Summary of Statements By Topic

Statements made at the 2005 Session of the
Conference on Disarmament

Click on a Topic:
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
PAROS
Nuclear Disarmament
Negative Security Assurances
A5 Agenda
Verification
Terrorism

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
(see also CD Report from June 29 for States' positions on FMCT)

Finland, 18 August
" Today we have to note that the inability of the CD to continue working on the FMCT the following years has been one of the most concrete disappointments. Despite the fact that the NPT 2000 review conference encouraged us to initiate also the discussions on nuclear disarmament in general."

Canada, 14 March
"On the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty for example, we have long believed that this accord would represent a crucial step on the road to the elimination of nuclear weapons, by turning off the production tap of the material needed to fashion them. A former Canadian ambassador, the late Gerald Shannon, worked hard in the mid-1990s to develop a negotiating mandate for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which until recent months enjoyed universal support in this forum. We are convinced that this mandate remains the best basis for initiating negotiations. But precisely because our priority is the initiation of negotiations, rather than debates over the merits of any particular mandate, we are prepared to engage in negotiations toward a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty without any preconditions."

Germany, 23 June
"First and foremost, we have to start negotiations in the CD on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. In this context, I recall para 36 of the Common Position of the EU relating to the 2005 NPT RevCon which “appeals again to the Disarmament Conference for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without pre-conditions, and bearing in mind the special coordinator’s report and the mandate included therein”. An FMCT would constitute a new substantial nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure, a proof for effective multilateralism and an essential building block for our international security."

India, 23 June
"We remain committed to our unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and to participating in negotiations on a multilateral, non-discriminatory and effectively and internationally verifiable Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty."

Italy, 15 February
"The priority for us has been in the past years and remains today the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We underline at this stage the urgency of this negotiation, which should be a logical priority for every country genuinely committed to nuclear disarmament and arms control. A FMCT would stop the production of the most dangerous fissile materials: those destined to produce nuclear explosions.

Non-nuclear weapons states should be the most evident supporters of this agreement which does not entail additional burdens for them. The main limitations and restraints would regard countries possessing nuclear weapons or those who might pursue, in the future, nuclear military capabilities. But they too would benefit from an agreement which would prevent a dangerous and costly spiral in fissile material production and would introduce a useful confidence building measure and transparency. An FMCT would be an instrument of nuclear arms limitation and would strengthen non-proliferation. This is important especially in view of the NPT Review Conference. It fully pertains to the Article IV of the NPT since it clearly relates to cessation of the nuclear arms race."

Japan, 17 March
"Firstly, given the rapidly changing security environment, we can no longer afford to continue lengthy procedural discussions. The CD has to offer new instruments to deal with the imminent security challenges facing us today. From this perspective, the FMCT, prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons, is extremely important, not only for nuclear disarmament, but also for nuclear non-proliferation. By halting the future production of fissile material, the FMCT will contribute to the elimination of a potential source of proliferation. For this reason, Japan considers the commencement of negotiations on the FMCT a priority for the CD. There may well exist different perspectives with regard to the possible substance of negotiations. However, no Member State, as far as I am aware, disagrees on the commencement of negotiation itself. Negotiations should begin without further delay, and eventual questions on verification can be resolved during negotiations."

Kazakhstan, 17 March
"Kazakhstan also believes that the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is essential for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This treaty is expected to tighten international negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials. We are convinces that the start of negotiations on an FMCD will be a significant step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation."

Netherlands, 15 March
"Before concluding, I would like to make a few special remarks about the three states that have chosen to remain outside the NPT. These states maintain that their security situation does not allow them to forego the option of possessing nuclear weapons. I would like to call on India, Pakistan and Israel to reanalyze their positions and to reconsider the case for joining the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. In the meantime, I hope that these states also realize that they are indirect beneficiaries of the NPT, and that they too can help to promote the success of that Treaty.

