17 May 2006

Algeria, Mr. Khelif (translated from Arabic):

Mr. President, I am speaking on behalf of His Excellency the Ambassador of Algeria, Mr. Idriss Jazairy, who has been unable to attend today. I should like to congratulate you very warmly on your assumption of the presidency, and to thank you for your efforts in aid of these well-organized discussions on the issue before us. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, for his achievements during his term in office. In addition, I should like to welcome Mr. Tim Caughley, who has just taken up his new duties as Director of the Geneva branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

The CD is not working in a vacuum. The current international political and security situation and signals from various quarters are causing growing concern about the perils of sliding toward a new arms race. However, as His Excellency the Ambassador of the United Kingdom remarked yesterday, this should not deter us from intensifying our efforts to enable the CD, as the only forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament, to respond adequately to the concerns of the international community and to strengthen international peace and security.

The issue of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices is one of our main concerns. The great importance of this matter arises from the fact that an eventual instrument could play a fundamental role in reducing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the vertical proliferation and qualitative improvement of these weapons. A treaty would be a step towards the eventual complete and comprehensive elimination of these deathly weapons.

The alarming possibility that these weapons could fall into the hands of a terrorist group is a cause of concern for the international community, a concern that we fully share. However, this should not prevent us from tackling the issue of fissile material production in a comprehensive, objective and balanced manner. This material may be at risk of falling into the hands of terrorist groups only because terrorist groups exist.

The international community has always been keenly aware of the sensitivity and risk associated with the use of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This issue has been on the agenda of the United Nations ever since the inception of the Organization. We may recall the report of the Atomic Energy Commission of 1946, the final document of SSOD-1 in 1978, as well as the General Assembly resolution of 1993 and successive resolutions thereafter, and finally the report of the Special Rapporteur and the related mandate contained in document CD/1299 dated 24 March 1995. All these documents clearly show the importance of this issue and the need to address it.

What makes the matter even more pressing today is the huge stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons and the large nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States, to say nothing of the failure to make progress with nuclear disarmament: witness the fact that the CTBT has not entered into force to this day. The continuing issue of uranium enrichment for peaceful uses in the framework of the NPT and fears of nuclear proliferation strengthen our conviction that this prospective new instrument will lead to the establishment of multilateral mechanisms designed to guarantee the right of States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and allay fears of its subsequent diversion to prohibited applications.

We are not starting from scratch. A number of States have taken steps and presented ideas which reflect their awareness that it is essential to put an end to the production of fissile material. There is the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA, for example, while certain nuclear-weapon States have announced that they have discontinued production of fissile material. Although these steps are inadequate in scope and are non-binding, they constitute basic elements by which we can be guided.

I should now like to present a number of ideas on the eventual treaty regarding the scope of application and verification measures. Our position on this prospective instrument stems from our suggestions to the international community, the context of current reforms, that international law should have primacy over national law. This principle should be applied to all States non-selectively and without discrimination.

As regards the scope of application, the aim of the eventual treaty is the banning of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, as well as all other fissile material that may be used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. The purpose is to lay down rules and binding legal commitments which prohibit all States and all groups of States from producing such material and to put an end to the present discrimination between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in the matter of the production of fissile material. That discrimination is a feature of the NPT, but it is essential to achieve a fair balance between the two categories of States. In our view the aim of these rules and commitments must be to ensure that the obligations and commitments of non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT are extended to all States, including nuclear-weapon States.

On the other hand, the implementation of this treaty must not be restricted to future production; it also should cover existing stockpiles of fissile material, in accordance with the Shannon report. This must be part and parcel of the nuclear disarmament process and a tool to prevent proliferation, as stated in the Programme of Action adopted at SSOD-1 in 1978. Paragraph 50 of the document refers to the cessation of the qualitative improvement and production of nuclear weapons and of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, as well as the need to develop time frames for the reduction of nuclear stockpiles with a view to their complete elimination. The prospective treaty must provide a basis for the liquidation of existing stockpiles and the achievement of a balance that will enable us to avoid a situation of uncontrolled production and use of such material.

