31 January 2006
China, Ambassador Zukang
Sha (translated from Chinese):
Mr. President, with regard to the calamity in your country last
Saturday, the Chinese delegation extends its sympathy and heartfelt
wishes for the swiftest possible recovery of the many victims.
I am very happy to have the opportunity to attend
the Conference on Disarmament once again because, as I look around
the colleagues present in this room, I find I am one of a very
few old disarmament hands that are still here. I am willing to
exchange views with any colleague on security and arms control
issues that bear upon international peace and stability. I wish
to congratulate you again, Sir, on your assumption of the CD presidency.
As we have just celebrated the Chinese Lunar New Year, I would
like to extend festive greetings to all. This year is the Chinese
year of the dog, a year of good augury. It is our hope that the
year of the dog will bring success to the CD.
Today’s meeting is of special significance: it is
the 1,000th plenary meeting of the CD. The Conference has come
a long way, evolving, witnessing profound changes in the international
situation and making a significant contribution to world peace
and security.
However one looks at it, the importance of the CD
is beyond question. In terms of authority, it is at present the
world’s only negotiating body for multilateral disarmament and
an essential part of multilateral disarmament regimes. In terms
of mandate, it deals with security and arms control issues that
affect world peace and stability - a weighty responsibility. In
terms of representativeness, its membership embraces all the major
political military Powers in the world today.
Over the years, guided by the common desire of the
international community, the CD and its predecessors have negotiated
many important arms control treaties in changing situations. In
the 1960s and 1970s the CD negotiated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty
and the Biological Weapons Treaty. After the end of the cold war
it concluded the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, both of which are of major historical
significance. Today the NPT, CWC, CTBT and other such treaties
are the essence of the international arms control treaty system.
They have made powerful contributions of lasting significance
to the realization of the human ideals of comprehensive and complete
disarmament and world peace and stability.
The glory of the CD’s past cannot cover up its present
difficulty. The CD has been unable to do substantive work for
many years. Some attribute the situation to its “outdated” working
method and believe that it cannot adapt to new circumstances.
Others blame a lack of political will in some member States to
break the deadlock, and question the CD’s future. As a matter
of fact, the CD’s working method is long-established. During the
cold war, when international relations were tense, we were able
to achieve a series of good results with the same system. The
root cause of the present deadlock is a difference of opinion
over the current security situation, over the concept of maintaining
security and over the priorities of security interests, and this
leads to differences over the programme of work.
An old Chinese saying goes “A leaf before the eye
shuts out Mount Tai”, which means having one’s view of the important
shut out by the trivial.
The CD does not operate in a vacuum. In searching
for the best way to break the deadlock we need to broaden our
vision by reassessing the world we live in, our basic understanding
of security and the fundamental links between security and arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The world is undergoing
rapid globalization, threats to security are becoming multifaceted
and the line between conventional and non-conventional security
is becoming blurred. Countries are moving closer to one another
because of security concerns and common interests are multiplying.
No country, no matter how strong or how advanced its arsenal,
can achieve security by relying on itself alone.
Security is always relative, not absolute. Only
when the common security of all countries is achieved can the
security of individual countries be guaranteed. Multilateral arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation are means, not an end
in themselves. The ultimate goal is to improve the security of
all countries. History has shown that unrestrained expansion in
arms is detrimental to the lasting peace and common security of
the world. In our present circumstances, only if countries respect
each others’ sovereignty and right to development, and boost their
dialogue and cooperation in a spirit of equality, openness and
solidarity, will we be able to build a world of lasting peace,
security, stability, harmony and prosperity.
China is in favour of cultivating a new security
concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation
as core values. He strongly supports multilateralism and more
democratic international relations. In the multilateral disarmament
process China stands for security through cooperation.
With regard to the CD’s future work, we wish to
make the following proposals. First, in carrying out its work,
the CD must respect and take into full consideration the resolutions
of the United Nations General Assembly, the most representative
multilateral mechanism. The relevant General Assembly resolutions
reflect the shared aspirations of the international community
and provide important guidance for our work. Without such respect
our work will be futile. Second, the CD must continue to uphold
multilateralism, adopt a working method that is compatible with
different ideas, and stick to consensus. The concerns of all parties
on specific topics must be taken fully into consideration and
settled in negotiations. Attempts to force proposals through in
total disregard of others’ interests, or to force a vote while
ignoring the possibility of a split in the CD, are unacceptable.
