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31 January 2006

China, Ambassador Zukang Sha (translated from Chinese):
Mr. President, with regard to the calamity in your country last Saturday, the Chinese delegation extends its sympathy and heartfelt wishes for the swiftest possible recovery of the many victims.

I am very happy to have the opportunity to attend the Conference on Disarmament once again because, as I look around the colleagues present in this room, I find I am one of a very few old disarmament hands that are still here. I am willing to exchange views with any colleague on security and arms control issues that bear upon international peace and stability. I wish to congratulate you again, Sir, on your assumption of the CD presidency. As we have just celebrated the Chinese Lunar New Year, I would like to extend festive greetings to all. This year is the Chinese year of the dog, a year of good augury. It is our hope that the year of the dog will bring success to the CD.

Today’s meeting is of special significance: it is the 1,000th plenary meeting of the CD. The Conference has come a long way, evolving, witnessing profound changes in the international situation and making a significant contribution to world peace and security.

However one looks at it, the importance of the CD is beyond question. In terms of authority, it is at present the world’s only negotiating body for multilateral disarmament and an essential part of multilateral disarmament regimes. In terms of mandate, it deals with security and arms control issues that affect world peace and stability - a weighty responsibility. In terms of representativeness, its membership embraces all the major political military Powers in the world today.

Over the years, guided by the common desire of the international community, the CD and its predecessors have negotiated many important arms control treaties in changing situations. In the 1960s and 1970s the CD negotiated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty and the Biological Weapons Treaty. After the end of the cold war it concluded the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, both of which are of major historical significance. Today the NPT, CWC, CTBT and other such treaties are the essence of the international arms control treaty system. They have made powerful contributions of lasting significance to the realization of the human ideals of comprehensive and complete disarmament and world peace and stability.

The glory of the CD’s past cannot cover up its present difficulty. The CD has been unable to do substantive work for many years. Some attribute the situation to its “outdated” working method and believe that it cannot adapt to new circumstances. Others blame a lack of political will in some member States to break the deadlock, and question the CD’s future. As a matter of fact, the CD’s working method is long-established. During the cold war, when international relations were tense, we were able to achieve a series of good results with the same system. The root cause of the present deadlock is a difference of opinion over the current security situation, over the concept of maintaining security and over the priorities of security interests, and this leads to differences over the programme of work.

An old Chinese saying goes “A leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tai”, which means having one’s view of the important shut out by the trivial.

The CD does not operate in a vacuum. In searching for the best way to break the deadlock we need to broaden our vision by reassessing the world we live in, our basic understanding of security and the fundamental links between security and arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The world is undergoing rapid globalization, threats to security are becoming multifaceted and the line between conventional and non-conventional security is becoming blurred. Countries are moving closer to one another because of security concerns and common interests are multiplying. No country, no matter how strong or how advanced its arsenal, can achieve security by relying on itself alone.

Security is always relative, not absolute. Only when the common security of all countries is achieved can the security of individual countries be guaranteed. Multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are means, not an end in themselves. The ultimate goal is to improve the security of all countries. History has shown that unrestrained expansion in arms is detrimental to the lasting peace and common security of the world. In our present circumstances, only if countries respect each others’ sovereignty and right to development, and boost their dialogue and cooperation in a spirit of equality, openness and solidarity, will we be able to build a world of lasting peace, security, stability, harmony and prosperity.

China is in favour of cultivating a new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation as core values. He strongly supports multilateralism and more democratic international relations. In the multilateral disarmament process China stands for security through cooperation.

With regard to the CD’s future work, we wish to make the following proposals. First, in carrying out its work, the CD must respect and take into full consideration the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the most representative multilateral mechanism. The relevant General Assembly resolutions reflect the shared aspirations of the international community and provide important guidance for our work. Without such respect our work will be futile. Second, the CD must continue to uphold multilateralism, adopt a working method that is compatible with different ideas, and stick to consensus. The concerns of all parties on specific topics must be taken fully into consideration and settled in negotiations. Attempts to force proposals through in total disregard of others’ interests, or to force a vote while ignoring the possibility of a split in the CD, are unacceptable.

