Reaching Critical Will

The Foreign Minister of Iran, Manouchehr Mottaki, today told the Conference on Disarmament that unjustified propaganda was misleading the international community on Iran’s right to research and to use peaceful nuclear technology.

Speaking before the Conference, the Minister said that over three years of robust and intrusive inspections, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had not proven that Iran’s nuclear programme was not peaceful. During Iran’s years of research there had been no diversion of nuclear materials towards illegal activities. He felt that certain countries did not feel committed to obtaining the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements, but used those instruments as tools for advancing their foreign policies.

Mr. Mottaki further said that the decision to involve the Security Council while the IAEA was still carrying out inspections in his country was another example of manoeuvring by western countries. That would only undermine the authority of the IAEA; it was an abuse of international mechanisms and was unacceptable. That could only do a disservice to law based conduct of international relations and was an attempt to manipulate the situation for the shortsighted purposes of certain States.

Access to peaceful nuclear technology was Iran’s indisputable right, the Minister said, adding that the adoption of political means to deny nations their inalienable rights would be a futile exercise and serve to weaken international treaties and create crises. One possibility to resolve the issue could be establishment of regional consortiums on fuel cycle developments with the participation of regional countries which had already developed fuel cycle programmes at the national level and intended to develop further their programmes. The regional consortiums would be placed under IAEA safeguards.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Pakistan, Austria on behalf of the European Union, Italy and Japan on the issue of a fissile material treaty, which will be discussed when the second part of the 2006 session of the Conference starts in May.

Pakistan said that in the context of a fissile material treaty, issues relating to definition, scope, verification, and existing stocks were to be discussed and addressed upfront. The Conference had to tackle the question if the treaty would deal with disarmament or non-proliferation. A few States wished to restrict the proposed ban on fissile materials only to future production. The vast majority of the membership of the Conference would like the fissile material treaty to address the issue of stockpiles and, through their progressive and balanced reduction, to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament, he added.

Austria, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said the European Union attached a clear priority to the negotiation, in the Conference, of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a means to strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament. The European Union called for the immediate commencement of negotiations as well as an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, without pre-conditions, and bearing in mind the special coordinator’s report and the mandate for an ad-hoc committee contained therein.

Italy said that pending the entry into force of a fissile material cut-off treaty, Italy called on all States, including non-NPT States, to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A confirmation on non-production of such a material even by NPT non-nuclear weapons States could be helpful to create a momentum conducive to a wider commitment. But moratoria and unilateral declarations as well as simple de facto abstentions on production were no substitute for a legally binding instrument.
Japan said that as a precursor to the meetings that would take place on a fissile material treaty in the Conference in mid May, it would organize an open meeting on this subject before the Easter weekend.

Before closing the meeting, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Doru Romulus Costea of Romania, said that in its attempt to return to substantive work, the Conference had taken a new path this year. It was no overstatement to say that the first part of the 2006 Conference on Disarmament session had brought a little bit of openness and mutual confidence to the endeavour to find a consensual solution. He strongly hoped that that positive trend would continue for the rest of the session and that it would not be affected by “spring fatigue” or even worse, “CD fatigue”.

Today’s plenary was the last in the first part of the 2006 session of the Conference. The next plenary meeting marking the start of the second part of the session will take place on 16 May at 10 a.m.

Statements

MANOUCHEHR MOTTAKI (Iran) assured the Conference on Disarmament of his country’s cooperation but said that the goal of the Conference must be getting to a balanced programme of work. It had been more than a decade, he said, since this body had engaged in its real business – negotiating disarmament. There had been a tendency in certain corners not to let this Conference work. It was a question of political will and he hoped that the Conference could soon have a consensus on its programme of work. He was sure that the hall would once again witness lively and energetic discussions and real multilateralism.

Iran, along with other members of the Group of 21 (G21), considered nuclear disarmament as the utmost priority to be addressed. He had followed with interest the reports of some nuclear weapons States with regard to reductions already carried out and those to be done in future. Such information was of high interest, not because of what had been done but because of the power of destruction, which still existed. Iran supported the call of the G21 for an Ad-Hoc Committee for nuclear disarmament, including a nuclear weapons convention.

Continuing, he said it was the right of States that had given up the nuclear weapons option to receive security assurances and to call for the negotiation of a legally binding document on security assurances. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to eliminate their threat. Non-nuclear weapon States should be assured by nuclear States that there would be no threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The production of a document on security assurances for non-nuclear States should be pursued.

