



FAREWELL STATEMENT TO THE CD

BY

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(Check against delivery)

Madame Chair,

Since it is the first time that I have the honour to take the floor under the Australian CD Presidency, let me first of all congratulate you Ambassador Millar on the assumption of the Presidency of the CD, for which I pledge the full and sincere support of the German delegation. At the same time, allow me to thank your predecessors of this years P-6 platform.

In my opening statement to the CD on 5 August 2005 I stated:” Despite the long stalemate in the CD, I start my work here in Geneva with great optimism and confidence. I am deeply convinced that all delegations ultimately are striving for the same objective, are supporting effective multilateralism in the area of disarmament and arms control. I fully share the view expressed by the UN-SG Kofi Annan in “In Larger Freedom” that success through multilateralism is not always guaranteed, but that “states have no reasonable alternative to working together, even if collaboration means taking the priorities of your partners seriously to ensure that they will take seriously your own in return”.

In applying these principles we have come at last to an important turning point on 29 May 2009: the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced CD program of work.

Yet there is no room for complacency: The expectations of the international community towards the CD have clearly risen. Also: A Programme of work is not yet action, but the -promise - of action. We cannot afford to get into sleepwalking mode again.

We are therefore now engaged in a great test. Before we really can get the lift of a driving vision in the CD, we have to get rid of some nightmares that we inherited.

In spite of of the adoption of the CD Programme of Work, it is obvious, that differing perceptions and priorities persist. Remaining barriers of mistrust and possible hidden agendas and may be even secret reservations will have to be brought to light and broken through, on a daily basis, as soon as negotiations and substantial discussions on all issues start.

It is not only the mandatory -task- of the CD to negotiate, but also its mandatory -duty- to do so, and this in an effective manner with meaningful lasting outcomes in the shortest- possible period of time.

Allow me to restrict myself today to a few forward looking, very personal, remarks of advice as regards the FMCT negotiations. Since these are personal remarks only, which I have not put forward to my own capital for agreement. I would therefore be grateful, if you refrain from holding my successor accountable for these few pieces of advice, that I am going to lay out to you in a moment.

I have heard a view not so long ago, that once the FMCT -negotiations start, we first need to discuss the underlying definitions and agree on them. This alone might take more than a year. We could only go forward to any further steps as regards the scope of an FMCT and an effective international verification mechanism only once the definitions are fully agreed.

I believe that such a view is wrong and would be a guarantee for failure or at least endless delay. Without at least a prior general understanding of the scope of an FMCT and without the definitions put into tune with existing or at least feasible, practical and affordable verification techniques, such approach to FMCT negotiations would lead to a dead-end.

These deliberations should not take place in a compartmentalized-closed box system. A practical integral approach to definitions, scope and effective international verification in a triangular manner is needed.

Definitions are a servant to the intended scope. They should be in tune with effective verification measures. They should -enable -and -facilitate -verification and, not prevent verification or make verification less feasible, more cumbersome, technically more difficult or too expensive.

They should also reflect the intended scope.

Therefore there is a clear triangular relationship between definitions, scope and the possibility of effective verification. According: They have to be treated in parallel. They have to be fine-tuned neatly to each other in parallel throughout the negotiations.

If the verification task should be entrusted to the IAEA, and I frankly do not see any other feasible and affordable option, this would require its dramatic overhaul of the IAEA, particularly as regards inspection system and inspection resources.

A gradual increase in the IAEA inspection capacity would be possible with the acceptance of IAEA verification of fuel cycle plants in nuclear weapons states on a voluntary basis, as a measure of a steady phase-in..

This would at the same time alleviate one of the unequal features of the NPT, the fact that non-nuclear states must submit all their fuel cycle activities to safeguards while nuclear weapon states so far have no such obligations.

It would be another recipe for failure if the CD member states who have produced fissile materials for explosive purposes or who still do so, would try to sort of "pre-cook" the FMCT negotiations outcomes behind the curtains, in the back rooms, and then try to impose their lowest common denominator, for example, as regards the scope or the verification mechanism, onto the large majority of non-nuclear CD member states.