As I have said above, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation promote safety and peace for all countries - both major Powers and the weak and small. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stipulated that disarmament must follow the principle of undiminished security for all. In order to ensure that all States would be able to participate in negotiations in a constructive, worry-free manner, the CD decided to work by consensus.

If majority decision is not appropriate for the CD, decision by a minority is much, much worse. As a working practice, “what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable”, or “do what I tell you to do”, is neither acceptable nor productive. It is undemocratic: a typical example of taking care of one’s own security interests while ignoring the security of others.

Third, we should cherish the mechanism of the CD. We have a saying in Chinese which, roughly translated, means “when we are united, no difficulty is insurmountable”. The more difficulties there are, the greater the need for us to close ranks. Constant threats to abandon the CD and start anew seriously undermine the CD’s authority. Such threats are unacceptable. In actual fact, what cannot be achieved in the CD will be just as hard to achieve in other forums or future negotiating frameworks.

The Chinese side has always been supportive of the work of the CD, and its hope is that the deadlock in the CD will be broken soon and that substantive work can start in a comprehensive and balanced manner at an early date. China will, as always, support and constructively participate in relevant efforts and join hands with all parties in promoting progress in the CD.

Colombia, Ambassador Clemencia Forero Ucros (translated from Spanish):
Mr. President, allow me to convey to you, in your capacity as Ambassador of Poland, my Government’s condolences and the feelings of solidarity of the Colombian people for the tragedy which has plunged your country into grief.

I wish to begin by expressing the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you directing our work. We are sure that under your guidance, and with your commitment to the subject which you have demonstrated, we will be able to take effective steps to enable the Conference to return to its substantive work. You may count on the full support of my delegation to that end.

The year 2005 ended with scant results in the field of disarmament, such as those achieved at the NPT Review Conference. The year 2006 has begun with little ground for optimism. Against a background of news reporting policies that bring fresh disquiet in the field of disarmament, we are therefore encouraged to begin this year by learning of the initiatives you have put before the Conference on coordinated and ongoing action by the six Presidents for the 2006 session, the setting up of a group of “Friends of the Presidents”, and the establishment of a timetable for holding thematic debates. My delegation finds these proposals very constructive, and hopes that they will meet with the shaping of the necessary political will to ensure that these proposals can contribute to putting an end to the worrying paralysis that has dogged the Conference for too long. Political will, of course, depends on our capitals, but as the artisans of disarmament, we have an obligation to encourage it.

In our interpretation, this first stage is intended to identify common positions on agenda items considered individually, as well as possible additional issues of particular concern to members of the Conference which could extend the scope of the agenda, with a view to achieving consensus on all or some of them individually. I will not attempt to repeat the profound analyses already undertaken in this chamber on whether each of the issues is ripe for action, nor wonder why one group of members feels that only if there is agreement to negotiate on certain issues would it be prepared to negotiate on issues of interest to their interlocutors. However, I should point out that elements such as the possibility that a non-nuclear-weapon State might fall victim to an attack or a threatened attack by a State which possesses this type of weapon of mass destruction rekindle concern as to the importance of negative security assurances, and highlight once again the fact that balance is a very delicate element which cannot be omitted from any possible programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament.

My Government does not prejudge the outcome of any negotiation, as we have often repeated, nor are our positions set in stone. That is why we would look forward with interest to some additional issues which have been referred to at Headquarters being addressed in this chamber, owing to their particular relevance to and impact on Colombian society. As an example, I would venture to mention just two: small arms and light weapons, which in my country are veritable weapons of destruction, together with the issue of anti-personnel mines, which are spread in our countryside by the illegal outlaw groups; and possible terrorist attacks on critical civilian infrastructure. However, such a prospect gives rise to new concerns. On the one hand, there are or could be specific forums for dealing with those issues and adopting more flexible and effective instruments to deal with them; on the other, in the circumstances currently prevailing in the Conference on Disarmament, adding such serious issues could do more to disperse our efforts and our interest than to facilitate a convergence of wills and consensus. In contrast, I think that we could have useful contributions and exchanges of views and experience in this regard under one or other of the headings or issues which already appear on the agenda of the Conference.

