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SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR CELSO AMORIM TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (GENEVA, 6 JULY 2000)

First of all, I would like to pay tribute to the strenuous efforts of my friend, Ambassador Jean Lint, of Belgium, as well as of the other colleagues who had assumed this high incumbency this year in trying to bridge the differences that still prevent us from agreeing on a programme of work. Their full commitment notwithstanding, this Conference has been unable, after sixteen weeks in session, to embark on any substantive work. This is certainly not a time for long statements. The short number or sometimes even the absence of interventions in our sessions is testimony to the current mood in this forum. Although the CD has lived through other "crises of identity the present one appears to be more serious. Overcoming it will require a new sense of engagement.

Ambassador Lint has generously recalled that this is the second time I serve at the CD. I do not know if this is a sign of bureaucratic longevity or is due to some other fortuitous circumstances. I can assure you. however, and especially the many young delegates with a promising career in disarmament, that I do not intend to benefit from this privilege when, in the next decade, the turn comes once again to Brazil to preside over this august body.

In January 1993, I had just come from Paris where 1 had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention an behalf of my government. That was an unprecedented, remarkable agreement -- the first, as we all know, to proscribe an entire category of weapons of mass destruction in a comprehensive and verifiable manner.

Only two days after the opening of the 1993 session, we were able to agree an the agenda and on the establishment of four Ad Hoc Committees. During that month, the CD was able to produce a consensus document with comments on the United Nations Secretary General's report entitled "New Dimensions of Arms Regulations and Disarmament in the post-Cold War era".

Certainly, in the early nineties, the window of opportunity generated by the end of bipolar confrontation still seemed wide open. The CD succeeded in taking advantage of that favourable context and advanced some important agreements. The prevailing atmosphere was, incidentally, reflected in the document which contained the CD's reaction to Dr. Bouthros Ghalils report: "The new conditions of international security reinforce the relevance of disarmament and arms regulation, because they facilitate the conclusion of new bilateral and multilateral agreements that would establish and codify security at lower levels of armaments."

Ours is a different political environment, and many concerns have been expressed over policies, actions or, in some cases, lack of action by important actors. My own government, in statements made at this Conference, was among those who expressed frustration in the face of this reversal of the positive momentum. While progress was achieved bilaterally or unilaterally, there were clear setbacks which have significantly impacted on the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

In my view, two considerations must be borne in mind in relation to how we could and should deal with the current deadlock at the CD.

Firstly, it is imperative that we build upon recent political steps, which were particularly meaningful f or this forum. For the first time, at the NPT Review conference, the five nuclear weapon State's assumed an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. A concrete and detailed programme of action was set up, comprising previously agreed steps and a number of new ones, thus providing f or a checklist against which progress can be measured in the coming years. Among these, it is noteworthy that the Conference on Disarmament was called upon to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.

This important political message must be translated into urgent action. The groundbreaking commitments, the spirit of compromise and the sense of responsibility towards the future of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation must be pursued here as well as in other places. This certainly requires concerted high level attention to the current logjam faced by this Conference.

Such attention, however, seems to be lacking.

The continued paralysis of the CD cannot but cast doubt over the value of progress achieved elsewhere. For reasons that may be understandable, yet not necessarily justifiable, breaking the impasse in the CD does not seem to enjoy the same degree of priority as avoiding failure in other disarmament-related events,

This, I would contend, is a mistake.

If the main multilateral negotiating body remains paralyzed, the very same forces, whose unleashing was feared, will be operating. Confidence in the future of disarmament and non-proliferation will be eroded.

Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament will naturally continue to be influenced by and responsive to developments in the international strategic scene which affect the security interests of individual member States. It would be naive to think otherwise. Rut the CD does not have a passive role only. This is a dialectical relationship. If the CD is capable of initiating meaningful work, it will to some degree have a positive influence on policies, decisions and developments outside its framework.

Much time has been spent on the question of the negotiating nature of certain mandates. I do not mean to underestimate the weight of some words and the commitment they may imply. But, as often recalled, the CD is a negotiating body. Any issue being discussed has to be seen under that light. Substantive discussions at the CD do not of necessity entail immediate negotiations, in the sense of treaty making. Nor should they be viewed as precluding such negotiations. Often, the preparation of the conceptual and technical groundwork made possible by in-depth discussions is in itself pre-negotiation.

I outline these thoughts without any illusion as to the difficulties of reaching compromise solutions when vital security issues are involved. But most of us here have been witness to other situations, in this or other fora, in which, in spite of crucial, substantive divergences, it was possible to "organize differences" in a way that did not prevent equally important goals, which were held in common, from being obtained. The real question we face is this: is it or is it not true that, in spite of our diverging priorities and concerns, we all share the same vested interest in reinforcing the multilateral machinery for disarmament and nonproliferation And, if this is the case, how far are we prepared to go in displaying the necessary flexibility to allow for constructive solutions that do not jeopardize perceived vital interests?

As with the characters in a Chechov play, whose lives wither away in f ront of us, in the midst of a sense of powerlessness and lost hopes, the substance and spirit of the CD are on the decline.

As in many other diplomatic processes, or in life itself, it is not always easy to pinpoint the moment in which deterioration becomes irreversible. Although many concerns have been expressed on the paralysis of the CD, a sense of crisis and, therefore, of urgency is not clearly perceptible.

It is incumbent on the members of this body to act, if necessary by raising the level of attention to the situation of the CD in their own capitals. Given existing differences, it is only from an acute perception of such crisis, and the risks it carries for disarmament and nonproliferation, that solutions may be found to our problems. It is our hope that the interregnum ahead of us will be fully utilized for thorough reflection on this situation, as well as for contacts and consultations, So that, when we reconvene in August, we may be closer to an agreement on our programme of work.

You can be assured that, on my part, I will spare no effort to promote real and meaningful progress towards that end. Needless to emphasize, the Presidency will be available at all times for consultations. Any constructive advice will be, of course, most welcome.

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