"The most productive step for them, in my view, would be for them to start negotiations and discussions without further delay in the Conference on Disarmament on a number of issues related to nuclear disarmament – first and foremost on an FMCT, without preconditions."

New Agenda Coalition, 24 March
"In the case of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, the CD has been unable to agree on a work programme that includes conclusion of negotiations within the specified time frame of five years. Worse, we have failed to live up to the measure we agreed in respect of negotiations for such a treaty under the heading “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference."

Norway, 15 February
"We think it should be possible for the CD to establish three or four subsidiary bodies and mandates. Norway’s first priority remains the start of negotiations with a view to achieving a verifiable treaty to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. A change in the Shannon mandate is at the outset not desirable, nor does there seem to be support for it. We are, however, hopeful that several options can be considered by all interested delegations."

Pakistan, 24 March
"Negotiations on an FMT, whenever they start, must cover existing stockpiles and an effective verification mechanism. We should strive to prevent militarization of outer space. In accordance with the commitments given by nuclear weapon states under Article IV of the NPT in its last Review Conference, a realistic program for disarmament must commence. Until the goals of nuclear disarmament are met, security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states would reduce incentives for proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Pakistan, 23 June
"Pakistan is observing a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests and we are ready to participate in on negotiations on a fissile material treaty in accordance with the Shannon mandate. "

Poland, 17 March
"This Conference faces important tasks. Long-awaited negotiations of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regime and advance disarmament goal of international community. Discussions about nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states should also help strengthen the role of this Conference in multilateral arms control and disarmament. It is our view that the CD should not refrain from addressing the issue of arms race in outer space. We should thus fulfill our obligation to reserve outer space for peaceful use."

Slovakia, 17 March
"To be more specific, Mr. Chairman, I do see a number of major challenges that this important forum is facing these days. The first major challenge is related to the upcoming NPT Review Conference. The CD was not able to start, let alone complete within the planned 5 year’s time, negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, in spite of the unambiguous political commitment taken to this end at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This is an obvious failure and a hard blow to the credibility of this body. The deficit caused by this failure has to be addressed with utmost seriousness in the coming months."

Ukraine, 15 March
"The immediate commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) as well as dealing with both nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space within appropriate subsidiary bodies- these three parts together constitute the basis today for an agreement to begin our work."

PAROS
(see also CD Report from June 30 for States' positions on PAROS)

Russian Federation, 6 September
The full statement is about PAROS.

Canada, 14 March
"On PAROS, Canada has long been associated with those who believe that an international agreement banning the deployment of weapons in outer space is an increasingly necessary goal and can be a practical exercise in preventive diplomacy. Here again, in order to foster a consensus, concessions were made and an original negotiating mandate was circumscribed as a discussion mandate. This issue is of sufficient import that we would be supportive if the Conference on Disarmament, as a first step, merely started to discuss it. Unfortunately, the flexibility shown by the earlier advocates of negotiation in agreeing to a dilution of the PAROS mandate has not been reciprocated, and the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to create a committee to begin to consider this theme."

Canada, 9 June
"Definitions or terminology is a crucial aspect of consideration of PAROS, and certainly it is important for those who champion the non-weaponization of space to develop common understandings of what is meant by terms like "weaponization" and "outer space".

"Our preference for doing this work, as our delegation has repeated on many occasions, would be via a re-established Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS that was an earlier feature of this Conference. In the interim, however we should find other ways of accomplishing this task. Last year a delegation suggested that an experts group on PAROS be established to look at topics like definitions. We would be supportive of this or of using a structured discussion in plenary. My Russian counterpart in his statement expressed the intention of organizing an open-ended working group to discuss the three thematic papers tabled by the Russian and Chinese delegations. We would suggest that he pursue this in consultation with the Presidency with a view to providing the Conference with an appropriate forum in which to consider and comment on these working papers in the manner that they deserve."

