Reaching Critical Will

The CD Report is a weekly reporting service from Reaching Critical Will, prepared in collaboration with the WILPF Geneva office.
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9 September - Final plenary of the CD's 2008 session
2 September - Draft report, work of the CD, and the US response to the draft space weapons treaty
26 August - Draft report and cluster munitions in Georgia
19 August - Continued stalemate and questions on the use of cluster munitions
14 August - Transparency in armaments
5 August - De-alerting and small arms
29 July - Third session opens

25 June - Another chapter closes without a programme of work
24 June - Still looking for ways forward
17 June - Clarifying opposition to consensus
10 June - Poverty, small arms, and the CD
3 June - Protesting the stalemate at the CD
26 May - More perspectives on CD/1840
20 May - Frankly speaking...
15 May - Back in session

27 March - France and nuclear weapons
18 March - More on the proposed programme of work
13 March - "New" proposal for a programme of work
11 March - Civil society involvement and the revitalization of the CD
5 March - The NPT, nuclear sharing, and the voice of women
4 March - Divergence, convergence and Foreign Minister pressure
3 March - Reminders of past proposals for FMCT negotiations
28 February - Outer space, missiles, and the work of the Conference
26 February - Steps to nuclear disarmament
19 February - Anti-satellites, nuclear disarmament, and the Oslo Process
14 February - Farewells, accolades, and other matters
12 February - Preventing the placement of weapons in outer space (Russian Foreign Minister)
7 February - Modernizing Article VI obligations (NNSA Administrator)
5 February - Defence on disarmament (UK Secretary of Defence)
31 January - The CD could help the NPT
29 January - Activities require action (Chair's "plan of activities")
25 January - A quiet start
23 January - We need progress! (Opening statements)

Report of the CD
The CD adopted its annual report (CD/WP.550/Amend.1) in plenary after an hour-long informal meeting. Reportedly, minor changes were suggested and accepted during this meeting, including the changing of the word "progress" to "result" in paragraphs 37, 38, 43, 45, 47, 49, and 51 (requested by the Iranian delegation).

Note: Reaching Critical Will will post the final version report on our website as soon as we obtain a copy. With minor exceptions, the text is the same as the draft circulated on 26 August, CD/WP.550.

The final report provides an overview of the CD's 2008 session, including a list of participants; attendance and participation of non-CD member states; the agenda and programme of work for the 2008 session; expansion of the membership of the Conference; a review of the agenda of the Conference; improved and effective functioning of the Conference; communications from non-governmental organizations; and summaries of the substantive work of the session. The report also notes the dates of the CD's 2009 session: 19 January–27 March; 18 May–3 July; and 3 August–18 September.

Pakistan's ambassador described discussions and negotiations on the report as "brisk, transparent and productive." The European Union's representative said the EU would have liked the report to reflect the determination of the CD to maintain its potential as a negotiating forum, but decided to join consensus on the report because it accurately reflected the deliberations held in 2008. China's ambassador said the adoption of the report brought the CD's 2008 session to a "satisfactory conclusion."

Work of the CD
Perhaps in response to the Norwegian delegation's comment last week—"The longer the CD avoids negotiation on an FMCT, the more chances discussions will be held outside the CD. To us, the venue or fora, however, is of less importance"—Finland's incoming ambassador, Hannu Himanen, argued it is "not in anyone's best interest" for states "to turn to other ways of negotiating international disarmament commitments." However, Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland offered his support for the Norwegian delegation's 2 September statement, saying he agrees the CD needs serious reform. He "especially agree[s] that we should seriously reflect on the rules of procedure and the way the consensus principle can be used to disable progress on procedural matters," and is receptive to Norway's call for broader inclusion of civil society. Colombia's representative said that while cooperation within a diplomatic forum like the CD creates opportunities for dialogue, these opportunities must then be seized and acted upon. He said, "we have more than enough words, we now need to put those words into actions."

In his farewell statement to the CD, Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan argued that the stalemate in the CD is a result of "divergences in national security interests of CD members as perceived at the highest levels of decision making." He blamed "shifting priorities of the most influential actors" for limiting the results of the hard work of diplomats who are sent to the CD to represent these interests. He also argued that although the CD has not negotiated a treaty since 1996, it continues to act as "an active catalyst," as a "fulcrum for all disarmament-related activities in Geneva and beyond within the UN System." He also maintained that consensus is possible if diplomats' instincts tell "them that a particular issue is amendable to compromise." It seems, however, that if national security interests perceived at the highest levels determine a delegation's position in the CD, a diplomat's instincts can only go so far before power politics from above impose limits and rules on their hard work. See, for example, the recent developments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where six hold-out governments were "strong-armed" into capitulating to "consensus" to grant India an exemption from the Group's strict guidelines, undermining all previous nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in its wake.

Ambassador Hernandez of Venezuela, the current president of the CD, delivered the final statement of the plenary. He remarked that "form is as important as substance," saying that good form "calls for dialogue, a broad approach, extensive consultations, exclusiveness of all, a great deal of transparency, and above all, something that has always been a constant requirement, flexibility." He argued that the CD "acted accordingly" this year. Yet he also acknowledged his concern with the continuing struggle of adopting a programme of work and urged delegations to put in "greater efforts" in 2009 to reach this goal.

Looking towards 2009
The six rotating presidents for 2009 will be Viet Nam, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, and Austria. Representatives from three of these delegations addressed the final plenary. The representative of Viet Nam, scheduled to be the first rotating president of the CD's 2009 session, indicated is delegation intends to conduct consultations during the intersessional period with all CD members "with the view to taking powerful steps to start the Conference next year," and indicated that the six presidents of 2008 and the six of 2009 will cooperate to facilitate a smooth transition. The representative of Argentina emphasized that his delegation is keen to build on the work of the 2008 session. The ambassador of Zimbabwe spoke on behalf of the Group of 21, pledging its commitment to ensuring the 2009 session is "fruitful".

Ambassador Streuli of Switzerland noted that one of the most positive developments in the CD over the past few years has been the cooperation between the six rotating presidents. He encouraged the six incoming presidents to work together on the P6 platform in 2009. However, none of the six incoming presidents have confirmed they will work in this manner.

Note on last week's report: US response to the draft treaty banning space weapons
One criticism by the US delegation about the draft treaty mentioned in RCW's overview is that "No sovereign government would agree to a legally-binding instrument in which its national security interests could be jeopardized by a simple majority of subscribing States exercising their amendment rights." However, the United States, along with 124 other states, has ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which says in Article II(2), "Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties." Thanks to Aaron Tovish of Mayors for Peace for pointing out this discrepancy in the United States' analysis.

Overall assessment of the CD's 2008 session
In short, 2008 saw a number high-level statements, another anti-satellite test by a CD member state, and another proposed programme of work. Some highlights included the International Women's Day Seminar statement and report, the opportunity to discuss nuclear forces in Europe, and the Russia and China draft treaty banning space weapons. Overall, of course, the end of the 2008 session marks another year without a programme of work—another year of frustration and disappointment, another year of rising military expenditures, violent armed conflict, and insecurity. Noting many suggestions for CD reform from delegations, non-government experts, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and noting the success of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that was negotiated outside of the CD, WILPF urges delegations and citizens alike to work for CD reform during the intersessional period and at the beginning of the 2009 session to ensure that next year is not another wasted year paid for by the victims of armed violence and obscene military expenditures.

Draft report
Norway’s Ms. Hilde Skorpen described the draft report as “balanced, factual, and objective,” though her delegation would have preferred a more substantial document. Ambassador Mauricio Montalvo of Ecuador agreed with the Norwegian delegation’s assessment of the report, describing it as a “useful” document “with a correct orientation that deserves constructive work from all parties” in order to improve it through discussion and analysis. Ms. Mabel Gómez Oliver of Mexico also agreed with these assessments, explaining that though it would like to contribute a few “minimal amendments,” the Mexican delegation is prepared to support the draft as it stands now. Ambassador Idriss Jazairi of Algeria indicated that while he will need to consult with the members of the G21 and others about the draft report, he does not think it will be as controversial as reaching consensus in the CD on a programme of work has been.

The new ambassador of Iran to its UN mission in Geneva, Ambassador Hamid Baeidi Nejad, welcomed the draft report and promised to work flexibly with the Conference “to finalize and adopt it in a way that is agreeable to all delegations.” He also reiterated some “general principals” that should guide discussions on the draft report—that it should be factual, not open to interpretation, avoid value judgment, simple, readable, non-repetitive, transparent and open, and that it must reflect that no consensus was made over a programme of work. He indicated that the Iranian delegation would like to see some elaboration of member states’ views within the report and said he would present more comments in informal discussions.

Work of the CD
Ms. Skorpen said, “Norway has long called for something like a cultural revolution in the CD. We believe it is a high time for an open and honest debate about working methods, rules of procedures, consensus principle, seating arrangements for that matter, and not least, the workings of the regional groups.” She quoted from a UNIDIR report from 2000 on breaking the deadlock in the CD, the questions and problems from which are still relevant today—such as, is the deadlock “due to structural deficiency in the CD or a reflection of a prevailing international security or insecurity situation?” She also quoted recommendations from the report, such as increasing the flexibility of the CD’s rules of procedure: “The consensus rule is often used to voice descent and opposition. It should be overhauled or at least not used for procedural issues. The group structure is not a mechanism that is conducive to progress or efficient work within the CD; it should therefore be replaced by an issue-based mechanism or like-minded state system.” She also argued that the role of civil society should be expanded as it has been within other policy spheres.

Fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT)
Ms. Skorpen of Norway explained that while her delegation would like “a negotiating mandate that includes both verification and stocks” for any FMCT, it “will settle for what is possible, a decision to start negotiations—the rest we’ll take from there.”

The conflict in Georgia
Ambassador Giorgi Gordiladze of Georgia again accused the Russian Federation of violating international humanitarian law and the law of occupation and argued, “Russia is trying to unilaterally alter the borders of a sovereign state through the use of military force.” Ambassador Valery Loshchinin of the Russian Federation responded by outlining Russia’s stance on the six points of the ceasefire agreement and refuting Georgian claims that Russia used cluster munitions against the civilian population.

Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary General of the CD, reminded delegations that the CD in not the appropriate forum for discussing matters outside of its agenda nor is it for “trading political blows.” He appealed to all delegations to focus on the issues at hand and to take their discussions about other situations elsewhere.

US response to the draft treaty on space weapons—and WILPF’s response to the US analysis
Noting that the draft treaty banning space weapons contained a “research mandate” rather than a negotiating mandate, the US delegation issued some “preliminary conclusions” and comments on the draft.

Use or threat of force
The US paper questions how the draft treaty’s Article II prohibition of placing or stationing weapons in space or using or threatening force against outer space objects is compatible with Article V’s condition that nothing in the treaty will impede the “sovereign right for self-defense.” It suggests one possible reading is that a party could employ force against another country’s space assets if it determines that it’s self-defense depends upon such actions.

WILPF argues that Article V of the draft PPWT simply invokes customary international law. In the UN Charter, Articles 2(4)—refrain from threat or use of force—and 51—right to self-defense—are read alongside of each other in a similar fashion as Articles II and V of the PPWT.

The US paper also asks what constitutes “threat of force”—developing an ASAT capability; destroying one’s own on-orbit satellite; a close fly-by of one’s own or another country’s satellite? It asks, “Does demonstrating a threat require some overt and unambiguous military action?”

While there is no consensus on what constitutes “threat of force” in international law, common sense and legal guidelines should prevail. British lawyer Ian Brownlie describes the “threat of force” as “an express or implied promise by a government of a resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of that government.” This implies threat of direct action, not simply the development of a capacity to threaten.

WILPF argues that determination of “threat of force” is largely circumstantial—did one state conduct close “fly-bys” of the satellite of another state with which it has heightened military and political tensions with? Nor should “threat of force” be confused with “threat”. When one’s capacity exceeds all others’, and when one uses its capacity in demonstrations of overt and unambiguous military actions around the world, the development of further capacity in other realms can constitute nothing but a threat. Furthermore, the development, testing, and deployment of space weapon technologies constitutes a threat to the peaceful use of outer space by creating space debris, threatening the daily operation of civil and commercial space infrastructure, and threatening confidence, trust, and cooperation between states. But this does not necessarily constitute “threat of force”.

Space-based vs. terrestrial-based weapons
The US paper correctly points out that while the draft treaty prohibits the deployment of ASAT systems and space-based missile defense components, it does not prohibit the research, development, production, and terrestrial storage of these weapons. Nor does it prohibit the research, development, production, storage, or deployment of terrestrial-based ASAT weapons or missile defense-related weapons, such as direct-ascent ASAT interceptors, ground-based lasers, and jammers. Therefore, “To the extent that terrestrial-based ASAT’s could be used to substitute for, and perform the functions of, space-based weapons against, for example, space objects, their deployment would undermine the object and purpose of the proposed draft treaty.”

This is one of the problems of the treaty that Reaching Critical Will recognized on 12 February, when Russia’s foreign minister introduced the draft treaty to the CD. We also noted that the draft does not restrict the development, testing, or deployment of missile defense systems or other ground-based anti-satellite systems, only systems placed in orbit or installed on structures or bodies in outer space. It also would not affect the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile interceptors, which could be used to attack space objects, because they travel on a sub-orbital trajectory. While some might travel through space, they never maintain sufficient velocity to achieve orbit, and thus would not be considered “space-based objects”.

Testing
The US paper argues that, through its interpretation of Article II, the draft treaty prohibits “the testing of space-based counter-space capabilities.” However, neither Article II, nor any other article of the draft treaty, actually refers to a prohibition on testing, only deployment. That said, the US paper is correct to note that it “may be possible to interpret the draft Treaty as not prohibiting tests against a country’s own cooperative outer space objects (i.e., targets) employing ground-, sea-, or air-based weapons.”

Under this interpretation, China’s test in January 2007 of an anti-satellite weapon would not be considered a violation of the treaty—nor would the United States’ test of anti-satellite weapon in February 2008, wherein the US military shot down one of it’s own failed satellites carrying a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel (a toxic chemical) with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defense system.

The US paper also notes that “terrestrial-based testing against another country’s space object would also not be prohibited if the test only involved a ‘fly-by,’ with no physical impact ... unless it were construed to be a ‘threat’ of hostile action.”

Referring to the above discussion on what constitutes a “threat of force,” while it seems clear this would unambiguously constitute such a threat of hostile action—especially if employed against a country with which the satellite flier has hostile relations—the US delegation is correct that the non-inclusion of terrestrial-based weapons could allow for such irresponsible interpretations.

Compliance and enforcement mechanism
Article VIII of the draft treaty says states parties will establish an executive organization to consider inquiries about alleged treaty violations; organize and conduct consultations with states parties with the view to settling situations of alleged violations; and “take measures to put an end to the violation of the Treaty by any State Party.”

The US paper argues that while other arms control treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, do have executive organizations, the one proposed in the draft PPWT is, “if taken literally,” unprecedented and unacceptable. The US delegation argued that any such executive organization must be vested in the UN Security Council. It also complained that the types of “steps to put an end to the violation” in Article VIII are not specified or de-limited, leaving it open to interpretation, “potentially in a way contrary to the national security interests of a Party to this Treaty.”

WILPF notes that Article VIII of the draft PPWT says that the “status, specific functions and forms of work of the Executive organization of the Treaty shall be the subject of an additional protocol to the Treaty.” This allows for the separate negotiation of the methods and means of an executive organization. However, this too raises problems: during his response to the draft treaty on 28 February, the representative of the European Union argued, “it is not sufficient to only refer to a possible future additional protocol.” The US paper also notes at the very end that the United States does not support an approach wherein key legally-binding provisions would be determined through subsequent negotiations.

Treaty amendment
The US paper says that Article X’s provision that amendments to the treaty shall be approved by a majority vote, without the right for a state party to block the adoption, is also unacceptable. The US delegation argues, “No sovereign government would agree to a legally-binding instrument in which its national security interests could be jeopardized by a simple majority of subscribing States exercising their amendment rights.”

Verification, transparency, and confidence-building measures
The US paper notes that while the draft treaty does not include “an integral, legally-binding verification regime” it does “provide for the possibility of subsequently negotiating a verification protocol.” It also notes that the draft treaty encourages the negotiation of voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, which the United States supports. However, the US delegation was quick to point out, it does not support such measures that are developed in conjunction with any arms control agreement and that such measures “are not substitute for an effective verification regime.”

US policy and key conclusions
The final page of the US paper emphasizes its rejection of this draft treaty and all others like it. Reiterating official US opposition to arms control “concepts, proposals, and legal regimes” that “seek prohibitions on military or intelligence uses of space; or fail to preserve the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations in space for military, intelligence, civil, or commercial purposes,” the paper stresses that the draft treaty “provides no grounds” for the US to change its position or policies. It once again rejects all attempts to develop “constraints or limitations on space-based systems or activities” and refuses to support the establishment of any ad hoc committee in the CD to negotiate such a treaty.

The US paper also reiterates US policy that it is impossible to develop an effectively verifiable agreement to ban either space-based weapons or terrestrial-based anti-satellite systems. It argues that because the draft treaty only bans the placement of weapons in space, a party could develop a related capability yet still remain within the provisions of the treaty.

WILPF policy and key conclusions
WILPF agrees that any treaty banning the deployment of space-based weapons should also include a ban on research, developing, and testing such weapons and related technologies, including those that are terrestrial-based. However, WILPF also believes that arms control measures such as a treaty preventing the weaponization of outer space will not limit any state’s right to use outer space for peaceful purposes but rather will ensure that such use is possible. WILPF maintains that multilateral, verifiable, non-discriminatory, legally-binding instruments are the key to ensuring international peace and security and thus welcomes the draft treaty by Russia and China. WILPF calls for serious discussion on the draft and/or other draft texts with a view to establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate such a treaty in the CD, or, if the CD continues to flounder, in an alternative forum.

WILPF is co-sponsor of the “PAROS Working Group,” an international consortium of activists working to prevent an arms race in outer space. For this working group, Reaching Critical Will has prepared a number of fact sheets, including:

Next plenary meeting
The next plenary of the CD is scheduled for Tuesday, 9 September at 10am. The CD will conclude the third and final part of its 2008 session on Friday, 12 September.

The ambassador of Venezuela, rotating president of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), opened the plenary meeting with information on the draft report on the third part of the CD’s 2008 session. The ambassador of Pakistan commented on this report and the ambassador of the Republic of Korea delivered a statement on CD/1840, the proposed programme of work and his confidence in the CD. Representatives from Georgia and the Russian Federation gave interventions on the conflict in South Ossetia.

Draft presidential report
Ambassador German Mundarain Hernandez of Venezuela explained the draft “Presidential Report to the Conference on Disarmament on Part III of its 2008 Session” covers the intersessional period between parts II and III of the CD’s 2008 session as well as the first five weeks of part III (up to 20 August). The intersessional period was filled with consultations between then-rotating president Christina Rocca of the United States and Conference members and the first five weeks of part III consisted of informal meetings on all agenda items. On 13 August, the seven coordinators reported to the six rotating presidents on the results from these informal meetings.

Ambassador Hernandez said the draft report notes that CD/1840 continued to generate support among a substantial number of delegations but has not yet achieved consensus. He also confirmed that the draft report “was factual and reflected the work of the Conference during its 2008 session.” Copies of the report were to be distributed to delegations following the meeting. Copies of the report were to be distributed to delegations following the plenary meeting. Reaching Critical Will will post the draft report on our website as soon as we acquire a copy: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/index.html

(Note: The reports on Part I and Part II of the 2008 session are contained in documents CD/1841 and CD/1845, respectively.)

Pakistan’s Ambassador Masood Khan gave a statement “in anticipation of the consultations on the draft report,” in which he emphasized that the report “should reflect diverse viewpoints, including substantive reservations, expressed during plenary meetings; and capture convergences and divergences.” He argued the report should not be interpretative or be used as a tool for discussion on the programme of work or “seek legitimacy for interim, ad hoc measures.” Rather, he argued, for these issues the Conference needs “independent space for conscious, collective decisions.” He also stressed that the report “will be a negotiated document.”

CD/1840 and the work of CD
In his farewell speech, Ambassador Chang Dong-hee of the Republic of Korea reiterated his delegation’s confidence in CD/1840 as a vehicle to fulfill the CD’s mandate and in the CD itself. Outlining the Republic of Korea’s position on the four core issues included in CD/1840, Ambassador Chang noted:

Finally, citing a book by a British civil servant, Ambassador Chang argued the CD has all the characteristics necessary for “diplomacy by conference” except for “elasticity of procedures.” He urged for increased flexibility in discussions, arguing that it could “bring about more significant impact on the viability of future instruments as well as build deeper trust among the Member States than the elastic procedures.”

Conflict in South Ossetia
Declining to “engage in debate regarding the justifications employed by the Russian Federation as grounds for its act of aggression,” Ambassador Giorgi Gordiladze of Georgia gave the CD an “update” on the current situation in Georgia, complaining about Russia’s alleged violations of international humanitarian law and use of cluster munitions and other means of indiscriminate warfare.

In response, Ambassador Valery Loshchinin of the Russian Federation argued that western media and some governments, particularly NATO member states, have confused the truth about the conflict in South Ossetia and are rearming Georgia under the guise of humanitarian aid. He also alleged that the Georgian military has been using indiscriminate weapons and indicated that Russia would release facts and figures within the framework of the Convention on Inhumane Weapons (also known as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).

