Conference on Disarmament Holds Debate on Future Disarmament

2 March 2006

The Conference on Disarmament today continued with its thematic debate on nuclear disarmament, focusing on the future of nuclear disarmament.

There were calls by Member States for the Conference to immediately start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and other calls for the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to discuss nuclear disarmament.

Some speakers urged that the issue of nuclear non-proliferation should not overshadow the importance of nuclear disarmament. Speakers reiterated support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and urged the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They said any assumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons States was incompatible with the NPT.

The importance of increasing transparency on nuclear disarmament issues, of confidence building measures and of creating nuclear weapon free zones were also highlighted. Member States acknowledged that there had been reductions in the size of nuclear arsenals, but said that they were not enough. They also stressed the importance of providing negative security assurances to non nuclear weapon States.

At the end of the meeting, Ambassador Park In-kook, the President of the Conference, said more than 30 countries had taken the floor during four plenary meetings this week in the focused debate on nuclear disarmament, and many Member States had offered useful suggestions and ideas as well as outlining their national positions. Some nuclear weapon States had also provided useful information and there had been specific proposals on how to make progress on future nuclear disarmament. However, unless the Conference maintained this momentum, it would end up with not much at the end of the day.

With a view to stimulating the general debate on agenda items 1 and 2 next week, he invited delegations to take into consideration the following elements to make the debate more interactive: the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; the way to strengthen transparency; the principle of irreversibility; and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. These were indicative guidelines, Ambassador Park said.

The delegations of the following countries took the floor at the meeting today: Pakistan, Malaysia, India, Algeria, China, Russian Federation, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, Nigeria, Morocco, Switzerland, Ireland, Canada, Sri Lanka, Italy, Brazil, Cuba, the United Kingdom, Chile and Sweden.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 7 March.

Statements

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) said the raison d’etre of the Conference was to save nations from the scourge of the nuclear war through disarmament, to avert such a war, and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples. The legal, political and moral imperatives for nuclear disarmament were apparent. The progress made so far in disarmament had been recognized. There were however continuing concerns in several areas. The commitment to article 6 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) for complete disarmament remained open-ended. The pace of nuclear disarmament was not fast enough. Even as cuts into existing arsenals were taking place, new and more sophisticated devices were being developed or experimented. The increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons in security doctrines undercut the logic of disarmament. The avowed principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility were not being upheld. There was no movement on the related issues of fissile materials, outer space, negative security assurances and test ban. And the disarmament machinery was in limbo. Pakistan attributed this state of affairs to a flux in the global security architecture. A new security consensus would help Member States in addressing existing and emerging challenges such as the proliferation to terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, vertical nuclear proliferation, the development and accumulation of advanced conventional weapons, development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, the absence of an international agreement on missiles, and the militarization of outer space. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were two sides of the same coin. They should be pursued simultaneously, not sequentially. Pakistan supported international arms control and disarmament initiatives and efforts. With India, Pakistan was working on strategic stability, confidence building and nuclear risk reduction. The international community should reinforce efforts aimed at strategic stability in South Asia at the lowest possible level.

WAN A. YUSRI WAN ABDUL RASHID (Malaysia) said any assumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, ether horizontal or vertical, was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime as well as with the Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons which was rendered by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996. While it was important to focus international attention on concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament which were achievable in the short term, Malaysia was strongly of the view that it was equally important to simultaneously consider the requirements for a comprehensive nuclear disarmament regime in order to develop an international understanding of the final destination of nuclear disarmament steps. In this connection, Malaysia hoped that the Conference, pending the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, could begin discussions on the legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world. A comprehensive overview of the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear free world would be able to affirm such elements which already existed, assess those which were currently being developed, evaluate and link those which had been proposed and identify additional elements which would also be required. The challenge facing the international community in trying to realize a nuclear weapon free world had become more formidable than ever, requiring full and unqualified commitment to the goals which were set. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference would significantly contribute to concerted and collective endeavours to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

