Summary of Statements By Topic

Statements made at the 2006 Session of the Conference on Disarmament

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Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
PAROS
Nuclear Disarmament
Negative Security Assurances
A5 Agenda
Verification
Terrorism

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (about FMCT)

2 February, Australia
"It is a great regret that the CD has not begun negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. This negotiation is long overdue. States have a good understanding of the key issues after years of examination. An FMCT would make a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Australia believes a most effective FMCT would include appropriate measures to verify parties' compliance with their obligations. But the priority should be to start FMCT negotiations. Detailed aspects of the treaty, including the nature of any verification regime, should be left to that negotiation. For this reason, Australia supports calls for the commencement of FMCT negotiations, without delay and preconditions. But should the CD yet again fall short of this goal, we would support continued efforts to prepare for negotiation of an FMCT at the earliest possible time."

28 February, Australia
"A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would strengthen disarmament - and non-proliferation - by capping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons."

17 May, Australia
"An FMCT should contain basic provisions including a commitment to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, appropriate definitions and a mechanism for review. And it should deal with the status of pre-existing fissile material stocks. On this point, Australia sees an FMCT as a forward looking treaty that proscribes - or 'cuts off' - further fissile material production. "

9 February, Brazil
"With regards to the negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material treaty, my delegation is of the view that an "all or nothing" approach risks protracting the beginning of these negotiations. We strongly advocate that a treaty on fissile material be provided with a verification mechanism, but we think that different positions on this specific aspect should not impede the start of negotiations."

16 March, Brazil
"In the context of the CD, we favor the start of a negotiations of a Fissile Material Treaty. We advocate a treaty provided with a verification mechanism, but we are also aware that very strict, detailed and prescriptive approached at the outset risk delaying the beginning of negotiations."

18 May, Brazil
"We believe that a Fissile Material Treaty should be non discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable. Nonetheless, as we have indicated previously during this first phase of our work this year, the fact that there are different positions on the specific aspect of verification should not impede the start of negotiations."

2 March, Canada
"For the Canadian Delegation, we would put at the top of the list the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which would in our opinion represent a significant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation accomplishment and one for which the international community has long seen the Conference on Disarmament as the right forum to undertake. We would like to initiate these negotiations promptly and have, on a national basis, already demonstrated considerable flexibility as to the nature of the mandate under which such negotiations could get underway."

16 May, Canada
" An FMCT which proves ultimately to be merely a vague declaratory statement of good intentions about future production does the international community a disservice, and would be an indication that we are not serious about nuclear non-prolifteration arms control and disarmament. Just as in the case of the CTBT, a strong FMCT can be invaluable in creating a new international norm against the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Has there not already been enough fissile material roduced for nuclear weapons in the world? Is it not time to stop?"

17 May, China
"FMCT negotiations in the CD should be based on the mandate contained in the Shannon Report. We belive that the right approach to achieve the "cessation of production of fissile material" is to adopt a legal instrument through negotiations. At the same time, we are of the view that future FMCT negotiations should not involve the issue of stockpile."

9 February, Cuba
"We join those who support the beginning of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty that would address both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives."

30 March, the EU (statement made by Austria)
"The EU attaches a clear priority to the negotiation, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a Treat banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a means to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We call again for the immediate commencement of negotiations as well as an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without pre-conditions, and bearing in mind the special co-ordinator's report and the mandate for an ad hoc committee contained therein. Pending entry into force of an FMCT, the EU calls on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and welcoms the action of those four States which have decreed such moratoria.

The EU looks forward to the upcoming structured debate focused on FMCT and hopes that delegations will respond positively to the appeal of the Presidents of the CD to participate actively in the discussion, including through the presence of experts and submission of working papers. The EU would also favour the participation of the IAEA to provide information on the FMCT issue in accordance with paragraph 41 of the Rules of Procedure."

22 May, the EU (Statement delivered by Austria)
"The EU attaches a clear priority to the negotiation, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a means to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We call again for the immediate commencement of negotiations as well as an early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without pre-conditions, and bearing in mind the special coordinator's report and the mandate for an ad hoc committee contained therein."

7 February, Germany
"Germany does not believe that one core issue is inherently more or less important than the other three. This being said in Germany's view in particular the "cut-off" issue is ripe for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable and verifiable FMCT, bearing in mind the special co-coordinator's report and the mandate included therein. The commencement of the FMCT negotiations constitutes the next logical and essential step in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. At present, we do not have a coherent and comprehensive approach for dealing with fissile material. Several high level initiatives during the last years related to fissile materials and their production equipment are a clear indicator of the significant risks associated with these materials and the necessity of improved and comprehensive controls."

7 March, Germany
"First and foremost, we have to start negotiations in the CD to prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. An FMCT would constitute a new substantial nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure, a proof for effective multilateralism and an essential building block of our international security system."

16 May, Germany
"Germany advocates a start of FMCT negotiations without preconditions: No precondition, neither with regard to what shall be negotiated nor with regard to the expected outcome."
"In our upcoming deliberations no delegation should be prevented from raising any issue it sees as relevant like the scope of the treaty, the issue of stockpiles produced before the entry into force, the management, accountancy and transparency of relevant fissile materials. The principle of no preconditions cannot and should not prevent us from having and expressing our ideas about the nature and elements of the Treaty to be."

2 February, India
"India has always expressed its readiness to participate in the negotiations in the CD on a multilateral, non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. This is the essence of the Shannon mandate, co-sponsored by India and many other member States. While conscious of the development in this regard over the past year and a half, we continue to believe that this essence should remain the basis for any future work."

