Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Conference on Disarmament

Thematic Debate on Nuclear Disarmament

New Zealand Statement, delivered by Ambassador Tim Caughley

28 February 2006

Mr President,

I congratulate you on the manner in which you are presiding over this Conference under the presidency of the Republic of Korea. Mr President, I am pleased to take the floor today to discuss nuclear disarmament, an issue to which my delegation has attached the highest priority ever since the use and testing of nuclear weapons in the region from which I come.

I want to begin by mentioning some of the legal underpinnings for nuclear disarmament as an end in itself, and then I wish to explain why we see nuclear disarmament as a real tool in the crucial campaign against proliferation.

The legal imperative for nuclear disarmament is clear. Over the years, a significant body of international law and treaty obligations has accumulated, supporting effective progress on nuclear disarmament. Key amongst these, as others have noted, was the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. Building on this finding was the 2000 NPT Review Conference consensus outcome, which as we all know outlined practical steps for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and under which nuclear weapons states gave an “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

Unfortunately, nuclear disarmament proceeds much too slowly for my delegation. Progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons will inevitably be hampered while individual security doctrines continue to argue a military utility for nuclear weapons, whether in active use, or as a deterrent force. We thank France for the recent clarifications on its nuclear deterrence policy offered in this chamber, and we are encouraged that other nuclear weapon states are already actively contributing to this nuclear disarmament debate. Mutual understanding of security doctrines provides a valuable step in encouraging states to examine ways in which their doctrines could be reconfigured without compromising security.

In the pursuit of such an exercise, we would need to take a hard look at nuclear deterrence from a numbers standpoint. The numbers are coming down, as I’ll acknowledge shortly, but how many of these hugely destructive and toxic weapons are needed to deter a potential adversary – tens of thousands (as at present), thousands (perhaps by 2012), hundreds, a handful? What about the size and sophistication of existing conventional weapons in the arsenals of those that possess nuclear weapons? The answers to these questions are profoundly relevant for most if not all members of the international community.

We need to examine not only individual security doctrines, but also regional strategic alliances. NATO would be a useful case study in this respect. We would be interested to learn how the continuing justification of nuclear deterrence is reconciled within the alliance, given the overwhelming collective conventional force power held between its members. We commend those countries that are working to question and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in collective military doctrines.

Mr President, I come now to my second point.

We remain convinced that positive progress on nuclear disarmament would improve global security with respect to proliferation.

As we have said before with New Agenda Coalition colleagues, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Without for a moment subjugating our proliferation concerns, we will continue to insist on systematic and progressive efforts to implement the obligation in the NPT’s Article VI to pursue negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. We cannot accept that the unequivocal undertaking for the elimination of nuclear weapons, given to this end in 2000, was lightly made or was contingent in any way – the very word “unequivocal” brooks no such conclusion.

It has been asserted by some that our focus on nuclear disarmament equates to a de-facto argument that the retention of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states or the inadequate rate of elimination of those weapons is somehow an excuse for proliferation by others. Let me make clear in this forum that the continued retention of nuclear weapons or the unsatisfactory rate of progress in the elimination of those weapons is not a justification for proliferation by other states.

We also reject the argument that those of us who attach a high public priority on nuclear disarmament causes are failing to take into account the geo-political realities of today’s world. Nuclear disarmament encompasses the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons no matter in whose hands they are held. We no more wish existing nuclear arsenals to be sustained than we will tolerate parallel development of such arsenals by additional states.

In this context, commentator Joseph Cirincione made a useful observation in the publication Disarmament Diplomacy last year, when he asserted that to obtain full cooperation against the spread of nuclear weapons, “the nuclear weapons states must show that tougher non-proliferation rules not only benefit the powerful, but constrain them as well”. “It is difficult, if not impossible”, he continued, “to demonstrate either [notion] when immensely powerful nuclear weapon states reassert the importance of nuclear weapons to their own security”. Even a perception of the reservation of a right to develop or test new weapons has the potential for undermining the cause of non-proliferation.

Mr President,

In any debate on nuclear disarmament, the principles of transparency and irreversibility are essential constructs of good faith negotiations.

We welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 2002 as an encouraging first step in nuclear disarmament processes. The readiness of the United States and Russian Governments to formally contemplate reducing their arsenals from tens of thousands of nuclear weapons to single thousands by 2012 was an achievement to be commended, but the next step of the process, the application of transparency and irreversibility measures, would produce real gains in terms of delivering on disarmament obligations. The upcoming renewal of the Moscow Treaty provides Russia and the United States with the opportunity to make an effective concrete contribution to nuclear disarmament, by agreeing to destroy rather than merely stockpile the weapons covered by the Treaty. In response to a comment made this morning, I can assure the Russian Ambassador that it is always extremely interesting to my delegation to hear about irreversible reductions in nuclear arsenals, whether through the microphone on the record of this Conference, or in any other formal transparent way. The details provided by the leader of the US delegation are also welcome.

There is much that nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states alike can do to contribute to confidence building on nuclear disarmament. Although it has not yet entered into force, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has created a strong international norm against testing, guarding against future development of weapons. We urge all states to maintain the current moratorium, pending the Treaty’s formal entry into force, and we urge China and the United States, through an exercise of leadership, to become party to the Treaty, paving the way for ratification by all outstanding Annex II States.

In addition to the CTBT, the creation of nuclear weapon free zones acts as a powerful symbol for demonstrating renunciation of weapons of mass destruction to the international community. This is particularly valuable at a regional level. Nuclear weapon free zones’ potential to contribute to nuclear disarmament is most comprehensively illustrated in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, where Latin American countries moved together to discard the nuclear weapons option as a region. We will continue to work towards a collective nuclear weapon free zone encompassing the entire Southern Hemisphere. Surely, the entry into force of the CTBT and the extension and deepening of nuclear weapon free zones are cases in point in our argument that nuclear disarmament can serve the cause of non-proliferation.

In addition to the work of governments, notably through the G8 initiative which New Zealand actively supports, we need to facilitate the continued engagement of civil society in nuclear disarmament processes. Not only does civil society have a wealth of technical expertise to contribute to our work, but their ability to maintain pressure on governments from an accountability standpoint is also valuable. NGOs provide a much-needed reminder of our ultimate goal – a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr President,

Nuclear disarmament obligations are undisputed and long-standing. They were reaffirmed by all NPT states in 2000. The good faith negotiations envisaged by the NPT’s Article VI should begin as soon as possible. As an added boost to this end, we place strong priority on the immediate commencement of a treaty banning the production of fissile material. While differences remain as to the relative priorities of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it makes sense to move forward on a negotiation which will produce gains for both sides of the debate. We firmly believe that an FMCT would not only constitute a significant gain for non-proliferation, it would also move us further towards our nuclear disarmament objectives. We are pleased that this point of view is gaining real currency in this Conference.

Finally, we welcome the structured approach that you, Mr President, have provided for our discussion of this topic. The challenge now for the Conference is to deepen our treatment of nuclear disarmament by incorporating it in an agreed work programme. The continuation of our current impasse on the programme of work prevents us from undertaking any form of treatment of this vital issue in this body. This debate is not an end in itself, but a means to an end, as you said so wisely in your opening statement.

Thank you.