JAYANT PRASAD (India) said India shared the belief that the very existence of nuclear weapons, and of their possible use or threat of their use, posed a threat to humanity. India remained committed to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, to be achieved through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. India believed that there was no reason why nuclear weapons too, like biological weapons and chemical weapons, could not be eliminated. The Conference and its predecessor body had successfully negotiated conventions to prohibit biological and chemical weapons and it now had to find practical ways of addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament in a comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner. While India would continue to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, there was no dilution of India’s commitment to nuclear disarmament, which remained a core concern of India’s foreign policy. India’s nuclear doctrine was well defined and based on a posture of no first use and non-use of nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon States. India’s doctrine also reaffirmed the Government’s readiness to join multilateral negotiations for reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. India attached the highest priority to establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, India accorded high priority to the need for steps to be taken to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Any solution to end the impasse in the Conference on its programme of work must be responsive to the concerns of Member States of the Conference, big or small, developed or developing, nuclear weapon States or non nuclear weapon States, within or outside alliances and privileged security relationships. A basic problem afflicting the disarmament institutions and processes was the lack of trust among the States. Trust could only be restored through a reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

IDRISS JAZAIRY (Algeria) said during the debate on nuclear disarmament, some colleagues had argued that nuclear disarmament had been made the hostage of nuclear non-proliferation. Other colleagues, whose views Algeria supported, said that the complete respect for obligations concerning nuclear disarmament was the sole guarantee for nuclear non-proliferation. Nuclear disarmament was a matter of concern to global peace and attainment of the goal of nuclear disarmament was more urgent and necessary than ever. Nuclear States had a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. This was a legal, political and moral obligation stemming from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was regrettable and disturbing to see today the delay, retreat and even disavowal of undertakings taken by nuclear weapon States during the NPT Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000, pursuant to article 6 of the NPT. It was intolerable to find that nuclear weapons, the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction, continued to enjoy legitimacy which benefited a small number of nuclear weapon States while chemical and biological weapons were banned. Nuclear disarmament was an obligation, not an optional choice. In order to be effective, nuclear disarmament had to be carried out with transparency and verifiability. This would create the conditions required for trust. There were two approaches to achieve this objective. The first was addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament in a comprehensive manner within the framework of a convention which prohibited the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of nuclear arms and called for their elimination. The second approach was much more pragmatic and would seek attainment of a phased nuclear disarmament. Algeria considered the creation of a subsidiary body on disarmament whose mandate was restricted to the discussion of this subject alone, isolated from other issues, would not lead to a consensus. Multilateral cooperation in the field of disarmament, human rights and other spheres faced the syndrome of selectivity, discrimination and double standards and this posed the risk of emptying such cooperation despite its vital importance.

CHENG JINGYE (China) said nuclear disarmament was closely linked to international peace and security. Unfortunately, in recent years, the nuclear disarmament process had reached a stalemate. There was a tendency to stress non-proliferation while playing down nuclear disarmament, which had diluted the awareness of the international community of nuclear disarmament as a priority issue. China believed that to make progress in the international nuclear disarmament process, sustained efforts needed to be made in the following fields. A secured international environment and strategic stability should be preserved. A balanced approach was required to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The basic principles in nuclear disarmament should be upheld. And appropriate intermediate measures of nuclear disarmament should be implemented. These intermediate measures included, among others, that the nuclear weapon states should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, abandon the nuclear deterrence doctrine based on the first use of such weapons, give up the policy of lowering the threshold for their use, and withdraw and bring home all the nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories. The Conference should establish as soon as possible an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. China favoured an early agreement on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work on the basis of the Five Ambassadors proposal, so as to allow substantive work to get under way on nuclear disarmament, a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. China had positively contributed to the process of international nuclear disarmament with its policies and practices, and it would make unremitting efforts together with the international community to realize the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

VALERY LOSCHININ (Russian Federation) said the total elimination of nuclear weapons was only possible through a step-by-step approach with the participation of all nuclear weapon States and observing the principle of equal security. Today, he wanted to take a look at the future steps Russia would take in the field of nuclear disarmament. Taking into account the strategic military situation and Russia’s security, Russia would continue its policy of reducing nuclear weapons. Its strategic nuclear arsenal had been reduced four fold over the past 15 years and this would go on. In accordance with the provisions of the Moscow Treaty, at the end of 2009, Russia and the United States would reduce their strategic warheads by a further three fold. Russia was prepared to further reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal. President Putin had stated that Russia was willing to further reduce, on a mutual basis, the nuclear arsenal to the level of 1,500 warheads or even lower. Internationally, it was very important for others to follow Russia’s example. Russia would continue to be guided by the need to ensure the irreversibility of steps to reduce nuclear weapons. This was also important to development of an agreement on Fissile Material Cut-Off. It was important to bear in mind that the reduction of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon States was not taking place in a vacuum, and was related to key agreements on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It was also related to growth in military spending in a number of countries and the development of new weapons systems. The deployment of weapons in outer space would have serious consequences for nuclear disarmament and international security. There would be a new upward spiral in the arms race, not just in outer space, but also on land. The prestige of the Conference on Disarmament must be used to ensure that this traumatic scenario was not reached and to ensure the peaceful heritage of outer space. Russia had said that it would not be the first deploy weapons in outer space and it urged other States to do the same. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had a crucial role to play to solve the problem with Iran which would allow Iran to use nuclear technology peacefully and would provide certainty of the truly peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Moscow would continue to work with its colleagues on this issue. Russia hoped that this issue would be preserved within the purview of the IAEA. It would also be important to renew the moratorium on enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil, and for Iran to respond to the IAEA’s questions which remained unanswered on its past nuclear activities. Russia saw work on the Korean Peninsula within the Six Party Talks negotiations in which Russia would continue to participate actively. Any solution should include the return of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the resumption of monitoring activities of the IAEA in the country. It should also involve the emergence of the Korean people from international isolation.