2 March, India
"We are ready to participate in negotiations, in this Conference, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

17 May, India
"India continues to believe that any treaty banning the production of fissile material must be non-discriminatory: it must stipulate the same obligations and responsibilities for all States. While the nature, extent and mechanisms for verification shall no doubt be determined during the negotiations, we believe that an FMCT should incorporate a verification mechanism in order to provide the assurance that all States party to it are complying with their obligations under the Treaty. Full compliance by all States with their obligations under international instruments to which they are party is critical to the achievement of the goals envisaged in these instruments. When a State consents to adhere to an instrument are also complying with their obligations. Verification, which serves the dual purpose of detection and deterrence, provides that assurance. Absence of a verification mechanism may engender lack of confidence in compliance with the treaty, encourage willful non-compliance, and lead to allegations and counter-allegations of non-compliance."

30 March, Iran
" The question of a treaty on fissile material is of importance to us too, We, like many, consider such a treaty as a viable step towards nuclear disarmament However, we have serious doubts on how a treaty on fissile materials could serve the nuclear disarmament cause without covering the vast stocks which could easily be used for development of new and new types of nuclear weapons."

7 February, Ireland
"We believe that the CD should commence negotiations on a Treaty dealing with fissile material. Ireland is realistic. We appreciate that the CD cannot simultaneously begin serious negotiations on a range of topics. In this context, in 2006 we attach particular priority to commencing negotiations on a fissile material treaty while establishing subsidiary bodies to consider the other areas to which we attach priority."

28 February, Italy
"We must avoid a new nuclear spiral; we cannot return to the times of the cold war. The most promising and realistic way to do so is to "cut off" the production of fissile material for purposes of nuclear explosions. We have a clear indication in the 2000 NPT document to conclude a negotiation on an FMCT. We shall be dealing with that issue in the coming sessions. I confirm that such a negotiation, which is pertinent to the issues on which we are presently focusing our discussion, is and remains our priority in the Conference on Disarmament."

30 March, Italy
see pages 2 and 3 of statement

16 May, Italy
" Agreeing on the core business of a treaty should be our first endeavor: definitions will be another fundamental part of the process. On that basis it will be possible, as it is indicated in on of the papers, to identify additional features of a Treaty such as verifiability and scope. We are not starting from scratch: the international community has been working on these issues for more than 50 years: the NPT, the relevance of which is recognized universally even by countries not party to it, is for us a fundamental term of reference."

28 February, Japan
"Second, the CD must start negotiation on FMCT as soon as possible. Since I will be touching upon the FMCT at a later date, I will not go into detail on this issue. But I would like to stress that the FMCT is the most realistic multilateral legal disarmament measure envisaged at this moment."

16 May, Japan
" Japan has attached great importance to an FMCT as the priority at the CD as a measure to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. With this in mind, I have asked for the floor today to present to the Conference Japan's Working Paper on an FMCT. Though a great deal of work went into preparing this Working Paper, it is just on part of Japan's ongoing efforts to contribute to more detailed and precise discussions on an FMCT, and it does not in any way, prejudge Japan's position in future negotiations. We have endeavored, as objectively as possible to present ideas that are most appropriate."

24 January, Netherlands
"The Netherlands has never disguised that it is ready to start negotiating an FMCT. We think this can start tomorrow, as we consider it to be the most urgent issue to be addressed."

28 February, Netherlands
"In that regard, we feel that starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is the next step to be taken. After all, already a decade ago all of us agreed on the principle of starting these negotiations."

7 March, Netherlands
"My authorities were also pleased to note that a cross regional understanding emerged about negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty being the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament, since it is our strong conviction that an FMCT would benefit all of the CD members. Of course, there were different views expressed on what should a treaty entail, for instance on scope and verification. This, however, should not prevent us from entering into negotiations at the earliest possibility. Differences should be accommodated during negotiations. Starting negotiations on an FMCT as first step towards nuclear disarmament at this stage should definitely no longer be postponed. We have said it before, and I will say it again today: it is time the CD starts working again."

23 March, Netherlands
"As I have pointed out in an earlier statement, the Netherlands' government considers and FMCT the next logical step. They are definitely not the final step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. The Netherlands believe that an FMCT is a prerequisite step to a world free of nuclear weapons, creating at the same time the momentum we need to tackle other issues on our CD agenda."

16 May Netherlands
" 1. An FMCT constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear and non-proliferation disarmament agenda. An FMCT would ban the further production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives and is, therefore, a vital component of any coherent international nuclear non-proliferation strategy. 2. An effective and verifiable FMCT that puts a cap on the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes as well as increases the number of production facilities under international safeguards, represents an essential step forward in our arms control and disarmament efforts 3. The Netherlands regards an FMCT of the utmost importance to multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and calls for the commencement of negotiations, without preconditions, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices."

7 February, New Zealand
"My delegation's concern has been and remains that the matters requiring the most urgent attention are those covered by the four core issues. Prime amongst them - that is, the sole one with which a negotiating mandate has been labelled - is FMCT. The problem that arises is that that label is not unconditional. When an FMCT's negotiation is no longer conditional, work, we assume, will begin on that topic."

28 February, New Zealand
" …we place strong priority on the immediate commencement of a treaty banning the production of fissile material. While differences remain as to the relative priorities of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it makes sense to move forward on a negotiation which will produce gains for both sides of the debate. We firmly believe that an FMCT would not only constitute a significant gain for non-proliferation, it would also move us further towards our nuclear disarmament objectives."

9 March, New Zealand
"To my mind a pragmatic programme of work is one that entails two parallel but not necessarily equal activities. The first is the negotiation of a treaty dealing with fissile materials in a subsidiary body whose mandate will be to draft and adopt an effective agreement to secure discontinuation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. I haven't used the words "without preconditions" because them in themselves are conditional."