China, 15 February
"Progress in science and technology has put the peaceful uses and development of space within the reach of more and more countries in their efforts to benefit the people. At the same time, however, the research on and development of outer space weapons have also intensified, theories of outer space war contemplated, and the threat of the weaponization of outer space has increased. Given the obvious inadequacies in the international legal system for outer space, it is utmost necessary and urgent for the international community to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space."

China, 9 June
"For many years, China together with the Russian Federation and other countries have spared no effort in working for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the international community, the CD in particular. China and Russia stand for the negotiation, in the CD, of an international legal instrument prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space, and the use or threat of force against outer space objects. For this purpose, Delegations of China, Russia and other countries have tabled a working paper which was contained in document CD/1679.
...
The recent developments concerning outer space are worrisome and require more urgent efforts to start the work on preventing the weaponization of outer space. China appeals to all CD members to show political willingness and courage by agreeing on a programme of work, so as to begin substantive works on prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and a fissile material cut-off treaty, since they all bear on the international peace and security. "

Egypt, 15 March
"The G-21 would like to reiterate that Outer Space is a common heritage of mankind and must be used, explored and utilized for the benefit of all mankind in a spirit of cooperation. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has assumed greater urgency because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments are inadequate to deter imminent attempts for further militarization of outer space."

Kazakhstan, 17 March
"We are strongly convinced that space should be used only for peaceful purposes. Therefore, we support the initiative of the Russian Federation and China to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on the threat or use of force against space objects."

Russia, 1 February
"It is well known that the issue of preventing of an arms race in outer space is the priority of the Russian Federation in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Our common central task in this context is to prevent placement of weapons in outer space.

"We believe that fulfilling this task serves the interests of all countries without exception. Should we fail, the world would face a qualitatively new unstable military and strategic situation, emergence of additional motivation for an arms race in space and on the ground and much weaker capabilities to deter proliferation of WMD and means of its delivery.
Last October at the First Committee of the UNGA 59th session we launched a new major Russian initiative aimed at preventing of weaponization of outer space. For the first time Russia has unilaterally and unconditionally declared it would not be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space. We also called on all countries with a space potential to follow our example.

"Our statement does not imply a ban on military activities in outer space carried out in accordance with the UN Charter in the interest of maintaining international peace and security. It does not embrace outer space systems which perform information support functions and cause no harm to any outer space object; ballistic missiles passing through outer space; land- and air-based missile defense systems and space sensors; anti-satellite systems, excluding space-based. In other words, our initiative is aimed at limitation of something that does not exist yet. This can help other leading space nations to take decisions on making statements similar to our."

Nuclear Disarmament
(see also CD Report from June 27 for excerpts on States' positions on nuclear disarmament)

China, 23 June
" It should be stressed that efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and those on nuclear disarmament go hand in hand. In this perspective, it is of crucial for nuclear disarmament taht a missile defense system undermining strategic stability should not be developed, and that no weapons should be deployed in outer space. It is hard to imagine that once a full-fledged missile defense system is put in placeor weapons have been introduced into outer space there can be business as usual in nuclear disarmament. At best, such moves would never be conductive to nuclear disarmament."

Germany, 23 June
"Germany fully supports the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT RevCon."

India, 23 June
"The A5 proposal for the CD’s Programme of Work provides for a les-than-negotiating mandate for the Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. Our acceptance of the A-5 proposal, in no way, diminishes our commitment to the immediate commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament."

Italy, 23 June
"We share the aspiration of those who advocate more efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, and we will continue, together with our European partners, to encourage progress in this field. In order to find an understanding on a realistic way forward in the CD we could therefore agree on the establishment of subsidiary bodies one of which would deal with nuclear disarmament. Within this body information and views would be exchanged on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain the objective of nuclear disarmament and in doing so approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character would be examined."

Negative Security Assurances
(see also CD Report from July 8 for excerpts on States' positions on NSAs)

India, 23 June
"As a nuclear weapon State, India is conscious of its special responsibility towards nuclear disarmament. Our defensive security posture is marked by responsibility, restraint, and predictability and is predicated on a minimum credible deterrence that precludes the doctrines of first use or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. We have continued to advocate legally binding international instruments to enshrine these commitments, as also to negotiate a legally-binding instrument on assurance to non-nuclear weapon States."