RI TCHEUL (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) said the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held that nuclear disarmament was the most important priority issue for the Conference on Disarmament and the international community. The negative nuclear policy and doctrine and the threats and blackmail based on the nuclear weapons, which now emerged in international relations, posed great apprehensions to international security and produced only instability, mistrust and undesired results. It was attributable to the abnormal nuclear policy and doctrine that the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter was not respected and the inequality and injustice persisted in international relations. The pursuit of preserving and strengthening one’s own nuclear arsenals while disliking nuclear activities of others would negate establishing fair international relations. As long as this nuclear doctrine and nuclear threat remained, the hotbed of nuclear proliferation would not be eliminated. Nuclear disarmament was the main issue to be addressed in the field of disarmament. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not share the notion that it was unrealistic at this stage to call for revising the negative nuclear doctrine. Major nuclear weapon States should display the will to be in the multilateral negotiating process for international legal instruments on nuclear disarmament without further delay. Pending complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it would be urgently required to address the issues of redressing the nuclear supremacy doctrine, removing nuclear threats, putting an end to qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, withdrawing the nuclear weapons deployed abroad, and also withdrawing the nuclear umbrella provided to other countries while providing negative security assurances. The negotiating process on nuclear disarmament could start in that direction. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea supported the proposal to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament and to start negotiations on the issue. The programme of work of the Conference should be comprehensive and balanced and acceptable to all. Although the Five Ambassadors proposal fell short of the aspirations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it had agreed to support it if the proposal could serve as a basis for efforts for agreeing upon a programme of work.

FRANCOIS RIVASSEAU (France) said during the last Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2005, the European Union had adopted a joint position which bound them all. With respect to cut-off, it called on the Conference to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT had its proper place within the Conference today and France was committed to work on this treaty within the Conference. After a long stalemate, there was finally possibility for negotiations on FMCT in the Conference and France was looking forward to active participation on this issue because the issue of cut-off was vital to items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Conference. France’s general approach on an FMCT revolved around two points: the scope of the treaty on the total prohibition of the future production of fissile material for nuclear bombs, and the issue of verification according to the report of the Special Coordinator.

JOSEPH AYALOGU (Nigeria) said nuclear disarmament remained a top priority, not only for Nigeria but for the entire international community. Nuclear weapons posed the most horrendous threat to humanity. The effect of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan attested to this threat. It was unfortunate that the Conference had not been able to deliver on this mandate. Consequently, rather than a progressive movement towards nuclear disarmament, the number of nuclear weapon States had increased from two in 1950 to at least eight today. In addition, qualitative technological sophistication in the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear war heads and their delivery systems were taking place. For countries like Nigeria that had given up the nuclear option, the situation was disturbing and was complicated with increasing fears that these weapons may proliferate into the hands of non-state actors, particularly terrorists. Nuclear disarmament and non-­proliferation were the two sides of the same coin. They were mutually reinforcing, with decisive commitment and responsibility on both the nuclear and non nuclear weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in good faith. Nuclear weapon States should realize that any presumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by them could not be compatible with sustaining non-proliferation and the preservation of international peace and security. Total prohibition was the only guarantee against the threats that nuclear armament and proliferations posed to mankind. Nigeria was committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and that was why it had championed the creation of a nuclear free zone in Africa. Nigeria was also committed to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and would like to see the immediate implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