18 May. Nigeria
" It has been argued that it would be difficult and intrusive to account for production histories and stockpiles, and therefore, our work should exclude them. There have also been arguments for the exclusion of verification and compliance mechanism. In other disarmament instruments stockpiles, verification and compliance mechanisms have been incorporated because of their importance in achieving the set objectives of such instruments. Why should these elements not be considered in our work on fissile materials?"

31 January, Norway
"It has been stated in this hall over and over again that time is ripe to negotiate a fissile material cut off treaty. I am not convinced this is the case. If time is ripe to negotiate a fissile material treaty I suggest that the nuclear weapon States together with the biggest consumers of fissile material for peaceful purposes - far away from the CD - and consider negotiations. Then we will see if time is ripe."

16 May, Norway
" I will reiterate the role of an FMCT in the overall picture for improving oversight and control with fissile materials of all kinds. We need more proliferation resistant technology in place. We need to safeguard mote fissile material using existing arrangements and initiatives, such as the IAEA and the Trilateral Initiative. In this perspective the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes is an extremely important and natural first step."

9 February, Pakistan
"Pakistan supports negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT) in accordance with the Shannon Mandate and Report (CD/1299), and the A-5 proposal for a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. The agreed basis for negotiating the Treaty cannot be called "pre conditions"

30 March, Pakistan
see page 3 of statement

16 May, Pakistan
"We have not been able to begin negotiations on a FMT because of growing and deliberate scuttling of commitment to agreed principles, attempts to change the agreed parameters for negotiations, and efforts to dilute or control the content of negotiations before they start. Successive concessions have not been fully utilized. The desired target and goal posts have been constantly moving thus creating both a fluid and static situation- fluid in terms of defining the goal: static in terms of activity in the CD. A few states would want to restrict the ban to future production. A majority of CD membership and NPT member states, however, maintain that the proposed FMT should also deal with the issue of past production of fissile material and, through their progressive and balanced reduction, promote the goal of nuclear disarmament. The treaty must therefore address the question of production - past, present and future - in its entirety at both regional and global levels."

16 May, Poland
"We should retain flexibility in our thinking about the desired outcome of the negotiation process. We may easily imagine many possible scenarios ranging from a full-fledged treaty, with a comprehensive verification system, covering all outstanding issues; to a general, norm-setting treaty clearly prohibiting production, with clear provisions for further negotiations in the CD of the outstanding issues. It will be up to the states - within the proper negotiation process - to decide which alternative is more acceptable and would better contribute to solve the problems."

7 March, Republic of Korea
"Among the four core issues of the CD, FMCT remains the priority for Korea. Like many others, we believe that negotiations on FMCT should start immediately. We should not prejudge what the treaty is to say."

16 May, Republic of Korea
" As stated on many previous occasions, the Republic of Korea continues to place high priority on launching negotiations on the FMCT in the CD at the earliest possible date. My delegation believes that it is the only issue ripe for negotiations in the CD."

2 February, Russian Federation
"Russia consistently supports the agreed recommendations of 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences on elaborating the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. We expect that through the joint efforts of all member states we shall be able to reach a compromise on a balanced program of work of the CD, which will allow launching negotiations on this important issue."

16 May, Russian Federation
" Russian approaches to basic elements of the eventual treaty are well known. Let me recall some of them. The scope of the treaty should provide for 1) ban on future production of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium of nuclear weapons; 2) prohibition of assistance in or encouragement of production of these materials by other states: 3) prohibition of transfer of fissile materials from civil to military cycle for the purposes of nuclear weapons. The treaty will not prohibit production of fissile materials for any purposes other than making nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The scope of the treaty will not cover existing stocks of fissile materials, since otherwise it would entail establishing a cumbersome verification mechanism, and, accordingly, unacceptably high costs of its maintenance. The treaty would be of unlimited duration. Participation of the largest number of states is required, first of all nuclear powers as well as the countries that possess an industrial potential for production of nuclear explosive devices and have uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities."s

17 May, South Africa
" South Africa believes that a Fissile Material Treaty must be negotiated without any further delay. In a nutshell, such a treaty should be the product of multilateral negotiations, be non-discriminatory and verifiable, and fulfill both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Although cognizant of the difficulties associated with the past production of fissile material, we believe that stocks should be included in the Treaty."

16 May, Sri Lanka
" With regards to the CD's role in discussing a fissile material treaty, Sri Lanka stated its position as far back as 1980. My delegation has since supported a comprehensive international legal regime on banning fissile material production and use, negotiated and adopted as a part of the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda. We considered then, as we do now, such a regime as one of the most important barriers against more nuclear weapons as well as new nuclear weapon States."

31 January, Sweden
"We know that the FMCT is there. The CD should without any further delay begin negotiations on an FMCT. Such a treaty would be an important and irreversible step towards long-term nuclear disarmament. And it would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It would also facilitate discussions in relevant fora on multilateral approaches to the nuclear cycle."

2 March, Sweden
"Of course, negotiations in the CD should commence immediately on an FMCT that would take into account both non-proliferation and disarmament aspects. We would like to continue the dialogue with all states possessing nuclear weapons on what concrete measures you plan to take nationally, regionally, or internationally to make the world safer through nuclear disarmament measures. We look forward to your answers in this or the next CD-session."

16 May, Sweden
"New verification techniques and approaches are being developed and will continue to improve our ability to effectively verify compliance with an FMCT. My delegation looks forward to constructively engage at expert level with those who may take a more pessimistic view on verification. We continue to view the issue of stocks as an essential part of the negotiations of an FMCT from both the non-proliferation and disarmament perspectives. Several realistic approaches are on the table, including those put forward in the Canadian working paper. These, in my view quite modest proposals merit thorough examination this week."

