Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Statement by Mme Hilde Skorpen of Norway to the Conference on Disarmament 2nd September 2008

Unofficial Transcript

Thank you very much.

Let me first commend you as well and the other Presidents this year when your efforts of having work program adopted and for having presented a report that is balanced, factual, and objective.

Ideally we would like to see a report that was even more substantial and even more forward leaning but we can live with it as is. And most important to us is that the report can steer us on to productive paths to the coming year and that it reflects the broad support on CD/1840 and that all member states are ready to build on CD/1840 for 2009.

Like most others, we consider CD/1840 the best prospect for breaking the more than decade long deadlock in the CD. We consider an FMCT to be a topic most ripe for negotiations. We did so back in 1995 when CD succeeded in adopting a mandate to negotiate a Fissile Material Treaty and we believe that it is the topic most ripe for negotiation today. Ideally, we want a negotiating mandate that includes both verification and stocks but for now we will settle for what is possible, a decision to start negotiations, the rest will take from there.

Mr President, although we are disappointed that yet another year went without a work program, we find it encouraging that those that are still not in the position to endorse CD/1840 consider it a useful platform to continue or deliberations for next year. But this must not be a repeat of discussions of the past. we must put rhetoric aimed at stalling aside and get the issues into the open.

Norway has long called for something like a cultural revolution in the CD. We believe it is a high time for an open and honest debate about working methods, rules of procedures, consensus principle, seating arrangements for that matter, and not least, the workings of the regional groups.

Breaking the CD deadlock has been the subject of many a seminar up through the years. A report from a conference with this exact title organized by UNIDIR, eight years ago, starts out as follows, and I am sure that some of you were probably present at the conference and may remember it well. Others may not have heard of it so I thought that I would take this opportunity to bring up a few points from the conference because I think it is very pertinent to the debate we have today. The report starts out as follows, “The CD is described as the sole negotiating forum for negotiating international arms control and disarmament treaties yet for over four years, the CD has not been able to agree on a program of work nor has it managed to negotiated for more than a few weeks for the ban on production of Fissile Material that it was mandated to deal with in 1995.” The report goes then to deal with how the deadlock is perceived as from the outside. The report states rather disconcertingly, “Generally a few governmental officials and a few select Non Governmental Organizations are aware of the work carried out by the CD. Not many people outside the CD circles know about the deadlock, some who do know, don’t care as the work of the CD is perceived to be irrelevant to individual, regional security concerns. Indeed the CD is a multilateral forum designed to negotiate global arms control and disarmament treaties and problems that only have a regional impact are not dealt with at the CD, although in post cold war era regional issues are particularly salient and sensitive. This is often seen by outsiders to be a major failing of the CD.” Actually, judging by the last few weeks, this quote cannot be said to be entirely correct but I think that in the longer run, it is worth considering this point in a more systematic manner.

When it comes to the underlying causes of the deadlock, the questions remain the same. Is it due to structural deficiency in the CD or a reflection of a prevailing international security or insecurity situation? Many participants at the seminar back in 2000 questioned whether the rules and procedures governed the CD were obsolete and inadequate especially the with regard to the consensus rule and group structure. Then again, are national security concerns still assessed in terms of games or insecurity or lack of confidence so deep and mistrust so high that it is beyond diplomatic skills to find common ground that it is impossible to move forward? Or maybe many of our leaders are still to learn that the quest for absolute security ultimately leads to greater insecurity for all. We need to know if there are red lines, whether these are absolute or if there are room for diplomatic manoeuvring.

If there are red lines cast in stone, game would appear to be over for the CD, in any event, we need to have an open debate whether we are well served system in which one or two states are allowed to block progress for all of us. I found some of the recommendations from the UNIDIR seminar from 2000 as regard the working procedures worth repeating that the rules governing the CD should be more flexible especially in dealing with the establishment of a program of work. The Consensus rule is often used to voice descent and opposition. It should be overhauled or at least not used for procedural issues. The group structure is not a mechanism that is conducive to progress or efficient work within the CD, it should therefore be replaced by an issue based mechanism or like minded state system. This is recommendations to be discussed.

Further on, the role of Civil Society should be expanded within the work of the CD as it has been in most spheres of policy. Indeed, expanding the role of civil society within the CD could reassert the relevance of its work and counteract the diminished importance of disarmament in the eyes of many governments since the end of the cold war. It also recommends that in terms of substance a new mandate for CD could be formulated.

The report from the conference goes on to deal with substantive issues, the problems that we all know too well, question of equal treatment of each principle topics, linkages, what is considered disarmament primarily, what is considered non-proliferation primarily but it has one recommendation that I though I wanted to bring up because it is very relevant to where we are right now. It concluded that everyone at this conference agreed that starting negotiations on the ban of the production of fissile materials is important. The recommendation than goes, the most contentious issues could be better resolved through negotiations rather than being used as an excuse for not holding negotiations at all.

In our view, this is what CD/1840 is trying to do. Therefore we consider CD/1840 the best compromise till date.

The longer the CD avoids negotiation on an FMCT, the more chances discussions will be held outside the CD. To us, the venue or fora, however, is of less importance.

Thank you Mr President.