MOHAMMED LOULICHKI (Morocco) said Morocco has signed and ratified all multilateral instruments on weapons of mass destruction and was committed to general and complete disarmament, including irreversible, transparent and verifiable nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there could never be international and regional stability and security. In 1968, the majority of countries gave up their nuclear ambitions when the five nuclear weapon States agreed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to undertake negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to ensure nuclear disarmament and negotiations on a comprehensive disarmament treaty. The lack of substantial progress in nuclear disarmament was a source of concern. Of course, there had been reductions in the arsenals of nuclear powers, but these powers needed to take more significant measures. Gradual and verifiable nuclear disarmament should be carried out. The slow progress on disarmament increased the risk of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear free zones were a positive contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament. While hoping to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, Morocco called on all concerned parties to abstain, on the basis of reciprocality, from building, acquiring or possessing nuclear arms, and to abstain from allowing a third party to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. Morocco fully supported to establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference whose mandate would be to begin negotiations on a programme to totally eliminate nuclear weapons through a convention on such weapons. In a measure reflecting its flexibility, Morocco had agreed to accept that the mandate of this Ad Hoc Committee would discuss nuclear disarmament if that would help create a consensus on the program of work. Morocco hoped that the Conference would succeed this year in achieving a consensus on its programme of work which would open up the way to establish subsidiary bodies to help reach the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. SASCHA FULS (Switzerland) said Switzerland’s position on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation was well known. However, the interactive debate within the Conference plenary offered the possibility of reiterating this position. Switzerland supported all multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament pursuing concrete and verifiable results. It considered the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to be the sole legally binding instrument intended to promote non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It was a key tool for peace and international stability. Switzerland stressed that focusing on nuclear non-proliferation should not lead to the disregard of the two other pillars of the NPT, including nuclear disarmament. The majority of non nuclear weapon States had respected their undertakings under the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons and Switzerland called on nuclear weapon States to continue to implement their obligations. Switzerland supported the call for increased transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament. Concerning the field of non-strategic nuclear weapons, the transparency was even more ambiguous. Switzerland attached importance to all the undertakings taken at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. There was a need to respect the principles of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and steps to ensure that included the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by all States concerned, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee within the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and the negotiation, within the Conference, of a multilateral instrument which offered negative security guarantees to non nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT.

MARY WHELAN (Ireland) said she wished to address today the important role that greater transparency by States possessing nuclear weapons could play in creating a climate in which greater progress on nuclear disarmament could be made. Ireland was committed to the full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and believed that the 13 practical steps described in the concluding document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference set out a clear road by which the objective of article 6 could be reached. However not all members of the Conference were parties to the NPT and Ireland hoped they would use the opportunity presented by this structured debate to share their views on how the Conference could best address the issues referred to in agenda items 1 and 2. The role of greater transparency in achieving the shared objective of nuclear disarmament was recognised at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Ireland believed that nuclear weapon States could demonstrate greater transparency. The need for such transparency related to a number of factors. It was an important element in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transparency would be crucial in enabling the verification of compliance by States with their disarmament and arms control commitments in a self-sustaining process of confidence building. Ireland recognised that there would be several levels of transparency in the confidence-building process. Nuclear disarmament was most likely to be conducted as a series of phased transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions. In seeking greater transparency from States possessing nuclear weapons, Ireland did not call for the disclosure of information that was c1early proliferation-sensitive. However, it believed that far more information could and should be made available than had been the case to date. Ireland suggested that as first steps on a path to disarmament, all States possessing nuclear weapons should exhibit greater transparency in their actions and holdings. In particular, they were encouraged to publish complete fissile material production histories similar to the ones that had been published already by the United States and the United Kingdom in respect of their plutonium production. They should begin plurilateral scientific consultations among themselves on the verification requirements for the implementation of effective and irreversible disarmament measures. They should also make regular reports to the Conference, as the nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT had already agreed to do within the framework of the review process of that treaty, on the steps being taken by them - both individually and jointly - to secure greater progress towards nuclear disarmament.

ERIC WALSH (Canada) said the President had asked delegations to focus this meeting on the topic of "future nuclear disarmament measures" and Canada was pleased to do so. For Canada, at the top of the list was the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which would represent a significant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation accomplishment. Canada would like to initiate these negotiations promptly and it had, on a national basis, already demonstrated considerable flexibility as to the nature of the mandate under which such negotiations could get underway. As to other future measures, within the context of a discussion or pre-negotiation stage, Canada saw potential for the Conference to engage in a constructive exchange and examination of a range of issues connected with nuclear disarmament including doctrine, transparency, irreversibility, verification, dismantlement and disposition, confidence building measures, and non strategic nuclear weapons. Canada considered that a focused discussion of issues like those mentioned above could provide useful preparation for and serve as a complement to the Conference’s near term negotiation work.