My delegation’s position in this matter is reflected in the Group of 21’s position paper (document CD/1549) of 12 August 1998, which takes the view that the treaty should be integrated into the comprehensive nuclear stockpile elimination process. One of the functions of the prospective new instrument is to enshrine the principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament by ensuring that all fissile material obtained from dismantled nuclear weapons will be diverted to peaceful uses, and this, in our view, will overcome one of the shortcomings of the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

As regards verification, this issue is a sensitive problem, especially for those States that possess fissile material and nuclear weapons. Owing to the sensitivity and distinctive characteristics of fissile material, we must build confidence and agree, at a minimum, on the content and means of verification as a first step. There is nothing new in this; verification is a means of making sure that States are living up to their commitments. In this case, its function will be to ensure that fissile material is not produced for nuclear weapons or diverted for that purpose. Verification mechanisms will enhance transparency and confidence between countries. The credibility of the treaty and the effectiveness of the ban will depend on them. The verification arrangements should aim at setting up a safeguards regime which covers all nuclear installations, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities for nuclear weapons production. The object of these safeguards will be to make sure that fissile material is not being produced, to observe and monitor how it is used, and to detect any production in a timely manner.

However, can a safeguards regime confined to these installations guarantee that uranium is not being enriched, or plutonium separated from spent nuclear fuel to manufacture nuclear weapons? In our view, such a safeguards regime would be inadequate. A strong verification regime to detect any new production or the diversion of this material to non-peaceful uses requires a much broader and comprehensive regime which is applied to all installations and nuclear material, whether for military or civilian purposes, as well as installations that are no longer operational. The NPT and the safeguards agreement of IAEA, as well as the FMCT, all have one aim. How can the verification tool differ from one to the other? In our view, the safeguards regime of a treaty banning the production of fissile material must be based on and inspired by the safeguards provisions that are contained in the NPT, as well as the definition of nuclear material contained in article XX of the Statute of IAEA. The safeguards regime and the verification arrangements in such a treaty should aim at putting an end to the discrimination between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the production of fissile material. This can be achieved by putting all nuclear material, civilian and military, as well as nuclear installations both inside and outside the IAEA safeguards regime, under a single general and comprehensive safeguards regime. We also have to take into account the special characteristics of fissile material contained in warheads, which is covered by nuclear disarmament agreements between nuclear-weapon States or in a framework of unilateral steps aimed at reducing these weapons.

A safeguards regime and an effective ban require full access to sufficient information regarding fissile material production facilities and the volume and nature of stockpiles. It must include detailed inventories of civilian and military fissile material, including that obtained from the dismantling of warheads under bilateral nuclear disarmament treaties or unilateral arrangements. The issue of the body that will perform the work of verification has given rise to much disagreement and divergence of views. However, we must examine all ideas and proposals in terms of their effectiveness and cost. And IAEA must necessarily play a large role in this matter due to its experience, expertise and qualifications in the field of non-proliferation.

Several States have raised the issues of the verifiability of such a treaty and the high cost of a general, comprehensive safeguards regime. We do not understand how it would be feasible for the majority of countries to conduct verification measures to make sure that fissile material was not being produced, while the nuclear-weapon States would find this difficult. The South African experience is extremely valuable, and South Africa has taken a brave step in deciding to rid itself of fissile material and nuclear weapons. It is a good technical and scientific example which nuclear-weapon States should follow.

Regarding the cost of comprehensive safeguards, these safeguards, however costly, will always remain much cheaper than the actual manufacturing of fissile material, and the future of humankind and international stability and peace are much more important than any other financial considerations. It is regrettable that, despite the consensus on the importance of this issue and the requests made by States parties to the NPT in 1995 and 2000, negotiations have not started. Moreover, the agreement embodied in the Shannon report has remained a dead letter due to the differences regarding the priorities that should be dealt with in a CD programme of work.

I wish to reiterate the position of Algeria regarding the need to begin negotiations within a comprehensive and balanced CD programme of work, inasmuch as the Conference is the ideal forum for that purpose. It is essential to begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Rapporteur and the related mandate, as well as relevant General Assembly resolutions, the most recent of them being resolution 60/70, which was adopted at the sixtieth session. Negotiations on this matter must take into account the priorities of other countries. Therefore, Algeria feels that our efforts must be aimed at the adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work which would enable the CD to start work on the four key issues: nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, a treaty on banning fissile material production and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Algeria still firmly believes that the A5 proposal is the only means of achieving consensus on such a programme of work, one that would be satisfactory to all.

Belgium, Mr Alain Van Gucht (translated from French)

Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during your term, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your appointment and assure you of the full and enthusiastic cooperation of my delegation.

It seems that in this Conference everyone can agree on the need to begin negotiations that should lead us to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At this stage at least, I am not aware of any statements to the contrary. Significant differences of opinion nonetheless persist, as we know, regarding the details of such negotiations, and these differences are more often than not based on legitimate national security perceptions that we respect as such.

