



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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STATEMENT

BY

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TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

**Geneva,
24 March 2005**

Mr. President,

1. I congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We also appreciate the efforts of your distinguished predecessors - Ambassadors Chris Sanders and Tim Caughley.

2. This is the first time I am speaking at the CD. I thank you and members of the CD for giving me this opportunity. It is indeed an honour for me to address this prestigious forum. I am looking forward to working with my colleagues in the CD and benefit from their experience and expertise.

3. The Conference on Disarmament is a key multilateral forum for addressing all issues relating to most dangerous weapons on our planet, including nuclear weapons, and reduction and control of armaments. Several bilateral and plurilateral initiatives are sprouting, but legally and politically they cannot detract from the CD's mandate as the sole disarmament negotiating forum.

4. The fact is that despite its importance, at present, the CD is in a state of what one may call *suspended animation*. In the recent past, all sorts of creative attempts to energize the CD have not succeeded.

5. Ms. Laila Freivalds, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, aptly remarked that the failure is "political", not "diplomatic". To find the right remedy we need correct prescription. If the stalemate is deliberate, not inadvertent, it cannot be broken with innovative semantics, as the dynamic of this Conference is influenced by the changing paradigm of international politics.

6. For its part, as always, Pakistan supports this important body. The Conference on Disarmament should press ahead with its agenda within a balanced and comprehensive framework. Pakistan associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Group of 21 by Ambassador Naela Gabr of Egypt on March 15, 2005.

7. Negotiations on an FMT, whenever they start, must cover existing stockpiles and an effective verification mechanism. We should strive to prevent militarization of Outer Space. In accordance with the commitments given by the nuclear weapon states under Article VI of the NPT in its last Review Conference, a realistic programme for nuclear disarmament must commence. Until the goals of nuclear disarmament are met, security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states would reduce incentives for proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. The Conference on Disarmament should be enabled to take up the issue of missiles in all their aspects. It should also include in its programme of work conventional arms control at regional and sub-regional levels.

9. A comprehensive consideration of ways to address threats to international security should not be deemed as artificial linkages. Universal compliance requires legitimacy and broad support from constituents and stakeholders alike.

Mr. President,

10. Let me now turn to Pakistan's perspective on issues of peace and security as well as non-proliferation and disarmament as they affect us, our region - South Asia - and our extended neighbourhood.

11. I would like to allude to four concentric circles, namely, (a) *raison d'être* and rationale of our nuclear capability; (b) our command and control structure; (c) safety and security; (d) and our concept of a strategic restraint regime (SRR).

12. The overarching tenets of our nuclear programme are *restraint and responsibility*. Our pursuit of nuclear capability was security driven; not status driven. We were not the first to test. We do not have great power ambitions.

13. Our primary objective in acquiring nuclear capability was to deter all forms of external aggression that could endanger our national security. To that end, we have opted to maintain credible minimum nuclear deterrence, with flexible and sufficient delivery means. Simultaneously, we would maintain an adequate conventional military force. We believe that an open-ended arms race in South Asia is counterproductive and fraught with serious dangers. Pakistan will not transfer nuclear weapons or weapons related material or technology to any foreign entity or state.

14. In 1998, Pakistan made a transition from a recessed capability to an overt nuclear capability. In so doing, we breached no law, but merely responded to the regional security situation. After 1998, we rapidly put in place a raft of measures. I will highlight just a few.

- (a) In February 2000, our Government established a National Command Authority (NCA) with the mandate and power to oversee and manage Pakistan's strategic assets and nuclear programme. All key nuclear installations were brought under the unified control of the NCA, which has a strong civilian-military interface. The NCA exercises employment and development control over all strategic forces and strategic organizations. The President of Pakistan is the Chairman of this apex body; and the Prime Minister is the Vice-Chairman.
- (b) A reliable command and control system was put in place, which is supported by an elaborate network of communications, computer, information, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
- (c) Safety and security of our strategic assets are accorded the highest priority. Custodial controls have been streamlined and strengthened to guard against risks of leakage of technology, accidental launch or unauthorized deployment. Oversight is stringent. A series of checks and balances have been built into the system, which include complete institutional control over fissile materials and sensitive technology.
- (d) We have passed laws and enforced them to strengthen export controls. We are a party to both the BWC and CWC. To meet obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, we promulgated an ordinance in 2000. In

September 2004, we enacted a comprehensive Export Control Act to deal with nuclear and biological weapons. This Act tightens controls over export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of sensitive goods, technologies and equipment.

