Transcribed Statement of the Ambassador of Chile Juan Enrique Vega-President of the CD 15/3/01

Since this is the last session, which I will be chairing in the Conference, I think the time has come to offer a summary and draw some conclusions from our term of office as President of the Conference. The first thing I'd like to say is that I'm not disappointed with the work performed in that period of time, nor the results achieved. While we still do not have a program of work, which is indeed regrettable. We nevertheless observe that the Conference is an organism, body with great vitality. It is a storehouse of experience in the cause of world disarmament. It cannot and must not be allowed to go to waste. For the same reason there are feelings of impatience about the time, which is not being employed. And these feelings are fully justified. The Chilean presidency was based on the mandate to be found in paragraph 36 of the 2000 report by the Conference on Disarmament to the general assembly, which confer on Presidents Draganov and Westdal the continuation of consultations based on the so-called Amorim proposal, which is to be found in CD document 1624. That mandate, flowing from specific consultations conducted with groups of the Conference in China, was extended until the Conference decides otherwise or they're completed. This is of great importance because as we state in our consultations it reflects the progress made over a period of at least two years. The Amorim proposal, which we should really call the Amorim process depends or is the result of efforts of various presidents who attempted and implemented various formulas to achieve rapprochement within the Conference and these include Ambassadors Rodriguez, Dembri and Lint. Despite the difficulties, which we can see today as a result of the international political situation and a tendency toward unilateralism on the part of some of its actors, in the view of the majority of the members of the CD, it continues to be valid as the basis for arriving at the final approval of a program of work. The Amorim. process is a legacy, which we must husband in the interest of the Conference itself.

If we had to start from scratch after a number of months perhaps we would result in a very similar concept. Many member delegations have stressed significant progress implicit in the general willingness to establish for the first time after 30 years, an Ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. We share that view and consequently one of our principle objectives has been to preserve the political and legal status of the Amorim. proposal so that it may continue to be the basis for presidential consultations. Based on that mandate the presidency, which encompasses not only the President but also the members of the Chilean mission, conducted intensive consultations using various formats, bilateral consultations, working meetings with groups in the Conference and their coordinators. Also new crosscutting ideas reflecting emerging tendencies. Consultations have encompassed all members of the Conference with the exception of a few delegations who after being requested to participate were nevertheless unable to attend. We wish to engage in an exercise in transparency. We have consulted and reflected directly with the Conference. We have shared with you our ideas and possible alternatives, sometimes with a degree of candor, a characteristic which we think is occasionally necessary in diplomatic life. The consultations by the Chilean Presidency were conducted using three analytical scenarios:
First of all, acceptance of the Amorim. package as set forth in document CD-1624. The consultations lead to the conclusion that that first scenario continues to be unlikely due to the divergent positions of various actors who continue to be separated by as yet unbridgeable gaps. Barring extraordinary events taking place outside the Conference we do not believe that this scenario can be brought to reality in the short term. Secondly, modifications of the drafting of the draft decision to be found in CD- 1624 with the view to incorporating more explicitly the requirements of a number of Conferences in the Conference with respect to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the text. These refer respectively to the mandates for the Ad-hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and PAROS. Our consultations would suggest that this approach explored to a certain extent by Ambassador Westdal during his term of office and complemented by a New Zealand proposal in the first session of informal open-ended consultations this year, will likewise not make it possible to reach consensus. Meeting the requirements set by some would widen the degree of difference with others. The third scenario would be an alteration to the drafting of the draft presidential declaration to be found in CD- 1624, to strengthen the nature and the ultimate negotiating intent of all the mandates to be found in the draft decision. This approach, which omits the variant of presidential interpretive declaration to that same end could in our view lead to a program of work. If all the actors involved agree to embark on an exercise in constructive ambiguity, to continue this approach would mean setting the CD as our prime objective and setting aside considerations of precise language. Our consultations would suggest that in this approach there is some glimmer of hope. Indeed it might be possible, to attempt in order to contribute to getting the CD out of its present stalemate, it might be possible to attempt having a presidential statement, which free from the Amorim proposal, or independently of that, would refer to some of the following principle elements:

Reaffirmation that the CD is the sole multilateral foram for negotiation of universal disarmament instruments, reiterating that all the matters coming in the Conference may be subject for negotiation. hi addition to emphasize that subsidiary bodies and their mandates can contribute to opening PAROS for the commencement of negotiations. Our success would have to continue exploring this possibility. We would leave these ideas for further consideration. Our consultations suggest in addition that within the CD there is an important trend, which wishes to take advantage of the time and resources until such occasion that a consensus is reached on a program of work. All the members of the Conference we've consulted consider that our first task is to achieve a program of work and to get down to substance. They're all in agreement that the CD is primarily a forum for negotiations. We agree with both views. To many delegations however these defining factors do not exclude the performance what from the outset we've preferred to call complementary actions. These possible actions we consider to understand as complements to the principal effort and not as something taking their place. That's why we've avoided referring to a Plan B, the sheer graphic force of which might lead to misunderstandings and to thinking that its content is an alternative to the quest for a program of work. We are of the view that there should be no such alternative. To discuss the question of complementary actions, this Presidency convened informal openended consultations during the third week. The debate made it possible to identify at least four proposals or ideas, the interest and potential of which in our view suggest that they're worthwhile and warrant further exploring. We have first of all the proposal by Myanmar to conduct a structured debate within the framework of plenary sessions on substantive items in the approved agenda. This proposal was formulated and circulated in writing, which means that we may dispense with further comments now. Then Germany proposed revising the agenda, which has been knocking around without extensive amendments for 20 years now and the text of which does not refer to important issues, which although possibly within the view of the CD are dealt with outside this context. That country considered furthermore the establishment of special coordinators pursuant to decision CD-1036 to explore and foster consensus on a substantial item and their appointment accordingly presupposes the nonexistence of such a consensus. There appointment should not be linked to an overall consensus on the program of work. Germany also believes that it might be appropriate to reactivate special coordinators for the reform of the Conference on Disarmament. Then Italy suggests that the Presidency should continue to conduct intensive consultations on the three items of greatest scope and complexity, nuclear disarmament, FMCT and PAROS. But in the meantime we should begin complementary activities on other matters, negative security, transparency in armaments, landmines and possible reforms to the CD, which in their view seem to be less contentious. But as the Italian delegation acknowledged when they spoke last Thursday these are not totally free from controversy. This is a kind of piccolo program package. And finally Mexico has drawn our attention to various possibilities offered by the Conferences and Rules of Procedure Articles 19 and 23 are conceived in very flexible terms and would provide for all kinds of informal consultations with or in the absence of experts and the establishment of a great range of subsidiary bodies, including subcommittees, technical groups and expert groups, which could challenge our very imaginations. We've listened very carefully to the various reactions to these various proposals and ideas, which display once again the creative capital to be found in the CD. Nevertheless we are convinced it would be premature to draw conclusions today from last Thursday's debate. It is which we have referred to in a nutshell today, offer prospects for action. They call for further study and consultations. We've also heard the idea that it might be useful to appoint a special coordinator to specifically address the question of complementary actions. This is a concept, which obviously would leave open for consideration by those who will continue with the search for a way of getting out of the present deadlock. Many have referred to the need to modernize our procedures. There is a report on some aspects of this matter, which was coordinated by my predecessor Ambassador lannis on an earlier occasion.

Finally, I'd like to say a number of things speaking in my capacity as Ambassador of Chile. The present situation calls for a note of optimism. We should understand that here an invaluable effort is being made to keep open opportunity for dialogue and thinking and reflecting among member countries. An enormous wealth of experience and specific technical knowledge has also been generated thereby. These capacities are only awaiting a critical mass, which in the light of international political events, is then sufficiently powerful to come into play and ultimately to enable the Conference on Disarmament to begin its negotiating activities. We should bear in mind that each President and each year that goes by represents a contribution to the disarmament process and contribution to international security thereby to world peace. In this respect one relevant consideration is the sheer continuity inherent in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We reemphasize that we believe firmly in the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral forum with prime importance for world security. This conviction leads us to reaffirm the need for perseverance in our endeavors to get it out of the stalemate. When we observe among some, what we might describe as a temptation to desert or feeling of disenchantment, which leads some to declare the death of the Conference, the thought occurs that if the CD didn't exist, we would be hard at work to establish it. In another respect we believe that the Conference on Disarmament is a body, which ought to be made more democratic. This isn't the time to dwell on that but we will be working in due course to achieve that. At the commencement of our term of office we observed that we would not be taking on our shoulders responsibilities, which did not belong to us. To achieve consensus on a program of work is a task, which belongs to all the members of the CD and not to the president who in the best of cases can then serve as facilitator and articulate ideas on the search for consensus. Nevertheless this collective responsibility is not distributed equally among all our ranks. I cannot and I should not fail to emphasize my conviction that the states, which have opted for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrents have a greater responsibility in getting the Conference out of the stalemate. We would like to see them take that responsibility on. Securing the interests of states are legitimate, but in no case can they be put above international collective security.

Finally, I'd like to express my thanks for the opportunity, which I've had to exercise this responsibility. At no point have I regretted it. On the contrary it's been an experience, which is going to be an abiding memory for me. I'd like to express my thanks to the Conference Secretariat, to the Secretary-General Ambassador Petrovsky, to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference Ambassador Roman-Morey, Mr. Zaleski and all members of the office who cooperated so effectively and so selflessly. We extend our appreciation to the interpreters and the Conference Room staff and a special word for the members of the missions, Ambassadors and colleagues whom we have met. It has been a great pleasure to work with you. Thank you for your encouragement and respect. And I cannot refrain from referring to all the members of the Chilean mission. They've all been fundamental in performing this work. My respects for Ambassador Raimundo GonzAlez, Minister Counselor Alfredo Labbé and Counselors Waldemar Coutts and Rodrigo Espinosa. Thank you for your devotion, imagination and patience with me. I cannot fail to mention Marco Sanchez who has had to struggle with the difficulties I have with all the languages of the world including my own. Thank you very much.

It remains for me now only to wish my successor in the Presidency, Ambassador Hu of China, every success in his activities during his term of office. He may count on our full cooperation. This concludes our work for the day. The next plenary session will be on Thursday the 22 nd of March 2001 at 10 o'clock.