31 January, Switzerland
"In the opinion of the Swiss Delegation, the best way to get a breakthrough is by resuming soon the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and this without preconditions, the verification being of course part of the negotiations."

23 February, UK
" The priority for the UK remains the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions on an FMCT. Listening to the general statements made under the Polish Presidency, we have again been struck by the fact that no delegations disagrees on the need to start negotiations on an FMCT. Surely we can agree without prejudice to anyone's position, to begin negotiations on an FMCT without preconditions? Agreement on this would be core to any understandings designed to break-out from the continuing impasse of the CD. Of course we are aware of the differences of view on relative priorities, but it is apparent that only committed movement on FMCT without preconditions can provide the beginnings of a way forward."

23 March, UK
"The UK continues to seek and to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. To this end, we continue to believe that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is the appropriate next step in pursuit of nuclear disarmament. To our knowledge no delegation has disagreed on the value of starting negotiations on an FMCT. Of course, such negotiations will not be easy. But surely we can agree without prejudice to anyone's position, to begin negotiations on an FMCT without preconditions?"

17 May, United Kingdom
"It should therefore come as no surprise if I conclude by reiterating our commitment to negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. We all know why it is important to achieve such a Treaty, we all know what issues need to be negotiated to reach agreement on such a Treaty, and we all know how such a Treaty can be negotiated by this Conference if we all set our minds to it. It is the United Kingdom's view that we should now just get on and do it."

19 May, United States
"The United States has given considerable thought to what an FMCT should look like. The draft treaty that we have put forward sets forth the essentials needed for an FMCT that would meet the objective of ending expeditiously the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The basic obligation under such a treaty, effective at entry into force, would be a ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Stocks of already existing fissile material would be unaffected by the FMCT. The production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes, such as fuel for naval propulsion, also would be unaffected by the treaty."

Prevention Of an Arms Race in Outer Space

9 February, Brazil
"We also favor the consolidation and reinforcement of instruments to prevent the 'weaponization' of outer space."

16 March, Brazil
"The growing dependence of our societies on space activities, for instance, on communication, navigation, remote monitoring and weather forecast, recommends that we engage in the discussion of ways and means to preserve the outer space from an arms race and 'weaponization'. For Brazil, a developing country of continental dimensions engaged in a civilian space program, access to an outer space free of weapons is essential for our development. A free-weapon space is the only way to avoid the uncertainties and risks to space assets and to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space would be carried only for peaceful purposes, For this purpose, we are ready to engage in the upcoming structured debate on PAROS.

8 June, Canada
"One key element of a multilateral architecture for space security will be the negotiation in the CD of an appropriately scoped legally-binding ban on space based weapons. Canada welcomes the contribution that many delegations have made to this end. We call upon all delegation to play their respective parts in enabling the re-establishment of a PAROS Ad Hoc Committee to discuss and consider the possible contribution to international peace and security of a treaty to ban space-based weapons."

13 June, China
"Due to the complex nature of verification of outer space activities, which bears on the security interest of all countries, as well as to technical and financial constraints of verification, currently it is extremely difficult to negotiate a verification provision. For the time being, to put on hold the verification issue until conditions are ripe, and to negotiate a treaty without verification provisions could be a practical alternative."

9 February, Cuba
"Likewise, we welcome the beginning of negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

8 June, Democraic People's Republic of Korea
"The fact that the existing relevant international legal instrument lack the provisions to fully check the deployment of space weapons, as well as the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), the pursuit of missile defense systems, etc, give rise to the deep concern that outer space might be reduced into military monopoly. A new international legal instrument for comprehensive and effective prevention of an arms race in outer space is urgently required in the light of the circumstances in which certain space-related agreements have been abrogated or insufficient and the move to establish space weapon systems is practically in place"

7 February, Germany
"The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space could serve to explore and discuss the issue of strengthening the international framework and rules governing the civil as well as legitimate military use of outer space in order to avoid outer space becoming an insecure area with incalculable risks not only to world security, but also to commercial use of space as it is required by modern technology used in a variety of daily applications. Therefore, Germany welcomes all efforts to identify and examine specific topics and proposals which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, treaty commitments and the strengthening of the existing regime with a view to making any future arms race or dangerous technical developments in space impossible."

8 June, Germany
"Some may say that there is currently no arms race in outer space and that the current military uses of outer space for surveillance, navigation and communication are legitimate. We would point out, however, that it is an easier task to prevent an undesired militarization in outer space than to attempt to control and decelerate such a development after it has begun."

8 June, Group 21
"The Group further reaffirms its recognition that the legal regime applicable to outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that the regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment. For that purpose, the Group stresses the need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness. The Group also emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference of Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

8 June, the EU
"As we have stated on previous occasions, the EU supports the establishment of a subsidiary body at the CD to deal with this matter on the basis of a mandate, which will be the subject of an agreement by all"

2 February, India
"The peaceful applications of space technology have very much contributed to India's socio-economic development. India has created a growing infrastructure, including deployment of several satellites in Space for communications and remote-sensing, for utilisation of space technology and assets in space for such diverse sectors as agriculture, health, education, natural resource management and disaster management. India is, therefore, committed to the peaceful pursuit of space technology and to preserve outer space, a common heritage of the mankind, exclusively for peaceful uses. We share the concerns about the dangers of deployment of weapons in outer space and believe that this will not be in our collective interest. We regard the Conference as the appropriate forum to deal with this issue."

