear disarmament.

CARLOS ANTONIO DA ROCHA PARANHOS (Brazil) said Brazil fully supported the Five Ambassadors proposal. It was frustrating that such little progress had been achieved in the past few years on the issue of implementation of nuclear disarmament. The lack of political will in a small number of capitals even to abide by what had been agreed upon in the Conference in the nineties remained the basic impediment to any significant political movement in the Conference. One example was that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was not yet in force. Another was that establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate fissile material for nuclear weapons, based on the Shannon mandate, had been permanently delayed. The lack of results in the work of the Conference was the clear result of this lack of political will. The situation was aggravated by the fact that non nuclear weapon States were witnessing a clear shift of focus of some Nuclear weapon States from some of their commitments concerning nuclear disarmament. There was a lack of progress in assessing the implementation of nuclear disarmament as non nuclear weapon States, which were the huge majority, could not take center stage and could not report on the disarmament of those already disarmed. Reporting on the implementation of the commitments adhered to on nuclear disarmament was not a concession but an obligation. Transparency in information sharing and political will would have to be used as key political elements to guide the way.

FRANCOIS RIVASSEAU (France) said France was ready to actively participate in an exchange on the principal subjects identified by members of the Conference. France had no difficulty to come again to the Conference and inform it about the State’s nuclear disarmament actions taken within its obligations under article 6 of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. France’s actions came, among others, within the common framework of the position of the European Union. It was worth recalling here that the three principle points that determined France’s position included the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the determination to move forward systematically to reduce nuclear weapons and to move towards general disarmament. If the Conference was to focus on the proposals on the table before it, France would say that one issue that had been identified as most ripe and likely to reach success was the FMCT. This was the next logical step to nuclear disarmament. This was France’s commitment. For France, implementation of its nuclear obligations included first and foremost the FMCT. The call for an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament linked to the start of negotiations on an FMCT no longer made much sense for France. Some States had reservations on the FMCT. France respected these reservations because they were based on perceptions of national security. France respected that, but wanted to voice the wish that discussions on this issue should be more transparent because it was through more openness that Member States would be able to revitalize the Conference. He hoped this year there would be an opportunity to do so.

CRAIG MACLACHLAN (Australia) said Australia was committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament through balanced and progressive steps. All States had a role to play, but it was the nuclear weapon States that must take the lead in reducing the size of their arsenals. Importantly, several of these States have taken steps towards nuclear disarmament, but they should make further transparent and irreversible efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons - towards fulfilling their end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain between themselves and non-nuclear weapon States. In recognition of this reality, Australia had long supported efforts by all States to promote an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament. Clearly much more can be done in this area. A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would strengthen disarmament - and non­proliferation - by capping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would contribute to nuclear disarmament through a permanent ban on nuclear weapons testing. Moratoria on testing were welcome, but they were no substitute for the CTBT.

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said all the Member States of the Conference must unite their efforts to improve this present situation concerning nuclear disarmament. Japan had placed its highest importance on nuclear disarmament. As the only country to have suffered nuclear devastation, Japan recognized that it had a moral responsibility to the international community to actively campaign for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and it had conducted vigorous diplomatic efforts to realize this aim. The next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2010 would provide an excellent and timely opportunity for the States Parties to review progress of nuclear disarmament under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) and Japan encouraged both Russia and the United States to take further steps towards its full implementation, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty. Japan hoped the other nuclear weapon States would make similar or further efforts in the reduction of nuclear arsenals. Greater transparency in the process of nuclear disarmament was essential, and the Conference offered a good opportunity for nuclear weapon States to inform the members on efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. Japan believed the Conference must start negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty as soon as possible. It was the most realistic multilateral legal disarmament measure envisaged at this moment. Finally, Japan called on all States not parties to the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon States without delay or conditions. Likewise, all States that had not yet done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force.

