Statement by H.E. Mr. Inam ul Haque, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, in the Conference on Disarmament
- 25 January 2001

1 begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. You have assumed this office at a very challenging moment Given Canada's commitment to disarmament and non~proliferation, and your experience and diplomatic skills, we are confident that your stewardship will make a significant contribution to C13's work.

2. The delegation of Pakistan acknowledges the invaluable contributions made by your predecessors in promoting agreement on the CD's work programme, specially by two distinguished representatives from the Group of 21, Ambassador
Dembri of Algeria and Ambassador Amorim of Brazil.

Mr. President,

3. Together with the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, the Conference on Disarmament is an indispensable multilateral forum to promote and preserve international peace and security. It has the important mandate to
work on the elimination of the most dangerous weapons, including nuclear weapons, and the reduction and control of armaments globally. Bilateral or plurilateral endeavours outside the CD do not legally or politically constrain or restrict the CD's mandate as the sole disarmament negotiating forum. As such, and bound by the UN Charter's principles of sovereign equality, the CD must be responsive to the security needs of all states, large or small. It must strive to promote equal security for aU states. In practical terms, this means that aH States and peoples have the right to be free from the threat of aggression, destruction or annihilation. The realization of this universal goal is the great challenge to which the international community, specially this body, must respond with vision and courage.

4. This session of the CD opens during a leadership transition in the world's leading power. Pakistan welcomes the assumption of office by President George W. Bush. We are reassured that his Administration's external and defence affairs have been entrusted to people with vast experience and proven capability. Their decisions and actions will inevitably have major implications for the process of arms control and disarmament, including for the work of this Conference.

Mr. President,

5. Thirty years ago, the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union reached the conclusion that the deployment of anti-baffistic missile defences would erode the stability of mutual strategic deterrence between them. This conclusion, reflected in the
ABM Treaty, is now being questioned, in part because of the improvements in Ballistic Missile Defence capabilities and the collapse of the bipolar world. The issue requires careful examination, in view* of the major implications it is likely to have not only for strategic stability between the parties to the ABM Treaty but for other countries and regions as welL

6. Most countries, and the international disarmament community, remain unconvinced that abrogation or amendment of the ABM Treaty and deployment of National Missile Defences are the advisable course to enhance international or national security. If one or more States decide to create "shields" against ballistic missiles to protect their national territory, or that of their allies and clients, other States are likely to respond by improving and adding to their "lances". Missile defences, both NMD and TMD, could therefore heighten tensions between major powers, jeopardize the global strategic balance and turn back the disarmament clock. A security environment in which only some are secure from the nuclear threat, while others confront a possibly heightened danger, will not contribute to global stability.

7. We, therefore, believe that before irrevocable decisions are taken and actions initiated, it would be best to hold a thorough and inclusive debate on the rationale and the consequences of the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defences, both at the strategic and regional levels.

Mr. President,

8. The concerns expressed about missile proliferation should be evaluated from an objective perspective and not from the discriminatory premise that some states have the right to develop, possess, deploy, and use ballistic and cruise missiles while
others, including those targeted by such missiles, must be prevented, by an possible means, from acquiring them.

9. Thousands of long-range, medium-range and short range missiles are already deployed by the major powers and their allies. Even after the reductions envisaged under START II and a possible START Ill, the two major nuclear powers
win retain around 2500 nuclear warheads each deliverable by air, land and sea-based delivery systems. The missile-mounted nuclear weapons, which are held on high-alert, pose the main threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The first priority should he to address this danger. The best way of doing so would be to first de-alert and de-activate these weapons, and thereafter proceed to progressively deeper cuts towards the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons agreed to by the five NPT nuclear-weapon States at the last NPT Review conference.

10. Secondly, we need to address the underlying causes for the acquisition of missiles in other parts of the world. Regional missile development is largely an action reaction process in an already charged security environment. Each regional situation may require a sui generis approach which addresses the security concerns of the States concerned. In some cases, the role of missiles, specially for countries which do not have access to advanced and unaffordable military aircraft, may be vital for their defence strategies.

11. Thirdly, the introduction of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems into the military equation, at the global or regional level, is likely in itself to accelerate the qualitative improvement and quantitative deployment of "offensive" missiles. Thus, this "solution" to the problem of "missile proliferation" may, in fact, aggravate the problem.

