Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Statement by Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka to the Conference on Disarmament 24th June 2008

Unofficial Transcript

Thank you Madame President. May I join my colleagues in congratulating you on the assumption of the Presidency wishing you all the best not least because we know you in an earlier incarnation as a good and close friend of Sri Lanka.

Madame President, I wish to strike two notes, somewhat different from each other but certainly not contradictory.

One is the note of optimism. Looking at the global political horizon, it is possible to discern the prospect of change which may enable us to bring once again to the forefront the ideals of this conference – the ideal of comprehensive and general disarmament. A possibility which we last saw flicker in 1986 but disappeared since then. So this is the optimism that I wish to share with you and I hope that in the foreseeable future, we will be able to make serious progress on something to which only lip service has been unfortunately paid.

The second note that I would like to strike is one of realism. Madame President, you know that Sri Lanka has long been associated with the cause of disarmament and has institutionally shared this important notable points of the process because of our location, our situation; we also have a stake in this. But it is no secret that we are all players and in some ways can reflect more objectively on the discussions and the debate. In doing so, I think that we have to be somewhat more realistic than we have been so far.

It is inevitable that CD 1840 is a good basis for discussion, of that Sri Lanka has no doubt, having contributed to its precursor. However, I would also wish to draw attention to certain underlying structural anomalies or problems of geometry which have to be addressed if this happens to be successful. What do I mean by this? CD 1840 like its precursor privileges one agenda item over the others, now there maybe some logic for this, the argument is there is some prospect for negotiation on that agenda item. But that particular item which is elevated over the others involves certain member states more than they do to some others. Now if those member states feel that their fundamental national interests are at variance with the spirit of 1840 then is it not simply a question of a hand full of holdouts who are to be convinced but those actors assume a greater specific gravity if I may say so and therefore their concerns have to be very seriously engaged with. And if it is the perception of these states that is it more than a matter of wants, but the core strategic matters and interests that are at stake, then we maybe have to do better than we have done in getting them on board. And doing that may in fact mean looking afresh at other agenda items because it is no secret that for certain states, there is an underlying linkage and there maybe the possibilities of making progress on fissile material if there is progress on some of the other agenda items. Depending on how serious we are, even in this prioritization, how sincere we are, it maybe necessary into to precisely make progress, to revisit and upgrade the status of some of the other agenda items.

With these I just wanted to share those thoughts with you while reiterating that we do believe that 1840 is definitely a basis for very serious negotiations and should not be rejected out of hand by anybody.

Thank you.