SARALA FERNANDO (Sri Lanka) said she wished to convey her appreciation to Ambassador Park In-kook, the President of the Conference, for firmly leading this focused debate which was an initiative by the Six Presidents of the 2006 session of the Conference. The debate had been successfully launched and had brought out the relevance of multilateral efforts on nuclear disarmament. It had also reflected the eagerness of Member States to start substantive work this year. The statements by the Russian Federation and the United States must be acknowledged as progress and they would contribute to the building of transparency and trust within the Conference. Sri Lanka awaited the President’s guidance on how to take these discussions forward in the next step.

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said he would also like to make some remarks on the meeting like his colleague from Sri Lanka. The debate had underlined the usefulness of discussions and he gave credit to the President for preparing them well. Several delegations had encouraged Member States to be innovative in their statements to the debate. This was not always easy on an important issue like nuclear disarmament, but he still believed that there were innovative elements which deserved attention. He joined those who had expressed their appreciation for the indications of transparency which some nuclear weapon States had given, and he expected the remaining nuclear weapon States to also make statements. Several delegations had also acknowledged the relevance of the global partnership exercise, the importance of confidence building measures and the importance of nuclear weapon free zones. Many had expressed that for them, a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was a priority. The relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and the question of verification were also discussed. His conclusions from this debate were that the issue of nuclear disarmament was indeed a multifaceted issue which would be very difficult to deal with in a single and global way. A step-by-step approach was more convenient to be pursued. Italy supported a gradual approach, which was more realistic, but that did not mean that the Conference could not pursue and discuss at the same time a global approach.

CARLOS ANTONIA DA ROCHA PARANHOS (Brazil) thanked the President of the Conference for the focused debate on nuclear disarmament and stressed that for Brazil, it was important to have the President’s guidance on the next steps. The Russian Federation and the United States were thanked for their detailed statements, and the Conference had also heard statements on important measures which could be addressed in the Conference like enhancing transparency, the place of nuclear arms in military doctrines and verification. There was a lot of material to justify the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. These focused discussions should contribute to narrowing down the differences in the Conference. Brazil believed that they were getting to a riper situation with a view to discussing the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.

PARK IN-KOOK (Republic of Korea), President of the Conference, said he very much appreciated the participation of all Member States in the discussion and he would explore the issues to see if he could find some common denominators or elements to make the debate more polarized and interactive over the next two weeks. He needed further encouragement from Member States on this.

OSCAR LEON GONZALEZ (Cuba) said much stress had been placed on the reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and figures had been given to show that sufficient progress had been made. It was astonishing that some should be pleased that there were still thousands of nuclear weapons in existence. When two atomic weapons with 21 kilotons of explosives were launched by the United States against two Japanese cities, they caused between 400,000 and 500,000 casualties, including between 200,000 to 250,000 deaths. Current nuclear weapons were hundreds of times more powerful that these obsolete atomic bombs. If two of the modern nuclear bombs were used now, the number of the victims would be in the millions, up to 40 million persons. There were now thousands of nuclear weapons in existence with this capacity to deal out such death and destruction, so to approve that the number of nuclear weapons was down to the thousands was a bad joke. As long as one of these lethal weapons continued to exist, millions of people would be potentially threatened. The only solution was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Cuba called for the immediate start of negotiations within the Conference with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and the result of the negotiations should be an international, legally binding treaty which should eliminate those weapons. There had been no lack of specific proposals on how to reach agreement on the programme of work in the Conference. Cuba believed that the Five Ambassadors proposal was not perfect and fell short of its expectations but it decided to endorse the position of the Group of 21 on the proposal in a hope to reach a consensus. Cuba had seen this as a sign of flexibility on its part to remove the Conference from its stalemate, but a small number of countries opposed the Five Ambassadors proposal, namely, they opposed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to address the issue of nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear power States said they were committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, but they refused to address the subject, let alone negotiate it in the Conference. Cuba saw contradictions in this position. Cuba wanted to know the real reason that some of the nuclear weapon States rejected the Five Ambassadors proposal. Those who were really committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons should not fear addressing the issue in any framework.