8 June, India
"India supports the establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee of the Conference to deal with the issue of PAROS as outlined in the A-5 proposal. We believe that it provides a good basis for commencing our work on PAROS, which India stands ready to join"

30 March, Iran
"We also attach high importance to the question of Prevention of an Arms Race in the Outer Space. We reiterate that outer space is a common heritage of mankind and must be used, explored and utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit and interest of mankind in a spirit of cooperation. We are also concerned over the negative implications of development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technology capable of being deployed in outer space which has contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and strengthening of international security. We share the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has assumed greater urgency because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments are inadequate to deter an arms race in the outer space."

7 February, Ireland
"We see merit in embarking on a process which could eventually lead to agreement on the non-weaponisation of Outer Space."

13 June, Ireland
"My delegation has consistently said that we would like to see this Conference embark without delay on a process that could lead to an agreement to prohibit the weaponisation of outer space. However, pending progress on such a initiative, we believe that there are a number of measures that could be taken to increase transparency in space activities and otherwise to build confidence in the peaceful intentions of all space-faring states"

13 June, Italy
"We still encounter difficulties in reaching a consensus on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. For many delegations, including mine, an FMCT is the priority in the CD. But we heard no dissenting voice so far on the principle that the CD, as it conducts FMCT negotiations, could continue to work on other issues including PAROS."

15 June, Japan
"Japan, like other countries, is concerned with the safety of outer space. We share the view that in recent years the pace of technical innovation together with the upsurge in satellite technology use has been truly astonishing. Consequently, for the international community the smooth maintenance of outer space for peaceful use has become a matter of urgency. However, due to the rapid advancement in the use of satellites, there is the possiblity thet the efforts of the international communiy could lag behind the growing number of problems surronding the use of space. As it has been pointed out by many speakers who have already taken the floor in the thematic discussions on PAROS, tackling this issue with foresight is not only important but essential and we must maintain a healthy enviroment for satellite operations."

15 June, Kazakhstan
"Kazakhstan regards the issue of PAROS as an important and integral element of the work of the CD. This is not an option to choose, but a realistic way to address challenges associated with the increasing exploration of outer space."
" A clear definition of weapons in outer space is the most problematic issue. There is a general recognition that a defense component is an integral part of national space programs and military and legal experts will face a tremendous challange in drawing a distinction between offensive weapons and legitimate needs"
"Transparency and Confidence Building Measures can not be used as a substitute for a treaty but can play instrumental role in promoting its objectives."

22 June, Myanmar
"Myanmar wishes to call upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute effectively towards attainment of the objectives of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space"
"The existing legal instruments regarding outer space have played a positive role in promoting peaceful use of outer space and regulating outer space activities. However, the existing international legal system needs to be strengthened in order to prevent effectively the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space."

8 June, Netherlands
"While we have said repeatedly that in our view an FMCT is the next logical step to be dealt within the CD, that does not mean we do not want progress on the issue of PAROS, or any other issue of relevance for that matter. In our view the CD could and should start negotiating on an FMCT, while simultaneously discussions on PAROS could be started. When the time is ripe, these discussions could be followed by negotiations on the issue"

8 June, Sri Lanka
"As far back as 1985 Sri Lanka had proposed a moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons preceding multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit weapons in space. We see merit therefore in recent calls for a series of independent declarations from major space faring nations that they would not be the first to deploy weapons in space, which would provide considerable protection to existing space assets and help build confidence in the security of space."

31 January, Sweden
"And we know that preventing an arms race in outer space is vital. The weaponization of this last frontier would not only endanger our security and risk triggering countermeasures, in space as well as on the ground. It would also jeopardize the chances for future generations to reap the benefits of the enormous scientific and economic potentials of the peaceful uses of outer space."

8 June, Sweden
"The issues of Space Security and the prevention of the weaponization of Outer Space are too important to be paralyzed by the inability of the CD to agree on a Program of Work"
"Sweden, as was also expressed by the EU, supports the establishment of a subsidiary body at the CD to deal with this matter"

9 February, Pakistan
"We share the majority view that the existing international legal instruments are inadequate to prevent weaponization of outer space. We should consolidate and reinforce this regime and enhance its effectiveness."

13 June, Pakistan
"Military doctrines that seek full spectrum dominance projected through and from space are counterproductive and jeopardize the security of all humanity. Defense capability is legitimate but aspirations for impregnable defenses tend to undermine deterrence, and lead to new instruments of war and to arms race." "We have consistently argued, even during this session, that the time is ripe, indeed over-ripe, for focused discussions and negotiations on PAROS"

8 June, Republic of Korea
"The problem we are facing in our common endeavors to move forward is the suspicions about the strategic motives of the major powers on both sides of the debate. Addressing this will require building-up trust based on the existing commitments and taking a gradual approach, starting with addressing easily agreeable and immediate issues and eventually leading up to more complex and difficult ones. We can also try to build on progress made in outer space-related for a as well"

20 June, Republic of Korea
"On the prevention of arms race in outer space, like many other countries, the Republic of Korea has greatly benefited from space-based technologies. We are keen to safeguard the uninterrupted and free use of the outer space for peaceful purposes. We welcome the in-depth CD debates on PAROS. In the light of the complicated nature of the related issues, we believe a gradual and pragmatic approach is sensible at this state."

2 February, Russian Federation
"The Russian Federation's well-known priority is the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space by means of a legally binding ban on the placement of weapons there and the use of force against outer space objects. This is, perhaps, the most relevant and promising item on the CD agenda. After all, there are no weapons in outer space yet, and prevention is always easier than prohibition and reduction. Apart from that, it is all about further development of international outer space law - and its foundations have been already laid, as well as about covering significant lacunae in it. Our objective is elaboration and conclusion at the CD of a new legally binding agreement on non-weaponization of outer space and on prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects."