WILPF calls on both Russia and Georgia to cease any use of cluster munitions and on all states to sign and ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo in December. That both sides of this conflict accuse each other of using cluster munitions, implying they are illegitimate weapons of warfare, demonstrates that these weapons have been stigmatized before the Convention even enters into force.

Next plenary meeting
The next plenary meeting of the CD is scheduled for Tuesday, 2 September at 10am.

At the beginning of the meeting, the president of the CD also welcomed about 25 peace messengers from Nagasaki in the gallery, who brought thousands of petition signatures to the CD calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. He also commended them, and the generations of Japanese who have displayed for years their deep concern about the work of the CD towards nuclear disarmament.

Brief highlights

CD/1840
Ambassador Hernandez of Venezuela, rotating president of the CD, argued, “The commitment to peace, disarmament, human rights to people obliges us to get the Conference out of the stall in which it finds itself.” He described CD/1840 as “a basis for getting out of the stalemate.” In his farewell statement, speaking in his personal capacity, Ambassador Jean- François Dobelle of France said CD/1840 is the closest the CD has come to an object of general agreement. He suggested that if consensus cannot be reached on the four core items on the CD’s agenda, perhaps the consensus rule should be abandoned, or other issues, such as small arms and light weapons, should be addressed instead.

However, Pakistan’s Ambassador Masood Khan explained that for his delegation, six questions about CD/1840 “remain to be answered on the rule of consensus, the quest for a ‘perfect formula,’ compromise, pre-judgment, preconditions, and ripeness.” He suggested the rule of consensus is being given “innovative interpretations” in its application to CD/1840, while in the case of the A5 proposed programme of work in 2003 it was strictly applied. He also argued that while the perfect should not be the enemy of the good, as many delegations have asserted, CD/1840 is just not good enough—it is “riddled with built-in conditionalities, as it moves the goalposts of the CD 180 degrees” by dropping “verification as a goal for an FMT [fissile materials treaty], ad hoc committees as negotiating subsidiary bodies, and balance between the four core issues.” Furthermore, he argued, it is “a lop-sided compromise among broadly likeminded countries,” it prejudges the outcome, and its preconditions are explicit in its formulation. Finally, he argued, the determination of what is ripe for negotiation is “in the eye of the beholder.”

Ambassador Khan explained that his delegation will be able to endorse CD/1840 if it is revised to address the following issues:

New Zealand’s Ambassador Don Mackay responded to Ambassador Khan’s remarks, from the perspective of a country “that is not in possession of nuclear weapons, that has foresworn of ever acquiring nuclear weapons, that is totally committed to the non proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically.” In response to Ambassador Khan’s point about the misuse of consensus, Ambassador Mackay noted that the CD “is probably unique in the level of safeguards built in with regard to the use consensus”—consensus is needed to adopt a programme of work, to agree to an outcome once work has started, and to adopt an instrument as a whole, and then states have the right to decide whether they will become party to the instrument. With four levels of safeguards, Ambassador Mackay suggested “that states should in fact take a flexible approach with regards to first stage of the process, which is actually agreeing on a programme work, because they then have through the application of the consensus rule here and ultimately through the application of state sovereignty they have a lot of safeguards built in that will assure that they will not become party to an outcome that does not meet their national interest.”

In response to the second point, Ambassador Mackay said the programme of work does not need to be perfect, that national positions should be negotiated in the context of the programme of work. He argued “that everyone in this chamber should be willing to put their positions put in the test, to be negotiated, to see how they stack up rather than establish preconditions, predetermined outcomes on issues which are clearly not the subject as overall agreement on this stage.”

He disagreed that CD/1840 is a lopsided compromise, arguing, “A compromise is an outcome that is a fair position that then enables all arguments to put forward the substance, and in our view, this outcome from the presidents currently meets that criteria.” He also disagreed that CD/1840 contains pre-judgments or preconditions, saying, “CD/1840 enables all issues to be discussed but it does not set out in advance what elements have to be obtained in the actual outcomes.” Finally, regarding Ambassador Khan’s point about having negotiations on all four core issues, Ambassador Mackay said his delegation would be happy to start negotiations on any of the four issues but that they cannot all be dealt with equally and equitably at the same time. He argued, “even for large delegations, it is not possible to negotiate everything at the same time. That is certainly true for small delegations, not because of a lack of commitment but simply because of at a practical level, it would not work.” That said, he indicated that the best place to start right now seems to be a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT).

Overall, Ambassador Mackay pointed out that substantively, the delegations of New Zealand and Pakistan want the same thing. But Ambassador Mackay expressed wariness of demanding or setting out the outcome at the beginning. Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares of Brazil also responded to Ambassador Khan’s statement, saying that while the Brazilian delegation agrees negotiations on an FMCT should contain verification provisions, it is not that important for the principle to be included in the mandate, because even if it was, it would not guarantee that it would be included in the final negotiated document.

In response to Ambassador Mackay, Ambassador Khan said that while it was good to hear the New Zealand perspective, it seemed that Ambassador Mackay perhaps did not hear Khan’s full statement.

After listening to the above exchange, Ambassador Wang Qun of China said he would study the elements of the discussion seriously. He said there seems to be a new reality in the CD: the difference of views, over both procedure and substance, on how the Conference should proceed. He called for constructive dialogue rather than criticism.

Final report of the CD
Noting that the Venezuelan presidency is responsible for the CD’s draft report, which will be presented to the UN General Assembly, Ambassador Soares of Brazil curiously said the report should make it clear that the Conference is not ending in an impasse. He argued the report should not be a “static and rigid photograph” of the current state of the CD but should rather contain “stylistic imprints” highlighting the progress made this year that can be carried forward in 2009.

The CD president will present the draft report to the Conference at its next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 26 August.

The conflict in Georgia

Ambassador Valery Loshchinin of the Russian Federation took the floor to comment on the misleading information provided by Western media regarding the current situation in Georgia. He indicated that Georgian troops used cluster munitions against South Ossetian civilians and Russian peacekeepers and emphasized that Georgia “launched the aggression” and was “responsible for the ethnic cleansing.” He acknowledged that “this type of assessment” may not be pleasant for many states to hear, “particularly those who prepared Georgian leadership, who sent weapons there, and who provided assistance to his regime; they tried to present it as a window to democracy in the post-Soviet space.” Ambassador Loshchinin also noted talk of Georgia’s admittance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the idea of which seems to be gaining ground, as NATO has reportedly insisted that Georgia “remains on track to become a member” and agreed to “strengthen relations with Georgia by creating a special consultative body” to “assist Georgia, a valued and long-standing partner of NATO, to assess the damage caused by (Russia’s) military action and help restore critical services.” Ambassador Loshchinin argued this is a dangerous path, that it will not simply be a case of double standards, but a lack of any standards at all. He insisted that what is needed is a legally-binding instrument on the non-use of force, which will “lay the foundations for the restoration of lasting peace in the region.” He called on NATO and the European Union to focus their efforts on that rather than trying to bring Georgia in the political and military fold of their bloc.

The Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland, James C. O’Shea, asked for clarification on Ambassador Loshchinin’s statement that the Georgian military used the multiple launch rocket system “Grad” as a cluster munition. Mr. O’Shea explained, “As far as I am aware, the rockets of the ‘Grad’ system can have a number of different types of warhead, including unitary high explosive warheads, warheads containing submunitions, and others.” He asked Ambassador Loshchinin to clarify whether “it is being alleged that ‘Grad’ rockets equipped with cluster warheads, in other words, warheads containing submunitions, were used by Georgian forces on 8 August.”

In response, Ambassador Loshchinin said the Grad system can be considered a weapon in keeping with the definition of cluster munitions, though there is still no agreed upon definition of cluster munitions. He argued that the important thing is that they were fired on objects and destroyed civilian infrastructure, which is unacceptable.

Ambassador Anton Pinter of Slovakia highlighted the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Slovakia on 14 August related to the situation in Georgia. He reported that Slovakia’s position stems from “respect and support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia in the framework of its internationally recognized borders” and that Slovakia will “support the dispatch of European Union peacekeeping missions in the country.”

Next plenary
The next plenary of the CD is scheduled for 10am on Tuesday, 26 August, when the rotating president will present the draft report on the work of the Conference during 2008.

During the 14 August plenary meeting, the ambassadors of Israel and Italy bid farewell to the Conference, representatives from Georgia and the Russian Federation spoke on the conflict in South Ossetia, and the ambassador of the United States, the current rotating president of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), yielded her chair to the Venezuelan delegation.

Conflict in South Ossetia
The representatives of Georgia and the Russian Federation took the floor to present different versions of the current conflict in South Ossetia, one in which Russia is the aggressor who violated principles of the UN Charter and one in which Georgia attacked the civilians of South Ossetia and its own territory. The Russian ambassador also reported that late on 12 August, French president Nicholas Sarkozy, acting as President of the European Union, helped mediate a cease fire agreement based on six principles:

Bringing the conflict home to the CD, Ambassador Loshchinin said that two days ago during an informal meeting on Item 5 of the CD’s agenda, Transparency and Armaments, the Russian delegation argued that the UN Register of Conventional Weapons shows the preparations of Georgia for military action while data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows increases in Georgia’s military expenditures. The UN Register, as well as the UN Instrument for Reporting Miltiary Expenditures, are excellent tools for increasing transparency of and accountability for militarism that need to be better utilized—see Reaching Critical Will’s Military Spending Toolkit for more information and suggestions for action.

CD/1840
Italy’s Ambassador Lucia Fiori described CD/1840 as a “viable solution to resume substantive work at the Conference,” arguing that it is “realistic and balanced” and is “the result of several years of ‘negotiation on negotiations’.” She also argued that specifically, the formula for negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), which is “without preconditions, demonstrates “the openness of the mandate” to address all delegations’ concerns.

Work of the CD
Israeli Ambassador Itzhak Levanon delivered his final intervention before leaving the Conference on Disarmament and Geneva. Ambassador Levanon said he is grateful to have witnessed “the outstanding efforts exerted towards resuscitation of the negotiation process.” Acknowledging that many are skeptical about progress in the CD, he argued that member states have demonstrated the “potential” of the CD to be an effective international instrument, which is possible if states respect national security interests and “work jointly towards creating conditions that would eventually allow general and complete disarmament.” He then explained that in the Israeli delegation’s view, “there are two fundamental threats to global peace and security that deserve to be placed at a higher priority within the CD—the threat of terrorism in all of its dimensions and the proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destruction.”

Ambassador Christina Rocca of the United States welcomed the recent informal, interactive discussions on all of the CD’s agenda items, but noted with regret “that the enhanced exchange of views afforded by our informal meetings have, so far, failed to reach the third and I believe most important of their aims, to reach consensus on our program of work.” She said this is “all the more perplexing, as our discussions underscored the common understanding of the CD’s purpose, and the importance of substantive work on our four core issues, including the prompt commencement of negotiations on an FMCT.”

A brief editorial
It is perhaps less perplexing to those of us who Italy’s Ambassador Fiori addressed her final words to—those of us who follow the CD from the gallery. She said, “They are a testimony of the outside world waiting for the Conference on Disarmament to live up to its task: a more secure world.” We are waiting for the CD to live up to its responsibility, but unfortunately, we are no longer surprised when it does not. That is not to say we no longer believe in the CD’s potential or possibilities, or we would no longer watch from the gallery. But the threats to peace and security grow while the ways to address these threats—disarmament, diplomacy, dialogue—are undermined by the threats themselves—perpetual militarism, violence, and injustice. We recognize the underlying impediments to progress in the CD and are no longer surprised when, despite near consensus on rather simple proposal, the CD cannot reconvene its work after more than a decade of discussion. The world military-economic order does not work in favour of multilateral diplomacy, disarmament, peace, or justice. Until member states of the CD can break from this framework that shackles their “national security interests” to those of the world powers—whether in concert or opposition to those interests—what can we truly expect from this body?

The rotating Conference on Disarmament (CD) President, Ambassador Christina Rocca of the United States, opened the plenary meeting and invited the representative of Colombia to deliver the only intervention for the meeting.

Ambassador Clemencia Forero Ucros of Colombia reiterated her delegation's support for the proposed programme of work, CD/1840, arguing that it provides continuity for the work of the CD in moving forward—which she described as complicated and difficult but not impossible.

Small arms and landmines
Ambassador Ucros highlighted the Third Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms and Light Weapons held in New York last month, explaining that the final document adopted at that conference is a major step forward in identifying next steps to be taken for the Programme of Action to combat the illicit trade in small arms. She also informed members of the CD of Colombia's new programme to combat antipersonnel mines that will cover 16 provinces in the country.

Informals
In closing the session, Ambassador Rocca, reminded members that informal discussions on Agenda Item 3 (prevention of an arms race in outer space) will convene in the afternoon and informal sessions for Agenda Items 4 (negative security assurances) and 5 (new types of weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons) will be held on Thursday, 7 August.

De-alerting
On 31 July, during an informal debate on Agenda Item 1, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament," the ambassador of Switzerland delivered a statement on behalf of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland on de-alerting. Ambassador Jürg Streuli announced that Malaysia has joined the original five co-sponsors of the resolution "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems," which they introduced to the UN General Assembly in October 2007. He also announced that the co-sponsors plan to table the resolution again at this year's General Assembly and that they look forward "to continuing and deepening our constructive dialogue on this issue in order to build the widest possible support for our pragmatic approach."

The Russian Federation noted that they still have questions related to the substance and procedure of CD 1840, but that they are ready to support it. The Russian delegate welcomed the organizational framework for the third session of 2008, especially the scheduled informal plenary on 5 August on outer space. He also noted that on 6 August, from 10am - 1pm a side event is scheduled to discuss the 12 February draft text on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. He indicated that experts from the Russian Ministry of Defence, Space Agency and Foreign Ministry will be on present for what he hopes will be an "interactive discussion" on the specific points of the 12 February text.

India took the floor to welcome three new Ambassadors to the CD (Strohal of Austria, Hernandez of Venezuela and Soares of Brazil) and to remind the conference that their goals for the CD's work was detailed in the 28 February statement.

China was the third and final delegation to briefly take the floor expressing their wish that the CD will be able to "appropriately address the concerns of all parties and bridge the differences." They also indicated their support and willingness to participate in the schedule of informal discussions as presented in CD/WP.549/Add.2.

Regular Reaching Critical Will reporting on the CD will resume after the next plenary session to be held on Tuesday, 5 August at 10am. In the meantime, George Monbiot provides some food for thought in the Guardian.

Speaking on behalf of the Council of the European Union (EU), Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, addressed the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to encourage CD representatives to "start working". He also outlined the EU's positions on various disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

Value of the CD
Acknowledging that disarmament treaties can and have been negotiated outside the CD, Mr. Solana argued, "these efforts are no substitute for the necessary strengthening of comprehensive international agreements on weapons of mass destruction and other arms," and, "Everyone knows that the CD is the only place to forge a credible plan shared by Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States alike." Emphasizing that there is a new momentum for disarmament within the international community, Mr. Solana argued there is no justification for a "prolonged hibernation in the CD."

Compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Mr. Solana also outlined the EU's positions on the NPT, assuring member states that the EU is "ready to work on all three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy." However, he emphasized that the NPT will only work properly "if we are confident about the compliance by all states with their obligations under the treaty." Without referring to any state by name, he indicated that "serious proliferation cases have arisen in recent years." He did not elaborate on the EU's position regarding these cases, except to say that the EU "has been actively engaged" with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "to ensure full compliance with the NPT."

However, in his analysis of the IAEA Director General's most recent report on the implementation of NPT safeguards and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in Iran, Michael Spies of the Arms Control Reporter argues that determining compliance with the NPT is beyond the IAEA's legal mandate and technical competence:

1. Legal: The IAEA states the purpose of its investigation is to be able to provide assurances regarding Iran's nuclear program. However, as the IAEA continues to certify the lack of diversion of nuclear materials, these assurances seem unconnected to Iran's safeguards obligations or the Additional Protocol. Under the NPT, the IAEA is tasked with ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted to use in weapons. Problematic for cases of suspected compliance, however, the NPT does not provide for any international inspection of possible weaponization activities, some of which need not have any direct nuclear connection (e.g. modification of a missile reentry vehicle). While the satisfactory resolution of these issues may naturally lead to greater international confidence in Iran's nuclear activities, it has not been made clear what would be required of Iran for the IAEA to be able provide such assurances. This could entail conclusion of the investigation, or the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, or something else altogether. Additionally, it is not clear what the legal significance or practical effect of these assurances would be, as Iran is presently in compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations and in light of the fact that the matter of sanctions and negotiations are primarily linked to issue of Iran's uranium enrichment program.

2. Competence: Following from the IAEA's mandate under the NPT and related to its ability to provide assurances, it is unclear to what extent the IAEA has technical expertise to assess weaponization issues. This is highly relevant in the present situation, because the IAEA must draw a very general conclusion on whether or not Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, based on fragments of information. While there seems to be a strong circumstantial case for past Iranian nuclear weapons-related activities—mostly limited to component design studies—as the IAEA notes in paragraph 24 of the report, it has not seen evidence of other activities that would be required for the design and construction of a nuclear weapon. Many of these activities may not involve any direct nexus nuclear materials, and thus fall outside the technical capacity of the Agency. As such, it is unlikely the IAEA would ever be able to provide a truly full picture on weaponization issues. This ultimately poses a problem, as any weight the IAEA gives to circumstantial evidence, without the technical ability to provide a balanced and comprehensive portrait, serves as a cause for heightening international escalation on the Iran issue.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
Highlighting the importance of the PAROS, Mr. Solana said "the time might not be ripe yet politically, to aim for a treaty," such as the one introduced to the CD by the Russian Foreign Minister on 12 February. However, he announced that a Code of Conduct to build transparency and confidence-building in outer space, which the EU has been working on for some time now, will be presented to the CD later this year.

Draft elements of this code can be found in the UN Secretary-General's report on "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities," A/62/114/Add.1. The EU anticipates such a code would "contribute to filling the gaps that are developing in the existing [outer space legal] framework as we expand and diversify our use of outer space, thereby creating greater coherence among existing regulations and practices." The draft elements include general principles, scope, and participation.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Mr. Solana also emphasized that the CTBT, which "was one of the CD's great successes," is fundamental to disarmament and non-proliferation. He called for all relevant states to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay.

Today was the final plenary meeting in the second part of the CD's 2008 session. The third part of the session will be held from 28 July to 12 September. The next plenary meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, 29 July at 10am.

Opening the plenary meeting as the incoming president of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Christina Rocca of the United States outlined her plans for the term of her presidency and expressed support for the proposed programme of work, CD/1840. The ambassadors of Australia and Japan informed the Conference of the the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The ambassadors of Russia and Canada spoke on space security issues, South Africa and Sri Lanka's ambassadors critiqued the impasse in the CD, France's ambassador invited all member states to visit France's military fissile material facilities, and the ambassadors of China and New Zealand offered support for the US plan to revive informal discussions on all agenda items.

CD/1840
Most delegations that spoke offered their support for CD/1840. Explaining that the United States will “continue to focus on CD/1840 as the desired outcome of this year's CD activities,” Ambassador Rocca of the United States said, “CD/1840 is a compromise—and thus by definition, unable to meet anyone's goals perfectly, but well-suited to advance everyone's interests—to get the CD back to work.” Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia said CD/1840 “represents a balanced and well-considered proposal for commencing our work,” arguing that it “does not prejudice any countries' position on any core issue.” Ambassador Sumio Tarui of Japan also described CD/1840 as a “well-balanced compromise” and said that while “discussions in each field should progress independently and on its own merit, and logically it is inappropriate to hold back potential progress in one area just because of slower progress in others,” CD/1840 allows discussions to be held on the other three core agenda items, which his delegation finds enough reason to adopt the programme of work.

Ambassador Valery Loshchinin of Russia explained that while his delegation “would like a stronger, more focused mandate” on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is “prepared, with a view to be as quick as possible in the resumption of the work of the CD, not to oppose” CD/1840. Pointing out that none of the 2008 CD presidents has claimed that CD/1840 is perfect, South Africa's Ambassador Glaudine Mtshali explained, “whilst not perfect, my delegation believes that CD/1840 represents that which is possible and practical under the present circumstances.” New Zealand's Ambassador Don Mackay said CD/1840 is the best basis for advancing work in the CD, noting that while his delegation would like to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament, or any other issue on the agenda, “we acknowledge that it is necessary to start somewhere and ... we do have to begin in our view with one of the core elements.” He also argued it that it is not reasonable to try to start negotiations on more than one issue at a time right now.

Emphasizing that CD/1840 “is definitely a basis for very serious negotiations,” Sri Lanka's Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka outlined “certain underlying structural anomalies or problems of geometry which have to be addressed if this happens to be successful.” He explained, “CD/1840, like its precursor, privileges one agenda item over the others—now there maybe some logic for this, the argument is there is some prospect for negotiation on that agenda item. But that particular item which is elevated over the others involves certain member states more than they do to some others.” With this in mind, Amb. Jayatilleka argued that if these member states “feel that their fundamental national interests are at variance with the spirit of 1840, then is it not simply a question of a handful of holdouts who are to be convinced, but ... their concerns have to be very seriously engaged with. And if it is the perception of these states that is it more than a matter of wants, but the core strategic matters and interests that are at stake, then we maybe have to do better than we have done in getting them on board.”