The delegation of the Kingdom of Belgium is firmly convinced that international security requires us to step up our joint efforts as regards non-proliferation and disarmament, and, as has often been stressed, negotiations on a “cut-off” are the logical next step along this path, and many of us are of the view that this topic is now ripe for negotiation. The Conference on Disarmament should therefore seize this opportunity to contribute once again to multilateralism that effectively responds to the challenges that we must tackle together, not least of which is that of preventing the risk of the use of fissile material by terrorist groups. In this context, my country’s approach, that of Belgium, is a proactive one. We would like negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable “cut-off” to begin as soon as possible. To us this is a priority, and at the risk of being redundant, I would say that it is one of our high-priority priorities.

As you are aware, Mr. President, Belgium is proactive but also has a long tradition of being pragmatic. And as we have demonstrated in this forum and elsewhere, we will spare no effort to contribute to achieving an unbiased consensus, in a concrete manner and with a view to obtaining tangible results. We believe that we can achieve this progressively, in a spirit of transparency and mutual respect for each other’s security perceptions.

Belgium will take part in such negotiations without preconditions. In other words, we will avoid being too prescriptive, and I think it is necessary to avoid being too prescriptive, and at the same time we must ensure that we do not exclude anything a priori from our work. In keeping with our approach, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes has to do as much with disarmament as non-proliferation, whether the latter be horizontal or vertical. It should in our opinion be possible to tackle the whole issue of existing stocks of fissile material, and first of all stocks that have been declared in surplus, totally transparently if we wish to arrive at a balanced and effective instrument. We also think it would be desirable for negotiations to take place on a solid basis of shared objectives and clear and agreed definitions. And to that end the States concerned should show political will.

We are also of the view that appropriate verification, which appears to us to be technically feasible and politically desirable, must be guaranteed in the final outcome. And we fully share the views expressed this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of India on this subject. We have taken good note of his statement on this specific point. In this perspective, as we see it, we will need lastly to determine how IAEA’s verification potential could be utilized. Over the coming days we will no doubt have an opportunity to delve further into this and other concepts which are essential to our future treaty, and I welcome the decision we took at the start of our meeting to invite a representative of IAEA to a forthcoming session. The structured debate beginning this week is undoubtedly a new step in the right direction, and we appreciate the opportunity thus afforded to the Conference on Disarmament to conduct a substantive exchange of views on the essential elements of a future treaty on fissile material destined for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

This is an opportunity for us to make headway on a matter to which Belgium, like its partners in the European Union, in particular, attaches priority importance. We will be taking part in this exchange of views in an open and constructive spirit.

New Zealand, Ambassador Don Mackay

My delegation has consistently supported the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. This issue, in our view, deserves priority consideration on a number of fronts, not least its potential as a preventative measure in terms of minimizing stockpile build-up, but also as a substantive contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

When my delegation spoke on this issue during the CD’s thematic debates of June last year, we pointed out that delaying negotiations just complicates things further. This has resulted in significant increases in fissile material stockpiles since the development of the Shannon mandate a decade earlier. This concern has become more pertinent in the intervening year. In simple terms, the longer the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT is delayed, the greater the stocks of fissile material in existence around which debate will have to coalesce in the conclusion of any future instrument. This is getting harder, not easier.

We all know the sensitivities surrounding the issues of stocks and verification. Treatment of these topics within the framework of an FMCT is going to be contentious, and there would obviously need to be an opportunity for all sides of the debate to be taken into account during the course of any negotiation. However, to hold even the commencement of such negotiations hostage to agreement on these divisive points at the outset further compromises the security of us all. Surely the key imperative at this stage should be the launching of negotiations, without preconditions as to their outcome.

For New Zealand’s part, we are prepared to approach negotiations without preconditions. Within the framework of that process we would argue the case for an FMCT that dealt adequately with existing stocks and one that had structured verification provisions. Like others participating in the debate, however, we would listen carefully to the arguments on all issues, and we note that some very good work has already been done in the form of working papers presented to this session. I would mention in this respect particularly the thought-provoking paper put forward by Switzerland on verification and Canada’s useful ideas on the issue of stocks.

The often expressed view that an FMCT is the most “ripe” issue for negotiation within the CD’s remit gains greater currency this week through the mobilization of a significant number of international experts to contribute to our debate. And like others, we very much welcome the very sensible decision, I think, that we have all taken this morning to include IAEA in that process next week.

