| Mr. President,
I convey my congratulations on your assumption of office and assure
you of my delegation's support throughout your Presidency.
Some time ago a departing colleague suggested a rule of thumb which
allowed a farewell statement proportionate to the length of stay
of the Ambassador - a page for every year. I feel it is my duty
to inform you at the outset that I have served in Geneva for six
years !
For the first four years of my assignment, I was present in this
room as an observer. For the past two years, Ireland has had the
privilege of membership.
I was very honoured that we became a member of the CD during my
time as Ambassador. With Ireland's history in the disarmament area,
I felt deeply that we belonged in this forum and had something useful
to contribute.
A minor irony of history is that forty years ago, Ireland was approached
to accept a nomination to one of the five western seats in the then
newly formed Disarmament Committee, which had a total membership
of 18. It seems we turned down the offer because of staff shortages
in our diplomatic service! An application for admission to this
successor body, the Conference on Disarmament, was submitted in
1982 and we were finally admitted in 1999 after a seventeen year
wait.
On the day of our admission, I said that our sustained effort to
secure membership was an act of faith in the future of the CD. Despite
being sorely tested, that faith remains. I believe that this body
can and will recover its sense of purpose.
Role of the CD
In looking at how and why we have lost that sense of purpose, the
starting point is our mandate. Perhaps the most hallowed phrase
in this room is that the CD is the sole multilateral negotiating
forum in the disarmament area. That phrase conveys a fine sense
of our vocation and we use it repeatedly to urge ourselves to action.
But each of the elements bears further examination. "Sole"
- true of course that we
are the only standing forum but we are all aware of increasingly
unfavourable
comparisons with successful examples of ad hoc negotiation. "Negotiating
forum"
critical indeed to retain that focus so that the CD does not become
a talking shop. But
in the real world, the distinctions are not always watertight: purposeful
discussion can
lead to pre-negotiation which can lead to negotiation. In focussng
our vision, it is
important that we take care not to narrow it unduly.
However, it is on the term "multilateral" that I would
particularly like to pause.
Over the past few years, to explain and excuse the long paralysis,
we have reached for the explanation that the CD can only act when
the overall security climate is conducive - in effect that, though
a multilateral forum, we are hostage to key bilateral relationships.
Realism of course dictates that what happens in the CD reflects
developments on the outside. At the same time, it does not seem
unduly ambitious to hope for some movement in the opposite direction
- that progress or lack of it in the CD might affect, even in a
modest way, the perspectives of key players.
Regrettably, we have seen little of this in the past few Years.
Outside our circle here,
there is scant evidence that the prolonged inactivity of this body
is causing any real
concern. The opportunity cost of a stalled CD does not seem to weigh
heavily in key
capitals.
And yet even those who appear to feel they have the least need of
this body cannot be without concern. Firstly, if I might adapt the
phrase, diplomacy abhors a vacuum. If our proceedings are not making
things better, they risk making them worse. In the absence of serious
work here, national statements all too easily become vehicles by
which differences are sharpened and deepened rather than attempting
to find common ground on which differences might first co-exist
and eventually be resolved. Secondly, the assumption that the CD
can be put into cold storage for long periods, and then taken out
again for business as usual when there is a particular purpose to
be served, could prove flawed. One cannot exclude that the atrophy
which comes from prolonged disuse may do permanent damage.
Responsible Multilateralism
We look to the CD for the exercise of responsible multilateralism.
What is the essence of responsible multilateralism? It is a balance:
on the one hand, a recognition of the space which key actors require
for bilateral policy formulation; on the other hand, a responsiveness
by those key players to broadly representative views of the international
community.
It would be difficult to assert that we have got that balance right.
Currently new strategic directions are being explored and new strategic
bargains are being canvassed, while the CD risks becoming an irrelevant
sideshow.
One has the impression sometimes, at least in the security area,
that multilateralism is regarded as the self indulgence of small
nations. In fact, it is critical in terms both of methodology and
outcomes. It is the means of giving a voice to populations whose
lives and futures are at stake in strategic decisionmaking. It creates
a sense of
ownership of the instruments negotiated. And it is also, in our
view, the best way to achieve one of the main goals of disarmament:
the essential irreversibility of the process.
The ending of Cold War rigidities might have been expected to usher
in a period of vibrant and fluld multilateralism. So far this has
not happened and we need to ask ourselves why
Perhaps we misjudged the transition period required. The ending
of the Cold War is sometimes spoken of as if it occurred on a single
date and by general acclaim. The reality of course is much more
complex and there was bound to be a timelag before the multilateral
disarmament machinery caught up. But sufficient time has now elapsed
for us to have found our voice and our role.
Part of the problem may also lie in the fact that our structures
have not adapted to the new environment. The end of the rigidities
of the Cold War begs the question why such rigidities should continue
in bodies which were established to deal with the consequences of
the Cold War. I shall revert to that in a CD context in a moment.
