28 February 2006

Morning Session

President Mr. In-kook Park

I declare open the 1006th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

We have learned with deep sorrow that on 23 February 2006 at least 56 people were killed and dozens injured when the snow-laden roof of Basmanny market in Moscow collapsed.

Two days later, on Saturday, 26 February 2006, a six-storey building housing shops and offices collapsed in the Bangladesh capital, Dhaka. At least 19 people were killed and more than 50 were injured in that accident.

On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf, I wish to express our most sincere condolences and deepest sympathy to the families of the victims and to the peoples and the Governments of the Russian Federation and Bangladesh.

This morning I welcome the 30 new Egyptian diplomats from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs now in training in Geneva.

In accordance with the timetable of meetings for my presidency, this week the Conference on Disarmament will proceed to a focused debate on nuclear disarmament. I should like to remind you that I suggested that delegations make their interventions under the sub-item “Assessment of the implementation of nuclear disarmament”.

With regard to the arrangement of sessions, I would like to inform you that during the consideration of the timetable of plenary meetings of the Conference for the current week, the Coordinators of the Group of 21 requested that four plenary meetings be scheduled for the current week, that is, two meetings today, Tuesday, and two meetings on Thursday. This proposal was considered at the Presidential consultations held on Friday, 24 February, and subsequently accepted by the Coordinators of all the groups as well as China. Upon this development, the secretariat communicated the approved timetable to you, through the Coordinators of your respective groups. I appreciate timely and flexible consultations in a spirit of cooperation.

With regard to the meeting this afternoon, I have been informed by the Permanent Representative of Malta, Ambassador Borg, that due to unforeseen circumstances, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta has had to postpone his visit to Geneva, and therefore he will not address the Conference today. However, as I have already stated, the plenary meeting for this afternoon has already been scheduled and will be held.

I have the following speakers for today’s plenary meeting: the Syrian Arab Republic, Italy, Egypt, the Russian Federation, Argentina, Iraq, on behalf of the Group of 21, Brazil, France, Australia, Japan and Myanmar.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ambassador Bashar Ja’afari.

Syrian Arab Republic, Ambassador Bashar Ja’afari.

(translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to confirm our willingness to cooperate with you fully in order to bring this Conference, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, out of the impasse in which it has been stuck for many years. I should also like thank your predecessor, Ambassador Rapacki, for the excellent efforts which he made to revitalize the work of the Conference, and to associate myself, in advance, with the statement that the Ambassador of Iraq will deliver on behalf of the Group of 21.

This session on the subject of nuclear armaments follows on the heels of the failed seventh NPT Review Conference and World Summit, which were held in New York last year. Both events failed to reach any agreement on measures or commitments aimed at achieving disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular. In the light of this worrying setback for international discussions on this very vital topic, we should like to recall some important facts. Firstly, the States parties agreed, at the 1995 Review Conference, to extend the Treaty indefinitely in exchange for the adoption of a resolution on the Middle East aimed at making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the time, the Review Conference agreed to pursue efforts to strengthen the Treaty, and to make it universal, to adopt principles and objectives for its implementation and to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East that resembled those established by the Raratonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Antarctic treaties.

In the period between the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, Arab States non-parties to the NPT acceded to the Treaty, because of the positive outcome of the 1995 Review Conference, the adoption of the resolution on making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and because of the commitments made at the Conference. In that connection, we should like to point out that, in 2005, for the twenty-sixth year in succession, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution - resolution 60/52 - calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone area in the Middle East. The aims and purposes of this annual resolution reflect the aspirations of the States of the region and are consistent with the resolutions adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council.

In contrast to these positive international and regional developments, Israel remains the only State in the Middle East which has not acceded to the NPT and which continues to refuse to subject its installations to IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards regime, in spite of the grave threats which such installations pose to the security of States in the region, including Israel itself. In this anomalous situation, thanks to the fact that some major Western nuclear States have continued to supply Israel with the latest technology, Israel now has eight nuclear reactors on a piece of land measuring not more than 25,000 square kilometres. This situation is unprecedented anywhere in the world. These Western countries express concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but continue to supply Israel with enriched uranium, heavy water and other nuclear technologies.

