



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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STATEMENT
BY
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AT

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva,
19 August 2008

Mr. President,

We congratulate the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and you, Ambassador Germain Mundarain Hernandez, on assuming the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The expression may sound trite but you are being literally baptized by fire as you take this responsibility shortly after joining your post in Geneva. We are confident that you would successfully preside over the consultations and negotiations on the year-end report of the CD. In this effort, you will have the full support of the Pakistani delegation.

On this occasion, we also want to compliment your predecessor, Ambassador Christina Rocca of the United States, for her dynamic leadership of the Conference. She accelerated the pace of CD's activities by reviving the third round of informal discussions. More importantly, she conducted the business of the Conference in a fair, wise and skilful manner.

For us, today is a sad day, as we listened to the farewell speech of Ambassador Francois Dobelle. We are all losing a good colleague and a good friend. He leaves behind with us vignettes of his personal warmth, his sharp intellect, and his tenacity in defending his brief. We wish him success in his future assignments.

Mr. President,

The United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, while addressing the Conference on January 22 this year, had reminded us that, in setting priorities, CD members had no constraints as to how to conduct their work, other than to proceed on the basis of consensus.

On June 25, while addressing this body, European Union's foreign policy chief, Honorable Javier Solana, said that the EU had carefully listened to the difficulties a few countries had with the proposal CD/1840 and would be open to discuss any specific security concerns. We welcome such discussions with the EU, in order to go deeper into the issues and explore consensus.

A day earlier, on June 24, a very thoughtful statement had been made by the Ambassador of South Africa, in which, in her elegant style, she had pointed out that the structure, the Secretariat support, funding, and the Rules of Procedure – none of them were hampering the work of the CD.

Six questions still remain to be answered on the rule of consensus, the quest of a 'perfect formula', compromise, pre-judgment, preconditions, and ripeness.

- (1) *Is the rule of consensus being misused?* What constitutes a misuse? The misuse of a rule will be to invoke it when it serves one's national interest and deny it to others when it serves theirs. In the recent past, would it have been a misuse to uphold the rule of consensus in its entirety in case of A-5, but to give innovative interpretations to it in case of CD/1840, which is far from being an agreed document?
- (2) *Is the perfect the enemy of the good in the CD?* Sure, it should not be. In the CD, one is not looking for the perfect. But what is "good"? CD/1840? May be "good" but not "good enough", because it is riddled with in-built conditionalities, as it moves goalposts of the CD 180 degrees. The document drops verification as a goal for an FMT, ad hoc committees as negotiating subsidiary bodies, and balance between the four core issues. It proposes to set aside the agreed basis that had been negotiated after concerted work spread over decades. Some well-meaning delegates believe that all of these elements can be revived and restored once we start work. We are skeptical that we can do a year from now, what we cannot do now.
- (3) *Is CD/1840 a compromise?* CD/1840 is a compromise but a lop-sided compromise among broadly likeminded countries. It does not meet basic, minimum concerns of all CD members. It has *not* given concessions to all sides. In all fairness, the proposal has moved forward to some extent compared to last year's L.1, but in its present form, it does not represent a breakthrough.
- (4) *Is there a pre-judgment?* We are of the view that the paper prejudices the outcome. Consensus until recent years was that the CD would work for a verifiable FMT. That key ingredient is absent from CD/1840. Why? Because the principle of verification in this instance is being shelved or probably mothballed. The paper also foreshadows outcomes of substantive discussions on the other three core issues.
- (5) *Are there no preconditions?* We do not agree with the premise that CD/1840 does not have preconditions. It has, as stated earlier, three explicit or implicit, stated or unstated preconditions – no verification for FMCT, no ad hoc committees for negotiations, and a differentiated treatment of the three core issues, otherwise the ball will not roll. We appeal to all concerned to remove these preconditions and restore verification into the mandate for an FMT.
- (6) *Are all core issues not ripe for negotiations?* There is no agreement on the question as to which issue is mature, and which is not, for negotiations. The determination of the ripeness is in the eye of the beholder; or, shall we

say, the taste buds of the *food connoisseur* depending on policy imperatives? We believe that NSAs, PAROS, and nuclear disarmament are all as ripe for negotiations as the proposed FMCT. As we have given detailed arguments during informal discussions to prove this point, we do not want to repeat them here.

Mr. President,

We all know that negotiations on FMT were started in 1998 on agreed basis and within an agreed programme of work, following hard work of five years to develop and pursue the Shannon mandate. At that time, commencement of the negotiations was made possible by addressing issues, not by sidelining them.

Mr. President,

Yes, in recent weeks, some national statements have supported CD/1840 in the plenary sessions. In its statement on June 17, Pakistan expressed its reservations on the proposal in its present form. Since then, there has been no significant development in bridging the differences in key areas, though some very informal consultations have taken place on the points raised by Pakistan.

On August 2, 2007, the National Command Authority of Pakistan stated:

“The NCA reviewed the current status of negotiations on disarmament issues in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, including regarding the proposed FMCT. The NCA reiterated Pakistan’s position in favour of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty, taking into account the security concerns of all states.”

In the light of this direction:

- (a) Pakistan will sign on any dispensation or mandate that is non-discriminatory;
- (b) Pakistan will propose that the CD should work on a mandate for a verifiable FMT.

We will be able to endorse CD/1840, if it is revised to address the following issues stated in CD/1843:

- A commitment to negotiate a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable” fissile missile treaty. This is key.

- Creation of space for addressing the question of the existing and future stocks of fissile material.
- Balance among all four core issues – nuclear disarmament, FMT, PAROS, and NSAs.
- Using *ad hoc committees* or any other subsidiary bodies as mechanisms for negotiations, in accordance with the CD's Rules of Procedure.
- A differentiation between the role of the coordinators to facilitate informal discussions and the functions of formal CD subsidiary bodies to conduct negotiations in the context of the programme of work. The Coordinators have so far worked informally under the authority of the CD Presidents. Formalization of their role as the CD's subsidiary bodies for the core issues will require open and full-fledged discussions in the CD. This cannot be done indirectly by amalgamating the role of the Coordinators with the proposed programme of work.

Mr. President,

For Pakistan, incorporation of *international and effective verification* into the proposed mandate is of critical importance. It stems directly from our vital national security interests as we define them. Without verification, an FMT would promote neither disarmament nor non-proliferation. On other points, we are ready to negotiate.

On the basis of these points, Pakistan is ready for formal and informal discussions. We will also be ready to table an amendment to CD/1840 or a separate proposal containing elements for an acceptable formula.

I thank you, Mr. President.