Kazakhstan, 17 March
"Bearing in mind the continuing importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Kazakhstan strongly believes that the demand placed on Nuclear Weapon States to grant negative security assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States is well founded and reasonable, and supports the proposal to elaborate within the Conference an international agreement on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapon by Nuclear Weapon States against Non-Nuclear Weapon States."

A5 Agenda

Germany, 11 August
" As you are all aware, Germany supports all efforts which bring us closer to a programme of work and in particulat the A5 proposal because we consider it an acceptable comprehensive proposal taking into account the differing priorities and security concerns. But it requires political flexibility, willingness to compromise, readiness to move and not least: readiness to make ones formal positions known."

Algeria, 16 June
"Also, with the understanding, of course, that the purpose of this discussion and of raising any other issue, which may be raised in the course of these meetings, would be to try to move towards an agreement on a program of work. With this regard, we think that the A5 proposal remains relevant, as well as, of course, the other proposals which have been made there in after including the Food for Thought Paper presented by the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands, when he exercised with such competency the presidency of this meeting."

Brazil, 23 June
"We were responsible in 2000 for the presentation of the "Amorim Proposal" (CD/1624), which puts great emphasis on nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding, and with the view of trying to help getting consensus, including from those States that are resistant to any compromise, Brazil is flexible with regards to a program of work. As a compromise offer, we have, since 2004, supported the "A5 Proposal", which puts less strength on nuclear disarmament if compared with the proposal made by Brazil, and, more recently, indicated that the "Food-for-Thought" paper presented by Ambassador Chris Sanders, as an informal derivation from the A-5 proposal, could be a good basis for discussion, in order to lead us to the adoption of a program of work."

Canada, 23 June
"The proposed mandate for this committee, contained in the A5 proposal and the Food for Thought Non-Paper, calls for it to exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain the objective of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. We think discussions under this broad mandate could benefit from a more focused approach that would take up more specific topics and measures relevant to the nuclear disarmament efforts."

China, 23 June
"In order to promote international nuclear disarmament efforts, it is imperative to break the deadlock in the CD. China favors an early agreement on the programme of work on the basis of the “Five Ambassadors’ Proposal”, so as to start substantive work on the nuclear disarmament, FMCT, PAROS and negative security assurances. Concerning the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committe on Nuclear Disarmament, China supports the reasonable positions of the G21."

Egypt, 15 March
"The (G21) reaffirms its readiness to participate constructively in all efforts aimed at reaching an agreement on a program of work which is balanced and comprehensive and reflects the priorities of all the member States of the Conference on Disarmament. In this context the G-21 reiterates that the A-5 proposal, as contained on document CD 1693/rev. 1 of 5 September 2003, remains a viable basis for a Programme of Work and that further consultations on this matter should be continued."

India, 23 June
"In view of the growing impatience with this body’s lack of productive work, our task remains, besides appealing to good sense and wisdom, to generate ideas that could persuade member States to establish a Programme of Work for the Conference on Disarmament that reflects the concerns and priorities of all its member States and is responsive to the expectations of the international community. It is in this specific context, Mr. President, that India is supportive of the A-5 proposal. We continue to believe that it could form the basis for reaching consensus on the CD’s Programme of Work."

Ireland, 16 June
"It is in our position that we would support any initiative that is likely to command a very broad basis within this room. For that reason, we could support the Amorim proposals, the A5 proposals, the Food for Thought proposals and we would indeed support any proposal that’s likely to exceed the level of support or at least have the same level of support as those proposals had."

Ireland, 23 June
"While this conference may not yet be able to achieve a binding political consensus on future negotiations it should play a more active role in creating the necessary shared understanding to achieve this. Ireland, therefore, will continue to take a flexible approach to initiatives aimed at getting the Conference to work. We have seen a number of such initiatives including that of the Five Ambassadors and the “Food for Thought Paper”. In the course of these initiatives small but not insignificant compromises have emerged. These should be built upon not buried."