16 February, Russian Federation
See full statement of 16 February for more details on the "Compilation"
"The purpose of the "Compilation" is to supplement and enrich CD/1679, to help further in-depth discussions, to single out clusters of issues on which we have identical or similar assessments, and those on which contentious opinions are spoken out. This is a sort of a reflection of the current state of affairs with apprehension of the Russian-Chinese initiative and an additional "food for thought". We hope that the "Compilation" will be helpful for formulating and fine-tuning positions of the capitals. It should assist to streamline and focus our deliberations on PAROS in the CD this year. We believe it will become a significant reference material for the future CD Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS. Preparing the "Compilation" was quite an effort. Its outcome, in our view, clearly illustrates the importance of the issue and its close connections to the core security interests of the states; the significant attention paid by member states to the problem of PAROS and non-placement of weapons in outer space; the interest and productive work on these problems which is under way to the extent that the current situation in the CD permits; the need of reaching a compromise on the CD program of work at an early date so that the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS could be re-established after a protracted break; the good prospects for working out a new international legal instrument on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects. It also goes without saying that there are some issues which require further study. The Russian delegation will continue its active efforts to this end."

8 June, Russian Federation
"PAROS is the most important item of the CD agenda. The problem is far from being superficial. This is a topical and urgent issue. This is a purely disarmament issue. It's "price" is very high, It directly pertains to the vital interests of all states. This problem can be solved: we deal with prevention of something which does not exist yet, with preserving the current status quo. It's a win-win case for all. We believe that we shall succeed in agreeing on starting work on this issue in the CD"

13 June, Russian Federation
"Elaborating the treaty without verification measures, which could be added at a later stage, might be a preferable option. Transparency & Confidence Building Measures could, for a certain period of time, compensate for the lack of verification measures in the new treaty"

8 June, the United Kingdom
"The focus on our policy on space is on civil and scientific uses, and we firmly believe that all states have the right to explore outer space and make the most of opportunities for scientific, economic, environmental and communications advances." "We do recognize that, as national security activities in space have grown, so have concerns by some states about the risk of an arms race in outer space. We understand that some states would wish to see additional and more extensive arms control measures. However, se do not believe that there is an international consensus on the need for further treaties or further legal codification"

13 June, the United States
"Our delegation is more convinced than ever that issues relating to the supposed weaponization of space definitely do NOT command consensus in this body"
"the United States does not have any weapons in space, nor do we have any plans to build such weapons. On the other hand, the high value of space systems long has led the United States to study the potential of space-related weapons to protect our satellites from potential future attacks. As long as the potential for such attacks remains, our Government will continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets." "The cold war is over, and there is no arms race in outer space. Thus, there is no - repeat, no- problem in outer space for arms control to solve."

Nuclear disarmament
(see all statements from 28 February, 2 March)

16 March, Brazil
"As we have witnessed during the structured debate held under your presidency on items 1 and 2 of our Agenda, there are innumerous important issues that can shape us a substantive framework for discussions at an ad hoc Committee for dealing with nuclear disarmament. For this reason, it is misleading to argue that the proposal to create an ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament would represent just a tactical move to prevent the early start of negotiations of a fissile material treaty."

9 February, Cuba
"Cuba is convinced that the only effective solution to the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is their total elimination: therefore, Cuba considers that the Conference should establish an ad.hoc Committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament."

2 March, DPRK
"My delegation supports the proposal to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to start negotiations on the issue."

7 February, Germany
"We continue to support the establishment of subsidiary bodies for all four "core issues". Their mandates could be, and probably would be, differing. The mandates should strike a balance between the differing priorities of the different groups and the necessity for overall consensus. They should be both pragmatic and substantial, in order to be accepted by all."

2 March, India
"India attaches the highest priority to establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Group of 21 proposed this almost a decade ago. It sought to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament, for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. India, together with 27 other members of the Group, also put forward a proposal, in August 1996, for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as contained in document CD 1419."

7 February, Ireland
"We support the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament."

2 March, Malaysia
"In this connection, we hope the CD, pending the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, could begin discussions on the legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world, with the aim to integrate such thinking into the development of a program of action based on the practical steps agreed in 2000 for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT. We are of the view that these elements may include: 5.1 Non-discriminatory general obligations, applicable to States and non-State actors, prohibiting the acquisition, development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons; 5.2 Interim control, protection and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings; 5.3 Phases and steps for the systematic and progressive destruction of all nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles; 5.4 Mechanisms for verifying the destruction of all nuclear weapons; 5.5 Mechanisms for ensuring compliance; 5.6 An international organization to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under strict and effective international control; and 5.7 Disarmament and non-proliferation education to ensure that key sectors of society understand the importance of achieving and maintaining a nuclear weapons free world and how they can contribute to this goal."

28 February, Myanmar
"In this context, we call for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament at an early date and the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of these weapons. It is therefore that my delegation fully supports the proposal of the Group of 21, as contained in documents CD/1570 and CD/1571, on the programme of work and a draft decision and mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament."

28 February, Netherlands
"The Netherlands has actively supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament in further detail and as a gradual process. It is our hope that these focused discussions initiated under your Chairmanship, Mr. President, will pave the way to arrive, before the end of the year, at a common understanding of the threats we are facing and, above all, what realistically speaking can be done immediately at the negotiating table."

2 March, Nigeria
"The Nigerian delegation strongly supported past proposals in the CD aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, particularly those contained in CD/1570 and CD?1571; for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

2 February, Russian Federation
"We do not object to the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament with the mandate provided by the A5 proposal. In our view, the work of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament would be incomplete and one-sided should it focus exclusively on reductions of nuclear arsenals of nuclear weapon states. The issue of nuclear non-proliferation and strengthening the NPT regime is currently gaining additional urgency and acuity."