More generally, I want to assert our strong belief that the more
fluid, less polar, circumstances in which security matters have
come to be considered create opportunities for new coalitions of
action, which are capable of attracting widespread, committed and
effective support.
We see the New Agenda Coalition as one example of such an approach.
In 1998, Ireland came together with six other countries to form
this Coalition. With its diverse membership, the New Agenda Coalition
owes its cohesion to the shared conviction of its members that in
current circumstances there can be a seamless process of negotiation
and agreement to the elimination of the ultimate weapons of mass
destruction: nuclear weapons.
The New Agenda objective is an ambitious one: to try to give substance
and reality to
what was often expressed as a goal under the old rigidities but
which had little
prospect of agreement on a multilateral basis. The road down which
we are traveling is not and was never going to be an easy one. But
we believe that our participation as
a group in the NPT Review Conference last year did help to strengthen
the outcome,
and in particular helped to secure the 13 step guide which is a
critical part of that
outcome- We are working with our partners on continuing to define
the future role
for the Coalition.
The New Agenda Coalition is just one example. There can be many
others. The
basic point we want to make is that the legitimacy of multilateralism
needs to be
constantly re-asserted, nowhere more than in the disarmament area,
and never more so
than now, at a time of radical re-assessment of the international
security architecture.
The best outcome will be if the initiation of this work gives a
sense of renewal to the Conference and it becomes a prelude to rather
than a substitute for substantive work. The worst outcome will be
a sense that the CD is now justifying its
existence and that we can be a little more comfortable in leaving
the substantive challenges on hold.
The worst outcome will be a sense that the CD is now justifying
its existence and that we can be a little more comfortable in leaving
the substantive challenges on hold.
Having said that, there is manifestly useful work to be done in
relation to the structure and functioning of the CD. There is need
for radical updating to reflect new circumstances. Given the slightly
theatrical feel to much of our proceedings, I will borrow a theatrical
metaphor - the audience has changed, the script has changed and
yet we retain the props, the stage directions and the admission
policy of another era.
This body was formed in the era of iron-tight alliances. We believe
that under its current structures it encourages thinking along these
lines. This creates first frustration and then lethargy. We encourage
the Co-ordinators to think imaginatively as to how the mould Might
be broken.
I would make just a few specific comments on the series of interlinked
issues to be considered by the three Special Co-ordinators. On enlargement,
our position is unsurprising in the light of our own experience.
I repeat what I said on the date of our admission: Outside or inside
the CD, Ireland's conviction on the desirability of expansion remains
unchanged.
Significant further expansion would have major implications for
effective functioning of the Conference, not least in further calling
into question the relevance of our current grouping systems.
As well as perpetuating the rigidities of another era, the current.
system allows one or two members of a group to hide behind a co-ordinator
who must simply record lack of agreement. The informal caucusing
which has characterised, for example, the later stages of the negotiation
towards the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention has underlined
the need for and benefit of fluidity in such a process. The mismatch
of the group structure to the real world would become even more
evident in the event of the launch of a work programme which contained
all the currently proposed elements.
As a counterbalance to such a loosening of structure, the appointment
of a President for a longer term than is currently permitted could
provide continuity, and enhance the prospects of achieving defined
goals within a term of office.
On the agenda, I will be brief. The agenda needs to relate to current
realities, have the possibility of a longer duration than one year,
and be capable of regular review and amendment. However, modernisation
of the agenda, desirable as it can be and difficult as it may be
to agree, would be an empty exercise in the absence of a will to
give it expression through work. And of course, one outcome of the
current exercise which we must avoid at all costs would be to allow
the agenda to become an annual bone of contention and one more reason
why the Conference is unable to get down to work.
Another issue which requires attention is the need for a formalised
mechanism for
input from the non-governmental disarmament community. There would
be a
compelling argument even if this were a body which was pursuing
a full and active
work programme. In our current circumstances it is both compelling
and potentially
liberating. Whether in relation to small arms, anti-personnel landmines
or other
weapons which impact heavily upon civilian populations, civil society
has established
the right not just to be heard but to actively participate in our
deliberations, a right
which is effectively denied at present.
Mr. President,
I have dwelt a good deal on substance, given the indulgence that
is offered to a
departing Ambassador. But I also want to use the opportunity to
express my warm
and genuine appreciation to colleagues here. I have hugely enjoyed
your comradeship and hospitality, I have learned a great deal from
your experience and insights and eloquence, and I value greatly
the friendships I have formed. Successive Presidents have been extraordinary
in their energy and commitment and all members of the Secretariat
- under the wise and benevolent leadership of Mr. Petrovsky - have
shown themselves true professionals in the best sense of the term.
I thank you all.
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