New Zealand, 1 February
"We (particularly support the ) proposals that have come closest to finding consensus such as that of the Five Ambassadors, a proposal which readily drew New Zealand’s support and remains open, we know, to further refinement. For my delegation, the CD’s focus must be on agreeing as a matter of urgency a programme of work or even a timetable that will be accepted by the principal proponents of these issues as the most balanced, effective and resource-sensitive schedule for addressing them - rotationally if necessary - as is reasonably possible to achieve."

Pakistan, 23 June
"We associate ourselves with the statement given by G-21. The adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work based on the A5 proposal remains our priority."

Russia, 1 February
"Russia is interested in resumption of substantive work of the CD as soon as possible in order to commence a detailed discussion on the problem and ways of its solution in an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS...The flexibility demonstrated by Russia and China has in fact made it possible to consider the mandate for such an Ad Hoc Committee agreed as it is reflected in the last version of the A5 proposal."

Russia, 23 June
"With a good will, we stated that we would not object to eventual compromises on the CD program of work, proposed in the A5 initiative and the non-paper by Ambassador C. Sanders, although the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee om PAROS with “to deal with” mandate was much less than we wanted. We would not object if dealing with the issues of nuclear disarmament becomes a part of the program of work as indicated in these initiatives."

South Africa, 1 February
"As we are all aware, past efforts to narrow down the differences on a Programme of Work have led us to the proposal of the five Ambassadors – as amended – on which we have deliberated on many occasions. In this regard, it would be fair to say that many delegations, including this one, would ideally wish to see that proposal is strengthened in certain areas. As you are probably aware South Africa, for instance, has on a number of occasions stated in this forum that it is uncomfortable with the mandate of the proposed Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances.

"This having been said, Mr President, my delegation nevertheless believes that the A-5 proposal represents a delicate compromise that deserves the support of all Members of this body. In our view, it remains the most realistic proposal for the adoption of a Programme of Work and South Africa therefore remains willing to join a consensus on its adoption. In this regard, my delegation would once again appeal to all Members to show a spirit of flexibility, as well as the necessary commitment to ensure that this body, as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, lives up to the expectations of the International Community."

Verification
Netherlands, 15 March
"Another element addressed by the Thirteen Steps is the need for transparency and accountability, which for my government has always been a priority. Although the nuclear weapon states have provided a good deal of information, I think the world expects them to be even more open about their nuclear capabilities, wherever their national security allows. We urge the nuclear weapon states to report regularly on their aggregate number of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials. Transparency provides the basis for measuring progress in nuclear disarmament and for building confidence that will enable the NPT to remain the guardian of non-proliferation and peaceful uses.
The implementation of the Additional Protocol will build greater confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state. The NPT Review Conference should affirm that the Model Additional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards system, now represents the verification standard."

Poland, 17 March
"There are also other activities that could find their way to the schedule of activities of the CD- we should not limit ourselves to the traditional issues. MANPADs, verification and compliance of disarmament treaties, conventional weapons, confidence-building measures-are just a few examples of what this Conference could reflect on."

Terrorism
Finland, 15 March
"Finland supports and is actively taking part in efforts aiming at the creation of common global standards for arms export. Such standards must be based on existing international obligations under relevant international law. Stronger export controls on these weapons are necessary tools also in the fight against terrorism."

India, 23 June
"We also share the concerns of the international community concerning the connections between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. There is a danger of such weapon falling into the hands of terrorists, euphemistically covered by the term, non-state entities. We emphasize in this regard, state responsibility and accountability for combating terrorism, eliminating its support infrastructure and preventing proliferation. Our own record in preventing proliferation of sensitive goods and technologies have remained impeccable."