31 January, Sweden
"We also know the issues of nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances are on the table. The NPT-states have agreed by consensus that the CD should create a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament measures. Discussions on nuclear disarmament and legally binding negative security assurances remain priorities at a time when many are deeply concerned about indications that some nuclear weapons states may consider developing new kinds of nuclear weapons and new doctrines for their use."

28 February, G21
"The Group emphasizes that Nuclear Disarmament remains, as before, the highest priority for the CD. The Group has put forward proposals, as contained in CD/1570 and CD/1571, for the establishment of an ad hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention. Despite the fact that the mandate for nuclear disarmament in the A-5 proposal, as contained in CD/1693/Rev.1, falls short of these expectations, the Group has expressed its willingness to join consensus on the basis of that proposal."

30 March, Iran
"Iran, together with other members of the G21 and many other members of this Conference, considers nuclear disarmament as the utmost priority to be addressed. We have followed the reports of some nuclear weapon States about the results of their bilateral agreements and reductions already carried out and those to be done in future. We find such information of high interest, not because of the high number of reductions, but because of the power of destruction which still exists and whose capacity goes far beyond eradicating all human civilizations around the world. On the other hand, so long as the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability do not prevail, the bilateral initiatives are welcome but still far beyond the expectations of the international community.

We support the call of the G21 for the establishment of an ad hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention. New nuclear postures and doctrines which are based on development of new types of nuclear weapons, which lower the threshold of resorting to such weapons to the level of conventional confrontation scenarios and which name Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT as the targets of such weapons are in contravention of the unilateral declarations issued just before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference which decided on the indefinite extension of the NPT. Selective approaches towards the validity of outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference would certainly damage the credibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty mechanism as whole."

Negative Security Assurances

9 February, Cuba
"We also support, as one of the top priorities in this forum, the launching of negotiations on an international legal instrument on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states."

7 February, France
"The French delegation, as well as that of other nuclear powers, provides in particular negative security guaranteed to these States. As we had then said, this does naturally in no way affect our right, natural, of legitimate defense, as recalled in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, France has provided legally binding security guarantees to more than a hundred countries, by ratifying the protocols of Treaties creating nuclear-weapon-free zones: Tlatlelolco for South America in 1992, Pelindaba for Africa and Raratonga for the Pacific in 1996. Negotiations are under way for Central Asia and South-East Asia. All these guarantees remain of course fully valid."

7 February, Germany
"In the EU-Strategy against Proliferation of WMD, adopted by the European Council in December 2003, Germany and its EU-partners recognized "that positive and negative security assurances ... can serve both as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent". In the same vein, the NPT Rev Con 2000 agreed that "legally binding security assurances ... strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime". Germany therefore strongly calls upon CD stated to agree on a work programme that seriously pursues the issue of negative security assurances."

2 February, India
"As an interim measure, until the achievement of the objective of universal nuclear disarmament, India continues to support the demand of non-nuclear weapon States for multilateral and legally binding security assurances. They have regarded existing security assurances as conditional and not legally binding. There has been, however, little progress in realizing this demand."

28 February, Italy
"A significant set of confidence-building measures make nuclear attacks less likely. Nuclear weapon free zones and security guarantees are an important complement to the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime."

9 February, Pakistan
"Until nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states should have the assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. The security assurances offered by nuclear weapons states should be translated into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty."

2 March, Pakistan
"We will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.

2 February, Russian Federation
"The Russian Federation would not object to the A5 proposal on the establishment of the CD Ad Hoc Committee on the issue of assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Russia would be ready to move towards elaboration of a global negative security assurances agreement. At the same time we would like to note that nearly a hundred states members of nuclear-weapon-free-zones have been already provided with legally binding security assurances."

30 March, Iran
"We together with other NAM countries believe that it is the legitimate right of States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive security assurances and call for the negotiation of a universal unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances. I would also like to reiterate Our conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority."

30 March, Pakistan
"On NSAs we do not have to start from scratch. Unilateral declarations made by nuclear weapons states can be expanded. The negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee dealing with NSAs can help reach an agreement. Proposals, including drafts of an international convention, have been submitted under the relevant item in the CD. Therefore, in this context, we fully support the call of Ambassador Jose Artur DeNot Medeiros of Brazil made on March 16 in this chamber that legally binding assurances should be given to non-nuclear states."

A5 Agenda

9 February, Brazil
"Notwithstanding, and with the objective of the trying to achieve consensus, Brazil has shown its flexibility with regards to a program of work. As a compromise offer, we have, since 2004, supported the "A5 Proposal", which puts less strength on nuclear disarmament if compared with the proposal made by Brazil, and indicated that the "Food-for-Thought" paper presented by Ambassador Chris Sanders last year, as an informal derivation from the A-5 proposal, could also be an acceptable basis for discussion, in order to lead us to the adoption of a program of work."

16 March, Brazil
"As we have consistently pointed out in this forum, Brazil supports the A-5 proposal or a variation thereof. Therefore, a compromise solution for a program of work should necessarily include the four core issues - nuclear disarmament, fissile material treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances."

2 March, DPRK
"Program of work of the CD should be comprehensive and balanced one acceptable to all. Though the A-5 proposal falls short of this delegation's hope, it ahs expressed its position from the spirit of multilateralism that it supports the A-5 proposal and that this proposal could serve as a basis of our efforts for agreeing upon a program of work."

7 February, Germany
"We have always felt that the A5 proposal meets these requirements in full. Together with the overwhelming majority of the CD we share the assessment that the A5-proposal in fact constitutes the one proposal after 1998 that has brought the CD nearest to consensus. Sadly, we had to realize that being near to consensus by no means is equivalent to having reached consensus."