Mr. President,

15. In 2003, disturbing revelations pointed to the activities of the international nuclear black market, which had its tentacles in more than two dozen countries. We moved swiftly and resolutely to investigate the illicit proliferation network and dismantled it. The network as it related to Pakistan, has been neutralized definitively. We conducted these investigations in our own supreme national interest, but we are cooperating with the IAEA and the international community.

Mr. President,

16. A combination of volatility and nuclear weapons can be lethal. Active and festering conflicts are a threat to peace and pose risks of use of nuclear weapons in the regions which possess them.

17. Global diplomacy must focus on resolving longstanding disputes. The High Level Panel Report in its considered assessment said that such disputes "continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face." "Foremost among these", the Panel said, "are the issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula."

18. In the post 1998 phase of our history, we accelerated our quest for conflict resolution and peace in South Asia. Our concept of a strategic restraint regime in South Asia is premised on three elements – (a) sustained and result oriented dialogue to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir issue and other outstanding issues with India; (b) nuclear restraint and (c) conventional balance.

19. Since January 2004, following a historic agreement between President Musharraf and former Prime Minister Vajpayee, later endorsed by his successor Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, we have been sustaining an intertwined process of confidence building and composite dialogue with India. Our objective is to find a win-win, just and lasting solution of Kashmir. The dialogue has a cyclical pattern, with peaks and troughs, and we hope that peaks would define the current engagement between India and Pakistan.

20. We have seen some movement in the area of Nuclear CBMs. In a joint statement, issued on June 20, 2004 in Dehli, Pakistan and India recognized that their respective nuclear capabilities, based on their national security imperatives, constituted a factor of stability. They committed themselves to working towards strategic stability. Pakistan and India also decided to move in two other areas, namely, (a) nuclear risk reduction measures which include upgrading and establishing hotlines and (b) working on an agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles, an arrangement that has already existed informally since 1999. We hope that the agreement would mature in the second quarter of this year.

21. As part of the strategic restraint regime, over the years, we have also made the following proposals:

- Maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status.
- No operational deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles.
- No acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic missile system.

22. Conventional military balance between Pakistan and India is essential for stability in South Asia, as it will ensure prevention of use of force, which could escalate unpredictably. Last December, we had a preliminary round of talks with India on conventional CBMs.

23. Our vision for South Asia is anchored in a security architecture based on preventive diplomacy, confidence building and conflict resolution.

Mr. President,

24. In the recent past, there has been some talk of the so called "three state solution". Last year, during his visit to Pakistan, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states should be pulled out of "the nuclear netherworld." The IAEA Director General has also called for the inclusion of three non-NPT nuclear states in future talks on non-proliferation and disarmament.

25. The fact is that Pakistan is not in the netherworld. We are a declared nuclear weapon state. Ground realities ought to be respected. "Pulling out of the netherworld" has another connotation. Residual sanctions and intangible restrictions should be removed. Pakistan's legitimate requirements of technology should be recognized.

26. We qualify for such an engagement. We are fulfilling non-proliferation obligations, although Pakistan is not a member of the NPT. We are observing a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests. We have developed and implemented export control laws; we are investing heavily in the safety and security of our strategic assets and materials; and we are ready to participate in negotiations on a fissile material treaty in accordance with the Shannon mandate. Pakistan is also ready to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Last, but not the least, we are making vigorous efforts to resolve outstanding issues with India, especially Kashmir.

Mr. President,

27. The landscape of international security is constantly changing. Several new moves are afoot. There are proposals to reconfigure the disarmament architecture. Initiatives have been taken for proliferation security and maritime security. Separately, at IAEA an independent expert group has examined the question of nuclear fuel cycle. For the CD these developments pose a challenge for reflection and for a new synthesis.

Thank you. Mr. President.