FIONA PATERSON (United Kingdom) said during the last three sessions, various delegations had recognized efforts already made towards nuclear disarmament, but had called for greater transparency on the part of nuclear weapon States with a view to strengthening confidence and encouraging progress within the Conference. The United Kingdom welcomed the opportunity to set out its record of engagement and progress to date. Over the last 13 years, the United Kingdom had seen substantial progress with regards to its nuclear disarmament obligations as set out in article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Action had included the withdrawal and dismantling of its maritime tactical nuclear capability; the withdrawal and dismantling of the RAF’s WEI77 nuclear bomb; and the termination of the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles that it undertook with United States nuclear weapons held under dual key arrangements. It had reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons to one system, namely Trident. The United Kingdom was the only nuclear weapon State to have done so. The United Kingdom held fewer than 200 operationally available warheads – the minimum level necessary for its national security. In all, the explosive power of United Kingdom nuclear weapons had been reduced by 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War. The United Kingdom was committed to the maximum degree of transparency about its nuclear and fissile material stockpiles compatible with the requirements of its national security. In 1995, it announced that it had stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and it called upon others, including those States not party to the NPT, to follow this example. It remained committed to transparency on its fissile material stocks.

JUAN MARTABIT (Chile) said the early adoption of the agenda of the Conference at this session had been a first positive sign. Then there had been initiatives involving coordinating the work of the Presidents of the Conference, the Friends of the Presidents and the timetable for the focused debate. From the outset, Chile had supported these initiatives and it would continue to do so. Chile’s support of the Five Ambassadors proposal came within this spirit. Chile had made every possible effort to help realize a world free of nuclear weapons. It recognized the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the multilateral disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet everyone knew what the outcome of the last NPT Review Conference had been. The Conference was responsible for this situation. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had requested the Conference to begin negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with this, but it had made no headway on this issue. Chile urged the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and it advocated the early start of negotiating a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile materials. Concerning negative security assurances, Chile supported the negotiation of a universal instrument to ensure the pledge of nuclear weapon States not to attack non nuclear weapon States. In the context of confidence building measures, Chile favoured the submission of reports whereby States would promote transparency and monitoring of their efforts. Nuclear weapon free zones around the world were a very good example and should be followed in the Middle East and South Asia. Chile supported the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it was aware that this right was being challenged, given the danger of divergence towards clandestine programmes. This showed the importance of verification and monitoring processes.

ANNIKA THUNBORG (Sweden) thanked the nuclear weapon States which had provided specific and detailed information on their nuclear disarmament obligations and it looked forward to seeing these statements in a written form. It also looked forward to seeing similar details provided by other nuclear weapon States. Certain measures had been proposed over the past few plenary meetings on how to make the world safer and Sweden commended Ireland’s proposal regarding transparency. Sweden would also propose specific measures. They included that all States possessing nuclear weapons needed to declare moratoria on the development of new nuclear weapons. All nuclear weapons should be taken off alert. The Moscow Treaty should be strengthened with irreversibility and verification measures and the negotiation of a succeeding treaty should commence so that the weapons could be counted in the hundreds and not in the thousands. Sweden welcomed the Moscow Treaty as a confidence building measure but it saw as a serious problem that the treaty did not require the destruction of a single nuclear warhead. Sweden would also like to see the start of a process leading to a zone free of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the Middle East, and this needed to be parallel to the Middle East peace process. It was illegal for a Member State of the United Nations to threaten another Member State with extinction, and this rhetoric had to stop. Sweden also wanted to see confidence building measures on nuclear disarmament between the United States, China, India and perhaps the Russian Federation. Also, negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty should start immediately within the Conference.

PARK IN-KOOK (Republic of Korea), President of the Conference, said before closing the meeting, he wanted to share some of his thoughts on the results of this focused debate on nuclear disarmament this week. More than 30 countries had taken the floor during four plenary meetings, and many Member States had offered useful suggestions and ideas as well as outlining their national positions. Some nuclear weapon States had also provided useful information and there had been specific proposals on how to make progress on future nuclear disarmament. However, unless the Conference maintained this momentum, it would end up with not much at the end of the day. With a view to stimulating the general debate on agenda items 1 and 2 next week, he invited delegations to take into consideration the following elements to make the debate more interactive: the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; the way to strengthen transparency; the principle of irreversibility; and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. These were not sub-titles but indicative guidelines. He would also provide the Conference next week with a compilation of the various ideas and suggestions made by Member States during the past four plenary meetings.

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