Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Unofficial Transcript
Iran
21 June 2007

Iran appreciates the efforts you are taking for reaching an agreement on a program of work for the CD. Iran expressed clearly in this body, on the 5th of June 2007, there are problems dealing with document L.1. The problems are both of procedural and substantive nature. My delegation expressed its readiness to engage in negotiations for a balanced program of work. The efforts made to engage the CD in serious consultations, raises a glimmer of hope that in these consultations concerns raised by member states might be resolved.

By appreciating your efforts and I repeat, appreciating your efforts in this regard, I would like to bring to your attention there still remain substantive questions which have gone unanswered. It seems that in regard to L.1 we are in a situation of take it or leave it dilemma. It is despite the fact that delegations expressed their concerns and took them into account.

Madame President, explanation and clarification about the method of work and the process of deliberations as well as the outcomes of future decisions of the Conference are indeed valuable. At the same time, we should keep in mind the fact that document L.1 itself needs serious improvement. Substantive problems dealing with document L.1 by its nature need to be taken care of and consulted in an inclusive process, which would not be addressed or resolved by a Presidential Statement, however rich it may be.

The document L1 has fallen short of addressing our priorities, such as nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances, thoroughly and comprehensively. We had expected a clear commitment in the P6 proposal to start negotiations on this issue in the CD.

My delegation has always supported an international and effectively verifiable, comprehensive and nondiscriminatory FMCT. In our position, past and present stockpiles are to be covered under the scope of the treaty and we stress the negotiation process on a possible FMCT should be in the framework of the Shannon Mandate. The P6 proposal needs to be improved to cover these concerns. We are uncertain about the usefulness of an FMCT with no verification system and excluding existing stockpiles of fissile materials that can be used for nuclear weapons. We are of the belief that with a balanced Programme of Work of the CD, we will start its substantive work and play a major role in strengthening the peace and security of the international system.

Thank you so much Madame President