Work of the CD
Noting that the lack of negotiations in the CD “has been ascribed to a number of things,” including the lack of political will of member states, Ambassador Mtshali of South Africa argued that diplomats at the CD “have an important role to play in recommending courses of action to our principals that may influence or shape the exercise of political will.” She argued, “one cannot claim that the structure of the Conference does not allow negotiations to take place,” for if this were true than it would not have been able to negotiate the treaties it already has. She further argued, “one cannot argue that if the CD's Secretariat had more staff, then negotiations could commence. One cannot say that a lack of funding prevents the CD from negotiating. Neither can one make the case that the Conference's agenda does not allow negotiations to take place,” nor do the Rules of Procedure prohibit negotiations. Looking to the consensus rule, Amb. Mtshali asked, “is it not perhaps the misuse of the consensus rule, rather than the rule itself, that has created the problem?” She argued, “The consensus rule does not apply itself; it is the Members of the CD that choose when and how to apply it. When it is used to block the commencement—not the finalization—of negotiations, one can perhaps understand why some refer to the 'tyranny of consensus.'” Finally, she emphasized, “it is the Member States who decide whether or not to negotiate: not the 'machinery', or the institution.”

With this mind, Amb. Mtshali emphasized, “With a little ingenuity and a lot of flexibility and compromise it should be possible for us to work with—and not against—each other,” as “different priorities need not necessarily be mutually exclusive.” Getting to Yes, a guide to negotiations published by the Harvard Negotiation Project, explains that the underlying problem in negotiations “lies not in conflicting positions but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fears,” and argues, “Reconciling interests rather than compromising between positions” works because behind opposed positions often lie many more shared and compatible interests than conflicting ones. Figuring out and understanding both one's own and others' interests rather than just their positions is thus key to reaching agreement on a programme of work at the CD—once all relevant parties understand everyone's interests, they can, as suggested by Getting to Yes, invent options for mutual gain that they might not have otherwise considered. As Amb. Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka said, it is a matter of “core strategic matters and interests that are at stake,” which means all delegations at the CD need to think creatively in order to find compatible interests lying behind states' positions on CD/1840.

Resuming informal discussions
As an attempt to encourage discussion and hopefully consensus on CD/1840, Ambassador Rocca of the United States outlined her delegation's plan to resume informal discussions on the CD's seven agenda items underneath the coordinators who led discussions on these issues during the first session of 2008. She explained, “The full exchange of views in our renewed informal discussions will help refresh all the issues in members' minds, will help advance consensus on CD/1840, and will help inform our final report.” According to Amb. Rocca, each topic will be allotted a half-day meeting. She anticipates that each delegation will be able to consult their capitals before the discussions and arrange for the presence of experts if so desired.

While not directly referring to the US plan, Amb. Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka said that it might be necessary to look “afresh at other agenda items because it is no secret that for certain states, there is an underlying linkage and there maybe the possibilities of making progress on fissile material if there is progress on some of the other agenda items. Depending on how serious we are, even in this prioritization, how sincere we are, it maybe necessary into to precisely make progress, to revisit and upgrade the status of some of the other agenda items.”

It is unclear if the US plan for reviving informal discussions is intended to “upgrade” some of the other agenda items, but such a consideration might encourage the critical and creative thinking necessary to build consensus for a programme of work. New Zealand's ambassador agreed that anything that “helps refresh all the issues in members mind will actually remind all of us that the issues before us can only be positive. And certainly if it goes further and helps gain consensus on CD/1840 then that too will be invaluable.”

Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
The Russian ambassador offered his support to the president's proposal for holding these informal discussions, arguing that consensus for CD/1840 could be facilitated by “in-depth thematic discussions on all agenda items which were initiated at the winter session.” He expressed conviction that discussions on PAROS, scheduled for 5 August, “will make it possible to continue the discussion [that] began this spring, including the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space, the use of force or the threat of force against space objects PPWT, as well as the problems of transparency and confidence-building measures in space activities.” Lamenting that half a day “is hardly going to be enough to discuss the aspects of the draft treaty including questions from a number of countries so in this connection,” he suggested, together with the Chinese delegation, continuing the discussions on 6 August in an informal open-ended meeting with all interested delegations, “as a matter of side event or bilateral consultations with participating experts from capitals.” New Zealand's ambassador agreed this was a good idea, for any of the agenda items.

Amb. Loshchinin also noted that Russian introduced the Russian/Chinese draft treaty on weapons in space on 17 June to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in Vienna. He explained that most delegations expressed support of the idea of beginning real interaction between the CD and COPUOS on questions related to the draft treaty and reported that the Bureau of COPUOS and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs “are looking at alternatives for joint work in this regard.”

Canada's Ambassador Marius Grinius announced the release of a report on a conference, sponsored by China, Russia, Canada, the Secure World Foundation, and the Simons Foundation, held 31 March to 1 April on “Security in Space: the Next Generation.” He explained that the conference was the latest in a series of conferences held by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on issues related to outer space security, the peaceful uses of outer space, and PAROS. These conferences offer an opportunity for CD member states to convene “with academics, experts, non-government organizations, scientists and the private sector to discuss the challenges in space and to stimulate our thinking on how to address these issues.”

Fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT)
Japan's ambassador emphasized that while some states have expressed differences of opinion over “the modality and scope” of negotiations of an FMCT, “no delegation has expressed opposition to negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” He argued that CD/1840 only outlines “the clear objective of negotiating a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes” and that it “does not in anyway prejudge the outcome of negotiations.”

Amb. Mackay of New Zealand argued it is a mistake to look at an FMCT in isolation, as an FMCT, especially one that is comprehensive, would contribute to nuclear disarmament. He said his delegation would thus like to see verification and existing stocks included in such a treaty, though he does not “expect everyone to agree in advance on the contents of an FMCT ... That is the outcome of the negotiation. It is not something that you determine in the advance of the negotiation.”

Outside initiatives
Ambassador Millar of Australia informed the CD of the Australian prime minister's announcement of the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and of a joint statement released on 12 June 2008 between the prime ministers of Australia and Japan on their renewed determination “to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and to cooperate closely to achieve a successful outcome to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.” The new International Commission, which will include “senior international experts from a range of countries,” is intended to follow up on the work undertaken by the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum. It's findings, which are intended to “enhance global efforts to strengthen the NPT” will be “considered by a major international conference of experts, sponsored by Australia, in late 2009.” Japan's Amb. Tarui explained that Japan and Australia “are bilaterally consulting on the specific terms of cooperation for this commission.”

Amb. Mackay of New Zealand welcomed this new initiative, emphasizing the “pressing need to develop a common approach in the lead up to the Review Conference,” the need for high level cross regional leadership.

Ambassador Jean-François Dobelle of France pointed to the French president's “ambitious disarmament plan” and “unprecedented transparency measures” that France will use “to strengthen confidence”. He argued that the white paper on defense and national security that President Sarkozy presented on 17 June stresses his disarmament plan once again. Amb. Dobelle explained, “At Cherbourg, the President proposed in particular to invite international experts to come and witness the dismantling of our facilities for the production of military fissile material at Pierrlatter and Marcoule.” He renewed this invitation to all CD member states, explaining, “a visit to those facilities will be organized on September 16. All member states of this forum are invited to send a representative. My delegation will be prepared in the coming weeks to provide all the necessary and practical information.”

Amb. Mackay again welcomed this initiative, agreeing that transparency and confidence-building measures are clear themes that came through at the 2008 NPT Preparatory Committee and also in discussions in the CD.

The next plenary meeting of the CD is scheduled for Wednesday, 25 June at 10am, which will feature a statement by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. This will be the last public plenary of the second part of the 2008 session of the CD. The third and final part of the 2008 session will be held from 28 July to 12 September.

At the 17 June Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary meeting, the Swedish ambassador delivered a statement on behalf of Sweden and Finland urging states to endorse the proposed programme of work, CD/1840. The representatives of Cuba and Pakistan outlined their governments' positions on the document, while Canada and Algeria commented on their statements. As the current rotating president of the CD, the UK ambassador closed the meeting by speaking on the work of the CD and welcoming the ambassador of the United States as the next president of the 2008 session.

CD/1840
On behalf of Sweden and Finland, Swedish Ambassador Hans Dahlgren delivered a statement in support of CD/1840. He emphasized the responsibility of member states to “seize opportunities to negotiate treaties that strengthen global security,” arguing that these opportunities do exist. Amb. Dahlgren said CD/1840 would allow the CD to resume substantive work, to “start a process of hard bargaining based on 'give and take' and respect for each others' security perceptions,” which would lead to legally-binding agreements.

Cuba's representative, Mr Abel La Rose Domínguez, said his country would support CD/1840 if consensus was reached on the document. However, he emphasized that nuclear weapon states need to “unambiguously face up” the commitments under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament—and until then, CD member states “cannot continue to delay the adoption of a universal legally binding instrument without conditions which would provide security guarantee for non nuclear weapons states.”

Referring to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's call for “political vision” at the 22 January CD plenary meeting, Pakistan's Ambassador Masood Khan agreed with the Secretary-General's assessment that “Top-level political leadership and cooperation can forge a fresh consensus on future projects.” Amb. Kahn explained that Pakistan's position on a fissile material treaty (FMT)—and thus its position on CD/1840—“has been determined at the highest decision-making level”—the National Command Authority.

Outlining the process the six CD presidents undertook to develop CD/1840, Amb. Kahn argued that despite their claim that the version of CD/1840 presented to the Conference on 26 May “commands almost complete consensus,” nothing actually changed between the version presented to states during informal consultations on 13 March. He emphasized, “No engagement to amend or negotiate the text of the paper has yet taken place. The document remains as it was introduced. Not a single comma has been changed, though several substantive and procedural suggestions were indicated by our delegation and other delegations. Our understanding was it was not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal.” He went on to argue that while the six presidents did make sincere attempts to engage and consult with CD member states' missions in Geneva, and in some instances, even with capitals, “No serious overture has been forthcoming so far to accommodate the known concerns of the paper.”

Amb. Kahn outlined the response officials in Pakistan have given the six presidents:

He also reiterated Pakistan's concerns with CD/1840, including the necessity of including existing stocks; the need for negotiations on all four core issues; and “differentiation between the role of the coordinators to facilitate informal discussions and the function of formal CD subsidiary bodies to conduct negotiations in the context of the programme of work.” Finally, agreeing that the CD should commence work without preconditions, he argued that there currently are preconditions, imposed by other states, that should be dropped: that no negotiations can start if verification is part of the mandate; that negotiations cannot start if ad hoc committees will deal with the four core issues minus FMT; and that negotiations will only take place on FMT, not on the other three issues.

At the close of the plenary meeting, Amb. John Duncan of the United Kingdom argued that 12 rotating presidents of the CD (from this year and last year), from across all regional and political groupings, have noted almost complete agreement on the proposed programme of work, whether L.1 and its supporting documents (2007) or CD/1840 (2008). He said all of these presidents have called on the remaining states to demonstrate flexibility.

Fissile materials vs. the other three core issues
Responding to Amb. Kahn's remarks, Canada's Amb. Marius Grinius said that not all four core issues are ripe for negotiation, especially negative security assurances (NSAs) and nuclear disarmament. He said negotiations on NSAs would require as much background material and in-depth discussion on the subject as has been generated for a fissile materials treaty. He also argued that nuclear disarmament and a new outer space treaty are not ripe for negotiation and called on member states to be realistic about expectations and not to insist on negotiating everything together at once.

Algeria's Amb. Hamza Khelif, also speaking without a prepared statement, responded to Amb. Grinius' comments. He asked if the Canadian ambassador meant that consensus is lacking on the other three core issues or if there are other technical questions that need to be clarified for any of these items. He also questioned Amb. Grinius' comment that lack of consensus on NSAs is reason for it to not be ripe for negotiation, arguing that there is no consensus on any of the core issues, including fissile materials, or else negotiations would have already started on a fissile materials cut-off treaty.

The next plenary meeting of the CD is scheduled for Tuesday, 24 June at 10:00am under the presidency of the United States.

Two speakers delivered statements to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) today. The representative of Ecuador related his country's disarmament record, spoke about CD/1840, and reflected on the challenges to international security. The representative of France spoke about small arms and light weapons.

CD/1840
Emilio Izquierdo Miño, Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Integration of Ecuador, described the proposed programme of work as "a valuable procedural endeavour to address substantive items" and argued, "the approach described in the draft decision is realistic as a means of emerging from the coma in which we find ourselves." Acknowledging that CD/1840 has its weaknesses, Mr. Miño argued this is "inevitable in any consensus process" and explained that flexibility "will be decisive in developing and constructing a programme of work that will enable us to overcome such an unacceptable lack of action that might be regarded as evidence of a deplorable lack of imagination."

How the work of the CD relates to the world
Mr. Miño expressed grave concern with the lack of consensus in the CD, arguing that the "inability to act on disarmament agendas and items and to fulfill them violates the efforts of the international community, which should be a priority with the view to strengthening the machinery that will make possible the human development of less wealthy countries." He argued, "Lack of political will and craven avoidance of international commitment to peace, security, and international development have a fundamental impact on countries like Ecuador, [which are] striving with such sacrifice to overcome social inequality, poverty, and the abusive imbalances imposed by the unjust trade which only favours interests of the most powerful."

Calling on the CD "to display greater responsibility with respect to commitments undertaken since 1979," Mr. Miño explained that the CD "has in the past produced instruments which have proved key to strengthening of international peace and security and peaceful co-existence." Today, Mr. Miño—and citizens around the world, in developed and developing countries—call on CD member states to take responsibility and "speed up the processes to give effect to the ideals of [human]kind, to devote less resources on armaments, and to work to seriously fulfill the Millennium Development Goals."

In 2006, the Millennium Project estimated that meeting all of the targets of the Millennium Development Goals would cost approximately $135 billion. In 2007, global military expenditures reached approximately $1,339 billion. Developing countries suffer the most from the rise in military spending. Nitin Desai, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, and Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, have argued, "Even when there is no active conflict, military spending absorbs resources that could be used to attack poverty." They point out that military spending in the developing world has increased in the past decades and that the percentage of government budgets spent on arms and military forces in the developing world is often higher than the global average. In 2006, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing states amounted to nearly $28.8 billion, comprising 71.5 per cent of all such agreements worldwide. Desai and Dhanapala argue this spending has been both a cause and result of the large number of conflicts in the developing world; that the relationship between poverty and military spending is cyclical and reinforcing. The shortage of funds for economic and social development is a catalyst for conflict and violence within and among states; countries fall into perpetual cycles of conflict, military spending, and poverty that exclude the possibility of political, social, or economic development.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW)
The proliferation of SALW throughout the world is one of the major problems affecting sustainable social, economic, environmental, and political development. The Secretary-General's recent report reviewing progress made on the 12 recommendations contained in his 2002 report on SALW describes the thousands of victims that have resulted from the uncontrolled spread of SALW throughout the world, a well as the destabilization of their communities and the degradation of their resources, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Acknowledging that the CD is not the usual body for discussion of SALW, France's Ambassador Jean-François Dobelle cited this report, arguing that the CD should consider the issue. He then outlined France's participation in various export and arms trade control efforts and explained France's own initiative, which it has presented to a number of fora, to combat unlawful air trafficking of SALW. This initiative aims to: strengthen the exchange of information among states regarding their control mechanisms and to encourage increased cooperation between states; promote partnership with air transport firms "so as to identify the best measures to be adopted bearing in mind the economy of this sector"; and establish a guide for best practices, which will "improve the implementation of the controls required by [states'] national regulations or by international regulations in a more systematic and responsible fashion."

Amb. Dobelle closed his statement by explaining he was not "trying to ask the Conference to deal with a subject already dealt with elsewhere from a different perspective but rather to contribute to this work in awakening our consciousness." The ambassador is correct that SALW are linked to the overarching issues of international security, peace, and development and that the uncontrolled spread of SALW is one of the major challenges facing these issues today. However, he is also correct that SALW are dealt with elsewhere, much more successfully and thoroughly than any issue the CD has dealt with in over a decade. It is notable that the representatives to the CD have so little left to say about the work of the CD itself, as Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands remarked last week, that small arms and cluster munitions, which are being dealt with outside of the CD, create the most interest inside this chamber.

There does seem to be a need for the "awakening of consciousness" of CD member states: to help them find the links between small arms, cluster munitions, poverty, "excessive and obscene" military spending, and the issues the CD has on its agenda and its proposed programme of work, including nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and to help them realize that their perpetual inaction inside this Conference is one more impediment to peace, security, welfare, and justice around the world.

Rotating Conference President Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and invited delegates from the Syrian Arab Republic, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and the Netherlands to present their statements. The Syrian and Korean interventions focused on the proposed programme of work CD/1840, while the Netherlands' representative expressed frustration at the continued stalemate in the CD. The representative from Ireland presented a report from the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, which ended on Friday, 30 May with the adoption of a legally-binding ban on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

CD/1840
Ambassador Dr Faysal Hamoui of Syria praised the draft programme of work CD/1840, stating that the document has many positive elements, such as: keeping the door open for other proposals; implicitly affirming the importance of the four core issues and the linkages between them; and affirming that the work will be without prejudice to future work and negotiations on its agenda items. However, Amb. Hamoui also pointed out some of the document's drawbacks, including its imbalance—it calls for negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) and only calls for discussions on the other three core issues, without stipulating "anything about the aim or outcome of the said discussions." Furthermore, the section on negotiating an FMCT does include reference to stocks or verification.

The Republic of Korea's Ambassador Chang Dong-hee insisted that CD/1840 "contains well crafted elements," including "a solid basis to begin negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and to commence substantive discussions on three other core agenda items." Acknowledging that a few problems have been pointed out by other delegations "with regard to the process and the format of the document as well as its contents," Amb. Chang argued that these difficulties can be overcome. He pointed out that since the text regarding FMCT negotiations does not include any preconditions, the concerns of some delegations can be discussed in a serious manner once negotiations begin.

Work of the CD
Expressing frustration at the continuing stalemate in the CD, Ambassador Johannes Landman of the Netherlands asked what it would mean should a programme of work be adopted tomorrow. He argued that it would mean "nothing more, but also nothing less, than that we are allowing ourselves, at last, some thorough reflection about how for heavens sake, we are going to do this in practice, these negotiations, and these three substantial discussions." He bitterly pointed out, "In the ten weeks that are left [in the 2008 session], and by that alone, we [would] at least take away the stigma, meriting by now the Guinness Book of Records of being the sole global body for disarmament not having been able to produce anything meaningful for twelve years, not even a focused agenda allowing operational reflection on such existential matters as disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation."

He went on to reflect upon the position and role of diplomats, arguing, "diplomats are there to solve problems among themselves and for their governments. We are the chief advisors on the spot. If we are not able to agree to what are just submitted, we are really a poor lot. I myself feel ashamed, and increasingly regret ever to be offered this job, and even worse, to have accepted. If this small decision of us all, that is now imperatively required, can not be taken in the forthcoming days, it will not be taken at all." He then went on to say that without the "minimum performance" of adopting a programme of work, "I won't raise my body and my voice again in this body ... you won't hear from me anymore during the remaining of this year's session in this hall, it would be of no use at all."

Amb. Landman's argument that diplomats should be problem-solvers and advisors supports the view that the CD needs a deeper and freer engagement by representatives to the CD than we have seen in recent years—the majority of diplomats in multilateral disarmament fora seem to act primarily as mouth pieces for government policy rather than advisors to their governments or problem-solvers within the fora. As Reaching Critical Will argued in the 20 May CD Report, inspired by the comments of the Canadian ambassador to the CD, representatives to the CD need to engage in creative, open-minded conversations with each other and with other experts, advisors, and problem-solvers, to explore new options that might satisfy all parties' needs and interests. Rather than simply reiterating government positions, they need to outline their country's interests and collectively brainstorm compromises and strategies that can be transmitted back to their capitals.

We note with interest Amb. Landman's decision to not speak again for the rest of the CD's 2008 session unless a programme of work is adopted and are reminded of creative, nonviolent actions taken around the world in protest of increasing militarization and refusal by governments to listen to the overwhelming majority of their citizens who demand disarmament. On 13 May 2008, two Czech citizens, Jan Tamáš and Jan Bednar of a nonviolent movement against US bases in the Czech Republic, began a hunger strike against the proposed radar base that the United States wants to build on Czech territory as part of its "missile defense" system. They were joined by other strikes around the world, including in the United States. Tamáš and Bednar demanded an open discussion between citizens and the government about the base as well as an end to talks between the Czech and US governments. On 29 May, Tamáš and Bednar were granted a meeting with Czech Foreign Affairs Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, though feedback from that meeting indicated that the government was unwilling to accept any of their requests. They ended their hunger strike at midnight, 3 June, but others from around the world have already pledged to strike in their place.

We can't help but wonder, how many diplomats on hunger strike might it take to see progress in the CD?

Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions
The representative from Ireland, Mr. James O'Shea, provided the CD with general information about the Dublin Diplomatic Conference that took place from 19 to 30 May 2008, where participants negotiated a new instrument of international humanitarian law banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. Quoting UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Mr. O'Shea emphasized that "A broad-based coalition of States, international organisations and civil society has brought about a new international standard that will enhance the protection of civilians, strengthen human rights and improve prospects for development."

111 nations adopted the landmark draft treaty, which prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of cluster munitions. It also requires the destruction of stockpiles within 8 years and the clearance of cluster munition remnants within ten years. Participating nations are expected to sign the pact in Oslo in December.