The 2000 Review Conference welcomed, inter alia, the accession of all Arab States to the NPT. It called on Israel, the only State in the Middle East not to have acceded to the NPT, to accede to the Treaty and subject all its installations to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. However, Israel with overt and veiled support from major nuclear States and in flagrant defiance of other nuclear States, whether members of IAEA or the Conference on Disarmament, continues to defy the wishes of the international community and to repudiate its values and laws. Indeed, it has deliberately buried nuclear waste in the occupied Syrian Golan in flagrant violation of international law.

The General Assembly has consistently adopted the resolution entitled “Dangers of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, which receives overwhelming support year after year. The most recent such resolution was resolution 60/92, in which the General Assembly notes that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East not to have become a party to the NPT and reiterates the importance of Israel’s acceding to the NPT and subjecting all its nuclear installations to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime.

Syria, in the framework of the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations, and through its adoption of many draft resolutions and initiatives, has worked earnestly to rid the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons. In this respect, we should like to mention the many Arab initiatives that have been launched, the most recent being the initiative which Syria submitted to the Security Council on behalf of the Arab Group in December 2003. The initiative, which took the form of a draft resolution on making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, remains before the Security Council in blue print and has not been adopted because major Powers on the Security Council blocked it for political reasons that have nothing to do with protecting international peace and security.

As stated in the preamble to resolution 60/76 of 8 December 2005, on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: “the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and … their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and … the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again.”

Here, my delegation would like to express its grave concern over the dissemination of military doctrines that focus on the possible use of nuclear weapons and the new threats made by some nuclear States about using these weapons against non-nuclear States. Instead of complying with, and implementing, the ICJ advisory opinion by engaging in negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, some States concentrate solely on non-proliferation, in a highly selective way, while they go on building up their arsenals, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and developing tactical nuclear weapons. They continue to issue threats about using these weapons, in breach of prior commitments and their obligations under international law and international humanitarian law. Worse still, the right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes under IAEA supervision has itself become hostage to a policy of double standards.

Syria has already expressed its readiness to join a consensus on a comprehensive and integrated programme of work based on the A5-initiative. We continue to believe that this initiative is the most appropriate basis for our future work. However, we also believe that nuclear disarmament remains our first priority and that the establishment of a subsidiary body at the Conference on Disarmament to discuss the subject of nuclear disarmament is the least that we should all expect. The establishment of a nuclear body with a negotiating mandate would be a real and effective step on the road to nuclear disarmament.

Egypt, Ambassador Sameh Hassan Shoukry

(translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I wish to sincerely congratulate you on your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to reaffirm the willingness of the delegation of Egypt to support all your earnest efforts to revitalize the work of this Conference. We are keen to make a constructive and positive contribution to end the crisis that this Conference is facing and to serve the interests of all the parties in accordance with the agreed terms of reference and the mandate of the Conference. In this context, Egypt welcomes the adoption of the agenda, on 24 January, and reiterates its readiness to proceed on the basis of the proposed timetable for the proceedings and in accordance with the agreed agenda and the Conference’s rules of procedure.

The continuing stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament is a source of great concern to Egypt, especially at a time when international and regional security challenges are growing in scale and seriousness. Nevertheless, and in spite of the substantial changes in the security climate, many countries, including Egypt, continue to work to preserve the multilateral framework for disarmament. This is reflected in our continuing attachment to the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament. Here, we should like to express our support for the statement of the Group of 21 which will be delivered at the Conference today, the statement of the Group that was delivered on 15 March 2005, and the statement of the Arab Group, delivered on 23 June last year.

The real problem of the Conference on Disarmament is the lack of political will in some States to continue efforts to achieve concrete results in the field of disarmament and in accordance with agreed priorities. Such positions cannot be reconciled with calls to end the stalemate at the Conference by dealing with disarmament issues selectively. I believe that it is clear for all that no real progress at the Conference can be achieved unless equal consideration is given to the interests and priorities of all parties; this is the basis for any multilateral endeavour. We must therefore retain the Conference’s annual agenda as it is, because it is the backbone of our work in the Conference. There must also be an end to attempts to circumvent or bypass the agenda, since they upset the finely balanced agreement on the agenda items which was achieved by consensus, and because the agenda is the basis of our work here and a reference that should not be touched. Moreover, we take disarmament issues seriously, both by our words and our deeds. Our priorities and cooperation on these issues must be taken seriously if we are to achieve international and regional peace and security in cooperation with all the parties in the Conference.