As I have said above, disarmament, arms control
and non-proliferation promote safety and peace for all countries
- both major Powers and the weak and small. The first special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stipulated
that disarmament must follow the principle of undiminished security
for all. In order to ensure that all States would be able to participate
in negotiations in a constructive, worry-free manner, the CD decided
to work by consensus.
If majority decision is not appropriate for the
CD, decision by a minority is much, much worse. As a working practice,
“what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable”, or “do what
I tell you to do”, is neither acceptable nor productive. It is
undemocratic: a typical example of taking care of one’s own security
interests while ignoring the security of others.
Third, we should cherish the mechanism of the CD.
We have a saying in Chinese which, roughly translated, means “when
we are united, no difficulty is insurmountable”. The more difficulties
there are, the greater the need for us to close ranks. Constant
threats to abandon the CD and start anew seriously undermine the
CD’s authority. Such threats are unacceptable. In actual fact,
what cannot be achieved in the CD will be just as hard to achieve
in other forums or future negotiating frameworks.
The Chinese side has always been supportive of the
work of the CD, and its hope is that the deadlock in the CD will
be broken soon and that substantive work can start in a comprehensive
and balanced manner at an early date. China will, as always, support
and constructively participate in relevant efforts and join hands
with all parties in promoting progress in the CD.
Colombia, Ambassador Clemencia
Forero Ucros (translated from Spanish):
Mr. President, allow me to convey to you, in your capacity as
Ambassador of Poland, my Government’s condolences and the feelings
of solidarity of the Colombian people for the tragedy which has
plunged your country into grief.
I wish to begin by expressing the satisfaction of
my delegation at seeing you directing our work. We are sure that
under your guidance, and with your commitment to the subject which
you have demonstrated, we will be able to take effective steps
to enable the Conference to return to its substantive work. You
may count on the full support of my delegation to that end.
The year 2005 ended with scant results in the field
of disarmament, such as those achieved at the NPT Review Conference.
The year 2006 has begun with little ground for optimism. Against
a background of news reporting policies that bring fresh disquiet
in the field of disarmament, we are therefore encouraged to begin
this year by learning of the initiatives you have put before the
Conference on coordinated and ongoing action by the six Presidents
for the 2006 session, the setting up of a group of “Friends of
the Presidents”, and the establishment of a timetable for holding
thematic debates. My delegation finds these proposals very constructive,
and hopes that they will meet with the shaping of the necessary
political will to ensure that these proposals can contribute to
putting an end to the worrying paralysis that has dogged the Conference
for too long. Political will, of course, depends on our capitals,
but as the artisans of disarmament, we have an obligation to encourage
it.
In our interpretation, this first stage is intended
to identify common positions on agenda items considered individually,
as well as possible additional issues of particular concern to
members of the Conference which could extend the scope of the
agenda, with a view to achieving consensus on all or some of them
individually. I will not attempt to repeat the profound analyses
already undertaken in this chamber on whether each of the issues
is ripe for action, nor wonder why one group of members feels
that only if there is agreement to negotiate on certain issues
would it be prepared to negotiate on issues of interest to their
interlocutors. However, I should point out that elements such
as the possibility that a non-nuclear-weapon State might fall
victim to an attack or a threatened attack by a State which possesses
this type of weapon of mass destruction rekindle concern as to
the importance of negative security assurances, and highlight
once again the fact that balance is a very delicate element which
cannot be omitted from any possible programme of work for the
Conference on Disarmament.
My Government does not prejudge the outcome of any
negotiation, as we have often repeated, nor are our positions
set in stone. That is why we would look forward with interest
to some additional issues which have been referred to at Headquarters
being addressed in this chamber, owing to their particular relevance
to and impact on Colombian society. As an example, I would venture
to mention just two: small arms and light weapons, which in my
country are veritable weapons of destruction, together with the
issue of anti-personnel mines, which are spread in our countryside
by the illegal outlaw groups; and possible terrorist attacks on
critical civilian infrastructure. However, such a prospect gives
rise to new concerns. On the one hand, there are or could be specific
forums for dealing with those issues and adopting more flexible
and effective instruments to deal with them; on the other, in
the circumstances currently prevailing in the Conference on Disarmament,
adding such serious issues could do more to disperse our efforts
and our interest than to facilitate a convergence of wills and
consensus. In contrast, I think that we could have useful contributions
and exchanges of views and experience in this regard under one
or other of the headings or issues which already appear on the
agenda of the Conference.