Mr. O'Shea presented definitions and provisions for destroying stockpiles, clearance, and victim assistance. He also noted that the Convention requires annual reporting by states parties on the implementation of their obligations and that it includes provisions for states parties to cooperate militarily with states not party to the Convention who might use cluster munitions. These latter provisions include an obligation by all states parties "to promote the norms established by the Convention and make its best efforts to discourage States not party to the Convention from using cluster munitions."

Mr. O'Shea highlighted the importance of the Convention as a norm creator—he quoted Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who said, "We have also established a broader norm that those who engage in armed conflict can no longer just walk away from the long term consequences of the munitions they use and leave the burden to local communities, often in the poorest countries on earth, to deal with." From her final report from the Conference, Katherine Harrison, former WILPF disarmament intern, wrote, "Even States who called for broad exceptions or exceptions for their national stockpiles in the beginning of the negotiations agreed to adopt the treaty. The UK, one of the countries most strongly opposed to a complete prohibition, endorsed the Convention, following an unexpected announcement from Gordon Brown that the UK would accept a total ban and destroy its remaining two types of cluster munitions."

The new Convention demonstrates that progress on disarmament is being made outside of the CD. The idea that the CD is the "sole multilateral disarmament body," which Amb. Landman remarked has "been said so often in the past years that it has become almost a religious mantra of faith," is incorrect. While it is the sole body established for this purpose and remains the primary forum, both the Ottawa Convention that banned landmines and now the cluster munitions convention show that the CD is not the only place where multilateral disarmament can take place.

Responding to the concerns raised by Amb. Landman, rotating Conference President Amb. Duncan stated that the success at the Dublin Diplomat Conference "flows directly from dissatisfaction at the existing international architecture for arms control and disarmament's ability to grapple with these issues." Acknowledging Amb. Landman's frustration, Amb. Duncan noted that the six presidents will continue with bilateral consultations "to see what can be achieved in the coming weeks that lie ahead of us."

CD/1840
Pledging his delegation's unequivocal support for CD/1840, Ambassdor Zdzislaw Rapacki of Poland called on all CD member states to show flexibility, as the adoption of the draft decision "will have a tremendous impact" on the global security environment and "bring us closer to a safer world." He argued that the "extensive discussions" conducted during the second session of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee "demonstrate that there is room for maneuver in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation and ultimately, the stalemate in the UN system in this regard can be overcome." Ms. Paterson said CD/1840 "represents the culmination of over two years of discussion, work and refinement" and "commands almost complete consensus" at the CD. She argued that its adoption will not only allow the commencement of negotiations on FMCT but "substantive discussions on three other Agenda Items."

Ambassador Ali Reza Moaiyeri of Iran, however, argued that a "balanced and comprehensive program of work needs to be responsive to those priorities equally and not give weight to one priority at the cost of the others." He stated that his delegation is "ready to work on the four core issues identified earlier by the CD on an equal basis."

Fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT)
Acknowledging that there will be difficulties in negotiating an FMCT, Ms. Paterson emphasized, "The process of negotiations, the starting of which would in no way prejudice the outcome, is the very platform for designing an outcome acceptable to all." However, Amb. Moaiyeri of Iran insisted that delegations need to be clear in their objectives from the outset, arguing, "Lack of clarity is the most dangerous virus in any collective activity." Reminding the Conference that it has already agreed to the Shannon Mandate, which was reaffirmed in the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Amb. Moaiyeri argued, "If we do not resolve the issues now, there would not be any guarantee that in the course of negotiations we would be able to solve them."

Nuclear disarmament
Arguing that nuclear weapons are "as illegal as chemical and biological weapons," Amb. Moaiyeri called for the negotiation of a legally-binding Nuclear Weapons Convention. He said his delegation is concerned "over recent efforts by some Nuclear Weapon states to reinterpret Article VI of the NPT in order to make the obligations therein conditional," adding that the NPT "does not provide the right for [nuclear weapon states] to keep their nuclear arsenals indefinitely" and called on nuclear weapon states to fulfill their obligations under Article VI "without delay and without conditions".

In other matters, Ms. Paterson announced that under the presidency of United Kingdom, formal plenary meetings will convene every Tuesday in the Council Chamber, with the other days committed to intensive consultations.

Presiding over his final session as rotating Conference President, Ambassador Yevhen Bersheda of Ukraine opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary meeting and delivered his closing remarks at the end. The representatives of Germany, Brazil, and Canada delivered states focused mainly on CD/1840, the proposed programme of work. The Syrian delegation delivered a short statement on behalf of the Group of 21 offering condolences to China and to welcome the new ambassadors of Brazil and Chile. China also took the floor to thank the Group of 21 for its condolences.

CD/1840
Ambassador Brasack of Germany marvelled that the P6 have "managed to merge all these views [of CD member states] into a coherent layout for our work." He spoke in support of CD/1840 as an "honest, fair, balanced and comprehensive" document, which "in a realistic sense of compromise leaves [member states] equally unhappy with it." He equated the adoption of CD/1840 to the adoption of a "fundamental decision to get back to work," arguing that it would "testify our commitment to a multilateral treaty system."

While expressing his delegation's support for CD/1840, Ambassador Soares of Brazil noted that it "represents less" than his and other delegations want in terms of negotiations of legally-binding instruments—Brazil and many others would prefer negotiations toward treaties on all items of the agenda. He cautioned that the adoption of CD/1840 "should not preclude other decisions of the Conference" nor should it "be read as a prejudgment of the outcome of discussions and negotiations. Moreover, it should not be considered as closing the possibility of new avenues being opened in the future."

Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT)
Recognizing that some states have valid concerns about starting negotiations on an FMCT without preconditions, Amb. Soares recalled that any state can raise any issue in the course of negotiations, and is equally free to accept or reject proposals from others. He emphasized that his delegation favours an FMCT with "a multilateral verification mechanism and stockpile controls."

A moment of context for the CD
Ambassador Soares of Brazil expressed his concern with the deteriorating international security environment, which has affected "political will as well as economic prospects." He argued, "The lack of progress in nuclear disarmament lies at the basis for the general instability," that while the "growing number of local or regional conflicts may receive more attention in the media ... the ominous amount of lethal potential lies in the nuclear arsenals." Arguing that his country "does not identify itself with the logic of any system which relies upon the accumulation and refining of armament to ensure stability," Amb. Soares said he is "convinced that disarmament cannot be understood apart from the fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter."

Relating the "immobility in disarmament negotiations" to the failure of the multilateral system as a whole, he argued that "as individual states remain aloof or worst, adamantly keep their arsenals and improve their technological weapons capabilities," the complex system of cooperation, flexibility, and compromise that has been built up "since the days of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission" is being undermined and corroded. He called for "multilateral responses within a framework of collective responsibility." In this spirit, he emphasized that despite his government's reservations about CD/1840, it supports the draft decision "as a contribution to consensus building and to the end of the longstanding stalemate the CD is facing."

How to move forward
Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada, expressing his frustration with the lack of movement in the CD, suggested that CD member states engage in

The CD currently has "informal debates" on all CD agenda items, which civil society representatives are not permitted to attend, but Amb. Grinius' comments suggest these "informal" discussions are neither off-the-record nor unofficial. The type of discussion Amb. Grinius is requesting could represent a substantial step forward. The core principles of effective "win-win" negotiation strategies could be much more effectively employed in an unofficial setting. Even though the unofficial discussions would not be negotiations, they could allow for delegates to develop and use negotiating techniques in order to better understand each other, to learn to be more flexible with each other, and to think creatively and cooperatively.

For example, the famous guide to negotiations, Getting to Yes, explains the importance of not bargaining over positions, as positions are not negotiable, but rather focusing on interests, which define the problem. The book argues that shared and compatible interests often lie behind opposed positions, and that successful negotiation requires creative open-mindedness in order to explore or propose new options that might satisfy all parties' needs, based on these shared interests. While nothing in an unofficial discussion would be binding or even necessarily approved by capital, it could provide an excellent space for brainstorming and fresh thinking, which could be transferred back to the Council Chamber and eventually to the negotiating table.

That said, there must be a balance between off-the-record brainstorming sessions and transparency. One of the main impediments to the development of international security and to success in multilateral fora is lack of transparency. In order to build confidence, governments and citizens need to know and understand the policies and activities of our counterparts around the world—we need to have open and frank discussions at all levels among all parties. The spirit of compromise called for by the Brazilian delegation, combined with new creative approaches as called for by the Canadian delegation, is our only hope for progress in the CD, in other disarmament fora, and in increasing true international security.

The next plenary meeting is scheduled for Monday, 26 May at 10:30am, under the presidency of the United Kingdom.

Opening the first plenary meeting of the second session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), rotating CD President Ambassador Yevhen Bersheda of Ukraine expressed sadness at the recent disasters in China and Myanmar, and welcomed the new Ambassador of Chile, Mr. Carlos Portales. Representatives of Chile, the European Union, the East European Group, Morocco, China, Algeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan took the floor to express their sympathy and condolences to the governments and people of Myanmar and China, to welcome the new Ambassador of Chile, and to comment on the presidential draft decision CD/1840 and the work and structure of the Conference. The CD Secretary General, Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, also took the floor to clarify one of the rules of procedure, in response to a comment from Morocco.

CD/1840: Proposed programme of work
In his opening statement, rotating President Yevhen Bersheda reviewed the CD's substantive work from the first session and provided feedback on the intersessional consultations in which he and the other six presidents (P6) had engaged during the last month. Admitting it would be an exaggeration to assume that everything in CD/1840 is "of full satisfaction of all members," he added that the P6 are open to amendments to reach a document satisfactory to everyone and also highlighted that it is the closest the CD has come to reaching consensus. Some delegations have yet to provide their view on the document, as they await directives from their capitals.

The representatives of Algeria, Indonesia, the European Union, and the East European Group stated their support for CD/1840 and called on other states to be flexible and join the spirit of multilateralism. On behalf of the Eastern European Group, Amb. Sergei Aleinik of Belarus said that CD/1840 is the "logical outcome" of first session and that it "defines an area where the positions of all the delegations could come together, providing an acceptable basis for compromise." Indonesia's Amb. Puja remarked that though his delegation would prefer "a comprehensive and balanced program of work," his delegation "is flexible in its approach and open to new initiatives."

Morocco's Amb. Loulichki argued that the formulation and structure of CD/1840 "conceals the desire" of member states for the CD to "get into serious and inclusive negotiations" and it "gives the impression of déjá vu and is limited to a combination of documents from last year, that is, L.1, CPR.5, and CRP.6." This marks the first time in a plenary meeting that a member state has recognized that the text of this "new" presidential draft decision is virtually identical to the one introduced in 2007.

Amb. Loulichki also criticized the document for not including verification in its negotiation mandate for a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) and for giving "differentiated treatment" to an FMCT by calling for negotiations on that issue while merely facilitating discussions on negative security assurances, nuclear disarmament, and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Pakistan's Amb. Kahn agreed with the deficiencies of the document pointed out by Amb. Loulichki and argued that they were constructive and positive. He also welcomed the comments by the President for new amendments to the document, stating that they "will look forward to a new opportunity."

With these criticisms in mind, however, Amb. Loulichki said the Moroccan delegation "could constitute a basis for discussions, inclusive and global consultation taking into consideration the positions of all member states" if it is accompanied by political will and a spirit of flexibility. He did question CD/1840's status, suggesting that as a draft decision it violated rule 18 of the rules of procedure, as it was not a decision adopted by the Conference but rather by the presidents alone. CD Secretary General Sergei Ordzhonikidze explained that CD/1840 is not a decision taken by the Conference but a decision by the Presidents for themselves and presented to the Conference.

Institutional reform
Chile's Amb. Portales called for a review of the CD's structure and "functional terms," arguing that it is "partially obsolete," as it clearly does not facilitate cooperation among its members or help build "an atmosphere of confidence" conducive to adopting a programme of work. He eloquently argued, "One must resolve the substantive contradiction between the privilege implied and the security interest of major powers expressed to the use of the consensus rule in the strict sense of the term, and the requirement in this respect of the international community as a whole." He appealed to the "key actors" to understand that "taking into account the security interest of the international community as a whole will in turn enhance their own security" and called for "imaginative responses in all areas in which reality indicates that we must negotiate."

It is good to see that the new Chilean ambassador has picked up the call of his predecessor, Amb. Martabit, who in his farewell speech to the CD on 11 March 2008 argued that it is necessary to prepare the Conference to respond effectively and efficiently to the challenges it faces and to the changing world in which it must function. He made a number of suggestions that could help overcome the impasse in the CD, including reviewing: the composition of the CD's agenda; the method for adopting decisions; the group systems; the informal mechanisms; requests for expansion of the membership; and appropriate participation of civil society.

Review and reform of the UN's disarmament fora has been on their various agendas for years. The UN Disarmament Commission and the UNGA First Committee have both considered the need and possibility of reform, without taking concrete action. In addition, at the recently concluded second session of its Preparatory Committee, several states parties of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty made suggestions for institutional development of the Treaty. Some delegations argue that these questions detract attention away from the substantive issues at hand; however, the substantive issues are not being addressed efficiently, appropriately, or constructively. Reform of the bodies and structures that consider these issues need to be comprehensively reviewed. At the 2006 UNGA First Committee, Dr. Patricia Lewis, director of UNIDIR, suggested that the impasse in disarmament may partly be due to the machinery itself. Acknowledging that the political climate for disarmament is currently difficult, Dr. Lewis stated, "The machinery that we have created to work for disarmament negotiations should be designed to work in all conditions," arguing disarmament community needs an "all-weather machine" that would allow work to continue even in times of disagreement.

Ambassador Jean- François Dobelle of France addressed the Conference on Disarmament (CD), tabling as an official document the text of a speech given by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on 21 March. The representatives of Canada, Chile on behalf of ten Latin American countries, the Russian Federation, Iran, and China also addressed the CD. At the end of the meeting, rotating President of the CD Ambassador Yevhen Bersheda of Ukraine introduced a presidential report he had prepared.

French nuclear forces
Ambassador Dobelle emphasized some key points from Sarkozy's speech, including his belief "that the fundamental principles of the nuclear deterrence have not changed," and his argument that deterrence "has a strictly defensive purpose and constitutes the Nation's life insurance policy." Dobelle also reiterated Sarkozy's suggestion that France "fully complies with its international commitments, notably the NPT and particularly its article VI." In this context he noted that France had "voluntarily reduced by a third the number of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs]" and that France will reduce its nuclear arsenal to fewer than 300 nuclear warheads, half of its total during the Cold War. Sarkozy's speech indicated these reductions would come from the air-based nuclear forces.

While these reductions and efforts to be transparent are most welcome, it is important to note that France continues to modernize all branches of its nuclear forces. Sarkozy's announcement of cuts to the French nuclear arsenal was made during the unveiling of Le Terrible, the country's newest SSBN. In addition, France also expects to begin taking delivery of a new class of submarine-launched ballistic missiles with new warheads in 2008 for deployment aboard its SSBNs. The French Air Force is expected to take delivery of its first squadron of the new Rafale F3 nuclear fighter-bomber in 2008. The French Navy is expected to take delivery of the carrier-based version of the Rafale F3 in 2009. The planes are to be equipped with a new cruise missile, the ASMP-A, which France expects to deploy aboard its Mirage 2000N fighter-bombers in late 2008. The cruise missiles, equipped with a new warhead, are expected to be deployed on the Rafale F3 around 2010.

Proposed action plan on nuclear disarmament
Ambassador Dobelle also outlined the eight point action plan for nuclear disarmament that President Sarkozy suggested in his speech, which calls on the eight states that have conducted a nuclear weapon test—along with the rest of the international community—to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; dismantle all nuclear testing sites transparently; support the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the CD; establish an immediate moratorium against the production of fissile materials; elaborate transparency measures; negotiate a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles; adhere to and implement all of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; and mobilize on all other fields of disarmament.

These suggested steps are also welcome, especially presented as they were in the framework of the 2010 NPT Review Conference—many of the steps suggested are included in the 13 Practical Steps for the implementation of Article VI adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It is notable that a nuclear weapon state is advocating for nuclear disarmament to be on the agenda for 2010. Unfortunately, this proposal seems inconsistent with Sarkozy's insistence that nuclear weapons are vital for French, European, and NATO security. He emphasized that France's "nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a state," and suggested that a "nuclear warning" could be sent to those states who "miscalculate the delimitation of our vital interests or our determination to safeguard them."

In his statement to the Conference, Mr. Mohammed Tayhi Hosseini of Iran remarked that he is "concerned about the position of some Nuclear Weapon States including France for fabricating every excuse to avoid the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons."

Proposed programme of work
Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada welcomed CD/1840, the Presidential Draft Decision introduced on 13 March, and gave it Canada's "full support." Ambassador Alejandro Rogers of Chile, speaking also on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, and the observer countries Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, said that these governments supported CD/1840 and hope the Conference will adopt a substantive programme of work as soon as possible.

Mr. Victor Vasiliev of the Russian Federation said that while CD/1840 is the logical outcome of the CD's work in recent years, not everything in the proposal is fully acceptable to Russia. He explained that Russia would like to see a more active mandate regarding its priority concerns, such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, because CD/1840 represents a compromise, Mr. Vasiliev indicated that Russia would not reject it. China's Ambassador Wang Qu said he did not think that difference on the programme of work were too daunting, though he expressed dismay with the lack of sincerity and will to overcome these differences and called for fresh perspectives and joint efforts to narrow the differences.

Coordinators reports
Mr. Vasiliev also remarked that member states had not been given the opportunity to study or comment on the proposals for the coordinators reports, and expressed hope that the coordinators would consult with members during the second part of the session. Ambassador Wang agreed with Mr. Vasiliev, arguing that if broader consultations had been conducted on the report on prevention of an arms race in outer space, the report would have been more balanced, objective, and accurate.

Mr. Vasiliev also announced that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research is hosting a conference on outer space security on 31 March–1 April and a conference on international information security on 24–25 April at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

Today was the last plenary in the first part of the 2008 session of the CD. The second part of the session will be held from 12 May to 27 June and the next plenary of the Conference is scheduled for Thursday, 15 May at 10am.

Toward a programme of work
Ambassador Bersheda described CD/1840 as "an attempt to integrate the efforts of each and every CD-member to step up the work of the Conference and gain consensus on the way forward." He said, "It provides a good basis for the continuation of consultations and intensification of our common endeavours towards achieving global security." As explained in the 13 March CD Report, CD/1840 is virtually identical to the 2007 draft decision L.1 and CRP.5, the complementary draft statement reflecting the CD's understanding of the implementation of L.1. Ambassador Bersheda argued that L.1, which is the basis for the 2008 draft decision, has not lost its relevance, explaining that in this year during informal discussions the most active debates have taken place on the four core issues contained within L.1.

He went on to explain his belief that a compromise could more easily be found if informal debates gradually turned into formal negotiations, which could occur if discussions were to focus on interactive exchanges of views and "concrete comments on the items set out in the agenda" rather than declarations of government positions.

Civil society and some delegates have been calling for this approach for some time. Certain delegations have requested, or even spontaneously instigated, interactive debate in the sparse moments sometimes available at the end of "debates" in the UNGA First Committee or at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conferences. During the 2007 First Committee, informal question and answer periods were held after each of the panel presentations given by experts and analysts, providing for some of the most interesting discussions of the conference. Discussing specific items directly, without prepared statements laying out unchanging government positions, could lead to a more positive experience in diplomatic fora—experiences which could be explained to capitals, helping to foster a possibly more dynamic exchange between decision-makers and their diplomatic envoys. More creative interactions could help iron out issues that would undoubtedly come up during negotiations, while increased transparency would help reveal what these problems are and where they lie, giving others the opportunity to help overcome the impasse. However, interactive discussions are not an adequate replacement for a negotiating mandate. After more than a decade of discussion, we know what the issues are—it's time to start solving them.

Response to the proposed programme of work
Some of the delegates commented briefly on CD/1840. China's Ambassador Wang Qun said he is encouraged by the new text, but is aware that some delegates are still concerned about it. He expressed hope that they would "continue to endeavor to resolve and bridge their differences in bringing about the programme of work that is acceptable to all parties through further constructive dialogue and consultation." Ambassador Chang Dong-hee of the Republic of Korea reminded CD delegates "that we have now arrived at an important crossroad and we should choose the right direction. If we take the wrong turn and lose this opportunity it will take again a long time and a lot of efforts to get there on the right track." Mr. Pieter Van Donkersgoed of the Netherlands said his delegation would "actively participate" in continued consultations contained in CD/1840.

Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja of Indonesia spoke cautiously about the draft decision, saying that his delegation appreciates "any endeavor to break the impasse in such a way as to bring the CD back on track," but emphasizing "thorough and prior consultations ... should be conducted as broadly as possible in order to ensure that any proposal is worth further discussion. I believe Mr. President in the strength of intensive consultation that will help strengthen the conducive condition that is being developed this far." He said genuine and constructive dialogue "should become the means through which a transparent approach is applied to our efforts to move this process further along." He also called for "a cohesive process through intensive informal meetings, in a spirit of coordination, understanding, and flexibility."

Mr. Hamza Khelif of Algeria was also cautious in his endorsement of CD/1840, noting that while his delegation believes it "is a significant step forward to document L1," they still have some concerns. He invited Ambassador Bersheda and the other 2008 presidents "to continue their consultations within the framework that you would find appropriate in order to bring positions together and overcome the stalemate that we have been witnessing here."