Nuclear disarmament remains a priority for Egypt, both regionally and internationally, because we are convinced that so long as there are nuclear weapons we will never achieve real peace and stability. In this regard, we should like to express our disappointment at the Conference’s failure to heed the calls addressed to it by the Sixth NPT Review Conference, urging it to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. We furthermore reiterate our commitment to achieving the objectives set forth in the Final Document of the Conference, particularly the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament, which continue to stand as commitments.

Nuclear disarmament must remain at the top of the Conference’s priorities, in accordance with the priority given to it in the Final Document of the First Special Session on disarmament. States members of the Conference must shoulder their international responsibilities by continuing efforts to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament. This can be achieved by negotiating the FMCT. We look forward to seeing the Conference shouldering its responsibilities for concluding a comprehensive convention that is of real value from the nuclear disarmament perspective, and not just a partial measure. The treaty must incorporate all the elements of other successful disarmament treaties in order to ensure that it is effective and implemented to the letter.

One of the main challenges which our modern world faces is developing an international system that can bring peace and security to everyone in the international community. There is no doubt that this noble aim becomes even more difficult to achieve in a fast-moving world faced with rapid global changes. It is also made difficult by the tendency, especially in the field of disarmament, to deal selectively with vital issues that are the very underpinnings of disarmament. We believe that growing trends in this direction threaten past achievements and the future prospects for multilateralism. We look forward to an end to these destructive tendencies, that are based on self-interest, so that we can contain their adverse impact on the Conference’s work and restore faith in joint efforts to promote the shared principles that we cherish and that should consolidate international peace and security.

At the same time, Egypt is fully convinced of the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a vital element in disarmament and non-proliferation. It has proved its effectiveness in combating and curbing nuclear proliferation for over a quarter of a century. The fact that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the NPT is a sign of their belief in its importance in ridding the world of the spectre of nuclear war.

The regional dimension of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, is of the utmost importance to us, given the threats posed by the ongoing insecurity in the region. We believe that a regional approach to disarmament will ultimately lead to better security at the international level. The Arab States rejected the nuclear option by acceding to the NPT, and agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, because they were convinced that peace and security could be guaranteed by implementing the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that context, the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference was very clear; it reaffirmed “the importance of Israel’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East”.

Egypt believes that all practical steps must be taken to achieve the universality of the NPT. It calls on all the members of the international community, especially States with a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and the CD, to bear their responsibilities in accordance with items 1 and 2 of the agenda. The spurious excuses proffered by some, and attempts to impose conditions in order to subvert this objective, are not compatible with regional realities. They are merely further proof of double standards at work and will have dire consequences for the future of the non-proliferation system as a whole and the credibility of our future options. The failure by certain countries to abide by their commitments will only jeopardize international and regional security, destabilize the non-proliferation regime and deny the international community the opportunity to work together to combat the dangers that we all face.

In conclusion, I should like to welcome the confidence-building approach and the priority given to it this year by the Conference. However, it must be based on reciprocity and equality for all and not on the interests of one party at the expense of another. It is also important to develop constructive dialogue between regional groups and between delegations via regional groups in order to create a climate of trust, which we sorely need, given the obstacles that have recently hampered our multilateral work.

Finally, I should like to thank you and my colleagues and to welcome the group of visiting junior diplomats to the Conference. I am confident that this visit at the beginning of their career will have a very large impact on their future.

Russian Federation, Ambassador Valery Loshchinin

(translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to convey my appreciation to you and all the members of the Conference for the condolences you expressed to us on the tragic events and the incident that took place in Moscow.

We welcome you to this important post, and wish you every success, bearing in mind that your success will be success for all of us, and you can count on the support and cooperation of the Russian delegation.

We have repeatedly declared Russia’s willingness not to object to the five Ambassadors’ proposal on the programme of work of the Conference, if it supplies a basis for consensus. In this context, we do not object either to the proposed mandate for work on the issue of nuclear disarmament. We understand the importance of this issue for the international community, and we confirm our commitment to the obligations we have assumed, including those under article VI of the NPT.