Allow me to sum up my country’s position in the
Conference. If all members of the Conference consider that addressing
additional issues and dealing with each of the issues on our agenda
separately and with no interlinking, or waiting for new proposals
on a programme of work based only on issues which are ripe, is
the most efficient way to end our deadlock, then Colombia would
be the first in line to encourage negotiations. On the other hand,
if the members of the Conference believe that we should work without
prejudging the outcome on the issues on the agenda which we have
re-endorsed, and that what we need to do is to overcome mutual
distrust and the lack of political will, then allow me, Mr. President,
to repeat what we said in past statements last year, and invite
you to reread the five Ambassadors’ proposal, supplementing it
wherever you feel it necessary and appropriate, formally and explicitly
sharing your disagreements or fears. Once we have done that, then
perhaps we could reach a political agreement at a high level,
so that taking into account the physical limitations involved
for delegations of member States if all the core issues were negotiated
at one and the same time, we should set up an orderly sequence
and a mechanism for a negotiating round to address the issues
in parallel.
We further believe, as has been said here today,
that participation by civil society is something to be encouraged
in a responsible way and with all due maturity. Of course, we
would have to find ways and means to permit such participation,
as proposed by the Government of Ireland during its term in the
Chair in 2004. Perhaps the contribution of civil society could
prompt the world’s governments and principal leaders to include
in their agenda a real commitment to avoid nuclear catastrophe
through the progressive negotiation of the appropriate instruments
which would lead us to our goal - the end of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear disarmament.
Secretary-General
of the CD, Sergei Ordzhonikidze
Since I represent all of you, I would like to join all of you
in your expressions of condolences at what happened in Poland
in Katowice, in condolences to the Government and people of your
country.
The 1,000th plenary meeting of the Conference on
Disarmament is an appropriate occasion to asses past achievements,
to reflect on the causes of the impasse which has existed since
around 1999, and to give thought to ways and means of restoring
the leading role of the Conference in multilateral arms control
and disarmament negotiations.
During the first decade of its existence, the Conference
on Disarmament set up its priorities, recorded in the so-called
“Decalogue”, on the basis of which the yearly agenda was to be
drawn, and detailed its working methods that were then periodically
reviewed and modified. Towards the end of this period, preparatory
efforts started to bear fruit - the Conference entered the phase
of the negotiation of treaties.
With the conclusion of negotiations on the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1992 and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty in 1996, these items were removed from the agenda. Following
the adoption of the treaties, the Conference entered a period
of a slowing-down of activities, which over the years has led
to the impasse. Paradoxically, the origins of the impasse can
be attributed to the end of the cold war, which significantly
changed the international security equilibrium and led to a re-evaluation
of disarmament priorities by States. These priorities - until
then rather stable - started to evolve with the changing perception
of security by member States.
New actors have emerged on the international scene,
and with the possibility of the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction by terrorists, international relations have become
even more complex, more dangerous and less predictable than previously,
paradoxically enough. Notions of strategic stability, the avoidance
of war and nuclear deterrence have been redefined, and multilateralism
has been giving way to the predominance of particular national
interests.
Besides the short period in 1998 when two ad hoc committees
were established, one on negative security assurances and the
other on the prohibition of the production of fissile material
for weapons purposes, the Conference on Disarmament has been
unable to start negotiations, or structured deliberations, on
any item on its agenda. Intensive efforts to break the deadlock
have not brought the expected results. Gradually, the divergence
of views on disarmament priorities led to the establishment
of a package of items representing the priorities of different
groups of States, but not acceptable as a whole to a number
of States - the so-called “programme of work”. Subsequent variations
of such a programme of work, although sometimes attracting the
support of a considerable number of CD members, have never enjoyed
consensus. For years, success in striking a balance between
these priorities has eluded the Conference. Thus, instead of
negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements, the Conference
has been trying to forge consensus on current disarmament priorities.
Over the years, the impasse has been attributed to a number
of causes, including differing views concerning the agenda,
the rules of procedure, the decision-making process, the informal
system of political groups, the composition and the lack of
involvement of civil society, and so on and so forth. Potential
remedies have not had the desired effect. The expansion of the
Conference’s membership by 23 members in 1996, and by 5 members
in 1999, did not help the Conference overcome its problems.