Iran attached high importance to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Mr. Mottaki said. It was the common heritage of mankind and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes in the spirit of cooperation. He was concerned by the pursuit of advanced military technology, which was contributing to the erosion of a climate conducive to disarmament. The prevention of an armes race in outer space had assumed greater urgency and current legal mechanisms were inadequate. What’s more, any treaty on fissile material should be verifiable in order to produce and create confidence.

Multilateralism was the only viable option to tackle the most threatening dangers to our common security, he said. The trend in some circles to resort to unilateral action in resolving international security issues was a trend, which used troops, terror and violence as responses to insecurity. If these policies were not contained, the world would be facing the biggest challenge to global peace and security. Unilateralists were threatening the foundations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The unilateralist States, whilst developing destructive and inhumane weapons were so intolerant that they refused to let the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) function smoothly. They argued for depriving developing nations from using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and tried to justify this approach under the guise of the non-proliferation concern.

Unjustified propaganda was misleading the international community on Iran’s right to research and to use peaceful nuclear technology. Over seventeen hundred man/days - three years - of robust and intrusive inspections, the IAEA had not proven that Iran’s nuclear programme was not peaceful. During Iran’s years of research there had been no diversion of nuclear materials towards illegal activities. He felt that certain countries did not feel committed to obtaining the objectives of the NPT and the IAEA safeguard agreements, but used these instruments as tools for advancing their foreign policies.

The decision to involve the Security Council while the IAEA was still carrying out inspections in his country was another example of manoeuvring by western countries. This would only undermine the authority of the IAEA; it was an abuse of international mechanisms and was unacceptable. This could only do a disservice to law based conduct of international relations and was an attempt to manipulate the situation for the short-sighted purposes of certain States.

Access to peaceful nuclear technology was Iran’s indisputable right, he said, and the adoption of political means to deny nations their inalienable rights would be a futile exercise and serve to weaken international treaties and create crises. One possibility to resolve the issue could be establishment of regional consortiums on fuel cycle developments with the participation of regional countries which had already developed fuel cycle programmes at the national level and intended to develop further their programmes. Such consortiums would be jointly operated by the regional States and the costs and benefits would be shared by the participants. Countries outside the region could also participate in such regional arrangements based on the modalities agreed between the parties. The regional consortiums would be placed under IAEA safeguards which would be yet another contribution to strengthening the IAEA safeguards and increasing the scope of international cooperation in the nuclear field.

MASOOD KHAN (Pakistan) said this year, the six Presidents of the Conference had initiated an interactive thematic debate and the P6 had designated the Friends of Presidents to look at the agenda and the methods of work. The interactive dialogue was especially useful because it would help build confidence and enhance understanding of the issues involved. Such engagement was also necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations. Increasingly, it was difficult to explain the anomaly that a reasonable programme of work, such as Five Ambassadors proposal, which enjoyed the support of the majority of States, did not enable the Conference to commence negotiations. The premise that a package approach was hampering the process was not tenable because such an approach attempted to address core concerns of all. The alternative would be to accept a unilateral remit suggested by a few. That would not help the Conference to move forward.

In the context of a fissile material treaty, issues relating to definition, scope, verification, and existing stocks were to be discussed and addressed upfront. The Conference had to tackle the question if the treaty would deal with disarmament or non-proliferation. The Conference’s approach to a fissile material treaty was based, at a minimum, on the three elements: it should be tied to the twin objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament; a treaty should have an effective verification mechanism; and it should be non-discriminatory. A few States wished to restrict the proposed ban on fissile materials only to the future production. The vast majority of the membership would like the fissile material treaty to address the issue of stockpiles and, through their progressive and balanced reduction, to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament. In order to maintain strategic deterrence in South Asia, there was a need to take into account the existing fissile materials. One could only presume that, over time, fissile material stocks would be transformed into nuclear weapons. A fissile material treaty, which froze or accentuated asymmetries, would accelerate not arrest non-proliferation. The principles of a non-discriminatory character of the treaty as well as the international and effective verification were not preconditions.