It is unclear, however, how CD/1840 is a significant improvement or step forward from the 2007 proposed programme of work, as an examination of the documents proves that they are identical in content, though CD/1840 is much more efficiently organized. Despite this, some delegates emphasized the need for continuing dialogue, perhaps indicating that they are hesitant to endorse a proposal that, after a year of consultations, is exactly the same as the previous one.

Civil society and the CD
Ambassador Bersheda concluded with a note about the International Women's Day statement read to the Conference on 11 March. In response to the concerns expressed in that statement, he reminded us, "conducting multilateral negotiations on disarmament is a very complicated and delicate process which does not bring immediate results." He said that CD members "reasonably behave cautiously and make comprehensive analysis of discussed issues," which are complicated because of "geostrategic and internal situation[s] in member states." While the members of civil society who call for progress at the CD appreciate the complexity of international relations, we also understand that "geostrategic" interests—coupled with a lack of respect for multilateral processes and agreements—have led to increased military spending, war and weapons profiteering, inter- and intra-state tensions, and crises of human security and sustainable development.

We have never called for immediate results, but the CD has not adopted a programme of work since 1999 and has not negotiated a treaty since 1996. The issues on the proposed programme of work have been in discussion at the CD for many years. Thus what we call for is sincere, progressive, creative, transparent, democratic engagement in multilateral fora, respect for international law, and the development of an architecture for international relations more conducive to peace, security, and justice.

Rotating President Ahmet Üzümcü opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with no list of speakers, giving his closing remarks to mark the end of his four weeks as Conference President and announcing that a document, a draft decision from the six presidents, was to be distributed during the informal session. Brief interventions were made by the representatives of India and China.

Ambassador Rao of India thanked the coordinators of the CD's agenda items for their reports, which were circulated during the week, but highlighted that the reports were "personal summary and assessments" and cannot be considered an "accurate reflection of all concerns of the delegations given the limitations of the process itself." President Üzümcü confirmed that the reports were not official documents.

China's representative intervened several times during the meeting, asking what "document" President Üzümcü was going to circulate in the informal session. President Üzümcü eventually said it was a draft decision for the Conference's consideration. The plenary meeting then ended and went to informal.

The 2008 draft decision, which is meant to "constitute a programme of work for the current session," is very similar to the 2007 draft decision, L.1, and CRP.5, the complementary draft statement reflecting the CD's understanding of the implementation of L.1. The 2008 decision contains both the operative instructions in L.1 and the reflection of understanding in CRP.5.

The 2008 decision appoints coordinators to lead negotiations or substantive discussions on the four core issues in the CD: Ambassador Tarui (Japan) to preside over negotiations of a fissile material treaty; the Ambassador of Chile to preside over substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war; Ambassador Grinius (Canada) to preside over substantive discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and Ambassador Mbaye (Senegal) to preside over substantive discussions on negative security assurances. The coordinators are to present a report to the CD on their progress before the conclusion of the current session.

In reference to "negotiations of a multilateral and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices," both CRP.5 and the 2008 draft decision stipulate that negotiations shall not have any preconditions, "thus providing all delegations with the opportunity to actively pursue their respective positions and priorities, and to submit proposals on any issue they deem relevant in the course of negotiations."

The 2008 draft decision also requests the coordinators for other items on the CD's agenda previously appointed by the 2008 Presidents on 29 January to continue their work during the current session: Ambassador Draganov (Bulgaria) on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and radiological weapons; Ambassador Jayatilleka (Sri Lanka) on a comprehensive programme of disarmament; and Ambassador Puja (Indonesia) on transparency in armaments.

We hope to hear discussion on this proposed programme of work in the next plenary, though, as it is virtually identical to last year's proposal, it is unclear if progress toward its adoption is anticipated.

During his statement to the CD on 4 March, the Foreign Minister of Slovakia said that the 2007 proposal for a programme of work was organizationally well thought-out and that it puts "existing priorities into a logical sequence." He argued, "It represents a platform that enables everyone to address their own national interests at various stages of negotiations and substantive discussions." However, some delegations objected to the 2007 proposal because the operational paragraph on negotiating a ban on fissile materials did not reference the 1995 Shannon Mandate. Pakistan's Ambassador Khan, for example, has argued that while any issue may of course be raised in negotiations, specific reference to such matters as verification in the negotiation mandate is crucial, as when entering negotiations "one has to be sure what is sacrosanct and what is not."

These positions, of course, are not simply determined by diplomats in the Council Chamber of the Palais. They stem from government policy, influenced by politico-military concerns and posturing such as the US-India deal, tensions in South Asia, US relations with the international community, China's concerns, and hyper-militarism among the major players. All of the these issues demonstrate the capacity for geostrategic concerns to impede progress in multilateral fora, where treaties that could address and help settle some of the imbalances and tensions should be negotiated.

The next plenary meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, 18 March at 10am with incoming President Yevhen Bercheda of Ukraine.

Rotating President Ahmet Üzümcü read the International Women's Day Disarmament Seminar statement and report to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this morning. Ambassador Juan Martabit of Chile delivered his farewell address to the CD and Ambassador Lwin of Mynamar called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. A few other delegates, including those from Syria, Norway, Algeria, and Australia commented on the International Women's Day Seminar and statement. They and the representatives of China and Peru also bid farewell to Ambassador Martabit.

International Women's Day Disarmament Seminar statement and report
The International Women's Day (IWD) statement, which was drafted by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom on behalf of the Geneva NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security and NGO Committee for Disarmament, "highlighted the crises of human security and sustainable development caused by military spending, war and weapon profiteering, and the persistence of ideas and expectations of gender that shape how war, women, and peace are considered." It reported on the IWD Seminar held in the Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations last Thursday, which included over 100 NGO representatives from more than 40 countries. The women called "on governments to abandon narrow concepts of military security and instead focus human and economic resources on addressing the real daily threats to the security of their citizens, such as poverty, hunger, insecurity, HIV and AIDS, climate change, and environmental degradation." They called for a paradigm shift in resource allocation, rejected the idea that the military industry or the arms trade brings jobs, prosperity, or security, and called for the Security Council to act in compliance with Article 26 of the UN Charter by delivering a plan for reducing armaments.

The Seminar "focused on the roles and responsibilities of women, outlined in Security Council Resolution 1325, to participate in conflict prevention, disarmament, and all levels of security decision-making," and emphasized how important it is for women "to contribute their perspectives, help determine the direction of policy options, and have a greater say over budgetary allocations." It revealed the need "to examine the relationship between masculinity and war as much as the relationship between women and peace," arguing that wisdom about gender roles and expectations "will contribute to the peace that can be achieved."

The statement ended with a call to speak with our own voices—voices "which are often suppressed or ignored"—in the CD. President Üzümcü read,

The representatives of Syria, Norway, Algeria, and Australia supported this call. Abdulmaola Al Nuquari of Syria thanked the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security for their contribution, and reiterated his country's position that NGOs should be given the opportunity to address the Conference personally. Norway's Ms. Hilde Skorpen argued that the involvement of civil society is vital to moving forward, pointing out that NGOs have helped in other areas such landmines, small arms and light weapons, and cluster munitions. She said she would like to see the women deliver our own statement in the future. Likewise, Algeria's Mr. Hamza Khelif expressed regret that consensus has allowed the President of the CD to continue delivering the International Women's Day statement on behalf of civil society, arguing that as the nuclear threat endangers the entire international community, the concerted efforts of the entire community is needed to address it. He said he hoped the CD would allow the women's NGOs to take the floor in the future, pending a decision by member states to widen participation in the CD to other NGOs. Mr. Craig Maclachlan of Australia agreed that NGO representatives should be allowed to address the CD themselves and argued that supporting civil society is part of Australia's commitment to disarmament.

Civil society involvement
The exclusion of civil society from the CD is contrary to its welcomed participation in other multilateral disarmament processes. Patrick McCarthy of the Geneva Forum gives the example of NGO involvement in the recent Wellington conference on cluster munitions, where NGO representatives "intervened at will in the discussions and openly criticized certain States for attempting to weaken the Wellington text." They "provided valuable inputs to the debates based on sound research, interpretation of evidence and testimony of victims. In short, civil society was an integral, dynamic and vital element of the Wellington conference that influenced the outcome of the meeting."

While McCarthy explored some possible explanations for this "schizophrenic" behaviour in a subsequent post on Disarmament Insight, overall the question of civil society involvement in the CD appears to be another anachronism in the "'community of practice' to which disarmament diplomats belong" that John Borrie, also writing on Disarmament Insight, referred to in a post about telephones. It is customary for the International Women's Day statement to be read by the (invariably male) rotating president of the CD and not by the women themselves; the custom is simply accepted and those who call for change are ignored. Perhaps this is reflective of the problems of the CD's work more broadly—the Conference might benefit from divesting from custom, trying something new, in order to fulfill the role it was created for.

Revitalizing the CD
In this vein, Ambassador Martabit of Chile argued in his farewell speech that it is necessary to prepare the Conference to respond effectively and efficiently to the challenges it faces and to the changing world in which it must function. He pointed out that the multilateral system is undergoing a process of renewal and innovation and argued that CD members should not just stand aside and and continue to work in a body that is a relic of the past. He said the time has come for reconsidering a variety of issues in order to help overcome the impasse in the CD, including the composition of the CD's agenda; the method for adopting decisions; the group systems; the informal mechanisms; requests for expansion of the membership; and appropriate participation of civil society.

In a 2003 statement to the CD, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued, "Revitalizing the Conference requires, first and foremost, renewed political will and determination among its Member States. It calls for imaginative concepts developed and endorsed at high political levels, with the participation of the main players in the international political arena." In his 2008 address to the CD, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued that the CD "must rekindle the ambition and sense of purpose that produced its past accomplishments." He encouraged high-level participation, saying this "leadership and cooperation can forge a fresh consensus on future projects."

The Secretary-Generals' calls for more and deeper involvement by high-level individuals and Ambassador Martabit's call for a revitalization of the processes and structures of the CD are supplementary and reinforcing. The "imaginative concepts" called for by Annan and the "fresh consensus" called for by Ban require a solid structure based on sound processes, and vice versa. Foremost, revitalization requires a willingness to change, adapt, and try new things.

Nuclear disarmament
Ambassador Lwin of Mynamar emphasized the importance of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, arguing, "Nuclear weapons impinge on the security of all nations." As the Group of 21 did on 26 February and as India's delegate did on 28 February, Ambassador Lwin outlined some measures that states should fulfill in the interim. These steps included legally-binding negative security assurances; strict compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; strengthening nuclear weapon free zones; recognizing and encouraging unilateral nuclear disarmament measures by the nuclear weapon states; de-alerting nuclear weapon systems; and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and doctrines. He argued that the will to fulfill the "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals must be "demonstrated by the full implementation of the '13 practical steps'."

Strengthening the NPT
Mr. Belfrage's statement carried the same urgency present in the statements made in yesterday's plenary by the foreign ministers. He spoke extensively about the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), emphasizing the reciprocal relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation and the need to build upon the fundamental commitments of the Treaty. He argued that the NPT recognizes "that the indefinite possession, or even the presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by any one state would undermine efforts to prevent their proliferation." Pointing to the statement made by the UK Secretary of Defence, Des Browne, on 5 February, Mr. Belfrage argued, "The commitment of all parties to the NPT to 'ease international tension ... in order to faciliate ... the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery' is .... 'not some get out clause for the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States'. It is a fundamental recognition of the relationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the joint commitment and responsibility which follows." He further argued, "Those who choose to see only one side of this balance are in fact challenging the vision of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. Doing so invites a reaction and undue emphasis on the other side of the balance in other quarters ... [leading] to mutually assured paralysis."

According to Mr. Belfrage, the CD "should be the place to to demonstrate one's willingness to avoid such paralysis." The CD provides a forum to build upon the fundamental commitments to the NPT, including those from the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. He suggested that negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), "with appropriate scope and verification measures," would reinvigorate the CD and fulfill one of the NPT commitments, and that it could "be seen as a litmus test of the political will to avoid new global or regional arms races in the nuclear field." He also urged the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle in order to build upon and develop NPT commitments.

Nuclear forces in Europe: undermining the NPT
Speaking about the 350 non-strategic nuclear weapons belonging to the United States estimated to be stored in five European NATO states—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey—Mr. Belfrage argued, "There is no reason to keep these weapons in a Europe less militarized and with less tension than at any time during the past one hundred years." The presence of these arsenals is neither confirmed nor denied by the United States or the host countries, though NATO's Strategic Concept confirms NATO policy to "maintain for the forseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, kept up to date where necessary, at the minimum sufficient level." In 2001, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group met to discuss and review the Strategic Concept and determined, "Nuclear forces are a credible and effective element of the alliance's strategy of preventing war; they are maintaining the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability, under conditions that continue to meet the highest standards of safety and security." The Strategic Concept is up for review again in 2009.

Mr. Belfrage suggested future US-Russian talks and negotiations should include these weapons. He argued that elimination or withdrawal from active duty "of a category of weapons so clearly designed for another age and time, would indeed be a show of statesmanship and leadership." Many critics of the nuclear sharing policy argue it would, more importantly, bring the United States and the five NATO members into compliance with the NPT. Article I of the NPT forbids nuclear weapon states "to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly." Article II forbids non-nuclear weapon states "to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly." While NATO maintains the legality of its policy insofar as the weapons remain under US control, many critics argue that NATO's nuclear sharing policy, and the peacetime planning for the use of weapons by non-nuclear weapon states, is in direct violation of Articles I and II. The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy also says that NATO members argue "that the arrangements predated the NPT and that 'general war' would end the validity of the NPT." However, the Acronym Institute points out,

Furthermore, "In 1985, the NPT Review Conference agreed as part of its Final Document that the Treaty remains in force 'under any circumstances'. Though not made explicit, this language was intended to constrain the NATO nuclear sharing policy."

The Acronym Institute also argues that the nuclear sharing policy undermines implementation of the NPT, pointing out that while "NATO countries claim to support the full implementation of the NPT ... they are often put under pressure by the United States to oppose disarmament proposals endorsed by the majority of non-nuclear nations in multilateral fora such as the NPT and UN First Committee." In addition, the Acronym Institute notes, NATO's nuclear policies have been "an obstacle to improving negative security assurances," which the Group of 21 delivered a statement about today. On behalf of the Group, Ambassador Hamoui of Syria lamented "strategic defense doctrines, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances [and] nuclear deterrence policies."

Several host governments or elements within their governments, along with their citizens, have pushed for removal of these weapons from their territories. On 22 March 2005, the Commission of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Belgian Senate adopted a resolution requesting the Belgian government to broach the possibility of removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. On 21 April 2005, the Belgian Senate unanimously echoed this call. In April 2005, the Liberal Party in Germany proposed a resolution in Parliament asking the government to insist on the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from German territory. The proposal was overwhelming supported by the German public and politicians.

However, in June 2005, NATO Defense Ministers issued a communiqué that effectively rejected these calls, stating, "the nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance," and reaffirming, "the fundamental political purpose of NATO's nuclear forces: to preserve peace and prevent coercion." This communiqué was followed by the adoption of a second resolution in July 2005 by the Belgian Parliament calling for the removal of NATO weapons from Belgium. In Germany, in January 2006, nine parliamentarians from the newly formed party Die Linken introduced a resolution to German parliament calling for the German Air Force to end its NATO commitment to deliver US nuclear weapons in times of war.

In the Netherlands, in February 2001, Dutch parliament held a debate on the Netherlands' role in NATO nuclear sharing. Several Dutch political parties support the unilateral removal of US nuclear weapons from the Netherlands, but two of the three governing parties have argued for negotiated removal, while a slight majority in parliament's Lower Chamber supports increased transparency by NATO. During the debate, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozias van Aartsen argued, "We are part of an alliance which possesses nuclear weapons, this is part of NATO's strategic concept and this therefore means that Holland must play a role in this." He went on to assert that "in all the negotiating fora which we have on this in the coming years, that the aim remains the abolition of nuclear weapons."

In June 2006, Turkish parliament debated the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Turkey after Turkey's former ambassador to the United States, Sukru Elekdag, referenced the Natural Resources Defense Council's US Nuclear Weapons in Europe report. It marked the first time the report was brought up in Turkish parliament. Elekdag argued that nuclear weapons were removed from Greece in 2001 and that Turkey's continued allowance of US nuclear weapons cannot "be easily explained" to its Muslim and Arab neighbors.

In addition, many mayors in these countries—298 in Belgium, 309 in Germany, 259 in Italy, 35 in the Netherlands, and 10 in Turkey—are members of Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision Campaign, championing a call for a worldwide ban of nuclear weapons before 2020 and demonstrating "the growing democratic deficit with regard to NATO nuclear policies."

Conclusion
Mr. Belfrage began his statement by paraphrasing the opening message of the report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission: WMD "are designed to terrify as well as to destroy. They can, in the hands of either states or non-state actors, indiscriminately kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack. The impact on mind, body and environment of such an attack will be long-lasting. They are the most inhumane of all weapons and threaten the very existence of mankind [sic]."

This understanding is at the core of the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons that has persisted since the first nuclear weapons were created, through the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, and today in the words and actions of civil society members and committed diplomats. Mr. Belfrage commended international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for their efforts and ideas, and said they "should continue to play an important and constructive role—in the CD as elsewhere." He paid particular tribute to the participants of the International Women's Day Disarmament Seminar "who will meet in this very hall tomorrow ... to discuss 'Women, War, Weapons, and Conflict Prevention,' and how to fulfill the vision of Security Council resolution 1325." The Seminar includes both an NGO conference on 5 March—an opportunity for activists and advocates to share information in a series of briefings, discussions, and strategizing on gender, security, and preventing conflict—and an opportunity for dialogue among NGOs, governments, and UN officials on 6 March.

Unfortunately, NGO representatives, including the women involved in the International Women's Day Disarmament Seminar, are marginalized in the CD. In a post on Disarmament Insight, Patrick McCarthy of the Geneva Forum notes,

The International Women's Day Disarmament Seminar will vigorously promote a vision of a nuclear free world as contained in the conclusion of Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security, an NGO response to the report of the WMD Commission by the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, Western States Legal Foundation, and Reaching Critical Will of WILPF: "Nuclear disarmament should serve as the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and environmental needs." And it will be promoted, as Mr. Belfrage noted, "in this very hall."

The foreign ministers of the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Romania, Iran, Slovakia, Norway, Turkey, Japan, and the Ukraine, and the vice president of Colombia, addressed the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The participation of high-level representatives demonstrates the international community's continued interest in the CD, though Minister Kubis of Slovakia suggested, “as the impasse over priorities goes on, there may be a noticeable reduction of high-level engagement by governments in the CD.” He indicated that the longer the stalemate continues, public and government interest alike will decline—and with it, “the sense of pressure.”

One theme that resonated throughout most of the statements at this plenary was a sense of pressure. Delegates recognize that action is needed now to overcome the impasse in the CD, and further, to understand and overcome the sources of instability in the world. However, the same divergences in opinion and priority that have caused the stalemate in the CD and that have halted progress in disarmament in general were present in these statements, highlighting the true challenges to disarmament and security—trust and compromise.

Divergence: Threats to security
One particularly large divergence in governmental opinion is what constitutes a threat to security. Some representatives, such as the Mr. Gahr Store, Foreign Minister of Norway, spoke of “the threat of proliferation, and the scenario of nuclear technology and material falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists,” while others indicated that nuclear weapons in any hand are a threat to peace and security. Mr. Mottaki, Foreign Minister of Iran, highlighted unilateralism, the resort to military rather than peaceful means to settle disputes, and military doctrines based on pre-emptive strike as threats to security.

Divergence: Compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation obligations
The foreign ministers' statements also offered widely varying perspectives of the current state of international compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Mr. Verhagen, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, noted the “bold steps” nuclear weapon states have so far taken to “embrace their responsibility” of nuclear disarmament, Mr. Mottaki of Iran argued, “attempts to reinterpret the commitments of nuclear weapon states under the Article VI of the NPT in order to attach conditions in fulfilling those obligations ... deliberately ignore the letter and spirit of Article VI of the treaty.” Mr. Tazhin, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, further lamented the destructive attitude that permeates the NPT and hinders its work, particularly the inequality that “is set in the core” of the NPT, meaning “nuclear powers see no point in observing disarmament obligations.”

Related divergence: Iran's nuclear programme
In terms of nuclear non-proliferation, Iran's alleged nuclear weapon programme is currently the main focus. On 3 March, the UN Security Council voted 14-0 (with one abstention, Indonesia) in favour of Resolution 1803 (2008), a new sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear programme. Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as previously stipulated in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007). The thrust of the resolution is to widen the scope of existing sanctions on imports of materials listed on Nuclear Supplier Group and Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and to add to list of sanctioned individuals and entities. As in past resolutions on Iran's nuclear programme, the Council again declined to make a determination that Iran's efforts constitute a threat to international peace and security, a requisite for the Council to impose either sanctions or authorize military force under Article 39 of the UN Charter. The Associated Press noted that for the first time, the resolution bans trade with Iran in goods which have both civilian and military uses. It also extends the freezing of the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. The Council also decided that if Iran should fail to comply with its decisions, it would adopt additional measures under Article 41 (sanctions).