Member States have continued to disagree on changing the agenda
that was developed in the early years of the existence of the
Conference and on changing the composition of the political
groups. Also, civil society is not fully using the existing
mechanisms for disseminating its views and materials to the
members of the Conference, including those adopted by the CD
in 2004.
In this context, we should not lose sight of the fact that
progress on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation has also
been elusive in other contexts. The greatest disappointment
of the 2005 World Summit in September was no doubt the failure
to reach agreement on even a single paragraph on non-proliferation
and disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction pose a severe danger
to all of us, in particular the possibility of such weapons
falling into the hands of terrorists. Progress on disarmament
and non-proliferation is vital for our collective security,
and efforts must continue as a matter of priority.
Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) indicate that in 2004 alone, the global total spent
on arms topped $1 trillion for the first time since the height
of the cold war. In contrast, the amount spent on aid over the
same period was $78.6 billion. Disarmament could thus - if we
ever start working - liberate significant resources to be channelled
towards development efforts, in addition to building greater
confidence among States and contributing towards stability,
which in turn would also be conducive to the development agenda,
including the Millennium Development Goals.
Following the setbacks in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
last year, the whole multilateral disarmament machinery needs
an overhaul. The impasse in the CD has political - and I would
like to emphasize the word “political” - not structural or procedural
sources. Debates aimed at “getting the CD back to work” that
took place in 2004 and 2005 revealed the mostly unchanged political
positions of States. In such circumstances, it seems that it
would be difficult to agree on the programme of work without
joint efforts based on new, imaginative approaches. And I would
like to call upon you to use your imagination in political approaches
as to the substance of the issue, rather than on procedural
problems.
Generating more interest and changing the attitude towards
the Conference in capitals could be a welcome remedy. Also,
developing a new political consensus on priorities in arms control
and disarmament and going beyond narrowly defined national security
interests could be of crucial importance in the revitalization
of the Conference. Without political decisions at the highest
levels, even the most determined efforts of the existing multilateral
disarmament bodies, including the Conference on Disarmament,
will not succeed. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations
stated in his message to the Conference this year, “the impasse
cannot be broken by procedural means or by merely fine-tuning
existing proposals. Capitals need to thoroughly reassess attitudes
towards the Conference, and develop a new political consensus
on priorities in arms control and disarmament”.
Frustration over the impasse has led some to contemplate the
possibility of suspending or even dissolving the Conference,
should it not be able to “deliver results in the foreseeable
future”, and setting up an alternative forum based, for example,
on the “like-minded” concept. There are, however, other views
to the effect that replacing the Conference on Disarmament with
another negotiating mechanism would not necessarily solve the
problems it now faces. Firstly, the existing fundamental divergence
of views on priorities on the international disarmament agenda
and the specific security concerns of States would not disappear
with the dissolution of the CD. Secondly, the main difference
between the Conference on Disarmament and any negotiating body
based on the “like-minded” concept is that the latter, by definition,
excludes some States that do not consider themselves “like-minded”
but whose participation would still be crucial for a meaningful
outcome of negotiations. Needless to say, certain issues can
only be resolved through the multilateral disarmament negotiating
body, and that is the Conference on Disarmament, due to its
intellectual and political potential, experience and clear rules
of engagement.
We should not be discouraged, though, from using the existing
and potential mechanisms available to the Conference now, such
as debates on issues on the agenda, for mutually influencing
policies and security perceptions of member States and for furthering
the consensus-building process. In parallel, the Conference
should review its working methods and seek new approaches that
could make it more responsive to contemporary security threats
and challenges. Progress may be modest, but the Conference cannot
afford to remain inactive. We must remember that consensus-building
is a process that may take time - but not as long as it took
here for the CD - especially when dealing with issues of strategic
importance. I firmly believe that political will, perseverance
and patience should be the virtues guiding our efforts in the
future.
Ukraine, Yevhen Bersheda
I wish also to convey our deepest condolences to the Polish
people and families of those who died in the tragic accident
last Saturday.
Since this is the first time I am taking the privilege to address
the Conference on Disarmament, may I start by congratulating
you, Ambassador Rapacki, on the assumption of the presidency
of the CD and by wishing you every success in this endeavour?
The year 2005 proved to be another year of standstill for the
CD, which was unable to launch its work effectively, notwithstanding
the numerous and tireless efforts made by the Presidents of
the Conference last year.