The reality is that far too many years have elapsed since we had substantial numbers of technical experts working in partnership with the diplomatic process. The time that has passed since potential FMCT provisions were last under intense discussion makes it important for our work now to be informed by relevant technological advances in the field of fissile material research. In that respect we welcome in particular the formation of the International Panel on Fissile Material and the presentations of Professor Frank von Hippel and his team yesterday afternoon at the very valuable interactive discussion that we had here in this chamber, which gave us an excellent starting point for interactive debate on technical issues.

The priority that my delegation attaches to the subject of nuclear disarmament, I think, is pretty well known, and the potential for an FMCT to function as a supporting mechanism for nuclear disarmament is obvious. The fundamental concept underpinning an FMCT - that is, to prevent the further production of fissile material for making nuclear weapons - clearly illustrates the interlinking relationship between these two core CD issues. Any instrument which contributes to a norm against the production of nuclear weapons helps to provide momentum to the nuclear disarmament debate.

My delegation looks forward to substantive discussions on FMCT issues during the coming period, and, as noted, we welcome very much the participation of international technical experts to help inform our work. However, as we said at the beginning of the focused debate on nuclear disarmament, we should not delude ourselves that discussion alone is an acceptable substitute for active negotiations under an agreed programme of work. In our view one of our common goals for this week should be to see whether building support for FMCT objectives could contribute to unlocking the CD’s continuing stalemate. And obviously, if we can make progress in that area, we will have made very significant progress in addition to the undoubtedly substantive and very useful discussion that we will be having on the issue itself.

Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Alabbas Hayder (translated from Arabic)

Mr. President, please allow me first of all to express our appreciation for your efforts on behalf of progress in the work of the CD. I should like to begin by saying that my delegation supports the statement made yesterday morning by His Excellency the Ambassador of Pakistan. We also support the remarks of the delegation of Algeria.

Very briefly, the position of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the issue at hand, that is, a treaty banning the production of fissile material, is as follows. We support the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the framework of the CD to negotiate a potential FMCT as soon as the CD adopts a comprehensive, balanced programme of work that takes into account the priorities of all and deals on a basis of equality with the four main issues: nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and avoidance of an arms race in outer space, as well as a ban on fissile material production. Any treaty banning the production of fissile material should cover existing stockpiles of such materials.

Finally, such a treaty must include verification mechanisms.

Australia, Mr. Russel Leslie

Mr. President, as this is the first time I’ll be speaking on behalf of my delegation, I wish to thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak. I wish to address the issue of definitions under the FMCT.

My delegation considers that the definitions that are relevant to the scope of this treaty include the definition of the term “fissile material” that will be subject to the FMCT commitments, the meaning of the term “production”, the meaning of the term “stocks” and clarification of “non-proscribed” activities.

The fissile materials to be covered by the treaty should be only those relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Broadly speaking, these are: high-enriched uranium, plutonium and U-233.

The materials regarded by IAEA for safeguards purposes as unirradiated direct-use materials could serve as a useful template. Unirradiated direct-use materials are those nuclear materials that could be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation, further enrichment or reprocessing. These materials are as follows: high-enriched uranium, that is, uranium enriched to 20 per cent or more in the isotope U-235, plutonium containing less than 80 per cent of the isotope Pu-238 and U-233. These would seem to be an appropriate basis for the definitions in the FMCT.

Production of fissile material, as defined above, requires three processes: for high-enriched uranium - uranium enrichment; for plutonium - uranium irradiation in a reactor and separation by reprocessing; for U-233 - thorium irradiation in a reactor and separation by reprocessing. Plutonium and U-233 production should not encompass irradiation, but only reprocessing. For the treaty to encompass irradiation would give it an extremely broad scope, essentially applying to all reactor operations. As noted above, plutonium and U-233 produced in reactor fuel is only available for weapons use if it is separated through reprocessing.

This is also relevant to the issue of stocks. In the case of plutonium and U-233, only that material that is being separated prior to the time at which the FMCT comes into force for the State concerned would be considered to be part of the pre-existing stocks of nuclear material.

And the final issue to be addressed as a definitional issue would be the non-proscribed activities under the treaty. The treaty would not proscribe production of fissile material per se, only production for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Reprocessing for civil use would not be proscribed, nor would production of high-enriched uranium for civil use, which would be expected to be limited, or for non-explosive military use, for example, naval propulsion.

A working paper containing this issue of definitions has been made available for all delegates.

Republic of Korea, Mr Wan Ki Yoon

It is my pleasure to present the Korean working paper. My name is Yoon Wan-ki, Safeguards Regulator. The paper was written together with Mr. Lee Han-myung, sitting next to me, from the Korea Atomic Research Institute. The title of my presentation is “Definitions of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices”.