In the CD, Mr. Verhagen of the Netherlands argued that the statements delivered at the Council session by the five veto-wielding nuclear weapon states and Germany (P5+1) “underlines their sincere intentions to offer everything reasonable to reestablish a respectful relationship between Iran and the international community.” However, as Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa pointed out at the Council session, the sponsors of the resolution persisted with the same text they had tabled before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report was released. He noted that the resolution did not adequately take into account the progress that has been made between Iran and the IAEA, and that the vote on the new resolution was not even postponed until the IAEA Board had a full opportunity to review the report and consider the matter, leaving the impression that the progress made was virtually irrelevant to the co-sponsors.

The IAEA's latest report demonstrated, according to South African Ambassador to the IAEA Abdul Minty, “increasing confidence” that Iran does not intend to use its nuclear programme for military purposes and that Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. In explaining his country's abstention, Ambassador Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia said that “more sanctions are not the best course,” arguing that sanctions “would only give a potential negative impact at a time when progress is being made.” However, the P5+1 argued that recently declassified Western intelligence suggesting Iran conducted high-explosives tests and design work on a missile warhead as part of a covert nuclear arms programme was a serious concern that needed to be addressed by Iran immediately. Mike Veiluva of DisarmamentActivist.org pointed out on 26 February,

This behaviour is not exactly reflective of “sincere intentions to offer everything reasonable to re-establish a respectful relationship between Iran and the international community.” During his statement to the CD plenary, Iran's Mr. Mottaki suggested the P5 are simply “making baseless accusation against others under the pretext of so-called proliferation concerns in order to create smokescreen to cover non-compliance with disarmament obligations and to deceive public opinion.” Overall, the divergence over Iran's nuclear programme and over compliance with the NPT in general demonstrates what Indonesia's Ambassador Marty Natalegawa speculated was the “heart of the matter”: lack of confidence and trust.

Convergence: Disarmament is security
Despite these significant divergences in perspective over threats and non-compliance, most statements in the 4 March plenary reflected the belief that nuclear weapons should be abolished in order to ensure greater security. Mr. Tazhin of Kazakhstan argued that the independent history of his country, which is “inseparably linked with disarmament,” convincingly demonstrates “that it is not the nuclear arsenals, but a peaceful foreign policy, internal stability, sustainable economic and political development that in fact [constitute] the real security.” Mr. Akgünay of Turkey said, “We cannot argue that more arms would bring more security, and there lies the virtue of disarmament,” while Mr. Mottaki of Iran suggested a world free from weapons of mass destruction would better ensure the security, prosperity, and welfare of all nations—it “would be quite different from a world where powers seeking absolute security for them and to that end continue to advance and modernize their nuclear arsenals.” Searching for absolute security through the possession of nuclear weapons “diminishes security, erodes confidence and trust among nations and paves the ground for new arms race and revival of militarism.” Mr. Nakayama, Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, recalled that “disarmament is important to establishing peace,” and argued, “resources can be freed up from spending on armaments and instead be used for economic development, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.”

Visions of a nuclear free world
Many of the ministers, including those from Japan, Kazakhstan, and the Netherlands, called for the United States and Russia to negotiate an extension to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a verification mechanism. Mr. Nakayama of Japan also called for greater transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability of the nuclear weapon states' disarmament measures. Most called for further reductions of nuclear weapon arsenals, reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the establishment of a multilateral, reliable nuclear fuel supply, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and negotiations on a fissile material treaty.

Mr. Mottaki of Iran noted, “Nuclear weapons are as illegal as chemical and biological weapons,” and argued that the illegality of nuclear weapons needs to be recognized through a legally-binding Nuclear Weapon Convention. Many spoke of the value of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ). Mr. Tazhin of Kazakhstan said the creation of a NWFZ in Central Asia “is a significant contribution to stability and security” in the region, and “refers to potential strength of the NPT as well.” Mr. Mottaki of Iran argued a NWFZ in the Middle East “would promote the economic and social life of the people in this region through contributing to strengthening confidence in the region.”

Others still discussed the need for a new and/or strengthened missile control regime. The ministers of the Netherlands and Turkey, for instance, advocated renewed national commitment to implementing the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) as a confidence-building and transparency-enhancing measure. Mr. Verhagen of the Netherlands said he would write a letter to the foreign ministers of the HCOC's other 127 signatories to renew their commitments. Mr. Verhagen indicated he looked forward to discussing the potential multilateralization of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as suggested by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the CD on 12 February.

Oslo conference
During Norwegian Foreign Minister Gahr Store's report on last week’s Oslo conference that convened to discuss “concrete steps” toward a world free of nuclear weapons, he indicated five key principles and ten policy recommendations that emerged from these discussions. The five principles include committed leadership, concrete and implementable steps, shared responsibility, non-discrimination, and transparency. The ten recommendations include many elements discussed by the other ministers, but also suggest that “non-nuclear weapon states should co-operate with nuclear weapon states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament,” and that governments should convene “a broadly-based high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to advise governments on the core requirements for abolishing nuclear weapons.” Most of these points, along with the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, did not originate with the Oslo conference, but have been persistently discussed, analyzed, and suggested by those who work and act for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Hopefully, the focus on nuclear disarmament can be sustained so that it does not, as Mr. Gahr Store described, glide “down the scale of international attention and resolve” once again.

Outer space
The ministers of Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Romania, and the Ukraine welcomed the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space submitted to the CD by Russia and China on 12 February. Mr. Khandogiy of Ukraine suggested that substantial discussion on outer space in the CD should focus on providing greater transparency of space programmes; expanding the scope of information about space objects in orbit; and developing rules of behaviour while performing activities in space, including establishing a Code of Conduct. Mr. Verhagen of the Netherlands said the European Union is currently in the process of drafting a “code of conduct, or a set of best practices.”

Cluster munitions
The ministers of the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, and Turkey discussed cluster munitions. Norway's minister explained the rationale behind the Oslo Process on cluster munitions is to develop a legally-binding instrument “to take the humanitarian consequences as a starting point, and address the need to prevent new victims and to provide assistance for victims of cluster munitions and their communities.” He argued, “A ban on cluster munitions ... is about fulfilling our humanitarian obligation to put a stop to the use of a weapon that severely harms civilians and impedes development.” The minister of Slovakia said his government is “working diligently within CCW and Oslo processes on the new norm prohibiting” cluster munitions. He argued the instrument (or instruments) would have to “achieve a balance between legitimate defense needs and humanitarian concerns,” and “has to set the conditions for main users and producers of this weapon system, as well as important donors, to come on board.”

On the final day of the Wellington conference, the latest stage of the Oslo Process, 72 countries endorsed the Wellington Declaration, the “ticket” to participate in the negotiation of an international treaty on cluster munitions in Dublin in May. Katherine Harrison of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom noted,

Arms trade
The ministers of Turkey and the Ukraine indicated their support for the development of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Ukraine's Mr. Khandogiy said his country “welcomes establishing common standards in the international arms trade sphere.” Turkey's Mr. Akgünay said his country supports the ATT because it is “[c]ognizant of the damage small arms inflict on peace and security worldwide.” He also mentioned his country's support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which he described as a “useful mechanism.” The Register is a database to which UN member states submit information on international arms transfers, procurement through national production, holdings, and relevant policies. 172 states have participated in the Register since it was established in 1991. However, the Register does not have an agreed-upon definition of the term transfer, leading to discrepancies in reports. In addition, participation in the Register is voluntary. Three of the top 15 military spenders for 2006—India, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea—have never submitted a report to the Register. In order to use this tool to its maximum potential, more governments need to participate more consistently with the Register and clarify the definition of transfer. Increased transparency on the import and export of arms would provide insight as to whether and/or how such transfers adversely affect international security and give the whole world an indication of who has what—and what they might use it for.

Conclusion
Mr. Kubis of Slovakia concluded his statement by saying, “Slovakia is fully determined to support all initiatives that [aim] at improving the global security environment in the most expeditious and realistic way in the present world full of uncertainties and mistrust.” This conclusion highlights the key problem facing the international community today, which resounded throughout the statements of this plenary—the lack of trust and transparency which impedes people's willingness and ability to compromise. Everyone involved in this work is a human being, subject to suspicions and fears, misunderstandings and miscommunication. There are tools to help us work through our suspicions, however, that enable us to understand the other and figure out how to meet them halfway for the benefit of all. Tools like the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures should be used to increase transparency and build trust; fora like the UNGA First Committee and the UN Disarmament Commission should be used to build understanding and consensus on the most critical questions of security and disarmament; and conferences like the one in Oslo and events hosted by many non-government organizations throughout the year should be used to discuss and analyze issues, perspectives, and strategies with diplomats and members of civil society.

Ultimately, of course, we come back to the CD, “the multilateral forum of choice, where the international community negotiates the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation.” All of the ministers and civil society observers hope that the CD once again fulfils its “primary role.” Soon.

While pointing to the importance of bilateral agreements (such as the nuclear cooperation agreement signed recently between the presidents of Argentina and Brazil) and regional agreements (such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco), Mr. Taiana emphasized they could not replace multilateral agreements for nuclear disarmament, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He argued that states' obligations under the NPT cannot be reinterpreted based on "current situations," as they are always, by definition, in flux. He also argued that select states cannot demand non-proliferation while they continue developing more sophisticated weapons. He called for political support at the highest levels for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Welcoming the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space submitted to the CD by Russia and China, Mr. Taiana suggested it could be fruitful to establish an ad hoc committee on the issue to explore it further. However, he emphasized that he does not wish to see the work of the Conference held up any longer. He urged the CD to commence negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty, regardless of whether the other items were ready to move forward simultaneously. While acknowledging that some states have concerns, he argued that now is the time to negotiate, not to negotiate about negotiating, as the CD has already taken ten years to do that. He lamented that the CD has been unable to negotiate legally-binding agreements on disarmament, the specific task that gives its reason for existence, in all that time.

Mr. Taiana noted the impending tenth anniversary of the Ottawa Convention, an instrument negotiated outside the framework of the United Nations. This reminds us of the possibility of moving negotiations outside of the CD in light of continued difficulties in adopting a programme of work. In 2005, six delegations in the UNGA First Committee—Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden—introduced a non-paper, with an explanatory note, "Draft Elements of an UNGA60 First Committee Resolution: Initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues." The non-paper outlined elements of a draft resolution that would establish four open-ended ad hoc committees on the CD's four priority issues. The draft elements of the resolution stipulated that as soon as the CD adopted a programme of work, the committees would stop meeting and report their results to the CD. The six delegations ultimately decided not to table their resolution, largely due to pressure from the US delegation, which circulated a memo to member states' capitals calling the draft resolution a "divisive proposal" that would "likely spell the end of the CD."

Ambassador Paul Meyer, Canada's former ambassador to the CD, often argued, "the international community should not allow issues of form or fora get in the way of coming to grips with the substance of the fissban." In an article in Arms Control Today, he suggested negotiations could be initiated under the auspices of other multilateral fora outside of the CD, such as the NPT or the International Atomic Energy Agency, or an open-ended working group of the UN General Assembly. Each of these options poses its own challenges—some exclude those who oppose the currently proposed negotiating mandate for the FMCT, others limit the process to a select number of states with advanced nuclear programmes. None of these options provide for creating the conditions necessary for successful, non-discriminatory, inclusive negotiation of an FMCT. Their undertaking could, however, demonstrate the political initiative that appears to be lacking in recent years and encourage additional proposals and ideas. As Ambassador Meyer said in his farewell address to the Conference last August, "If States are serious about accomplishing something in the field of multilateral arms control, they will find the appropriate diplomatic vehicle for doing so."

The next plenary of the Conference is scheduled for Tuesday, 4 March at 10am, when the Foreign Ministers of the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Romania, Iran, Slovakia, and Norway, and the Vice President of Colombia, are scheduled to speak.

Rotating President of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Üzümcü of Turkey, opened the session. He was followed by interventions from the representatives of Syria on behalf of the Group of 21, India, and Slovenia on behalf of the European Union. All three of their statements made reference to the topic of prevention of arms race in outer space and welcomed the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by the Russian Foreign Minister to the CD earlier this month. Ambassador Rao of India also spoke on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and fissile materials.

Outer space
Speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, Syria’s Ambassador Faysal Khabbaz Hamoui raised concerns over the inadequate existing legal instruments “to deter further militarization of outer space or prevent its weaponization” and emphasized the necessity of further measures that effectively provide for verification. He further lamented the development of missile defense systems and other “advanced military technologies ... which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security.”

Ambassador Hamoui argued, “it is time to start negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on matters related to the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space,” and referred to UNGA Resolution 62/20, which recommends the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD in 2008. India’s Ambassador Rao echoed this call, stating that as a country ranked “among the advanced space-faring nations in the world,” India is “deeply conscious of the need to strengthen the present international legal framework.”

While Ambassador Hamoui said the draft treaty submitted by Russia and China “is a good basis for further discussion toward adopting an international binding instrument,” Mr. Jerman of Slovenia, on behalf of the European Union, said work is needed to achieve consensus on definitions and an “effective and robust verification system.” He argued, “it is not sufficient to only refer to a possible future additional protocol.” In the meantime, Mr. Jerman said, the EU “wishes to focus on a pragmatic and incremental approach,” through transparency and confidence-building measures. The EU plans to present these measures to the CD for discussion. They will presumably be based on the concrete proposals that the EU submitted to the Secretary-General, which were included in his report of 17 September 2007.

Nuclear disarmament
Ambassador Rao outlined India’s contributions to the promotion of nuclear disarmament within the CD and concrete steps to disarmament, much as the Group of 21 did on 26 February. He pointed to the “holistic framework seeking negotiations for a time bound commitment for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons to usher in a world free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence” submitted by India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi to the Special Session on Disarmament in 1988. This action plan called for a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in stages within a specific time frame; the participation of all states in the process of nuclear disarmament; and the demonstration of tangible progress at each stage.

Missiles
Ambassador Rao also called for “an inclusive process based on the principle equal and legitimate security” to govern the possession and use of missiles. He argued the lack of legal regime on missiles “arises mainly due to the untenable claims made by some states for the exclusive rights for the possession of advanced weapon systems and their continued modernization.” He expressed hope that the panel of government experts currently meeting at the UNGA on missiles in all their aspects will initiate a “multilateral, universal and non-discriminatory approach to missiles.”

India has produced two classes of nuclear capable, land-based ballistic missile designs, the Agni and the Prithvi, which have been inducted into the Army and the Air Force. The Navy has sea-based surface-launched ballistic missiles, which may soon be deployed on its warships, and tested a nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile a few days ago. India is jointly developing a cruise missile with Russia, called BrahMos, which was brought into service by the Indian Navy in 2006. India is also developing an intercontinental ballistic missile named Surya, based on its polar space launch vehicle.

Work of the Conference
Ambassador Rao concluded his statement by quoting a former Indian ambassador to the CD, who said

This perspective was upheld by the Indian delegation’s position on a fissile materials cut-off treaty, about which Ambassador Rao said, “It is obvious that the Treaty would have to meet India’s national security interests.”

Though many delegations might agree with this assessment of the CD’s purpose and nature, it actually undermines the potential of the CD—and the vision of a nuclear weapon free, nonviolent world presented by India’s former Prime Minister—in several significant ways. First of all, it suggests that the governments of 65 states have the exclusive right to determine what is relevant—and when it is relevant—not just for international security but primarily for those states’ national security priorities, for national security is placed above international security in this formulation. It ignores human security altogether, emphasizing the concerns of government—the elites, whose interests generally lie with preserving the status quo and pursuing a position of influence in the heavily militarized structure of international relations—over those of its citizens, who instead call for money not to be spent on the military-industrial complex but rather on education, health, housing, social programmes, gender equality, sustainable energy, and ecological preservation.

Benin’s representative to the UNGA First Committee recognized that the perspective of the CD presented by India’s delegation is no longer appropriate, when in 2007 he suggested delegates should strive to set aside their national priorities when they enter deliberative or negotiating fora, to come as agents of change whose job it is to find solutions to the problems of humankind.

Other Conference matters
President Üzümcü announced a series of high level sessions next week. On Monday at 4pm, the Foreign Minister of Argentina will address the CD. On Tuesday at 10am, the Conference will hear from dignitaries from Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Romania, Iran, Slovakia, Colombia, and Norway. The second session on Tuesday will begin at 3pm with addresses from dignitaries from Turkey, Japan, Ukraine, and the Republic of Korea. The Conference will also convene on Wednesday to hear from the Swedish State Secretary.

Ambassador Hamoui emphasized the importance of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and of the resolutions, declarations, and International Court of Justice opinion that reaffirm this goal. He outlined the Group of 21's past contributions to deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the CD, including several working papers, draft mandates for ad hoc committees, and proposals for a programme of work, and suggested "concrete steps to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament." These steps included reaffirming commitments to disarmament; eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; de-alerting nuclear weapon systems; negotation of legally-binding instrument on negative security assurances; negotiation of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons; and negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention leading to complete, non-discriminatory, verifiable nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework.

Ambassador Puja echoed many of these sentiments, emphasizing, "Nuclear disarmament is not an option, it is an obligation." He suggested the Conference revisit some of the Group of 21's working papers, arguing that most of them are still relevant today. Responding to an oft-repeated argument of the US delegation in disarmament fora, that before nuclear weapons can be eliminated, a "new security environment" is necessary, Ambassador Puja argued, "We agree that we need to create an environment conducive for nuclear disarmament. However, we also believe that the international security environment and the nuclear disarmament efforts should reinforce each other. Nuclear disarmament will in fact greatly contribute to international security."

This debate is not new; it came up most recently during the 2007 UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, where Jeffrey Eberhardt of the US State Department asked how the international community can achieve a global security environment that allows for nuclear disarmament, an environment that does not "require" reliance on nuclear weapons. Many delegations to the First Committee asserted that the first step to increasing international security is abolishing nuclear weapons. These debates generally end in stalemate, with few new ideas presented to overcome the impasse. While many delegations have outlined steps to disarmament, as Ambassador Hamoui did today, they generally do not address the question of creating conditions necessary to undertake these steps. However, the US approach, which is to dismiss "laundry lists of traditional arms control steps" in favour of emphasizing "the practical challenges of making nuclear disarmament the most stabilizing, deliberate policy choice," normalizes the existence and concept of nuclear weapons—it suggests that disarmament is an option, that nuclear weapons fill a legitimate role in maintaining security that can only be eliminated when the nuclear weapon possessor is convinced the status quo—primarily, their military dominance—can be assured through other means.

When Des Browne, UK Secretary of State for Defence, addressed the CD on 5 February, he announced that the United Kingdom is willing to host a technical conference for the five NPT nuclear weapon states on the verification of nuclear disarmament. He expressed hope that "such a conference will enable the five ... to reinforce a process of mutual confidence building: working together to solve some of these difficult technical issues." He emphasized that any plan for disarmament has to be transparent, sustainable, credible, and multilateral—"shared by Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States alike." Des Browne was quick to point out that the United Kingdom "certainly does not have a monopoly on good ideas—others have put equally good proposals on the table," and he encouraged other delegations to suggest further initiatives.

As a backdrop to good ideas, however, threats to the international security environment and disarmament continued last week, with the US military shooting down its failed spy satellite with a Standard Missile-3, a component of its controversial missile defense system. A missile designed to intercept ballistic missiles was reconfigured—relatively quickly—to destroy a satellite that arguably posed little danger to humans on Earth. Many critics argued that the maneuver was a test of the US missile defense system and a demonstration of the US military's space weapon capabilities. In the Washington Post, Josh White and Marc Kaufman wrote that while General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, denied these charges, "the operation makes it clear that the missile defense system can be modified very quickly to accomplish such a task." They argued, "Scientists, arms-control advocates and others said the shoot-down was based on questionable modeling by the government of the risks to human health and was a danger to the future peaceful use of space." No one in the CD has yet mentioned this anti-satellite demonstration or its implications for space security or the future of the draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space introduced on 12 February.

In other matters, President Üzümcü announced the high level attendance expected at the CD next week. He said one Vice President, seven Foreign Ministers, four Deputy Foreign Ministers, and a State Secretary of Foreign Affairs will address the Conference. The confirmed list of dignitaries will be circulated in Thursday's session. He also announced that there will be two meetings next week on Tuesday and probably one on Wednesday morning.

Incoming rotating President Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD) session and gave a general outline of the schedule of activities for the Conference during Turkey’s term. Germany’s delegate was the only representative to deliver a statement during the session; he spoke about the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by the Russian Foreign Minister last week.

Ambassador Üzümcü welcomed the second round of informal discussions on the CD’s agenda items, scheduled to begin today under in the organizational framework introduced during Ambassador Labidi’s presidency. He intends to devote the final week of his term to an evaluation of progress by the agenda item coordinators. He also explained that he plans to “pursue intensive consultations” toward “the possibility of a consensus building on the Presidential Proposal crafted by last year’s Presidents.” Ambassador Üzümcü also mentioned that the Human Rights Council will hold its high-level segment in Geneva during the first week of March, during which time he would like senior political figures, who will already be in the city, to address the CD.

Ambassador Bernhard Brasack of Germany welcomed the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by Russia’s Foreign Minister. He argued, “Clear delimitations between purely peaceful uses and distinct military uses have become a meaningless fiction. Just as an example: Space tracking and surveillance capabilities for monitoring debris, following satellites for avoiding potential collisions, inherently also have a potential for offensive space applications.” With this in mind, Ambassador Brasack suggested elaboration through discussion on three issues “not yet sufficiently covered by the draft”: the relationship between a potential new instrument and the existing ones, particularly the Outer Space Treaty; the dangers posed by the development and testing of anti-satellite weapons; and compliance and verification mechanisms. He also remarked, however, that “meaningful discussions” in the CD on space security issues “will only be possible if the CD agrees to a Programme of Work.”

