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Remarks by Director-General of
UNOG to Thousandth Plenary Meeting of Conference on Disarmament
31 January 2006
Following are the remarks by Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General
of the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United
Nations Office at Geneva, to the thousandth plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament held today at the Palais des Nations:
“The 1000th Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is
an appropriate occasion to assess past achievements, to reflect
on the causes of the impasse which has existed since around 1999,
and to give thought to ways and means of restoring the leading role
of the Conference in multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations.
During the first decade of its existence, the Conference on Disarmament
set up its priorities recorded in the so-called “Decalogue”, on
the basis of which the yearly agenda was to be drawn, as well as
detailed its working methods that were then periodically reviewed
and modified. Towards the end of this period, preparatory efforts
started to bear fruit – the Conference entered the phase of negotiations
of treaties.
With the conclusion of negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention,
in 1992, and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 1996,
these items were removed from the agenda. Following the adoption
of the treaties, the Conference entered a period of slowing-down
of activities, which over the years has led to the impasse. Paradoxically,
the origins of the impasse can be attributed to the end of the Cold
War, which changed significantly the international security equilibrium
and led to a re-evaluation of disarmament priorities by States.
These priorities – until then rather stable – started to evolve
with the changing perception of security by States.
New actors have emerged on the international scene, and with the
possibility of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists,
international relations have become even more complex, more dangerous
and less predictable than previously. Notions of strategic stability,
war avoidance and nuclear deterrence have been redefined, and multilateralism
has been giving way to a predominance of particular national interests.
Besides the short period, in 1998, when two Ad Hoc Committees were
established: (1) on negative security assurances and (2) on prohibition
of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the
Conference on Disarmament has been unable to start negotiations,
or structured deliberations, on any item on its agenda. Intensive
efforts to break the deadlock have not brought the expected results.
Gradually, the divergence of views on disarmament priorities led
to the establishment of a package of items representing priorities
of different groups of States, but not acceptable as a whole to
a number of States – the so called “programme of work”. Subsequent
variations of such a programme of work, although sometimes attracting
the support of a considerable number of CD Members, have never enjoyed
consensus. For years, success in striking a balance between these
priorities has eluded the Conference. Thus, instead of negotiating
multilateral disarmament agreements, the Conference has been trying
to forge consensus on current disarmament priorities.
Over the years, the impasse has been attributed to a number of
causes, including differing views concerning the agenda, the rules
of procedure, the decision-making process, the informal system of
political groups, the composition and the lack of involvement of
civil society. Potential remedies have not had the desired effect.
The expansion of the Conference’s membership by 23 Members in 1996,
and by 5 Members in 1999, did not help the Conference overcome its
problems. Member States have continued to disagree on changing the
agenda that was developed at the early years of the existence of
the Conference and on changing the composition of the political
groups. Also, civil society is not fully using the existing mechanisms
for disseminating its views and materials to the Members of the
Conference, including those adopted by the CD in 2004.
In this context, we should not lose sight of the fact that progress
on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation has also been elusive
in other contexts. The greatest disappointment of the 2005 World
Summit in September was no doubt the failure to reach agreement
on even a single paragraph on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Weapons of mass destruction pose a severe danger to all of us, in
particular the possibility of such weapons falling in the hands
of terrorists. Progress on disarmament and non-proliferation is
vital for our collective security, and efforts must continue as
a matter of priority.
Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) indicate that in 2004 alone, the global total spent on arms
topped $1 trillion for the first time since the height of the Cold
War. In contrast, the amount spent on aid over the same period was
$78.6 billion. Disarmament could thus liberate significant resources
to be channelled towards development efforts, in addition to building
greater confidence among States and contributing towards stability,
which, in turn, would also be conducive to the development agenda,
including the Millennium Development Goals.
Following the setbacks in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
of last year, the whole multilateral disarmament machinery needs
an overhaul. The impasse in the CD has political, not structural
or procedural sources. Debates aimed at “getting the CD back to
work” that took place in 2004 and 2005 revealed mostly unchanged
political positions of States. In such circumstances, it seems that
it would be difficult to agree on the programme of work without
joint efforts based on new, imaginative approaches.
Generating more interest and changing the attitude towards the
Conference in capitals could be a welcome remedy. Also, developing
new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament,
going beyond the narrowly defined national security interests, could
be of crucial importance for the revitalization of the Conference.
Without political decisions at the highest levels, even the most
determined efforts of the existing multilateral disarmament bodies,
including the Conference on Disarmament, will not succeed. As the
Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his message to
the Conference this year, “the impasse cannot be broken by procedural
means or by merely fine-tuning existing proposals. Capitals need
to thoroughly reassess attitudes towards the Conference, and develop
a new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament.”
Frustration over the impasse has led some to contemplate the possibility
of suspending or even dissolving the Conference, should it not be
able to “deliver results in the foreseeable future”, and setting
up an alternative forum based, for example, on the “like-minded”
concept. There are, however, other views to the effect that replacing
the Conference on Disarmament with another negotiating mechanism
would not necessarily solve the problems it now faces. Firstly,
the existing fundamental divergence of views on priorities on the
international disarmament agenda and specific security concerns
of States would not disappear with the dissolution of the CD. Secondly,
the main difference between the Conference on Disarmament and any
negotiating body based on the “like-minded” concept is that the
latter, by definition, excludes some States that do not consider
themselves “like-minded” but whose participation would still be
crucial for a meaningful outcome of negotiations. Needless to say,
certain issues can only be resolved through the multilateral disarmament
negotiating body, that is, by the Conference on Disarmament, due
to its intellectual and political potential, experience and clear
rules of engagement.
We should not be discouraged from using existing and potential
mechanisms available to the Conference now, such as debates on issues
on the agenda, for mutually influencing policies and security perceptions
of Member States and for furthering the consensus building process.
In parallel, the Conference should review its working methods and
seek new approaches that could make it more responsive to contemporary
security threats and challenges. Progress may be modest, but the
Conference cannot afford to remain inactive. We must remember that
consensus building is a process that may take time – but not too
much – especially when dealing with issues of strategic importance.
Political will, perseverance and patience should be the virtues
guiding our efforts”.
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