It was repeatedly said that, at a deeper level, the global security architecture was in a state of flux. There were clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among Member States. In order to bridge those differences, Pakistan had called for the need to evolve a new security consensus to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation in order to address existing and emerging global challenges. That should be promoted through consultations and agreement among all UN Member States. Multilateralism required States to have a long-term view and to transcend their national positions. It was not a simple aggregation of national interests, because no such aggregation was possible given varied interests of States. Multilateralism if anything was the sum of “enlightened self-interest”. It would ensure collective security and agreement on systems for monitoring and verification, and compliance. Pakistan appreciated that recently, some significant pronouncements had been made about multilateralism.

WOLFGANG PETRITSCH (Austria), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament remai§§ned a serious concern and the existing and new threats to peace and security required that this standstill be overcome. The European Union was strongly committed to reaching consensus on a programme of work in the Conference and welcomed the fact that new ideas and proposals had been put forward over the last few years. The European Union welcomed the debate that had taken place during the structured debate focused on nuclear disarmament and looked forward to continued active discussion on other topics. He also wished to highlight the important role that could be played by the Friends of Presidents in assisting the six Presidents on specific topics and activities by making use to the fullest extent of their capacities. In addition, the European Union recalled its attachment to the follow-up of the enlargement process of the Conference.
The European Union attached a clear priority to the negotiation, in the Conference, of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a means to strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament. The European Union called again for the immediate commencement of negotiations as well as an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, without pre-conditions, and bearing in mind the special coordinator’s report and the mandate for an ad-hoc committee contained therein. Pending entry into force of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the European Union called on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises and welcomed the action of those four States that had decreed such moratoria.

The European Union looked forward to the upcoming structured debate focused on FMCT and hoped that delegations would respond positively to the appeal to participate actively in the discussion

CARLO TREZZA (Italy) said that with regard to a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a legally binding commitment would significantly enhance international peace and security. An FMCT was part of the acquis on nuclear disarmament to which at least all contracting parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had subscribed. It was feasible, and Italy believed it was consensual. Some delegations had other priorities. Italy was ready to deal with them. Nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances, the so-called “new issues” were legitimate terms for a programme of work, however as yet they did not command full consensus. It would be a paradox if an FMCT, which was part and parcel of the nuclear disarmament process, were to fall victim to that very process. How could one be serious about nuclear weapons disarmament if one did not start by “cutting off” the flow of the material necessary to produce those weapons?

Italy welcomed the fact that most of the nuclear weapon States had already established a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons, some of them had taken a further step forward by dismantling their production facilities, other were believed at least not to produce such material any more. Pending the entry into force of an FMCT, Italy called on all States, including non-NPT States, to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A confirmation on non-production of such a material even by NPT non-nuclear weapons States could be helpful to create a momentum conducive to a wider commitment. But moratoria and unilateral declarations as well as simple de facto abstentions on production were no substitute for a legally binding instrument.

The issue of the possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle was one of the key problems the international community had to face today. Proposals were coming from many quarters to nuclear weapon States. A new discipline on fissile material for civil purposes would benefit from an agreement on weapon grade fissile material through an FMCT. Referring to the most dangerous kind of nuclear fissile material destined for nuclear exposition, he said that was the material which terrorist groups were most eager to obtain. The international community would be much safer if such production were stopped, if a new nuclear arms race were made impossible, if production facilities for that material were to be decommissioned. An FMCT could be conducive to possible understandings on the discipline of the nuclear fuel cycle.

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said that Japan, as a precursor to the meetings that would take place on a fissile material treaty in the Conference in mid May, would organize an open meeting on this subject before the Easter Weekend.
DORU ROMULUS COSTEA, (Romania) President of the Conference on Disarmament, said that in its attempts to return to substantive work, the Conference had taken a new path this year. It was no overstatement to say that the first part of the 2006 Conference on Disarmament session had brought a little bit of openness and mutual confidence to the endeavour to find a consensual solution. He strongly hoped that this positive trend would continue for the rest of the session and that it would not be affected by “spring fatigue” or even worse, “CD fatigue”.

In preparing for the resumption of the second part of the current session of the Conference, he said, he wished to highlight one crucial element for the Conference’s activity: the instructions delegates acted upon from their capitals. Everyone was aware of the importance of these instructions, however it must not be forgotten that one of the rationale for the presence of delegates at the Conference on Disarmament was exactly to provide first-hand inputs and constructive, realistic suggestions to such decision-making processes.