Although little has been said in the formal sessions of the CD on the draft treaty submitted by Russia, discussions on agenda item three, prevention of an arms race in outer space, will be held during the informal session on Thursday.

The upcoming US anti-satellite maneuver
Delegates to the CD have also not yet mentioned the US announcement to disable a failed satellite carrying a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel (a toxic chemical) by shooting it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defense system. This incident highlights one of the deficiencies of the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China, which does not address attacks from ground- or sea-based interceptors such as the SM-3. It has also evoked criticism from many space security experts, who have vocalized two primary concerns.

One concern is the debris. While Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said most of the debris will come down within two orbits, Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation said, “modeling of debris creation isn’t an exact science,” arguing, “the debris that the light-weight interceptor will kick into higher orbits when it hits the massive (bus-sized) satellite” will remain in orbit, posing a risk to the International Space Station.

The second, but no lesser, concern is the political implications of conducting what amounts to an anti-satellite test. The US administration has argued the test is not the same as the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007, which it condemned. The US government says the Chinese test was “designed specifically” to test the ability to destroy satellites, and argues that its own plan is only aimed at protecting civilians on the ground. However, the Russian Defence Ministry asserted the US plan is “in many ways close” to China’s test, arguing, “The impression arises that the United States is trying to use the accident with its satellite to test its national anti-missile defence system as a means of destroying satellites.” Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, likewise argued, “The Bush administration is magnifying the risk to justify the testing of new dangerous and provocative offensive space warfare technologies.” Jeffrey Lewis also argued that the “deck is stacked” in favour of shooting down the satellite, pointing out the administration’s worst case scenario for intercepting the satellite is that they miss, “not that they are wrong about the debris estimates or how much debris would reenter with a successful intercept,” while they have considered the worst case for the tank of hydrazine coming down into a populated area from which people cannot evacuate.

For a government that pours millions of dollars into its potential dual-use missile defense and space technology each year and is openly hostile toward a ban on attacks against space objects and on weapons in space, the decision to use some of that equipment, on grounds which have been described by most experts as ill-considered at best, gives the impression that the US military is just looking for an excuse to test its offensive space capabilities and demonstrate its military dominance.

Informal discussion on nuclear disarmament
During informal discussions today on nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren of Sweden delivered a statement on behalf of Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland on de-alerting nuclear weapon systems. During the 2007 General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, these five states introduced a draft resolution called “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems,” inspired by the recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. The resolution was adopted by the First Committee (124-3-34) and the General Assembly (139-3-36), with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States voting against it each time. Ambassador Dahlgren emphasized that de-alerting is was one of the thirteen practical steps agreed to at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, that it would signal the nuclear weapon states take their obligations seriously in the lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, that it “can be achieved easily,” and that it “brings us further on the path to reducing nuclear dangers.”

Ambassador Dahlgren indicated that his group has carefully considered the views of those states who were not ready to support the initiative last year. He said they are looking forward to constructive dialogue on the issue, but “would prefer not to repeat a debate on terminology.” He explained, “What we ask for is a change of deployment practices. With a view to today’s security policy threats, we would see a significant increase in security and confidence if none of the States possessing nuclear weapons would have the capacities or policies to launch its missiles within a few minutes.”

Cluster munitions
The plenary was less-attended than usual, as many CD delegates are currently in Wellington, New Zealand for the latest preparatory conference of the Oslo Process, an international initiative to ban cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, to assist survivors and affected communities, and to ensure clearance of their land. More than 150 representatives from 50 countries are there along with over 100 non-governmental organization representatives from 42 countries. The conference will result in a draft treaty text that states will agree to negotiate in Dublin, Ireland during the next stage of the Process from 19–30 May 2008. See the Cluster Munitions Coalition, www.stopclustermunitions.org, for more information. The issue of a ban on cluster munitions was taken out of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in early 2007 when it became clear that progress on the issue would be painstakingly slow.

On Wednesday, informal sessions will focus on agenda items one and two, and Thursday’s informal session will focus on agenda items three and four. There will be no formal sessions on Thursday.

Outgoing President Samir Labidi opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD), bidding farewell to Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil and Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch of Austria. Members of the Conference also heard statements from representatives of Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Sri Lanka (speaking on behalf of the Group of 21), Syria, the Russian Federation, China, Morocco, Italy, Pakistan, and Algeria.

Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov announced that on 13 February, the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria imposed a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Bulgarian Armed Forces, pending the advent of an international treaty banning such weapons, and called on other CD members to follow suit. The timing of such a decision is impeccable, with the Wellington Cluster Munitions Conference, the next stage of the Oslo Process, beginning Monday. However, according to Human Rights Watch and the Cluster Munitions Coalition, Bulgaria also produces cluster munitions, yet this moratorium appears to only be on the use of the weapons. Ambassador Faysal Khabbaz Hamoui of Syria welcomed Bulgaria's moratorium, and said he hoped others would follow suit. While Syria is not a user or producer of cluster munitions, according to Human Rights Watch, it has KMG-U aerial dispensers and the RBK series of cluster bombs "in service" (as of June 2007). Syria has also not acceded to Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which currently contains the only legally-binding obligations "to minimise the risks and effects of explosive remnants of war in post-conflict situations."

The ambassadors of Switzerland and Malaysia welcomed the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT). Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland stated, "a number of technical and legal points still needed to be worked out," and recognized the need to overcome "significant political obstacles." Malaysia's Ambassador Hsu King Bee said the draft PPWT is "a positive step," and expressed hope "that the CD would set an objective to approach the issues in a comprehensive manner, engaging in structured substantive discussions with a view for an early commencement of negotiations, for an international legally binding treaty." She also proposed the "establishment of Ad Hoc Committee with the appropriate mandate agreeable to all," and called for a "moratorium on the testing of all kinds of weapons and on the deployment of weapons in outer space."

Ambassador Paranhos of Brazil also welcomed the draft PPWT. In the past, the Brazilian delegation has been a strong proponent in the CD of preventing the weaponization of outer space, and in his farewell statement, Ambassador Paranhos said, "It is of utmost importance that this negotiating forum takes the lead in ensuring that the outer space remains a peaceful domain."

Algeria's Ambassador Hamza Khelif took note of draft PPWT, and indicated his delegation has communicated it to their capital for consideration. He said he would like discussions on the issues of outer space to provide sufficient time to examine the proposal. However, the draft PPWT is based on elements proposed in 2002 and on substantive discussions that took place in the CD in 2006 and 2007—it should not be new information for capitals.

It is unclear what implications referring the draft treaty to capitols will have on the CD, as it is unclear exactly what is meant to happen with the draft PPWT. It was submitted with a research mandate, which we have not yet seen. In June 2002, China dropped its call for a negotiation mandate for an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and instead said that work should be conducted "with a view to negotiating a relevant international legal instrument." Is this the same spirit in which the draft PPWT was offered on Tuesday?

Surprisingly few states dwelled on the merits or problems of the draft PPWT or Russia's proposal for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Instead, most of the session was spent bidding farewell to Tunisian Ambassador Labidi as President of the Conference, and to Ambassador Paranhos of Brazil and Ambassador Petritsch of Austria.

Most delegations expressed their gratitude to outgoing President Labidi for his "friendly," "transparent," and "inclusive" leadership. In his statement, Labidi noted the "virtues of multilateralism" that need to be considered in order to avoid politicization of the CD and to produce concrete results. He welcomed the "constructive spirit" of all parties, and said this needs to be strengthened further. Yet it is unclear what progress has been made so far this year—there have been interesting presentations by high-level officials, but little discussion on any of them by delegations in plenary sessions, and no apparent movement towards adopting a programme of work. Is the CD a body for presentations, or for negotiations?

In his farewell address, Ambassador Paranhos of Brazil thanked "the NGOs that follow our deliberations sometimes with impatience and disappointment but always persevering." He noted that over the last decade of the CD's stalemate, the Brazilian delegation has agreed on several proposals even if it did not always favour "the treatment of certain issues of the agenda to the detriment of others." He explained, "Not all the proposals fitted into our expectations but we were able to go along with them in good faith, in the spirit of strengthening multilateralism and finding concerted solutions for our common goals."

As observers to the process, and as victims of its failures, we would like to encourage all delegations to adopt this spirit of compromise and good faith and uphold the responsibility to negotiate that they've been charged with. This seems to be something worth persevering for.

Background to the PPWT
The key note of interest at the plenary was the introduction of the draft PPWT. The prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) has been a longstanding agenda item in the CD, though no subsidiary body dealing with the subject has met since 1995. Debate on PAROS continued in plenary discussions, and in 2006 and 2007, the CD engaged in focused, structured discussions on the subject. At the CD and in the UNGA First Committee, where a draft resolution on PAROS is introduced annually, discussions often focused on the definition of PAROS and the implications of its meaning. The United States’ delegations to multilateral disarmament fora routinely argued, “One: there is no arms race in space. Two: there is no prospect of an arms race in space. Three: the United States will continue to protect its access to, and use of, space.” During the 2007 thematic debate on outer space in First Committee, Disarmament Counsellor Magnus Hellgren of Sweden explained, “In order to move away from this linguistic and philosophical debate, the discussion in the CD has of lately [sic] been focused not on a PAROS-treaty, but on a treaty to Prevent the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the so called PPW-treaty.”

Overview of the draft treaty
The draft PPWT introduced by Minister Lavrov is the first text formally introduced to the CD, though it is based on elements proposed in a working paper to the CD in June 2002 by Russia, China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Syria. Minister Lavrov explained the draft treaty is designed “to eliminate existing lacunas in international space law, create conditions for further exploration and use of space, preserve costly space property, and strengthen general security and arms control.”

The preamble of both the 2002 paper and the new draft treaty emphasizes the need to keep outer space free from “military confrontation” and open to peaceful uses and exploration for the “development of humankind”. It also notes that while existing arms control and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space “play a positive role ... in regulating outer space activities,” they are insufficient to “effectively prevent the placement of weapons and an arms race in outer space.” It argues for “examination of further measures in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.”

The draft treaty’s articles expand upon the elements contained the 2002 working paper. It defines certain terms, such as “outer space,” “outer space object,” and “weapons in outer space.” It specifies that the latter means

It subsequently explains, “a weapon will be considered as ‘placed’ in outer space if it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before leaving this orbit or is stationed on a permanent basis somewhere in outer space,” and describes “use of force” or “threat of force” as meaning

The draft goes on to explain that states parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit “any objects carrying any kind of weapons,” not to install them on celestial bodies or other space structures, not to use or threaten to use force against outer space objects, and not to encourage any other parties to do so. It emphasizes the treaty will not impede the rights of states parties “to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law.” For matters of transparency and compliance, the draft provides for voluntary confidence-building measures. On verification and compliance enforcement the draft provides for the possibility of subsequent negotiation of an additional protocol and for the establishment of an executive organization for the treaty, which will consider complaints of treaty violations, organize and conduct consultations with states parties, and “take measures to put an end to the violation of the Treaty by any State Party.”

Analysis of the draft treaty
The draft treaty does not settle all of the questions government and non-government experts have asked over the years, such as:

As Canada’s Ambassador Marius Grinius said, “the nature of the issues involved will require considerable detailed and complex discussion of a technical, legal, and political nature on which no consensus currently exists.”

However, it is heartening to see an attempt at forward movement in the CD. Minister Lavrov was quick to point out that the draft treaty is being submitted “with a research mandate,” rather than a negotiating mandate, with a view to the establishment of a relevant ad hoc committee in the future, “when appropriate conditions are there.” He insisted that the introduction of this draft treaty “does not add any complications to achieving a compromise on the programme of work of the Conference.”

Media reaction
Yet the mass media has presented the introduction of the draft treaty as a “showdown” between the United States and Russia/China over “competing international treaties, one banning the production of nuclear materials and the other trying to prevent an arms race in space.” The Washington Times quoted an unidentified US official as saying, “We put our FMCT [fissile materials cut-off treaty] draft forward in May 2006 and have been pushing it all along, before there was any talk of a treaty on outer space.” An absurd statement to say the least, given that an ad hoc committee on PAROS was established in the CD in 1985, the UNGA has adopted annual resolutions on PAROS with an overwhelming majority for over twenty years (according to China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi), and Russia and China introduced possible elements for a PAROS treaty in 2002 (see above).

The Washington Times further (mis)reported, “Now Russia and China have linked negotiations on the FMCT” to the PPWT. Russia and China actually used to link the two items, and if they did so now it would be nothing new, as the Times suggests it is. However, in 2007 Russia agreed to adopt the compromise programme of work in document L.1, which called only for negotiations on an FMCT, thus dropping its linkage to PAROS. The Chinese delegation rejected L.1, and continues calling for a “balanced and comprehensive programme of work,” though it has not specifically demanded simultaneous negotiations this year.

The Associated Press reported that Washington called the introduction of the draft “a diplomatic ploy by the two nations to gain a military advantage,” and said Minister Lavrov’s introduction of the treaty “came with an implied threat.” It noted Minister Lavrov’s comment “that the nuclear arms race was started with a view to preserving the monopoly to this type of weapons [sic], but this monopoly was to last only four years,” implying Lavrov meant Russia would “catch up” to the United States in developing space weapons just as it did with nuclear weapons. However, unreported by the Associated Press, Lavrov went on to lament the waste of material and other resources “at the expense of finding solutions to the problem of development.”

In addition, the Associated Press reported, “Washington rejects the [draft treaty] because it feels it is only directed at U.S. military technology and allows China and Russia to fire ground-based missiles into space or use satellites as weapons of war.” This statement demonstrates the absurd spin put on issues that challenge US military dominance—the draft treaty would obviously prohibit the use of space-based weapons by all states parties, not just the United States, and does not limit any state party’s use of ground-based missiles, not even the United States’.

The Associated Press article goes on to report, “The U.S. says it is committed to ensuring the use of space for peaceful purposes, but insists that it will pursue programs to ensure that its satellites and other spacecraft are protected.” However, the US delegation stood alone in voting against the annual PAROS resolution in the UNGA in 2005–2007, and released a National Space Policy in October 2006 opposing “the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space,” and arguing it will continue to “dissuade or deter others from impeding [its right to operate in space] . . . and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.” In addition, its programs to “protect” its satellites and other spacecraft include some of the most aggressive technologies yet to be unleashed on the international community. Minister Lavrov noted in his introduction

Russia’s political philosophy
It is unfortunate that Minister Lavrov consistently referred to strategic stability and political equilibrium as the only potential sufferers from the deployment of weapons in outer space. Broader discussions of PAROS and space weaponization often neglect the effect that weapons in space would have on human security—particularly from the unconscionable waste of resources. In his outline of “the new Russia’s foreign policy philosophy,” Minister Lavrov indicated that social and economic growth “will be one of the key guarantees” of Russia’s security and recognized the “indivisibility of security and development.” Yet the Russian government has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the United States and NATO on developing missile defense systems for Europe—systems which the Russian government itself has routinely insisted are unnecessary because the threats they are deemed to protect against do not exist; systems which squander excessive economic resources; systems which undermine the “more just and genuinely democratic architecture of international relations” that Minister Lavrov called for in his philosophical treatise.

Response in the CD
Response to the draft in the CD on Tuesday was brief. Welcoming “Russia’s efforts to energize discussions” on PPW, Canada’s Ambassador Grinius said his delegation had “submitted detailed comments” on the draft. He also highlighted the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) as “a valuable and existing” transparency and confidence-building measure (TCBM) and suggested it would be unrealistic to create TCBMs ones when “existing ones ... are regrettably falling into disuse.” Ambassador Grinius also argued, “the dividing lines between civil and military issues in space are increasingly irrelevant in practical terms,” and called for greater cooperation among the UN’s space-related institutions and between the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.

Sri Lanka’s Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka congratulated China and Russia’s collaboration on the draft PPWT and “did not see why a fissile material treaty should take priority over the draft treaty submitted.” He also stated that the L.1 proposal should “be a starting point” for future work and proposed that a contact group should be set up to consult with member states who have reservations on L.1 to address these concerns.

Strategic nuclear arms reductions
During his statement to the plenary, Minister Lavrov also mentioned negotiations for a follow-on treaty to START, which will expire in 2009. He said the Russian government believes “all the best elements of the existing Treaty” should “be borrowed and placed in the foundation of a new agreement ... which should, of course, be legally-binding, could provide for new, lower ceilings subject to verification on both strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), and their warheads.” He said the Russian government proposed this three years ago, but “it has so far been impossible to arrive at acceptable solutions.”

INF Treaty
Minister Lavrov also proposed “a new multilateral agreement based on the relevant provisions of the existing INF Treaty” to make the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty an international legal arrangement. In October 2007, the US and Russian delegations to the UNGA First Committee circulated a joint statement calling for interested countries to discuss the possibility of internationalizing the Treaty, “though the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs.”

Noting that some states were not prepared to support the initiative and that his government is interested in “searching jointly for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem,” Minister Lavrov circulated an unofficial document outlining elements of the proposed agreement to members of the Conference. The proposal included general state obligations; rules of accounting and definitions of types of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles; elimination procedures; and compliance verification.

While he notes the value of addressing the issue of missiles, which is often neglected by the nuclear disarmament community, he warns that in light of “the current atmosphere of superpowers that seem allergic to verifiable and irreversible reductions in their strategic forces, any proposal that tends to accentuate existing imbalances in the international strategic framework without ameliorating the root causes of insecurity seems a bit cynical.”

Other Conference issues
Montenegro and Nepal were approved to participate as observers at the Conference.

The next plenary session is on Thursday, 14 February 2008 at 10am. Rotating President Labidi will present his last statement as CD President.

Correction to the 7 February CD Report
The Natural Resources Defense Council report cited in last week’s CD Report does not take into account the cuts to its nuclear arsenal that US government announced in December 2007. The correct report, updated on 3 January 2008, indicates the US stockpile includes about 4,075 operational warheads: 3,575 strategic warheads and 500 nonstrategic (tactical) warheads. It estimates approximately 5,400 additional warheads are held in the reserve or inactive/responsive stockpiles or are awaiting dismantlement.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD)’s rotating President Samir Labidi of Tunisia opened the session and welcomed Thomas D’Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States, who made a presentation to the plenary. Mr. D’Agostino was accompanied by William Tobey and Dr Christopher Ford. The plenary then broke into an informal session for questions to Mr. D’Agostino and the formal session resumed 40 minutes later, with statements from representatives of Algeria,, Poland , Malaysia, and Iran.

The PowerPoint presentation delivered by Mr. D’Agostino was an updated version of a similar presentation delivered by Dr. Ford during the 2007 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee. New information included reports that the US has achieved the stockpile reduction goals set out in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) five years ahead of schedule, and that on 18 December 2007, President Bush declared an additional 15% planned reduction in the US arsenal. Mr. D’Agostino went on to state that there are “ongoing discussions with Russia on a Post-START arrangement after Treaty expiration in December 2009.” He also noted that there are currently discussions taking place in the US Congress about conducting another nuclear posture review.

Regardless of the actual number of US strategically deployed warheads, it is important to remember that, as Dr. John Burroughs noted in his comments during a debate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Washington, DC on 29 November 2007, “the detonation of just one or a few nuclear bombs ... would be abhorrent.” He went on to quote McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who said, “one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.”

Throughout his presentation, Mr. D’Agostino emphasized the dismantlement of the US nuclear arsenal. After the informal session, Algeria’s Ambassador Al Jazaïry said the US efforts “would be more interesting if they met the criteria of irreversibility, transparency, and above all, the criteria of verification decided on through consensus by the states parties to the NPT in 2000.” Mr. D’Agostino noted in his presentation that the US has made outreach and engagement a priority, saying the US has issued fact sheets, given speeches and briefings, and maintained a public booth at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Unfortunately, fact sheets and information booths are not the same thing as verification—if they were, perhaps the United States would agree that a fissile materials cut-off treaty would be verifiable.

Mr. D’Agostino’s presentation included a slide quoting Ambassador Linton Brooks, Former Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security, March 2004:

The US administration may see this as an argument that other states will seek to acquire nuclear weapon technology even if the US reduces its stockpile (or if it ever eliminates its stockpile); WILPF takes it to indicate that many members of the international community are not placated by a reduction from an incomprehensible amount of nuclear weapons to an insane amount of nuclear weapons. In addition, it indicates that the US government’s other policies and actions—including its nuclear weapon modernization programs, its continued plutonium “pit” production, its quest for a prompt global strike capability, its development of ballistic missile defense and space weapon technology, and its occupation of Iraq, among others things—have done little to ease the security concerns of the international community.

An important side note, in response to Brook’s inclusion of Iran as a state developing a covert nuclear weapon program: as Michael Spies of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy pointed out in December 2007, “Scant evidence exists in the public domain to back up the administration’s assertion that Iran had a nuclear weapons program.” He argued that Iran’s nuclear-related activities, even those prior to 2003, do not indisputably indicate a “covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program”.

Mr. D’Agostino also mentioned the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), arguing that the RRW “is key to sustaining our security commitment to allies, and is fully consistent with U.S. NPT obligations. Indeed, for the reasons above, RRW can help advance Article VI goals.”

First, a note on RRW itself. As pointed out by Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group on 4 February, the Energy Department’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2009

Second, a note on D’Agostino’s remark. Modernizing nuclear warheads is not consistent with US NPT obligations, nor does it advance Article VI goals. In their 2004 information bulletin, Lichterman and Cabasso said, “There is no way to reconcile this resurgence of nuclear weapons development with disarmament.” They argued, “The approach taken by the United States towards its own disarmament obligations ... expects us to accept the possession and constant modernization of thousands of nuclear weapons for many decades to come as meaningful progress towards disarmament.”

