Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Statement by Ambassador Don Mackay to the Conference on Disarmament 19th August 2008

Unofficial Transcript

Thank you very much indeed Mr. President.

Could I also join the colleagues who have congratulated you and complimented you on the assumption of the Presidency and also pay tribute to the work which is being done by the previous Presidents. And I think we would wish to acknowledge that work and express our confidence in the prospect of the CD moving forward under your Presidency. But I also would like to join others paying tribute to the departing ambassadors for their contribution to the CD during the time that they have been here.

We have heard this morning a number of interesting interventions that have ranged across quite a wide area including and in fact certainly two of them have been linked, the intervention from the distinguished Colleague of France and distinguished colleague of Pakistan, have been linked in the sense that they both address the inability of the CD to get down to negotiations which has of course been the subject of comment in this chamber, in fact a period of 11 years.

I wanted to just specifically take up some of the points raised by our distinguished colleague from Pakistan because I think it is important that the record be presented on this subject in a way that reflects not only one view point but also another view of within the chamber.

The view point that I represent, my country represents, a country that is not in possession of nuclear weapons, that has foresworn of ever acquiring nuclear weapons. That is totally committed to the non proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically and I think our record stands very strongly in that sense and we have spoken on many occasions on that I this body and also in others.

I can understand therefore that the perspective that we have on the inability of the CD to move forward on a work program, on an FMCT, maybe somewhat different from our Pakistani colleague, obviously, coming from a country that does possess nuclear weapons and is not entered into the commitment of the sort that I have indicated and my country as a non-nuclear weapons states and a party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty has done. And certainly I think from the statement that our distinguished colleague from Pakistan has made in the chamber this morning, the difference in those perspectives comes through quite clearly and I would just like to briefly go through the six points he has elaborated this morning in support of his position.

With regard to first point, is the rule of consensus being misused? Obviously, the term use or misuse is something that can be bended about at great lengths. Clearly there is a consensus rule in the CD. Clearly it is up to states to take advantage of that rule to prevent the work proceeding in the CD is they judge that they wish to do that. I would however note that this body is probably unique in the level of safeguards built in with regard to the use of consensus in the CD. For example, a consensus is required for a work program. Once one has agreed on a work program and we are getting down to work. Unfortunately we have not been able to agree on a work program for what is it eleven or twelve years, I lose track. Once one gets down to work, one needs a consensus in the chamber to actually agree to a particular outcome. We have a second consensus safeguard built in. Then there is a consensus obviously required in the CD to adopt an instrument as a whole so we have a third level of safeguard built it. Then of course all states have the sovereign right to decide whether or not they are going to become party to the outcome in the CD. The mere fact that the CD has adopted an outcome does not mean that all states are going to become party to that outcome, that they have to become party to that outcome, so we have a fourth level of safeguard built in.

So I would suggest in a situation where you would have such succession of safeguards available, that states should in fact take a flexible approach with regards to first stage of the process which is actually agreeing on a program work because they then have through the application of the consensus rule here and ultimately through the application of state sovereignty they have a lot of safeguards built in that will assure that they will not become party to an outcome that does not meet their national interest. Even if the judgment of the international community of heart as a whole, is that it meets the collective interest of the international community. So again I should say that one should actually approach the invocation of the consensus rule that initial stage when one is agreeing or disagreeing to a program of work. One should approach that with an open and flexible manner and I have to say that unfortunately all of the evidence that we are in that situation and it is being done.

With regard to the second point, I totally agree with the colleague from Pakistan. We shouldn’t be looking for the perfect when we decide to commence work. What we should be doing is looking for a basis on which to commence work and then we can negotiate our national positions in the context of that negotiation. That is what normally happens elsewhere. One doesn’t simply block the adoption of a work program to prevent that further stage being implemented and preventing the testing of other country positions and one’s own national positions to see how they stand up on the substance.

