



# PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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**STATEMENT**

**BY**

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AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN**

**AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT  
ON "NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT"  
23 JUNE 2005**

**Geneva,  
June 23, 2005**

Mr. President,

I congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We wish you success and assure you of our full support in your endeavors.

We appreciate that, despite the deadlock in the CD, you have invited member states to speak on the four core issues. Positions on these issues and political configurations are more or less known here. Yet repetition, reiteration or reinforcement of our views can help us understand our perspectives which may well be undergoing a change. Well, your method is innovative and deserves commendation.

We associate ourselves with the statement given by G-21. The adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work based on the A-5 proposal remains our priority.

Mr. President,

Today, there are three main concerns about nuclear disarmament: (a) the pace of disarmament is not fast enough; (b) there is no movement on interrelated issues of test ban, fissile materials, outer space, and negative security assurances; and (c) the debate and dialogue on disarmament are completely stalled.

In this context, I will talk about *five* challenges:

The *first* thing that comes to mind is the creeping institutional deficit or, more appropriately, a gradual emaciation of the existing multilateral forums. The Conference on Disarmament itself has not been very active in the business of disarmament.

Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his report *In Larger Freedom*, says that we must revitalize our multilateral frameworks "to ensure continued progress on disarmament and to address growing risks and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, especially in the nuclear field." Are we doing that? Can we do that? Is there a way to go past the rituals of exhortations and self-flagellation?

We believe that multilateral legal norms and instrument enjoy universal legality and acceptance. Decisions taken in exclusive or non-institutionalized multilateral forums will not have legitimacy in the long run.

In order to show seriousness about disarmament some life will have to be put back in the CD to play its role as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. We must also fully involve the First Committee and the UN Disarmament Commission in addressing issues of disarmament and non-proliferation. These forums should not be turned into empty, cosmetic shells. That said, working methods of the disarmament machinery must be improved and made more effective.

The *second* challenge is to resolve the tension between nuclear *legality* and nuclear *reality*. This has at least three dimensions.

*One*, five nuclear weapon states have undertaken legal commitments to achieve nuclear disarmament. Some progress has been made. More needs to be done. There is a perception that the nuclear powers intend to retain their nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. We believe that a credible programme of work for nuclear disarmament, within a reasonable time frame, is essential to revalidate the "bargain" between disarmament and non-proliferation and to safeguard vital security interests of a majority of states.

*Two*, there are three other nuclear weapon states, which are also not likely to renounce their capabilities in the foreseeable future outside the framework of a programme of global nuclear disarmament or regional arms control and conflict resolution. IAEA Director General Mohammad AlBaradei has called for the inclusion of the three non-NPT nuclear states in future talks on non-proliferation and disarmament. Such calls should be heeded. Pakistan is a *de facto* nuclear state. In this context, legality has to match with reality. *De facto* needs to be changed to *de jure*.

*Three*, cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy should continue to enjoy international sanction. The questions related to the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle should be addressed equitably and in a non-discriminatory manner.

We can go a step further and convene an international conference to resolve these tensions.

The *third* challenge is to diminish the role of the nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Disarmament and non-proliferation are the two sides of the same coin. They cannot now be separated. The primacy of nuclear weapons in national security policies has a demonstration effect and a spillover impact on disarmament.

The *fourth* challenge is to fight terrorism and deny WMD access to terrorists.

And I would say the *fifth* challenge is to promote a genuine dialogue between *haves* and *have nots*, because in the current environment they are talking past each other.

Mr. President,

From the mid-1970s to 1998, when we became an overt nuclear power, Pakistan proposed several regional disarmament measures, but they were not supported by our primary interlocutors. Post-tests, for our national defence and security, we opted for a minimum credible deterrence.

Today, realistically speaking, South Asia may be a long way from disarmament, but Pakistan is against an open-ended strategic or conventional arms race in our region. We will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. We support international arms control and disarmament initiatives and efforts.

Pakistan is observing a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests and we are ready to participate in on negotiations on a fissile material treaty in accordance with the Shannon mandate.

Pakistan is pursuing with India a strategic restraint regime (SRR) which has three constituents – nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance, and conflict resolution. We are making some headway. Last year Pakistan and India affirmed that their respective nuclear capabilities, based their national security imperatives, constitute a factor of stability. Beyond declaratory statements, we are also working on strategic stability, confidence building and risk reduction. We are engaging India to find a win-win, just and lasting solution of Kashmir.

Mr. President,

Today, the Conference on Disarmament faces a crisis of relevance and functionality. The CD has faced and survived similar crises of inaction and self-doubt in the past. The reasons for the present hiatus are political not procedural. In order to energize the CD we need to understand the enormity of the threats posed by WMD and demonstrate willingness to address them collectively.

I thank you, Mr. President.