Allow me to sum up my country’s position in the Conference. If all members of the Conference consider that addressing additional issues and dealing with each of the issues on our agenda separately and with no interlinking, or waiting for new proposals on a programme of work based only on issues which are ripe, is the most efficient way to end our deadlock, then Colombia would be the first in line to encourage negotiations. On the other hand, if the members of the Conference believe that we should work without prejudging the outcome on the issues on the agenda which we have re-endorsed, and that what we need to do is to overcome mutual distrust and the lack of political will, then allow me, Mr. President, to repeat what we said in past statements last year, and invite you to reread the five Ambassadors’ proposal, supplementing it wherever you feel it necessary and appropriate, formally and explicitly sharing your disagreements or fears. Once we have done that, then perhaps we could reach a political agreement at a high level, so that taking into account the physical limitations involved for delegations of member States if all the core issues were negotiated at one and the same time, we should set up an orderly sequence and a mechanism for a negotiating round to address the issues in parallel.

We further believe, as has been said here today, that participation by civil society is something to be encouraged in a responsible way and with all due maturity. Of course, we would have to find ways and means to permit such participation, as proposed by the Government of Ireland during its term in the Chair in 2004. Perhaps the contribution of civil society could prompt the world’s governments and principal leaders to include in their agenda a real commitment to avoid nuclear catastrophe through the progressive negotiation of the appropriate instruments which would lead us to our goal - the end of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Secretary-General of the CD, Sergei Ordzhonikidze
Since I represent all of you, I would like to join all of you in your expressions of condolences at what happened in Poland in Katowice, in condolences to the Government and people of your country.

The 1,000th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate occasion to asses past achievements, to reflect on the causes of the impasse which has existed since around 1999, and to give thought to ways and means of restoring the leading role of the Conference in multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations.

During the first decade of its existence, the Conference on Disarmament set up its priorities, recorded in the so-called “Decalogue”, on the basis of which the yearly agenda was to be drawn, and detailed its working methods that were then periodically reviewed and modified. Towards the end of this period, preparatory efforts started to bear fruit - the Conference entered the phase of the negotiation of treaties.

With the conclusion of negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992 and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, these items were removed from the agenda. Following the adoption of the treaties, the Conference entered a period of a slowing-down of activities, which over the years has led to the impasse. Paradoxically, the origins of the impasse can be attributed to the end of the cold war, which significantly changed the international security equilibrium and led to a re-evaluation of disarmament priorities by States. These priorities - until then rather stable - started to evolve with the changing perception of security by member States.

New actors have emerged on the international scene, and with the possibility of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, international relations have become even more complex, more dangerous and less predictable than previously, paradoxically enough. Notions of strategic stability, the avoidance of war and nuclear deterrence have been redefined, and multilateralism has been giving way to the predominance of particular national interests.

Besides the short period in 1998 when two ad hoc committees were established, one on negative security assurances and the other on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to start negotiations, or structured deliberations, on any item on its agenda. Intensive efforts to break the deadlock have not brought the expected results. Gradually, the divergence of views on disarmament priorities led to the establishment of a package of items representing the priorities of different groups of States, but not acceptable as a whole to a number of States - the so-called “programme of work”. Subsequent variations of such a programme of work, although sometimes attracting the support of a considerable number of CD members, have never enjoyed consensus. For years, success in striking a balance between these priorities has eluded the Conference. Thus, instead of negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements, the Conference has been trying to forge consensus on current disarmament priorities.