First, the most important issue. Russia is fulfilling its obligations regarding step-by-step reductions in nuclear arsenals first and foremost through agreements with the United States, as well as on a unilateral basis. In recent years, this process has gained new momentum. We would like to mention the contribution to this process made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, which have given up nuclear weapons and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear States.

At the recent NPT review conference, Russia submitted a large amount of specific information on the reduction of our nuclear weapons. This may be tiresome for my listeners, but I cannot refrain from citing a number of important figures, which confirm that in the area of nuclear disarmament very significant processes are under way, to which we cannot close our eyes. At present, compared with 1991, there has been a more than fivefold reduction in the total number of nuclear weapons in stockpiles in Russia. Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been reduced fourfold as compared to the levels in the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons today are deployed exclusively within our national territory and are concentrated in the central storage bases of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The most important contribution to unclear disarmament remains the indefinite treaty on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Under this treaty, we have completely destroyed land-based missiles in two classes, with ranges of 500-1,000 km and 1,000-5,500 km - a total number of 1,846 missiles and 825 launch installations. Let me repeat: these missiles no longer exist and have been eliminated as a class. Implementation of the provisions of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty continues, and is ahead of schedule. Under the treaty, by 5 December 2001 the level of strategic offensive weapons was due to stand at no more than 1,600 vectors and 6,000 nuclear warheads. In fact, by that date the actual levels were 1,136 and 5,518 respectively.

We are pursuing our policy for the further elimination of strategic offensive weapons. As is well known, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty imposes an obligation on Russia and the United States to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to a total of not more than 1,700-2,200 units for each side by 31 December 2012. This is a very significant reduction. The Moscow Treaty, together with the Russian-American declaration of 24 May 2002 on new strategic relations, is a major step forward towards nuclear disarmament, of great significance for the shaping of an international system of security in the twenty-first century. The SORT Treaty on strategic offensive reductions ensures the pre-eminence of the process of nuclear disarmament and arms control and is a major contribution to the realization of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Russia. As a result of Russia’s implementation of its policy of steadily reducing its nuclear weapons, by the middle of 2005 we had destroyed a total of 1,328 launch facilities for ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 2,670 missiles, 45 strategic nuclear submarines and 66 heavy bombers. By 1 January 2006, the Russian side had 927 units of deployed vectors for strategic offensive weapons and 4,399 warhead units. These figures will be steadily reduced.

I would like to point out that Russia believes it important to ensure that the process of reducing nuclear weapons is irreversible. An important measure to ensure irreversibility is the reuse of weapons-grade fissile material which is no longer required for defence purposes. Russia is taking measures to prepare for implementation of a programme for the reuse of superfluous weapons-grade plutonium declared to be no longer necessary for weapons purposes. A key condition for the initiation of this programme is the availability of adequate multilateral financing. In Russia we are working to halt the last few Russian industrial uranium graphite reactors used for producing weapons-grade plutonium. The material produced by these reactors is not being used for weapons purposes. In Russia, highly enriched uranium released as a result of strategic arms reductions is being converted on a large scale into reactor fuel, that is, low-enriched non-weapons-grade uranium. In September 2005, in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Governments of Russia and the United States of America on 18 February 1993, 250 tons of highly enriched uranium, which is roughly the equivalent of 10,000 nuclear warheads, were converted into low-enriched uranium. By 2013, a total of 500 tons of highly enriched uranium will be eliminated in accordance with this agreement.

Our steps towards nuclear disarmament have been accompanied by corresponding structural changes in the nuclear weapons sector in Russia. We have halved our corresponding production capacity, which is no longer required for defence purposes. We attach particular importance to ensuring the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Russia has ratified. This treaty can act as a reliable bulwark against the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and boost the irreversibility of the ongoing reductions. This treaty is also one of the most important components of the system of international security and a means of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We commend those States which have signed and ratified the Treaty. At the same time, we cannot but be alarmed that this important instrument has still not entered into force. We hope that the remaining 11 States on the list of 44 will take the necessary steps to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. It is also important that, in the meantime, the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions should continue to be observed.