Mr. President,

12. Restricted forums, with one dimensional agendas, like the MTCR, which operate on the basis of a selective and, therefore, a discriminatory approach, are unlikely to succeed in promoting a comprehensive and durable solutions to the dangers that are posed by the growing role of missiles in national defence strategies of both the major powers and others. Nor can such a forum address the issues of the acquisition and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The CD is, therefore, an appropriate
forum to consider the multifaceted ramifications of the issue of missile and anti-missile systems for international and regional stability and security.

Mr. President,

13. The Parties to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty are committed to using Outer Space "for the benefit of ad peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development". Outer Space has been declared the province of all mankind.
Today, there is heightened and legitimate concern that Outer Space could be further militarised through a proliferation of intelligence and communications assets. There is now also a real possibility of the actual deployment of space-based defensive and offensive weapons systems. It has thus become imperative for the CD to negotiate legal and political instruments against the weaponisation of Outer Space.

Mr. President,

14. My delegation is encouraged by your sincere and energetic efforts to build consensus on a work programme for the Conference on Disarmament. Pakistan maintains a constructive and flexible approach on this issue. We hope that the CD can
agree on a work programme this year.

15. Pakistan welcomes the emerging consensus that the CD should establish four Ad Hoc Committees to deal with Nuclear Disarmament, Fissile Materials, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Negative Security Assurances. We
trust that the differences regarding the specific wording of the mandates of some of these Committees will be resolved soon.

16. 1 wish to reiterate that Pakistan remains committed to negotiations on a Fissile Materials Treaty in the CD. We will seek to address and resolve the issue of unequal stockpiles within the framework of these negotiations. 1 should add that the

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evolution in South Asia's security environment will have a direct bearing on our position on this Treaty and its variou~ elements.

17. South Asia has been described as "the most dangerous place in the world". Pakistan wishes the region to be rid of this ominous appellation. We cannot, however, do it alone. South Asia can become a region of peace and progress through a
commitment on the part of both India and Pakistan to resolve the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies at the heart of problems between the two countries, through peaceful negotiations based on principles of international law and of the UN Charter and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. India and Pakistan have, in the past, gone to war on this issue. We believe that, in the context of present day realities, it is essential to take steps to defuse tensions over Kashmir and to launch the process for a just and peaceful solution to the dispute.

18. Pakistan has made consistent efforts to promote this objective. The Chief Executive of Pakistan, has offered to resume the dialogue with India at any time, at any level and at any place. In December 2000, Pakistan declared that it would unilaterally
exercise maximum restraint along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. There is greater tranquillity today all along the Line. This is recognized by India as well. Pakistan has also unilaterally withdrawn sizable forces from forward positions on the
Line of Control.

19. India's announced suspension of military operations against the Kashmiri freedom fighters will he meaningful only if it is combined with a purposeful dialogue for the peaceful settlement of Jammu and Kashmir, an end to repression and violence
against the Kashmiri people, reduction of Indian forces in Indian occupied Kashmir, release of all detainees and respect for the fundamental rights of the Kashmiri people.

20. While India has contirkped to avoid a dialogue with Pakistan and has sought to impose unacceptable preconditions on a resumption of dialogue, Pakistan has sought ways and means to promote a dialogue. In our statement on 2 December 2000
announcing maximum restraint on the Line of Control, we also proposed that the
Executive Committee of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, the representative of the Kashmiri people may he allowed to travel to Pakistan preparatory to a tripartitedialogue. We also suggested to India to undertake similar consultations with the
Executive Committee of the APHC. We believe that the discussions of the A-PHC withPakistan and India would lead to the commencement of a process for a final settlementof the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiri people welcomed this proposal and the leadership of the APHC nominated a five-member delegation to -visit Pakistan. Unfortunately, India has held up the process by seeking to decide the composition of the Kashmiri delegation through the stratagem of refusing travel documents to some of the Kashmiri leaders.

21. Pakistan hopes that the Indian government will review its approach and allow the delegation nominated by the API-IC to visit Pakistan and will agreeexpeditiously to the resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. It is only

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through a credible peace process and genuine reduction of repression by Indian security forces in Indian occupied Kdshmir that the Kashmiri people will he able to breathe in peace and decide their future in accordance with their own aspirations. We apprehend that, if not seized quickly, even this opportunity may be lost because of the approach and attitude of India.