Over the years, the impasse has been attributed to a number of causes, including differing views concerning the agenda, the rules of procedure, the decision-making process, the informal system of political groups, the composition and the lack of involvement of civil society, and so on and so forth. Potential remedies have not had the desired effect. The expansion of the Conference’s membership by 23 members in 1996, and by 5 members in 1999, did not help the Conference overcome its problems. Member States have continued to disagree on changing the agenda that was developed in the early years of the existence of the Conference and on changing the composition of the political groups. Also, civil society is not fully using the existing mechanisms for disseminating its views and materials to the members of the Conference, including those adopted by the CD in 2004.

In this context, we should not lose sight of the fact that progress on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation has also been elusive in other contexts. The greatest disappointment of the 2005 World Summit in September was no doubt the failure to reach agreement on even a single paragraph on non-proliferation and disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction pose a severe danger to all of us, in particular the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Progress on disarmament and non-proliferation is vital for our collective security, and efforts must continue as a matter of priority.

Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that in 2004 alone, the global total spent on arms topped $1 trillion for the first time since the height of the cold war. In contrast, the amount spent on aid over the same period was $78.6 billion. Disarmament could thus - if we ever start working - liberate significant resources to be channelled towards development efforts, in addition to building greater confidence among States and contributing towards stability, which in turn would also be conducive to the development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals.

Following the setbacks in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation last year, the whole multilateral disarmament machinery needs an overhaul. The impasse in the CD has political - and I would like to emphasize the word “political” - not structural or procedural sources. Debates aimed at “getting the CD back to work” that took place in 2004 and 2005 revealed the mostly unchanged political positions of States. In such circumstances, it seems that it would be difficult to agree on the programme of work without joint efforts based on new, imaginative approaches. And I would like to call upon you to use your imagination in political approaches as to the substance of the issue, rather than on procedural problems.

Generating more interest and changing the attitude towards the Conference in capitals could be a welcome remedy. Also, developing a new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament and going beyond narrowly defined national security interests could be of crucial importance in the revitalization of the Conference. Without political decisions at the highest levels, even the most determined efforts of the existing multilateral disarmament bodies, including the Conference on Disarmament, will not succeed. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his message to the Conference this year, “the impasse cannot be broken by procedural means or by merely fine-tuning existing proposals. Capitals need to thoroughly reassess attitudes towards the Conference, and develop a new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament”.

Frustration over the impasse has led some to contemplate the possibility of suspending or even dissolving the Conference, should it not be able to “deliver results in the foreseeable future”, and setting up an alternative forum based, for example, on the “like-minded” concept. There are, however, other views to the effect that replacing the Conference on Disarmament with another negotiating mechanism would not necessarily solve the problems it now faces. Firstly, the existing fundamental divergence of views on priorities on the international disarmament agenda and the specific security concerns of States would not disappear with the dissolution of the CD. Secondly, the main difference between the Conference on Disarmament and any negotiating body based on the “like-minded” concept is that the latter, by definition, excludes some States that do not consider themselves “like-minded” but whose participation would still be crucial for a meaningful outcome of negotiations. Needless to say, certain issues can only be resolved through the multilateral disarmament negotiating body, and that is the Conference on Disarmament, due to its intellectual and political potential, experience and clear rules of engagement.

We should not be discouraged, though, from using the existing and potential mechanisms available to the Conference now, such as debates on issues on the agenda, for mutually influencing policies and security perceptions of member States and for furthering the consensus-building process. In parallel, the Conference should review its working methods and seek new approaches that could make it more responsive to contemporary security threats and challenges. Progress may be modest, but the Conference cannot afford to remain inactive. We must remember that consensus-building is a process that may take time - but not as long as it took here for the CD - especially when dealing with issues of strategic importance. I firmly believe that political will, perseverance and patience should be the virtues guiding our efforts in the future.

Ukraine, Yevhen Bersheda
I wish also to convey our deepest condolences to the Polish people and families of those who died in the tragic accident last Saturday.

Since this is the first time I am taking the privilege to address the Conference on Disarmament, may I start by congratulating you, Ambassador Rapacki, on the assumption of the presidency of the CD and by wishing you every success in this endeavour?