THOMAS CYNKIN (United States) said Ambassador Loschinin had spoken eloquently of the joint efforts of Russia and the United States on arms reduction. Since 1992, the United States had expended more than $ 9 billion in non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance to the States of the former Soviet Union. This assistance to the former Soviet Union had resulted in more than 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads being removed from deployment and the elimination of more than 1,000 ballistic missiles. In 2002, the G-8 leaders had pledged to raise $ 20 billion over ten years for related projects, initially in Russia, and the United States commitment to that was half the amount. The United States own programmes for nuclear disarmament were known, but in the interest of transparency, he would spell them out. Among other steps, the United States had dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988. When the START treaty was signed in 1991, the United States and Russia each had deployed over 10,000 strategic warheads, and both had reduced this level to below 6,000 by 2001. The United States and Russia’s operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads would be reduced further to between 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. Upon completion of the Moscow treaty reductions, the United States would retain only one fifth of the strategic nuclear warheads that it had in 1991. The overall United States nuclear stockpile was shrinking at the same time. In total, United States non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO had been reduced by nearly 90 per cent since the fall of the Berlin Wall. United States navy surface ships no longer deployed with nuclear weapons. Reductions continued. Last fall, when the United States announced that it was deactivating its peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles, only one delegation, that of Bangladesh, had chosen to acknowledge that fact. This was indicative of the fact that while the Conference continued to hear a lot of empty rhetoric about how little progress had been made on nuclear disarmament, this flew in the face of the facts. The United States favoured full engagement and discussion on nuclear disarmament because any objective review of the facts should lead to the conclusion that the actions of the United States over the past 20 years had established an enviable record of nuclear disarmament.

ITZHAK LEVANON (Israel) said repetitive inaccurate information presented by the first speaker at this meeting had compelled him to take the floor to make some factual clarifications. The repetition of the statement that Israel opposed the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was inaccurate and did not reflect the reality. For the record, Israel wished to remind the Conference that it joined the international consensus every year on the resolution for the creation of a zone free of weapons on mass destruction in the Middle East. However, Israel always clarified in detail the conditions needed for the creation of this zone.

BASHAR JAAFARI (Syria) said every time Syria tried to shed light on the true problems in the Middle East, it was confronted with this repetitious statement by Israel. In reality, it was not Syria which said that Israel refused a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, rather it was the arsenal of international resolutions which said this. The statement that Israel had joined the general consensus on the resolution was inaccurate in itself. There were no conditions that could be imposed to force a State to join the priority of saving peace and security in the world. Israel’s first condition was that the nuclear weapon must remain in its hand, under the protection of coverage of certain powers which said that they were for nuclear disarmament, while other States in the region could not achieve the means of using nuclear powers for peaceful purposes. Sometimes, Israel said that a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was linked to the peace process. However, in the 2002 Arab summit in Beirut, all Arab States had pledged their support for the peace process. The only party that rejected this stance was Israel. Syria had a lot to say about misleading Israeli propaganda.

ITZHAK LEVANON (Israel) said Israel did not believe that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate framework for parties to speak of political issues. He requested that Syria refrain from doing so. Also, Israel had not spoken of conditions, but of circumstances.

ELISABET BORSIIN BONNIER (Sweden) said last spring and summer, Sweden had made two suggestions on how the Conference could begin to approach the issue of nuclear disarmament, namely by an open and transparent stocktaking of what disarmament efforts were already made or on-going and by a discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in the military and security doctrines of today. Today, she wished to share some thoughts on risks or threats related to nuclear weapons. First, there was the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear terrorism. Could non nuclear weapon States rest assured that the nuclear complexes were fully secured? Second, there was the risk of proliferation, the possibility that more States might acquire nuclear weapons. Proliferation had happened, and again, nuclear weapons could do nothing to counter proliferation. Thirdly, and concerning the existing arsenals, notwithstanding serious disarmament efforts being made, there were still almost 30,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and more than 25,000 of them were in the United States and the Russian Federation. One particular concern was that more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, large parts of strategic arsenals were still configured on hair-trigger alert, to be launched within minutes of warning of an attack. This carried the risk of unauthorized or accidental launch. As for those possessing nuclear weapons, for decades it had been considered imperative to keep the threshold for possible use very high and to advance the norm against use. Was this still the case? Sweden looked forward to an interactive debate on these and other issues. She welcomed that two nuclear weapon States had spoken today, and urged other nuclear weapon States to do the same.