2 February, India
"India has also, for instance, sought to accommodate the growing convergence on the A-5 proposal, even though its mandate had departed from the CD/1570, which proposed a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament. Though not fully satisfied with the A-5 proposal, India decided to support it in the hope that it could become a basis for CD's programme of work."

2 March, India
"India's preferred position has, thus, always been for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as contained in documents CD 1570 and CD 1571. Nevertheless, India decided to support the Amorim proposal and the proposal of the Five Ambassadors, hoping that they could become a basis for consensus on a programme of work for the CD. We recognize that given the current impasse, it may be unrealistic to expect consensus on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, but anything less than what is contained in the proposal of Five Ambassadors would be unacceptable to us."

2 February, Indonesia
"Ideally, we would prefer to see the CD address all the items on the agenda simultaneously: but we are also ready to start discussing some of them as suggested in the A-5 proposal, for example. The proposal which has been widely acclaimed as the most viable in years is on the table. My delegation is ready, if it is the wish of the Conference, to start discussing it and get the ball rolling."

7 February, Ireland
"We would be ready to consider how to move forward on other items on our agenda to which our negotiating partners attach importance. Like others we continue to believe that the A5 proposal has the potential to address the range of concerns in this room."

7 February, Nigeria
"From the interventions of delegations in the past one year, the A5 enjoy overwhelming majority support but not consensus. Nigeria suggests that the Friends of the P6 may focus their efforts in the search for a work programme based on the A5. They could try to identify the difficulties those delegations unable to join consensus have with the A5 and try to re-formulate the proposal to accommodate the concerns without creating new problems. It has been said over and over again that the A5 is not cast in stone. It is an evolutionary proposal. Finally, I want to assure you that Nigeria has supported past proposals on the table including the A5 and will remain flexible to help you in your efforts to get us out of the present impasse."

9 February, Pakistan
'We welcome your determination that a majority of delegations support the A-5 proposal, while some other delegations are not in a position to do so. At the moment, the work of the CD is the programme of work. The agenda is agreed. The methods of work are in place and operative. We therefore suggest that the combined weight of the P-6, the F-6, three regional coordinators, China and the other members be used to persuade the few countries that have reservations on A-5 to come on board. Pakistan supports the A-5 proposal as it presents a package solution to address the four core issues in a comprehensive and balanced manner."

2 February, Russian Federation
"We would be prepared not to object to the A5 proposal and really hope that consensus could be reached on its basis. This is the proposal that enjoys the widest support. We agreed, in the context of the A5 proposal, on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS with "to deal with" mandate rather than negotiating mandate. We are expecting reciprocal steps from our partners."

2 February, Sri Lanka
"My delegation is on record as stating that Sri Lanka fully supports the five Ambassadors proposal. We could also support any other proposal that would likely meet consensus."

23 March, UK
"We should be honest with ourselves: the package approach to starting substantive work in the CD has not delivered a consensus agreement on a way forward.

Verification

2 March, Ireland
"Secondly, transparency will be crucial in enabling the verification of compliance by states with their disarmament and arms control commitments in a self-sustaining process of confidence-building. In turn verification of warhead dismantlement, disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons, a fissile material treaty and the disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium will all require greater transparency of nuclear weapon and fissile material holdings."

28 February, Japan
"In the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, the application of irreversibility, verifiability, and increased transparency is crucial. Some progress has been made in the field of nuclear disarmament."

2 March, Malaysia
"A comprehensive overview of the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear weapons free world would be able to affirm such elements which already exist, assess those which are currently being developed, evaluate and link those which have been proposes and identify additional elements which would also be required. We are of the view that discussions on verification on the destruction of nuclear weapons could lead to progress in areas such as (i) agreements on data sharing with States and existing agencies, (ii) an international monitoring system comprising facilities and systems for monitoring by photography, radionuclide sampling, on-site and off-site sensors, and other data collection systems, (iii) consultation and clarification procedures, (iv) on-site inspections, and (v) a registry including information gained from States declaration, the international monitoring system, national technical means, inspections, other international organizations, NGOs and publicly available sources".

2 March, UK
"Since 2000 we have been pursuing a programme to develop UK expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally, with the overall aim of finding potential methodologies which could be used in a future nuclear disarmament verification regime.

30 March, Iran
"The question of verifiability is also of crucial importance. A treaty on fissile materials should be verifiable in order to be capable of creating confidence. By the term "verifiable" we mean that the treaty needs to have sufficiently elaborated provisions on its verification mechanism. We believe that the best way to proceed is to remain faithful to the already agreed languages and specifically the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein."

Terrorism

7 March, Germany
"Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control can make an essential contribution in the global fight against terrorism by reducing the risk of non-state actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, radioactive materials and means of delivery."

2 March, India
"The dangers posed by the increased risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors or, in some cases, rogue actors within State structures, has further aggravated existing dangers."

28 February, Italy
"On the other hand nuclear terrorism remains a possible threat. One country has announced its withdrawal from the NPT and declared possession of nuclear weapons, clandestine nuclear activities have come to the surface; the Director General of IAEA has been requested to make reports to the Security Council on one country's nuclear activities."

28 February, Sweden
"Firstly, we have the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear terrorism. We all know that a terrorist cannot be deterred from using nuclear weapons by fear of retaliation and that nuclear weapons are useless against a terrorist or terrorist network. Nuclear weapons thus serve no purpose in meeting this relatively new threat. The problem is rather in existing arsenals and stockpiles of fissile materials and their security. Can we, the non-nuclear weapons states rest assured that the nuclear complexes are fully secured? Presumably, most at risk would be the more easily transportable non-strategic arsenals."

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