During her statement to the plenary, Malaysia’s Ambassador Hsu King Bee voiced concern over “the development of new, more sophisticated types of nuclear weapons replacing old stockpiles, as well as qualitative improvement on existing nuclear arsenals within the stockpiles of Nuclear Weapon States.” She argued, “such retrogressive movements reinforce the untenable perception that the existence of nuclear weapons is essential for the maintenance of peace and security, and places the NPT regime and indeed the whole of humanity, at risk.”

Algeria’s Ambassador Al Jazaϊry said, the “indefinite extension [of the NPT] does not mean indefinite possession” of nuclear weapons. Yet the US presentation, like the UK presentation on Tuesday, indicates little movement from removing nuclear deterrence from national security strategies. If one state has decided it requires nuclear weapons for its security, what is to stop other states from deciding the same thing?

Mr. D’Agostino argued, “Even as it has been shrinking, the U.S. nuclear arsenal serves NPT objectives, assuring our allies that the U.S. security relationship continues to help ensure their security, thus obviating any need for them to develop nuclear weapons on their own. [emphasis added]”

Michael Spies argues, “To put it another way, under D’Agostino’s Orwellian logic, perpetual US repudiation of its NPT obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament actually is not only justified but necessary for the Treaty regime to survive.”

The main thrust of this statement is that benefit of US nuclear weapons extends only to its friends and allies. For the rest of world that does not benefit from this doctrine of benevolent US nuclear hegemony, Lichterman and Cabasso characterize US non-proliferation policy as increasingly moving “away from a policy emphasizing diplomatic efforts to restrain nuclear weapons proliferation, and towards a counterproliferation policy mainly based on the threat of overwhelming force.”

The contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons not just to counter use of similar weapons, but even to prevent their spread, arguably runs directly counter to the intent of the NPT, which states in its preamble that states should act at all times “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” and that “States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”

Mr. D’Agostino’s presentation covered a number of other points, including reduction of delivery systems, closure of certain segments of the nuclear weapon complex, consolidation of fissile materials, and various non-proliferation initiatives. For the full presentation, see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/1session/Feb7agostino.pdf.

After the formal plenary resumed, a few delegations took the floor and spoke about matters related to the CD. Algeria’s Ambassador Al Jazaïry said the CD is “paralyzed by attempts to equate consensus with unanimity.” He argued that he has not heard a single delegation categorically reject the L.1 proposal—thus the Conference cannot just leave it aside and go back to square one. He argued it needs to mature so that the programme of work can provide a feeling of security to all states in the spirit of the Decalogue. Poland’s Ambassador Zdzislaw Rapacki likewise said the CD only has one choice: to move forward. He argued, “Time is running out for all of us, not only as diplomats, but also as human beings. None of us has the luxury to waste another coming day.”

The next CD plenary session will be on Tuesday, 12 February at 10am. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will deliver the joint Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space.

Secretary of Defence for the United Kingdom, Des Brown, addressed the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this morning, putting forward a proposal on verification for nuclear disarmament and outlining the UK's position on several key issues facing the CD. The plenary also heard from representatives of Switzerland, Iran, Germany, Norway, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, and from the CD Secretary General, Sergei Ordzhonikidze.

Acknowledging that "it is rare for a defence Minister to address a conference on disarmament," Mr. Brown explained the UK wanted to send "a strong message about the priority" it gives to disarmament commitments.

Touching briefly on the issue of conventional weapons, Mr. Brown highlighted the UK's support of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Arms Trade Treaty initiative. He also indicated his commitment to "securing an international instrument that bans those cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians." He explained that he withdrew from service two types of cluster munitions last year, and has been meeting with NGOs and diplomats to discuss addressing cluster munitions through the Oslo Process and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Mr. Brown's statement focused on nuclear issues, however, emphasizing, "if we are serious about doing our bit to create the conditions for complete nuclear disarmament, we must now also begin to build deeper technical relationships on disarmament between nuclear states." He announced that the UK is willing to "host a technical conference of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010," to "reinforce a process of mutual confidence building."

He highlighted a technical cooperation initiative that the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment has developed in conjunction with several Norwegian defence laboratories and stated his wish to see the UK as "a role model and testing ground for measures that we and others can take on key aspect of disarmament. In particular, measures needed to determine the requirements for the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons." This is not the first foray that the UK government has made into verification research, as it once conducted a three-part study that looked at the authentication of warheads and their components, and verification technologies and their potential uses in warhead dismantlement, the final results of which were presented at the 2005 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

Mr. Brown acknowledged cuts to warheads and stocks by Russia, the United States, the UK, and France, and urged increased transparency of these reductions. He also welcomed the "ongoing bilateral discussions between Russia and the United States for a follow-on arrangement" to START. He also emphasized the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation, arguing, "Although, we all understand that there is no formal conditionality between progress on disarmament and non-proliferation, our goal should be a virtuous circle, where progress on one reinforces the other." Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen of Norway agreed with this assessment, saying, "substantial progress on disarmament is vital to ensure further progress on non-proliferation as well."

Mr. Brown also argued that securing a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) is "a key milestone towards building this climate for disarmament," and said he would like to see "political commitment transformed into a legal one through a treaty." Switzerland's Ambassador Jürg Streuli echoed this view, stating that "such a mandate is of the utmost importance" and is the issue that is the "most ripe for negotiation". The representatives of Norway and Germany agreed, with Germany's Ambassador Bernhard Brasack arguing that the decision to start negotiations must be the "clear goal this year" and "an opportunity and priority that waits to be seized as the next logical step after the CTBT," and Norway's Ambassador Angell-Hansen advocating that governments "put short term security considerations aside and embark on a joint mission so that we can turn back the hand of the Doomsday Clock." Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, however, indicated that any mandate to negotiate a fissile materials treaty must include discussion on the scope of the possible treaty, and the ability to talk about existing fissile materials stocks.

Regarding the Conference's work more generally, Iran's Ambassador Ali Reza Moaiyeri argued, "the efforts to resume the work of the CD on one priority should not be done at the cost of the others," pointing out, "There are different proposals from the previous years," which "are important and can be helpful in our collective endeavours." Germany's Ambassador Brasack remarked, "our key task is to ensure security on the basis of jointly defined global norms and through cooperation rather than isolation and confrontation. Today, more than ever, our maxim must be: security is indivisible."

Referring to the NPT as "more than a mere instrument for combating proliferation," Ambassador Brasack argued, "the possession of nuclear weapons by states outside the NPT risks undermining all non-proliferation and disarmament efforts," and called on states not yet party to the NPT to "accede unconditionally to the NPT." Ambassador Brasack also expressed his concern "that even some members of the NPT have given reason for doubts as to their commitment to the NPT," and his regret that the Review Conference of the NPT in 2005 "was unable to agree on "a substantive final document." He said he hopes the second Preparatory Committee in April–May 2008 will "jumpstart into substantial discussions and proposals without any delay."

For the first time this year, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary General of the CD, took the floor. He discussed the democratic nature of the UN and recalled the true goals of the CD, stating that "consensus is good, but it is not our final end. Our final end is strategic disarmament."

It is obvious that the Conference has not arrived at a consensus for a programme of work, however, the President, Ambassador Samir Labidi of Tunisia, stated that it should not prevent the Conference from continuing its work to "narrow differences". He also announced the seven coordinators* to lead discussion and debates on the agenda items in informal sessions. The Conference also saw the inclusion of Denmark as an observer.

The next plenary meeting will be on Thursday, 7 February at 11am and will include an address by Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States, Thomas D'Agostino.

*As previously reported, the seven coordinators for 2008 are:
Ambassador Juan Martabit of Chile for agenda items 1 & 2, with a focus on the prevention of nuclear war;
Ambassador Sumio Tarui of Japan for agenda items 1 & 2, with a focus on a fissile materials treaty;
Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada for agenda item 3, prevention of an arms race in outer space;
Ambassador Moussa Bocar Ly of Senegal for agenda item 4, negative security assurances;
Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria for agenda item 5, new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons;
Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka for agenda item 6, comprehensive programme of disarmament, and;
Ambassador Mr. I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja of Indonesia for agenda item 7, transparency in armaments.

President Samir Labidi of Tunisia opened today's Conference on Disarmament (CD) session by briefly discussing the calendar of activities. He emphasized that the Conference needs to remain flexible to take into consideration any progress that may occur as a result of discussions. Delegates from Argentina, Syria, Colombia, Morocco, Mexico, Indonesia, Germany, Russia, Israel, China, and the Netherlands then took the floor.

Speaking on behalf of the Latin American countries who are members of the CD—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela—and also of the Latin American observer countries—Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Guatemala—Argentina's Ambassador Gondra stated that a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) would be "the next logical step" in the disarmament regime. He said the FMCT would help to achieve the nuclear disarmament obligation agreed to in Article 6 of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), emphasizing that the concerns of states around verification issues and existing stocks must be taken into consideration. Ambassador Gondra said the Conference must "renew its responsibility as a negotiating forum for disarmament," arguing that progress on disarmament in the framework of the CD could give a clear signal to the NPT regime, in time for the 2010 Review Conference. He also recognized that the L.1. package has majority support and hopes that it could lead to the adoption of a programme of work for the year.

Colombia's Ambassador Forero Urcos announced that his government ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 29 January 2008. Colombia initially signed the CTBT in September 1996. Since that time, the government has cited constitutional issues preventing their ratification. This ratification brings the total number of Annex 2 ratifications to 35, leaving only 9 states whose ratification is needed for the CTBT to enter into force. The announcement was welcomed by the Netherlands and Germany. China's delegation also congratulated Colombia, and added that the Chinese government is "still in the process of reviewing the final ratification of CTBT," but that what it has done "has already exceeded the requirements of the CTBT."

The delegates from Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and Morocco highlighted the issue of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs). Argentina's Ambassador Gondra reminded the Conference that Latin American was the first to establish a populated nuclear free zone. Germany's delegation stated that they would have "subscribe to every word" said by Ambassador Gondra if geography was not an obstacle. Many people do wish that Germany too could become part of a NWFZ. It is unfortunate that the NATO nuclear doctrine prohibits this. Perhaps Germany could raise this issue at the upcoming NATO Summit in April. Morocco's Ambassador Loulichki also mentioned that "the establishment of nuclear free zones particularly in the Middle East remains an essential means for achieving nuclear non-proliferation and consequently achieving nuclear disarmament."

Syria's delegation stated that they wanted the CD to focus on negative security assurances (NSAs) and the FMCT, and suggested that bringing up "political questions that are not within its mandate" such as terrorism—as raised by Israel on Tuesday—will "disrupt the work of the Conference". This prompted an informal response by Israel's delegate, who reminded the Conference that the Rules of Procedure allow for any subject to be raised at any time.

The President's plan of activities includes a series of informal discussions based on the seven agenda items of the CD, rather than the identified four "core issues"—fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. By not specifically focusing on the four core issues, the plan of activities begs the question, where does discussion of a fissile materials treaty fit in—under the agenda item nuclear disarmament, or under prevention of a nuclear war and related matters? The agenda item under which this issue is discussed affects how it is approached and developed—for example, will it be treated as a disarmament measure or a non-proliferation measure?

The President also appointed coordinators for each of the agenda items. Agenda item 1, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, will be coordinated by Ambassador Juan Martabit of Chile; agenda item 2, prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, by Ambassador Sumio Tarui of Japan; agenda item 3, prevention of an arms race in outer space, by Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada; agenda item 4, negative security assurances, by Ambassador Moussa Bocar Ly of Senegal; agenda item 5, new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons, by Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria; and agenda item 6, comprehensive programme of disarmament, by Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka. The President is still in consultation over a coordinator for agenda item 7, transparency in armaments, and hopes to appoint someone by the next plenary on Thursday. The plan of activities designates Tuesday and Thursday mornings for plenary meetings. As always, this proposal does not preclude any delegation from raising any issue at any time.

Coordinators will serve in their personal capacities, as they did last year. Pakistan's Ambassador Masood Khan emphasized this point, reminding the Conference that these appointed coordinators do not fall under Rule 23 in the rules of procedure—that is, they are not special coordinators mandated to lead negotiations. He stressed, "the coordinators will work informally and unofficially under the authority of the Presidents.... The reports of the coordinators [based on] discussions held by them will have no status; they will be transmitted under the authority of the President."

All delegations that took the floor supported the plan of activities, though Germany's Ambassador Bernhard Brasack reiterated his "full and unequivocal support" for last year's Presidential Draft Decision, L.1, which he said is still on the table today. Delegates from Australia, Brazil, Chile, and the Republic of Korea also expressed their support for document L.1. Pakistan's delegation indicated its position on the programme of work contained in L.1 has not changed from last year, citing continued national security concerns—which in the past have included the US-India deal. Ambassador Brasack argued that, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in his opening speech last week, the adoption of L.1 "would not deprive any CD Member State of the ability to assert its national position in the subsequent phases of the Conference's work." Ambassador Brasack also argued that this year's plan of activities "must avoid a simple repetition of these discussions, rather it needs to be purposeful and build on their results."

Ambassador Caroline Miller of Australia echoed this sentiment, saying "we have 'talked the talk' ... it's time 'we walk the walk.'" She also endorsed the idea of beginning substantive work on the basis of L.1, and called for negotiations on an FMCT, arguing, "such a treaty is essential and practical contribution to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation." She explained that an FMCT should prohibit the production of enriched uranium and separated plutonium for nuclear weapons, have a periodic review of national implementation, and appropriate measures to ensure effective verification of State's implementation. Ambassador Miller argued that the mandate for negotiations set out in L.1 ensures the "opportunity for all positions—be they on verification, stocks or other issues—to be scrutinized and tested as can only be done in a genuine negotiation." Ambassador Brasack likewise called for negotiations on an FMCT, arguing that it is the only issue "ripe for negotiation."

Ambassador Miller also expressed interest in discussing a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space on the basis of L.1, and discussions on negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament. She emphasized nuclear weapon free zones as "an effective means by which negative security assurances can be provided," and called upon nuclear weapon states "to make deeper, faster and irreversible cuts to all types of nuclear weapons—and to do so with even greater transparency."

In addition to the four core issues, which were discussed by most of delegations that took the floor, Ambassador Itzhak Levanon of Israel said "the threat of terrorism in all its dimensions; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery" should be the highest priorities of the CD. He argued that these "two fundamental threats to global peace and security" need to be addressed in order to create "the conditions that would allow eventually achieving general and complete disarmament." He stated that the transfer of arms to terrorists "is a scourge to modern civilization" and that "such arms transfers do not occur in vacuum." He also discussed the importance of national laws to implement international agreements, emphasizing the role of export control regimes and arguing that "national legislation is the basic feature for addressing proliferation threats.

A number of administrative matters were raised by delegates during the course of the meeting. The delegation from the Dominican Republic was approved to be an observer member, and the Netherlands' Ambassador Landman raised the issue of excessive paper consumption. This matter makes one wonder, will the CD continue to merely push around paper, or will we see some progress this year? Civil society requests, "a little less conversation, a little more action please."

Rotating President Samir Labidi of Tunisia opened the second session of the 2008 Conference on Disarmament. Delegates from the Russian Federation and China both delivered statements, and the Netherlands' ambassador gave a short intervention before the plenary was closed for an informal discussion on the agenda. After about 10 minutes, the public session resumed, and the 2008 CD Agenda (CD/WP 548) was formally adopted. Delegates from Slovenia (on behalf of the European Union), the Netherlands, and Sri Lanka then took the floor.

The President presented an overview of bilateral consultations conducted from October 2007 until mid-January 2008 with all delegations to build consensus on the agenda and towards a programme of work for the year. He emphasized that adoption of the agenda "can give a strong signal concerning its determination to move forward." Labidi also indicated that not everyone is on board with a programme of work for 2008, and that he plans to ceaselessly continue consultations in a calm frame of mind to achieve consensus.

China's new ambassador, Mr. Wang Qun, commented that the Conference on Disarmament "has a heavy mandate". He noted a Chinese saying—"the closer we are to the goal the more difficult it becomes"—while referring to the need for a balanced programme of work.

Russian Ambassador Valery Loshchinin suggested that to in order "to get the subject of disarmament back on the global agenda," the programme of work should be based on last year's Presidential Draft Decision, L.1. While he highlighted the need for the Conference to "move from words to deeds" in filling in "the well known gaps in international space law," he also indicated that Russia would not object to starting negotiations on a fissile materials treaty or holding substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances. He emphasized that the development of a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS), the elements of which were "proposed by Russia and China together with a group of co-sponsors back in June 2002," would "constitute yet another multilateral measure in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and thus would be a real contribution to strengthening the NPT regime." Continuing the high level profile of the CD, Loschinin said that the draft for this treaty will be submitted for consideration on 12 February by Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov.

In addition to the Russian Foreign Minister's intended visit, the President of the Conference also announced that the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Des Browne, would be present at the Conference's plenary meeting on Tuesday, 5 February, and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States, Thomas D'Agostino, would attend on Tuesday, 12 February.

After a short informal session and the adoption of the agenda, the President announced the list of observer states that were approved to participate in the Conference's 2008 session (see below).

On behalf of the European Union, Ambassador Andrej Logar of Slovenia echoed Ambassador Loshchinin's call for the adoption of 2007's Presidential Draft Decision L.1. He reiterated the EU's position that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty is a "clear priority," while relaying that the EU is also "ready to engage in substantial discussion on the other items included in L.1." Ambassador Logar also reminded the President of the Conference that there are still a number of states who have submitted their formal request to join the CD, many of them from the EU.

Quoting the "Renewed Call for A Nuclear Free World" printed in the Wall Street Journal on 15 January 2008 by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, the ambassador of Netherlands, Johannes Landman, argued that a nuclear free world was indeed possible. Landman went on to quote Plutarch, reminding the Conference, "Perseverance is more prevailing than violence," and there are many things which cannot be overcome when they are together, yet yield themselves up when taken little by little. He also recalled the words of Moliere, noting that it is not only what we do, but what we do NOT do for which we are accountable.

Sri Lanka's Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka reminded the CD that those who are striving for nuclear weapons are doing so as a symptom of insecurity—either real or perceived—and that getting to the root of these security perceptions is a necessary step, "incumbent on us to be sensitive to," in order to move forward with the work of the Conference.

Non-member states that have been approved to participate in the work of the Conference in 2008:

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Kuwait, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Sudan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Arab Emirates

The President bid farewell to the Ambassador Tofique Ali of Bangladesh, Ambassador Cheng Jingye of China, Ambassador Prasad of India, Ambassador Shein of Myanmar, Ambassador Bocar Ly of Senegal, and Ambassador Strømmen of Norway.

He welcomed Ambassador Wang Qun of China, Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao of India, Ambassador Lucia Fiori of Italy, and the new ambassadors of Bangladesh, Denmark, Norway, Senegal, and Ukraine.

“We need progress” was the message given by Ban Ki-moon United Nations Secretary General during the first formal session of the 2008 Conference on Disarmament. This is the first time this millennium that the UNSG has personally opened the CD session to “personally renew [his] call” on the CD to “move forward in a spirit of compromise”. It was a high level beginning for Tunisia’s presidency, as their Foreign Minister of Tunisia, Abdelwaheb Abdallah also took the floor. Russia (on behalf of the Eastern Group), Sri Lanka (on behalf of the Group of 21), Italy (on behalf of the Western Group) and China also addressed those crowded in the CD chamber and the dozens in the public gallery.

Telling the conference that a “disarmament stalemate can also jeopardize other key Charter goals.” The SG was “deeply troubled by [the] impasse over priorities” and reminded the conference that “when you were at the verge of reaching a decision on this draft presidential decision last June, I called on you to move forward in a spirit of compromise and seize that historic opportunity. You did not.”

Echoing the need for the conference to move forward, Foreign Minister Abdallah also reminded the conference about the Tunisian approach to international relations that is “based on a tight interdependence between security, peace and development.” Earlier, the SG reminded the conference that “concerted disbarment will forestall arms races [and]… free up resources that would have been diverted to armaments…[that] can then be used to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”

Sri Lanka’s Ambassador, Dayan Jayatilleka, representing the Group of 21 acknowledged the statements made by the UN Secretary General and called it “… the spur of conscience to the flank of plodding procedure.” He also stated the vulnerability of the Group of 21 to nuclear weapons build up and put forward two pillars on which he believed the work of the CD should rest- a balance between urgency of the imperative; and the need for consultation, compromise, constructive dialogue and consensus.

Russian Ambassador, Valery Loshchinin noted that the CD is “succeeding in holding serious and far-reaching discussions on all agenda items. Trust among partners has also increased.” Building and strengthening that trust and the threat perceptions of CD members into a consensual programme of work is the challenge that has kept the CD from negotiating since the 1996 CTBT conclusions.

Italy’s Ambassador Lucia Fiori, the only woman to take the floor, recalled some of the specific modalities that have moved the CD closer to a programme of work in recent years. Specifically noting the appointment of coordinators for seven items of the CD agenda Ambassador Fiori said that the deliberations that took place under their work “culminated in the presentation of a Presidential draft Decision (L.1).”

The high level of attention paid to the opening of the CD this year sends a strong signal to CD members- who will hopefully live up to the SG’s expectation to “make this a breakthrough year.”