Mr. President,

22. Apart from the urgent action required to avoid conflict over Kashmir andto promote a peaceful solution to this long-standing dispute, it is essential to take steps toarrest nuclear and conventional arms build up in South Asia. Instead of a triad of
nuclear forces Pakistan seeks a triad of peace, security and progress. To this end wesuggest:

One, resumption of high-level talks between India and Pakistan to discuss and resolve the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, which is the core issue between the two countries as wed as other outstanding disputes and dillerences.

Two, a Strategic Restraint Regime, involving measures for nuclear restraint and conventional balance.

Three, High-level interaction for the promotion of trade, transit arrangements, development cooperation and investment generation.

23. In this forum, I will dwell only on the strategic restraint regime as we visualize it.
24. Prior to India's 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan was prepared to live with "existential deterrence". In our now nuclearised region, Pakistan believes it would bebest to preserve mutual deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan will not enter
an arms race with India. However, if India continues to move up the nuclear ladder,Pakistan may be compelled to take the steps necessary to preserve the credibility of itsdeterrence. We are prepared to discuss, in fairly specific terms, our requirements for a minimum credible nuclear deterrence, if India is prepared to do so. However, if the well publicised Indian nuclear doctrine is any indication of the future direction of India's nuclear programme and ambitions, it should be a matter of deep concern for the international community, as it is for us. New Delhi has claimed that the nuclear doctrine is a non-official document. Yet, India has not disavowed the ambitious goals and plans for a "triad" of land, air and sea based delivery systems which could entail the acquisition of several hundred nuclear weapons.

25. Pakistan is prepared for reciprocal agreements with India for nuclear andmissile restraint. These could include agreements on:

One, not to deploy ballistic missiles;

Two, not to operationally weaponise nuclear capable missile systems;

Three, formalize the understanding to provide prior and adequate notification of flight-tests of missiles; and

Four, to declare a moratorium on the development, acquisition or deployment of Anti Ballistic Missile systems, since these can destabilize "minimum credible deterrence".

26. Such measures of nuclear restraint will be much more effective in preventing.the possible use of nuclear weapons than a mere declaration of 'no-rirst use', which has been used by our neighbour as a justification for acquiring a large nuclear arsenal on the basis of the argument that this is required to develop a second-strike capability.

27. Nuclear restraint agreements between India and Pakistan could be accompanied by political and technical confidence building measures. Bilateral or technical arrangements can be envisaged for the credibility and confirmation of mutual
nuclear restraint measures, including through agreed monitoring mechanisms. Such arrangements also include enhancing the effectiveness of the Command and Control systems by each country. The two countries could establish round-the-clock
communications between designated authorities with a view to crisis stability and management and to preclude any misunderstandings regarding strategic assets.

28. 1 Mutual nuclear restraint between India and Pakistan wifi have to be built on a balance in the conventional forces and capabilities of the two countries. An imbalance in conventional capabilities will he obviously destabilizing. The 28% increase
in India's defence budget last year is by itself equal to the entire defence budget of Pakistan. India seeks to justify its huge defence outlays by pointing to its long borders. But, the fact remains that almost all of the India's military assets are deployed against Pakistan. If India continues its conventional arms build-up, Pakistan will be compelled to recalibrate its defence planning in order to effectively reduce the heightened threat of conventional conflict

29. India's conventional arms build-up will not help preservation of peace in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. It could well threaten it. An ambitious nuclear programme coupled with a massive conventional arms build up will only point to a
policy of seeking regional hegemony which will evoke concern and reaction throughout the region.

30. Conventional arms control is, therefore, essential to preserve the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and to reduce wasteful defence expenditures. Pakistan has made specific proposals to promote these objectives, including a mutually agreed ratio of forces between India and Pakistan, measures to increase mutual conridence and elimination of the threat of surprise attack and pre-emptive strikes by

either country. These proposals, and others that seek to promote regional stability, should he considered by India and Pakistan in bilateral talks and in plurilateral mechanisms that should he created to elaborate the new security architecture for South Asia.

31. The three piNars of South Asian Peace, Security and Progress, which 1 have mentioned, namely: a high-level dialogue to resolve Jammu and Kashmir and other outstanding disputes, a mechanism to promote trade and economic cooperation,
and a strategic restraint regime would complement, sustain, support and reinforce each other.

32. Through sincere and persistent efforts, we can, indeed we must, create the conditions for durable peace and enhanced prosperity for the thirteen hundred million people of South Asia.

I thank you Mr. President.