The Conference on Disarmament this afternoon heard a statement by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Frank Belfrage, and from Syria, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, on the issue of negative security assurances.

Mr. Belfrage noted that in recent months, claims had been made of the possible need to take measures involving nuclear capabilities, such as retargeting missiles in certain circumstances. Threats of that kind were unhelpful, and emanated from a logic dating back to the Cold War. Today's security challenges needed cooperation and full transparency. Although progress had been slower than planned, the principles underpinning the Six Party Process could be considered an example of that. Sweden and its European Union partners attached great importance to the common goal of the Six Parties to achieve the early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Sweden remained seriously concerned that the International Atomic Energy Agency, after four years of intense efforts, now reported "that it is not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme". The new resolution that had just been adopted by the Security Council showed the concern of the international community over Iran's nuclear programme; on the basis of Security Council resolutions, negotiations were the way forward there as well.

Mr. Belfrage also observed that there was no reason to keep so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons in a Europe less militarized and with less tension than at any time during the past 100 years. That category of weapons would, in Sweden's view, have a natural place in upcoming United States-Russian Federation arms control talks and negotiations. Reaching agreement on the elimination, or at least withdrawal from active duty, of a category of weapon so clearly designed for another age and time would indeed be a show of statesmanship and leadership.

In a statement of position by the Group of 21 on the issue of negative security assurances delivered by Syria, the Group stressed the need to recognize the right of non-nuclear weapon States not to be attacked or threatened with the use of nuclear weapons; expressed its deep concern at strategic defence doctrines which set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintained unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances nuclear deterrence policies; and called for efforts to conclude a universal and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States to be pursued.

The next plenary of the Conference will be held at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 11 March 2008.

Statements

FRANK BELFRAGE, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, said if there was one new State with nuclear weapons, there was a danger that another would follow. And then another, and with it the risk that somehow somewhere a situation would arise where those weapons would be used, or fall into the hands of terrorists. The risks of nuclear proliferation had already been recognized half a century ago, and the international community had struck a grand bargain, connecting non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and civil nuclear energy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) embodied the recognition that the indefinite possession, or even the presumption of the indefinite possession, of nuclear weapons by any one State would undermine efforts to prevent their proliferation. The nuclear Powers had a special duty – to live up to their responsibilities and show leadership. However, that did not absolve the rest of them. They all had to contribute to easing international tensions; they all had to make sure that there was no doubt that they were committed to preventing proliferation of those weapons. Those who chose to see only one side of that balance were in fact challenging the vision of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had a special role and should be the place to demonstrate one's willingness to avoid paralysis. Those few remaining States that had not already done so should therefore endorse the adoption of the programme of work contained in document CD/2007/L.1, which was a carefully crafted compromise. It had never been meant to resolve, in and of itself, real differences in security perceptions. However, Sweden remained convinced that it could form the basis for substantive work to the benefit of all members of the Conference, without undermining any Member State's ability to defend its legitimate security interests.

Mr. Belfrage noted that, in recent months, claims had been made of the possible need to take measures involving nuclear capabilities, such as retargeting missiles in certain circumstances. Threats of that kind were unhelpful, and emanated from a logic dating back to the Cold War. Today's security challenges needed cooperation and full transparency. Although progress had been slower than planned, the principles underpinning the Six Party Process could be considered an example of that. Sweden and its European Union partners attached great importance to the common goal of the Six Parties to achieve the early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Sweden remained seriously concerned that the International Atomic Energy Agency, after four years of intense efforts, now reported "that it is not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme". The new resolution that had just been adopted by the Security Council showed the concern of the international community over Iran's nuclear programme. On the basis of Security Council resolutions, negotiations were the way forward there as well.

One of the key issues before the Conference was the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Such a Treaty, with the appropriate scope and agreed verification measures, would ultimately limit the ability of States parties to expand their nuclear arsenals. It could be seen as a litmus test of the political will to avoid new global regional arms races in the nuclear field. Another key issue before the Conference was outer space, and the European Union was presently working on a proposal for a set of transparency and confidence building measures on that issue. A step in the right direction in this area was the proposal by Russia and China for a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. However, Sweden had a number of questions and concerns regarding the draft, including certain definitions of scope, issues of development and testing of weapons and verification. It was also a matter of deep concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, more than 10 years after it had been opened for signature, had not yet entered into force, owing to the lack of ratification by nine States – seven of them nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons capable States for whom nuclear testing might still appear as an option. Intensified efforts had to be made now to convince those nine States to proceed to the ratification of the Treaty. On the issue of so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons, there was no reason to keep those weapons in a Europe less militarised and with less tension than at any time during the past 100 years. That category of weapons would, in Sweden's view, have a natural place in upcoming United States-Russian Federation arms control talks and negotiations. Reaching agreement on the elimination, or at least withdrawal from active duty, of a category of weapon so clearly designed for another age and time would indeed be a show of statesmanship and leadership, Mr. Belfrage concluded.

FAYSAL KHABBAZ HAMOUI (Syria), delivering a statement of position on behalf of the Group of 21 on the issue of negative security assurances, said that pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reaffirmed the urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Further, the Group believed that there was a need to recognize the right of non-nuclear weapon States not to be attacked or threatened with the use of nuclear weapons. The Group underlined the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The Group remained deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintained unjustifiable concepts on international security, based on promoting and developing military alliances nuclear deterrence policies. The Group believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned was a positive and important measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Group of 21 reiterated its support, in particular, of the need for the speedy establishment of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, the Group did not subscribe to arguments that declarations that had been made by the nuclear weapons States were sufficient, or that security assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In addition, given their geographical limitation, security assurances guaranteed to States members of such zones could not substitute for universal legally binding security assurances. The Group recalled that the demand for security assurances had been raised by the non-nuclear weapon States in the 1960s, and the demand still persisted. While various approaches existed, efforts to conclude a universal and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States should be pursued. Such an instrument would be an important step towards achieving the objectives of arms control, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

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