The year 2005 proved to be another year of standstill for the CD, which was unable to launch its work effectively, notwithstanding the numerous and tireless efforts made by the Presidents of the Conference last year.

The CD cannot remain deaf to the legitimate expectations of the international community. We cannot but acknowledge that some items of the Conference agenda have been taken up in other forums. Does the international community still need to have at its disposal an ineffective multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations?

As ever before, we all need to restate our commitments to multilateralism as a core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening appropriate universal norms and enlarging their scope.

Ukraine has repeatedly stated that the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. We continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of and universal compliance with the NPT, as well as the 13-point action plan. We call upon all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty without delay, and unconditionally. Pending its entry into force, we urge all States with a nuclear capability to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and refrain from any actions which are contrary to the Treaty.

I would like to stress that progress on nuclear disarmament is as essential to winning the struggle against proliferation as ever. There can be no progress in combating the scourge of nuclear proliferation without tangible steps in nuclear disarmament, and vice versa.

In the context of the CD, this refers especially to two important practical steps agreed by all NPT States parties, i.e. the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. This undertaking should pave the way for an agreement on the Conference’s programme of work.

Ukraine believes that legally binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities.

We strongly encourage the nuclear-weapon States to reconfirm their commitments laid out in the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. In this regard Ukraine endorses the idea of establishing the appropriate ad hoc committees in the CD.

The success of this endeavour requires that the security concerns of all States be taken into account. The immediate launch of FMCT negotiations, as well as dealing with both nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, within the appropriate subsidiary bodies whose mandates will need to be both pragmatic and substantial in order to be accepted by all - these three parts together constitute the basis today for an agreement to begin our work. Ukraine is convinced that such an agreement is within our grasp.

We cannot but highlight areas on which there is already broad agreement, such as the universal application of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Ukraine believes that the safeguards serve as an important technical tool for sustaining an environment in which there can be the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the threat of proliferation. In this connection, we strongly support the verification role of IAEA. We also take the view that the universal adoption and faithful implementation of the strengthened safeguards and the additional protocol to them is a prerequisite to an effective and credible nuclear non-proliferation regime. This leads me to suggest that those new developments in the field of the non-proliferation of WMD that the world has seen over the past years may well bring about progress in nuclear disarmament.

Under such new developments, I mean first of all United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in 2004. The adoption of this instrument has marked the more active involvement of the United Nations in addressing the problem of the non-proliferation of WMD. Resolution 1540 is, undoubtedly, vital to consolidating international efforts to enhance the global WMD non-proliferation regime and, accordingly, to intensify the nuclear disarmament process. In this context it would also be expedient to mention the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, established to address, inter alia, non-proliferation and disarmament issues.

The illicit trafficking and uncontrolled accumulation of small arms and light weapons remain among the greatest impediments to sustainable development, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. Ukraine is a strong advocate of the efforts within the United Nations system, and especially at the regional level, to address the SALW issue in all its aspects. Being a firm supporter of practical steps at the national level to ensure the effective implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action, as well as of the OSCE document on SALW, Ukraine attaches particular importance to the issue of the destruction of excessive stockpiles of this kind of weapons and related ammunition.

Ukraine fully supports the aspirations of the Ottawa process initiators and like-minded States to overcome the humanitarian crisis caused by the large-scale proliferation and the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. In this regard I have the pleasure to inform you that on 27 December 2005 Ukraine’s instrument of ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Ukraine is open to a constructive dialogue aimed at breaking the current impasse and getting the CD back to work. And in this regard we are pleased to be invited to become one of the group of “Friends of the President”. Ukraine is deeply concerned over the continuing lack of consensus in this room that could eventually cause and is already leading to the erosion of multilateral instruments in the arms control and disarmament sphere, thus making a negative impact on mutual trust and confidence among States.

The considerable potential of the CD needs to be activated as soon as possible. Ukraine pledges its strong support to you, Mr. President, and to your successors with a view to bringing the Conference back to the leading role it is designed to play in this ever-changing world.

 

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