Kazakhstan, 17 March
"The system of international security has changed drastically in the past decade. New threats and challenges, proliferation of nuclear arms and the rise of international terrorism- have become a matter of grave concern of the international community. The possibility of the acquisition of nuclear weapons or their components by terrorists has grown tremendously and cannot be excluded as an imminent reality.
Kazakhstan stands for the establishment of a Council of the regional organizations under the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That Council could be very useful in coordinating the measures and plans of regional organizations with regard to addressing the problem of terrorism."

New Agenda Coalition, 31 March
"The New Agenda is concerned, however, about the risk of non-state actors gaining access to nuclear weapons. We are also concerned about the risk that despite strenuous efforts by the nuclear-weapon States and others vast amounts of nuclear material world-wide remain susceptible to theft and diversion."

Poland, 17 March
"The new international environment is characterized by qualitatively new phenomena like mega-terrorism, unprecedented proliferation of weapons, including both conventional and weapons of mass destruction, increasing number of states in distress and the emergence of new capabilities of non-state actors to attack states. Combination of these elements poses a major challenge to states, their stability and security."

Slovakia, 17 March
"Launching substantive work in the CD is not an end to itself. It is for the sake and benefit of noble goals of peace, global stability, security and prosperity of all. Prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including their clandestine proliferation, curbing the risk of their falling into the hands of non-State actors and terrorist groups, addressing the question of disarmament: these are topical issues of our time. There is no doubt that the CD has an irreplaceable role in addressing these issues. However, the only viable way for the CD to effectively perform its tasks and to reinforce its relevance lies with the member states. It is the capitals that must take the challenges seriously and initiate action."

Russia, 2 June
"Scientific and technological progress, use of its achievements by terrorists, emergence of the so-called high-tech terrorism, and the main threat – risk of mastering by terrorists of WMD, genetic engineering, biotechnogenic and information technologies – makes international terrorism as dangerous as never before.

It goes without saying that the use of combat component of WMD for terrorist purposes is quite difficult in terms of either manufacturing of theft and, consequently, is unlikely. At the same time, improvised WMD systems can become a universal mean of influencing the most important interests of states. Acts of sabotage and subversion at the WMD manufacturing, storage and transportation facilities are also extremely dangerous.

The factor of possible appearance of WMD in the hands of terrorists allows to consider antiterrorist activity as inseparable from other important track, i.e. non-proliferation.

The global character of the terrorist threat confirms that security in modern world is indivisible and, hence, the fight against security threats must be collective. One of the directions of such collective work is further working out new antiterrorist legal mechanisms, as well as universalization and improvement of existing ones.

The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted by the UN General Assembly was worked out on the basis of the draft introduced by Russia in 1997. For the first time an antiterrorist convention has been developed by the international community in a preemptive way, i.e. before a terrorist act with the use of nuclear material and other radioactive substances is committed. This is the first universal treaty aimed at prevention of terrorist acts of mass destruction.

In a situation when international terrorist structures seek to possess nuclear potential, the adoption of such treaty is of paramount importance, primarily for maintaining international peace and security."

Russia, 23 June
"Russia properly ensures safety and secure storage of its nuclear weapons. I can repeat that all our nuclear weapons have been transferred to and consolidated at the centralized storage facilities, exclusively on the Russian territory. Russia has developed and applied a set of measures to counter terrorist actions. We carry out periodic comprehensive checks of all facilities which could pose nuclear and radiation risk to assure their safety and preparedness against terrorist actions."

Turkey, 2 June
"Turkey attaches great importance to playing its part in the PSI, which constitutes a noteworthy effort by the international community in its struggle against terrorism. Turkey, knowing all too well the importance of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, will continue its efforts in this vein in all fora."

Sweden, 15 March
"Threats to our collective security include the risk that terrorists could acquire weapons of mass destruction. Illegal networks of proliferation have been discovered and shown to be alarmingly wide-ranging. North Korea has declared that is possesses nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear programme is high on the international agenda. These proliferation threats are being addressed in various ways, but we also need to create conditions, which prevent such problems and concerns from arising in the first place."

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