One of the core issues of the negotiations would be what would be included in the scope of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. For this purpose, a common understanding of the meaning of the term “fissile material” should be established.

First, regarding uranium and plutonium. Various definitions of the term “fissile material” exist in the literature, including documents from the United Nations as well as IAEA. United Nations report A/6858 describes fissile material for nuclear weapons as uranium with a content of U-235 isotope of more than 90 per cent and plutonium with a content of Pu-239 isotope of more than 95 per cent. This description can be a reference for the definition of fissile material.

The IAEA Safeguards Glossary published in 2001 defines fissile material as the isotopes that undergo fission by neutrons of all energies, including thermal neutrons. In the glossary, U-233, U-235, Pu-239 and Pu-241 are referred to as fissile material. However, there is no explanation in the glossary about the contents of the uranium isotope or the plutonium isotope to be categorized as material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

The term “nuclear-weapon-grade material” is also used. In general, uranium enriched to contain more than 90 per cent - sometimes 93 per cent is also used - of U-238 is categorized as nuclear-weapon-grade. And plutonium containing more than 93 per cent of Pu-239 is categorized as nuclear-weapon-grade plutonium. Others have defined nuclear-weapon-grade plutonium as that containing less than 7 per cent of Pu-240. There are no precise criteria on the contents of the isotopes in uranium or plutonium to be categorized as nuclear-weapon-grade.

In advanced nuclear weapon technology, it is known that HEU and reactor-grade Pu can also be used to make nuclear explosive devices. However, there is no unique definition of reactor-grade plutonium. Some define reactor-grade Pu as that containing more than 18 per cent of Pu-240, and other definitions include that containing 60 per cent of Pu-239.

The term “nuclear-weapon-usable material” has been used in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991). IAEA interpreted the term to mean HEU or separated plutonium in a report distributed as United Nations document S/1997/779.

In the IAEA Safeguards Glossary “direct-use material” is defined as nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment. Plutonium containing less than 80 per cent Pu-238 and HEU containing more than 20 per cent of U-235 and U-233 are listed as direct-use material. Under the definition, direct-use material includes both irradiated and unirradiated material. It is noted that Pu in spent reactor fuel is categorized as a direct-use material.

Speaking of neptunium and americium, there has been growing concern about the proliferation risk for the last three decades because they can also be used in nuclear explosive devices. Currently neptunium and americium are not defined as special fissionable material. In October 1999, according to IAEA document 1999/19, neptunium and americium were described as material that can be used to manufacture nuclear explosive devices with difficulty.

The physical properties of neptunium show clear potential in nuclear explosive devices. It does not produce heat and radiation. Emission is fairly low. The level of heat and radiation of americium is considerably high. However, the nature of the basic physical properties of americium showed that its proliferation potential is still attractive. In general, the proliferation potential of americium is said to be lower than that of neptunium. However, rapidly advancing technology can solve the difficulties of manufacturing. If separated, americium and plutonium are available. Most existing inventories of neptunium and americium are contained in civilian spent reactor fuel in unseparated form. Some countries that have a reprocessing capability, whether civilian or non-civilian, have the potential to acquire separated weapons-usable material.

Currently IAEA is monitoring the international transfer of separated neptunium and americium to non-nuclear-weapon States and any activity to produce separated neptunium and americium in comprehensive safeguards States as a voluntary undertaking.

In conclusion, typically, the nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices have been understood as weapon-grade uranium and weapon-grade plutonium. However, advances in weapon technology may enable a lower quality of fissile material to be used for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. In this respect, the term “direct-use material” can be a reference for further consideration to define “fissile material” for FMCT negotiations. And also, neptunium should be included in the negotiation.

Japan, Mr Masahiro Kikuchi

May I make a few comments on the scope of the treaty? I would like to state a definition of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

Before examining the definition of fissile materials for inclusion in an FMCT production ban, as the Ambassador stated before, it should be emphasized that fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices will be banned, while materials for civil purposes will be outside the scope of such a ban. That is a very important point in Japanese intentions. It is impossible to make nuclear weapons from civil-use nuclear materials.

Based on such a premise, it can be said that there is consensus that special fissile material as stipulated in article XX of the IAEA Statute - Pu-239, U-233 and uranium enrichment of over 20 per cent - falls within the scope of “fissile materials for nuclear weapons” under an FMCT. The inclusion of other materials also suggested - transuranic elements (neptunium, americium), tritium and thorium - should be studied in detail by experts based on possible discussions in IAEA.

Japan intends to exclude civil-use nuclear materials under the FMCT. That is our intention.

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008