The CD cannot remain deaf to the legitimate expectations of
the international community. We cannot but acknowledge that
some items of the Conference agenda have been taken up in other
forums. Does the international community still need to have
at its disposal an ineffective multilateral forum for disarmament
negotiations?
As ever before, we all need to restate our commitments to multilateralism
as a core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament
and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening
appropriate universal norms and enlarging their scope.
Ukraine has repeatedly stated that the NPT is the cornerstone
of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation
of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI of the
Treaty. We continue to attach great importance to achieving
the universality of and universal compliance with the NPT, as
well as the 13-point action plan. We call upon all States which
have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty without delay,
and unconditionally. Pending its entry into force, we urge all
States with a nuclear capability to abide by a moratorium on
nuclear test explosions and refrain from any actions which are
contrary to the Treaty.
I would like to stress that progress on nuclear disarmament
is as essential to winning the struggle against proliferation
as ever. There can be no progress in combating the scourge of
nuclear proliferation without tangible steps in nuclear disarmament,
and vice versa.
In the context of the CD, this refers especially to two important
practical steps agreed by all NPT States parties, i.e. the negotiation
of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the establishment of
an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament. This undertaking should pave the way for an agreement
on the Conference’s programme of work.
Ukraine believes that legally binding security assurances by
the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties
to the NPT will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation
regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear
capabilities.
We strongly encourage the nuclear-weapon States to reconfirm
their commitments laid out in the relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT
Review Conferences. In this regard Ukraine endorses the idea
of establishing the appropriate ad hoc committees in the CD.
The success of this endeavour requires that the security concerns
of all States be taken into account. The immediate launch of
FMCT negotiations, as well as dealing with both nuclear disarmament
and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, within the
appropriate subsidiary bodies whose mandates will need to be
both pragmatic and substantial in order to be accepted by all
- these three parts together constitute the basis today for
an agreement to begin our work. Ukraine is convinced that such
an agreement is within our grasp.
We cannot but highlight areas on which there is already broad
agreement, such as the universal application of the Additional
Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Ukraine believes
that the safeguards serve as an important technical tool for
sustaining an environment in which there can be the peaceful
use of nuclear energy without the threat of proliferation. In
this connection, we strongly support the verification role of
IAEA. We also take the view that the universal adoption and
faithful implementation of the strengthened safeguards and the
additional protocol to them is a prerequisite to an effective
and credible nuclear non-proliferation regime. This leads me
to suggest that those new developments in the field of the non-proliferation
of WMD that the world has seen over the past years may well
bring about progress in nuclear disarmament.
Under such new developments, I mean first of all United Nations
Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in 2004. The adoption
of this instrument has marked the more active involvement of
the United Nations in addressing the problem of the non-proliferation
of WMD. Resolution 1540 is, undoubtedly, vital to consolidating
international efforts to enhance the global WMD non-proliferation
regime and, accordingly, to intensify the nuclear disarmament
process. In this context it would also be expedient to mention
the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction, established to address, inter
alia, non-proliferation and disarmament issues.
The illicit trafficking and uncontrolled accumulation of small
arms and light weapons remain among the greatest impediments
to sustainable development, conflict prevention and post-conflict
peacebuilding. Ukraine is a strong advocate of the efforts within
the United Nations system, and especially at the regional level,
to address the SALW issue in all its aspects. Being a firm supporter
of practical steps at the national level to ensure the effective
implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action, as
well as of the OSCE document on SALW, Ukraine attaches particular
importance to the issue of the destruction of excessive stockpiles
of this kind of weapons and related ammunition.
Ukraine fully supports the aspirations of the Ottawa process
initiators and like-minded States to overcome the humanitarian
crisis caused by the large-scale proliferation and the indiscriminate
use of anti-personnel landmines. In this regard I have the pleasure
to inform you that on 27 December 2005 Ukraine’s instrument
of ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Ukraine is open to a constructive dialogue aimed at breaking
the current impasse and getting the CD back to work. And in
this regard we are pleased to be invited to become one of the
group of “Friends of the President”. Ukraine is deeply concerned
over the continuing lack of consensus in this room that could
eventually cause and is already leading to the erosion of multilateral
instruments in the arms control and disarmament sphere, thus
making a negative impact on mutual trust and confidence among
States.
The considerable potential of the CD needs to be activated
as soon as possible. Ukraine pledges its strong support to you,
Mr. President, and to your successors with a view to bringing
the Conference back to the leading role it is designed to play
in this ever-changing world.