Address by the Permanent Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament
His Excellency Mr. Michael Smith

20 June 2002, Geneva

(check against delivery)

Mr President

Let me begin by congratulating you on the way you have conducted your Presidency — you have been energetic yet measured in your management of the Conference; you have shown creativity and perseverance in your consultations with us all, yet have tempered your enthusiasm and impatience for progress with humour and a good sense of the political realities we are dealing with. In short, should I remain here long enough myself to progress around this room to your position, I will certainly cast my mind back to these days and do my best to emulate your calm, sensible and gracious approach.

As you have noted, this is the first occasion that I have had the privilege to address this Conference and I do so with a strong sense of the weight of negotiating history that is wrapped in these walls. Australia has always played an active role in this body. That has not been due to any misplaced sense of national self-importance. It has been because Australians have fought and died in many wars, and our community, notwithstanding the fact that no war has been fought on our soil, has a deeply rooted sense of the pain, dislocation and destruction that flows from conventional warfare. We firmly believe that there is a better way — that through negotiations leading to the establishment of global legal norms, collectively we can discourage and even head off some otherwise inevitable conflicts.

In this respect Australians are particularly conscious of the enormous potential for human suffering and devastation locked up in nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons technology. It is because of this that we have worked here with you and so many of your national colleagues on the drafting of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, on the Chemical Weapons Convention, on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on a number of other instruments. Many of these have come into effect and are working silently to deter the development and deployment of WMD; others are yet to achieve their full potential.

Mr President

I was aware of course before my arrival here that this Conference was locked in a stalemate that was preventing it from addressing its work. What has particularly struck me since I arrived here is the incredible pool of diplomatic talent that is gathered here poised to work and therefore what a waste it is that we can do nothing. The more so in the light of the terrorist attacks on 11 September and their aftermath. The average man or woman in our countries would be entitled to ask, why are we, the specialist body in the UN system charged with developing multilateral legal responses to security challenges, doing nothing about it?

Rather than repeating the answer we all know, I would like to set out what my Government thinks we should be doing and what I hope we can achieve in my time in Geneva, not only in the CD but in other multilateral forums here in Geneva and even elsewhere.

The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty has been endorsed repeatedly as the logical next step on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda and it is our firm hope that the CD will make an early start on negotiations on an FMCT. The most powerful barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation is the difficulty of acquiring sufficient quantities of weapons useable nuclear material. An FMCT would tighten international controls on fissile material, further raising the bar to proliferation. And recent tensions in South Asia are a reminder of the potential for a cut-off treaty to play an important security and confidence-building role in regions of tension, most particularly in South Asia and the Middle East.

Until there is a start to formal negotiations, and without in any way supplanting the CD’s rightful role as the negotiating forum, Australia sees value in further informal work in Geneva on FMCT issues, building on the workshops and seminars held last year. We very much welcome the Netherlands initiative for a structured series of FMCT seminars, the first of which took place on 7 June. We regard the seminars as making a valuable contribution to understanding of the important role an FMCT would play in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and strongly encourage wide participation by delegations in them.

Australia also encourages all CD delegations to consider other measures that could be taken to support the FMCT. In particular we urge relevant states to join a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Our efforts in the CD need to be complemented by other multilateral, plurilateral, regional and bilateral processes to promote arms control and disarmament goals.

The NPT remains essential to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and advance nuclear disarmament. We were encouraged by the strong commitment to the NPT evident at the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference in New York in April. We look to all NPT parties to continue to bring to the review process a spirit of constructive cooperation consistent with our shared interests in maintaining and strengthening this vital Treaty. Geneva of course will host the 2003 PrepCom. There is a special onus on delegations in Geneva to assist the Chair, Ambassador Molnar, with preparations for the 2003 meeting.

Australia continues to work energetically with other countries to achieve a complete ban on nuclear tests for all time through the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We are aware that concerns have been expressed about the prospects for the Treaty’s entry into force. We note however that with 165 signatories and 93 ratifications the Treaty has firmly established itself as a powerful international norm against nuclear explosive testing. Furthermore it has secured this support within a remarkably short time frame — less than 6 years. Nevertheless until our goal of CTBT entry into force is achieved we would urge all countries to maintain the existing moratorium on nuclear testing and support development of the CTBT International Monitoring System.

Australia will continue working vigorously for universal application of the Additional Protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards. We regard global application of the Additional Protocol as an essential reinforcing step for facilitating nuclear disarmament. We urge those yet to conclude an Additional Protocol to do so as quickly as possible.

The Biological Weapons Convention is another cornerstone of the multilateral disarmament system but it has faced serious challenges in the last twelve months. More than 6 months has passed since the Fifth Review Conference of this Convention was suspended. It remains nonetheless the best means the international community has for preventing and addressing the proliferation of biological weapons. But it remains insufficient. We do not have adequate means for promoting effective implementation of the Convention, nor for clarifying suspicions of non-compliance. Technological development is rapidly expanding the scope not only of peaceful applications of biotechnology but for even more dangerous biological weapons. Regulatory controls over access to pathogens in most countries remain inadequate. For these reasons and others, the BWC needs to be strengthened. A variety of practical proposals for doing that were put before the Conference last year and promising means of continuing that work received wide endorsement.

Our highest priority for the resumed BWC Revcon is ensuring a substantive conclusion that advances international efforts against biological weapons and provides security benefits to us all. We consider an indispensable part of that conclusion is agreement to more frequent meetings of States Parties to improve implementation of the Convention, reinforce compliance and strengthen accountability.

Preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which can serve as potential WMD delivery vehicles, is another Australian priority. We are encouraged by progress towards the finalisation of the draft International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against ballistic missile proliferation.

We should remember that the uncontrolled spread and indiscriminate use of conventional arms can also have a devastating humanitarian impact, threatening security and development. For this reason Australia remains strongly committed to universalisation of the Ottawa Convention and promoting implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in New York in July last year.

My predecessor Les Luck had the privilege of serving as President of the Second Review Conference of the CCW held in December 2001. My Government remains committed to the experts group process which was established at that meeting to consider further steps that might be taken to reduce the impact of the explosive remnants of war and anti-vehicle mines. Australia is hopeful that agreement can be reached on practical measures that reduce the effects of these weapons on civilians.

Mr President

I am conscious that that is an intimidating list of activities but I think we need to be ambitious if we are to make this body and the negotiating skills it contains, fulfil their potential. I can assure you Mr President that I and my delegation at the very least remain firmly committed to a strong, relevant and dynamic CD and we urge all member States to strive for the necessary compromises to allow the Conference to get back to work.

Thank you Mr President.

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008