Such a strategy did not turn out to be viable for example in the context of the deliberations in the CCW on cluster munitions. Such a strategy would again lead to the failure of the FMCT negotiations.

An approach of pleading almost unlimited verification requirements for -all the others- for example to non nuclear weapons states in the NPT-context, but raising at the same time an unlimited number of questions and concerns and asking for manifold exemptions, as soon as the FMCT-verification of ones own relevant nuclear installations is concerned, would also doom the FMCT negotiations to failure. Largely the same yardstick has to apply to everyone.

In my view the setting up a Group of Scientific and Safeguards Experts with practical experience in the implementation of IAEA safeguards, as regards the technical as well as the legal aspects, is now an immediate requirement. Germany has made such proposals at many occasions during the last two years.

It would be in my view also not advisable to approach the question of the inclusion of stocks upfront in a generic way; in a “yes” or “no” manner or to seek a solution in a generic way in the discussions about the scope. A discussion on this topic could e.g. be started in the context of the requirements for an effective verification system: If for example an effective verification of the production ban required a specific tangible baseline for the cut-off, it might be necessary to provide data on the size of the existing stocks at least in an aggregate manner. The issue of existing stocks would also have to be addressed when dealing in the text with transfers or possible transfer bans.

Also: Without an immediate binding moratorium on any further production of fissile material for explosive purposes, a premium would be put on complicating matters unnecessarily and delaying the FMCT negotiations.

A universal CTBT together with a universal NPT and FMCT would constitute a solid basis for a process of step by step nuclear weapons reductions until the vision of nuclear weapons free world will be achieved. It would make in particular any step irreversible.

The verification mechanism for the FMCT together with the verification system of the NPT could also constitute a decisive building block for a future mechanism to verify a nuclear weapons free world. It would indeed be a necessary precursor for a nuclear weapons free world.

Allow me at the end to express my profound gratitude to all colleagues in the room for the their friendship and cooperation throughout my four years here. This includes, as is normal, many colleagues who left Geneva before me.

Special, deeply- felt thanks go to the the Secretary General of the Conference and Director General of the United Nations Office Geneva, H.E. S. Ordzhonikidze and to the Secretary General High Representative for Disarmament H. E. Sergio Duarte. They supported our common efforts in differing functions and differing ways, but any progress achieved so far, would not be thinkable without their assistance and advice.

A special thanks also to Jerzy Zaleski who will leave in a few month time, to Peter Kolarov who was invaluable to me in my capacity as Regional Coordinator of the Western Group in CCW-matters and to Ambassador Tim Caughley.

UNIDIR has been and continues to be a powerhouse of ideas and inspiration, thank you for that.

I profited a lot from and was supported by very differing institutions and I would like to mention pars pro toto the ICRC, the Geneva De-Mining Center (GICHD), the Geneva Forum, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), the Monterey Institute, SIPRI –, the websites of the Accronym Institute and the Women's International League and so many others here in Geneva and New York.

My deep thanks includes all members of the UN- ODA, the Support Group (ISU) of the BWTC, the interpreters, the meeting room clerks and -technicians who provided excellent services on a constant basis, here in Geneva, but also New York .

Sometimes I am asked, if I feel any regret or even bitterness, that now that the prospects for substantial work in the CD finally are bright, I have been reassigned by my authorities to other duties. Such a question always brings back to my minds eye the Mount Nebo, which I visited, when I attended the Conference of the States Parties of the Ottawa Convention at the Dead Sea in Jordan. This is where, according to the Bible, Moses saw the “land of milk and honey”- it must have been the valley of the river Jordan then- after having roamed with his people in the deserts for years. Here I have to add three remarks:

Firstly, it depends very much on you, if the implementation of the CD programme of work is comparable to that land of milk and honey. Secondly, I have reservations, at least no immediate plans, about dropping dead instantly, as Moses did then on Mount Nebo, because thirdly, I would never compare myself with that ancient great leader of his people anyway.

Thank you very much.