Certainly our national position on the substance, I would say that it is not very much different from the substantive position put forward by Pakistan this morning. We also believe that there should be international and acceptable verification. We also believe that there should be no discrimination; we also believe that existing stocks should be included in the treaty but we are willing to have our positions and our arguments put to the test on this, as happens in all negotiations. And we believe that everyone in this chamber should be willing to put their positions put in the test, to be negotiated, to see how they stack up rather than establish preconditions, predetermined outcomes on issues which are clearly not the subject as overall agreement on this stage.

The third point, is CD/1840 a compromise? It is a compromise. Is it a lopsided compromise, I don’t think it is a lopsided compromise. I think that the present successive presidents of the council have done an extraordinary good job in presenting an outcome that should be acceptable to all. Does it meet our preferred national position? No, that’s the nature of a compromise. A compromise is an outcome that is a fair position that then enables all arguments to put forward din the substance and in our view, this outcome from the Presidents, currently meet that criteria. It certainly does not mean the needs of any one country and nor should it, whatever, the status of that country – whether it has nuclear weapons or doesn’t have nuclear weapons. We see this as a nuclear disarmament issue, other countries may not, but we need to get these things out on the table, out on the floor and until we commence work, we will not be able to test these things.

Is there a prejudgement? There is a prejudgement in CD 1840 in the sense that it doesn’t really actually prejudge anything and if one is looking for prejudged outcome for CD 1840 then I guess that you can say that it is a prejedugement for CD 1840 not to contain any prejudgement. But I guess this is somewhat arcane and insecure, this argument. The fact is, that CD 1840 enables all issues to be discussed but it does not set out in advance what elements have to be obtained in the actual outcomes. In my view, objectively, that is not a prejudgement. If one does require certain outcomes, then one can mount an argument but don’t think it’s a convincing one that because the outcomes that one particular country wants are not specifically referred to as outcomes in the mandate that it prejudges things. I don’t accept that argument.

I think the same point applies with regards to preconditions. The sixth point, that all core issues are ripe for negotiations. Speaking again from New Zealand perspective, we would be happy to see negotiations on any of the items that are on the agenda of the CD. We would be happy to negotiate on NSA, on PAROS, on Nuclear Disarmament and on FMCT. What we don’t believe is that you can deal with all of them equally and equitably at the same time. The reality is that when the CD has negotiated its treaty, be it the Chemical weapons convention. The CTBT, it focused on one particular issues and negotiated. If it had focused on four or five different issues at the same time, I think one can say with complete confidence that we would never have produced a chemical weapons convention and we would never have produced a CTBT and the international community would be that much the poorer for it and our collective national securities would be that much the poorer for it.

The reality is that even for large delegations, it is not possible to negotiate everything at the same time. That is certainly true for small delegations, not because of a lack of commitment but simply because of at a practical level, it would not work. So we need to start somewhere and the judgement I think of virtually of all the delegation, is that the one that is closest is the FMCT. We actually see it as a nuclear disarmament measure so it fits in with the other issues that are dealt with here. Obviously, a nuclear disarmament issue is a nuclear disarmament issues. NSA is clearly related to nuclear disarmament so FMCT is a logical place to start.

I certainly welcome the indication by our distinguished colleague of Pakistan of a willingness to engage further in formal consultations with regard to the draft mandate in CD 1840 but again I come back to the point that we should not be seeking to stipulate in advance what the particular outcome of an FMCT negotiations should be. As I say in substance, we and Pakistan are very close. But we don’t believe that we should be trying to somehow set out in advance what the outcome of the negotiation to be before we embark on the negotiation, I have never heard of being undertaken elsewhere and I guess it did not happen in the case of other negotiations. I think we need to be very careful about going down that route.

Again, I apologize for speaking at some length, but I think it is necessary given the frank and forthright statement from Pakistan and we thank Ambassador Khan for that. It was necessary to go through and deal with the particular issues he had raised from the other perspective, at least one of the other perspectives that is present here in the CD and I hope that just as we will certainly reflect on the points he has made in his statement, I would certainly request the Ambassador of Pakistan to reflect closely on points in perspective I have made in mine.

Thank you.