All Russia’s nuclear weapons, including the non-strategic weapons, are under secure control. Their safety is ensured through a range of organizational, administrative and technical measures. We have done everything to prevent unauthorized access to these weapons, including strict limitations on information about them, and we have ensured the safe protection of places where nuclear warheads are stored. Russia has developed and implemented a range of measures to prevent terrorist actions. We periodically carry out comprehensive inspections of all facilities presenting a nuclear or radiation risk. An example of Russia’s responsible attitude to the safe storage and transport of nuclear weapons was provided by the special exercises held in Russia in August 2005 with participation by 49 observers from 17 States. Let me say that this was an unprecedented act of transparency. We hope that other States which possess nuclear weapons will take similar steps.

Through its practical actions, Russia is demonstrating its commitment to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. We are interested in the strict observance and the strengthening of this most important treaty. All the fundamental elements of the treaty - nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of atomic technology - are closely interlinked. As was shown by last year’s review conference, the NPT remains an irreplaceable component of international security and stability. Although the review conference was unable to come up with specific recommendations for the further strengthening of the NPT, it reaffirmed the main issue: the new challenges and threats to the non-proliferation regime can and must be resolved on the basis of the NPT.

Russia calls upon all States to comply strictly with their obligations under the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement, and to devise effective measures to prevent the illegal trade in nuclear equipment, technology and materials. In this context, we support the work of the United Nations Security Council’s 1540 Committee, and highlight the importance of the full implementation of resolution 1540 by all States Members of the United Nations. Here we emphasize once again that the tasks of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism must be carried out in strict compliance with international law, taking into account the legitimate interests of States. Russia has consistently advocated the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and the universalization of the Additional Protocol, which would allow the Agency to monitor the use of nuclear materials and equipment for strictly peaceful purposes and would ensure transparency in national nuclear programmes. Russia has developed and is implementing a national programme of scientific and technical support for IAEA safeguards. Together with the United States of America, Russia is implementing a project to solve the problem of the security of high-risk radioactive sources as part of IAEA’s plan of action to combat nuclear terrorism. Russia has signed the International Convention to combat acts of nuclear terrorism, which was drawn up in the United Nations at our initiative. We are grateful to all States for their broad-based support for this convention, which will provide a solid basis for international cooperation in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Preventing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists is a new danger, and we must give priority to neutralizing it. It is our hope that the discussion of nuclear disarmament issues under your leadership will allow us to move forward on this issue.

Argentina, Minister Marcelo Valle Fonrouge

(translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on taking the Chair and to assure you that you have the support of my delegation in carrying forward the work that will make it possible to begin negotiations regarding arms limitation and disarmament instruments.

The following statement contains brief additional comments and restatements of the ideas already expressed in the presentation on this agenda item made by our delegation on 22 June 2005 in this same forum.

On the basis of the negotiations that have taken place in good faith, the nuclear-weapon States should reflect the unequivocal commitment to the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Though we consider it desirable that advances in the field of nuclear disarmament should occur within the context of the relevant disarmament forums, we welcome any progress in reducing arsenals, including those that are achieved at the bilateral level. We hope that greater efforts will be made, that the international community will be informed of the new actions, and that the measures adopted to this end will take account of the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verification in order to give effect to the obligation entered into under article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the additional responsibility incumbent upon them as they are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

There exists a series of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to fully eliminate nuclear weapons. These include calls to carry out the signatures and ratifications necessary for the speedy entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the immediate initiation of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material. We urge States to promptly take the necessary steps to ensure the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and reiterate the need to maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests.

The establishment of a subsidiary body responsible for dealing with nuclear disarmament constitutes a step forward in the tasks involved in compliance with article VI of the NPT. An undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is a first step and a sine qua non for moving along this path, with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament. Any regime of disarmament has been preceded by a ban on use, for example, the ban on chemical weapons. Argentina rejects the arguments that make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament conditional on progress in the conventional field. Thus, as our delegation has maintained over the years in all competent forums, we deplore the security doctrines which allow for the use of nuclear weapons. Such policies can undermine the effectiveness of horizontal non-proliferation.