JOHANNES LANDMAN (Netherlands) said the Netherlands continued to consider the total elimination of nuclear arsenals as one of the most important objectives in the field of disarmament. As in the past, it would continue to urge, for as long as it took, the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. The Netherlands acknowledged the importance of the steps taken so far by nuclear weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals. However, much more needed to be done. Despite substantial reductions, nuclear arsenals were still vast. The Netherlands was not blind to the volatile international security environment. Ongoing reports of actual proliferation in countries with dubious records, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors, the illicit trade in nuclear weapon related materials would sooner or later lead to a catastrophe if nothing was done. These were very serious challenges to international security that needed to be tackled decisively. The Netherlands actively supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference to deal with nuclear disarmament in further detail, and as a gradual process. It felt that starting negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was the next step to be taken. Agreeing to an FMCT was the most effective means for further reducing the threat of illicit proliferation of fissile material, and at the same time imposing clear restrictions on nuclear weapon States themselves. This would also form a direct contribution to nuclear disarmament.

PABLO MACEDO (Mexico) said despite the ongoing discussion, there was a pressing need to agree on a programme of work and to start negotiations. Mexico hoped that the exercise the Conference was beginning today was not confined to an exchange of opinions but would allow it to make progress and to have an in-depth substantive discussion. Mexico would like to hear specific proposals. The President had suggested that the Member States assess nuclear disarmament. Mexico assumed that it dealt with the commitments made. While there had been some progress in nuclear disarmament, it was still clearly insufficient. A lot had to be done to comply with article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it was essential to have a greater degree of transparency. Mexico welcomed the information provided today by the United States and the Russian Federation, but this information was not uniform and it was insufficient. More information was needed on, among others, the state of alert and the number of existing weapons, to have a clear idea of what remained to be done. Concerning comments made by France earlier, the conclusion of Ambassador Rivasseau was not acceptable. Setting up an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament was necessary, whether or not negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) started. FMCT was a complementary issue.

KJETIL PAULSEN (Norway) said while a lot more needed to be done, considerable reduction of nuclear weapons had taken place since 1990. While there had earlier been an interesting discussion on transparency, Norway reiterated that greater transparency would be a significant confidence building measure. Needless to say, a dismantled or destroyed nuclear weapon could not be proliferated. Norway appreciated the statements by the United States and the Russian Federation on specific disarmament measures, and called on them to be more systematically transparent on disarmament efforts. There must be an inventory of nuclear weapons, there must be records, and it was not obvious to non nuclear weapon States why these weapons could not be made public. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was welcomed and it was hoped that it could be strengthened with irreversibility measures.

TIM CAUGHLEY (New Zealand) said the legal imperative for nuclear disarmament was clear. Over the years, a significant body of international law and treaty obligations had accumulated, supporting effective progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the world had yet to see concerted advancement by the nuclear weapon States on nuclear disarmament by the existing legal obligations. There was a need to take a hard look at nuclear deterrence from a numbers standpoint. How many of those hugely destructive and toxic weapons were needed to deter a potential adversary – tens of thousands (as at present), thousands (perhaps by 2012), hundreds, or a handful? There was a need to examine not only individual security doctrines, but also strategic alliances. Positive progress on nuclear disarmament would improve global security with respect to proliferation. It had been asserted that the focus on nuclear disarmament equated to a de-facto argument that the retention of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon States or the inadequate rate of elimination of those weapons was somehow an excuse for proliferation by others. This was rejected, as was the argument that those who attached a high public priority on nuclear disarmament causes were failing to take into account the geo-political realities of today’s world. In any debate on nuclear disarmament, the principles of transparency and irreversibility were essential constructs of good faith negotiations. New Zealand welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 2002 as an encouraging first step in nuclear disarmament processes. Also, there was much that non nuclear weapon States could do to contribute to confidence building on nuclear disarmament. In addition to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the creation of nuclear weapon free zones were a powerful symbol for demonstrating renunciation of weapons of mass destruction to the international community. While differences remained as to the relative priorities of disarmament and non-proliferation, it made sense to move forward on a negotiation which would produce gains for both sides of the debate. New Zealand firmly believed that an FMCT would not only constitute a significant gain for non-proliferation, it would also move the Conference further towards its nuclear disarmament objectives.

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