Argentina considers that nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute significantly to international peace and security, by placing some areas off-limits to the use or threat of use of these weapons. The meeting on nuclear-weapon-free zones held in Mexico last year, in 2005, helped to draw the attention of the international community to the work that has been undertaken by the different nuclear-weapon-free zones. We call for those zones to be fully supported both by the States of the regions concerned and by the nuclear Powers by means of protocols, bearing in mind that the Secretary-General of OPANAL has sent notes to that effect to the nuclear Powers.

As far as Argentina is concerned, the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in response to an attack using conventional weapons cannot be justified under international law, because it is not proportionate to the objective of the defensive action as acknowledged by the United Nations Charter in Article 51, as has repeatedly been stated by the International Court of Justice, which has emphasized the requirement of proportionality as an essential element of self-defence. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to review the interpretative declarations they made on signing the additional protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco with a view to their complete withdrawal.

I would like to say that Argentina supports the establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD on negative assurances, so that States which renounce nuclear weapons obtain a commitment from the nuclear-weapon States that such weapons will never be used against them. The options could be by means of an agreement negotiated in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or through a protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons itself.

And in this regard, we repeat that an agreement on guarantees of this nature should never detract from the guarantees already agreed upon by the nuclear-weapon States in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and in the context of the Security Council resolutions.

Israel, Ambassador Itzhak Levanon

I would first of all like to express my and my delegation’s sincere and deepest condolences at the passing away of Ed Cummings. He will be missed. I ask the representative of the United States to please transmit our condolences to his family.

I am going to be brief because I was not supposed to take the floor at this particular stage, but the repetitive inaccurate information presented by the first speaker of this morning’s session, the SAR representative, compels me to make some factual clarifications.

The repetition of Israel’s opposition regarding the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as described by the distinguished representative, is in fact inaccurate and does not reflect reality.

For the record, I would like to remind this august Conference that every year Israel joins the international consensus for the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In all our declarations, and among them my own statement made at the general debate in the First Committee last fall, I clarified in detail what the conditions needed for the creation of such a zone were. So as I already said in my speech, we clarify and give the position of Israel regarding this particular issue.

reply: Syrian Arab Republic, Ambassador Bashar Ja'afari

(translated from Arabic): I apologize for asking for the floor one more time but it seems, however, that every time we try to shed light on the real problems affecting our region we are confronted with this repetitious statement by Israel, which says that our information is not accurate. The fact is that I am not the one saying that Israel refuses to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; it is the international community that says it. A huge arsenal of international resolutions have been adopted in New York, by our Conference in Geneva and at IAEA. The scores of resolutions passed are not Syrian, Arab or Middle Eastern resolutions. Their purpose is not confined to exposing Israel’s attitudes in a particular situation, but to protecting the security and stability of our peoples and the States of the region.

In my statement, I said that Israeli nuclear weapons are a threat, not just to the countries of the region, but also to the security of Israel itself. To say that Israel has joined the international consensus on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is not only inaccurate, it is misleading. No conditions can be imposed before a State will agree to prioritize the maintenance of international peace and security. How can a State say: “I am in favour of establishing zones free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, but I have my own conditions”? The most important condition for Israel is that its nuclear weapons must remain in Israeli hands. These weapons are sponsored, protected, financed and supported by many Powers which say that they favour nuclear disarmament. At the same time, other States in the region are not even able to procure the means for using nuclear power for peaceful purposes. These are the conditions.

We also hear them say that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is linked to the peace process - another inaccurate statement designed to mislead international public opinion. At the Beirut Summit in 2002, all Arab States expressed support for a just and comprehensive peace and the Arab initiative won the support of all the international community; the only party to reject it was Israel.

I should just like to recall one incident before I conclude. At the very moment that the Beirut Summit adopted the Arab initiative for peace, before the Presidents and Kings of the Arab States had left Beirut, Israel stormed Jenin, carrying out an infamous massacre in that Palestinian city. I beg the Israeli representative not to compel me to talk about this matter again, as we have a lot to say about the way that Israel misleads international public opinion.

reply: Israel, Ambassador Itzhak Levanon

(translated from Arabic): I do not believe that this Conference is the appropriate framework for discussing political issues. I request the representative of Syria not to do so. I did not speak of conditions, I spoke of circumstances.

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