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Conference on Disarmament
Summary of Statements by Topic 2009
Fissile materials
cut-off treaty
Australia, 20
January
From Australia’s national perspective, and as we have
stated many times in this forum, a key priority – and
one that is very widely shared - will be to commence negotiations
on an FMCT.
Austria, 12 February
An FMCT
should not only entail the cessation of a nuclear arms race
by capping the amount of weapons-grade fissile material, but
also increase confidence through an effective verification
regime and enhanced transparency. This would pave the way
for the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control as called
for in Article
VI of the NPT.
Bangladesh, 3
February
The continued production of fissile material is a threat to
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Bangladesh supports
a negotiating mandate for a non-discriminatory, multilateral
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material (including existing stockpiles)
for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.
Brazil, 12 February
An FMCT
could be the gateway leading to nuclear disarmament. One could
argue that a treaty banning nuclear weapons would not depend
on a measure controlling one ingredient. However it is difficult
to deny that the major step of ridding the world of those
weapons of mass destruction cannot be attempted if states
shy of negotiating an FMCT.
China, 12 August
China supports the Conference in launching negotiations on
the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at an early date and will
take an active part in negotiations.
Egypt, 20 January
The mandate for negotiation of an FMCT
must adhere to progress already achieved more than a decade
ago in CD/1299
(1995), which clearly indicates that such a Treaty must be
non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and
effectively verifiable, and that it does not preclude any
delegation from raising for consideration the issue of existing
stockpiles.
Egypt, 17 February
Perhaps more than any other matter before the CD, the FMCT
is the one most ripe for negotiations. Egypt believes that
the most pragmatic way forward would be to foster consensus
around previously agreed upon outcomes, and in that regard
reiterates the call for negotiations of an FMCT to adhere
to progress already achieved more than a decade ago as contained
in the Shannon
Mandate CD/1299 of 1995.
European Union, 20 January (delivered by the Czech Republic)
The EU attaches a clear priority to the negotiation of a Treaty
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), as a means to strengthen
disarmament and non-proliferation.
European Union, 3 March
Attaches a clear priority to the negotiation, without preconditions,
in the CD of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT),
as a means to strengthen nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
By banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other explosive devices, a FMCT
will contribute significantly to the nuclear disarmament efforts
under article
VI of the NPT.
Germany, 12 March
We need a renewed effort to finally engage in substantial
steps forward to start FMCT
negotiations. It remains the next logical step, beside the
entry into force of the CTBT,
for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Together with
our Partners in the EU, Germany attaches a clear priority
to the negotiation, without preconditions, of an FMCT, as
a means to strengthen both disarmament and non-proliferation.
Germany has proposed in a working paper [NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.22]
submitted to for the NPT PrepCom in 2008, inter alia the establishment
within the CD of a Group of Scientific Experts to examine
the technical aspects of an FMCT.
Such an ad hoc group of experts could assist the discussion
in the CD and deal with technical aspects related to, among
other definitions, the scope and verification of an FMCT.
In addition to cutting-off the production of fissile material
for weapons purposes, we need to do more to increase the security,
transparency and control over existing fissile material stocks
worldwide.
Germany, 6 August
If we here at the CD can effectively agree on the termination
of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
purposes, we would tackle the issue of nuclear weapons at
one of its roots. To achieve this goal, Germany is ready to
contribute substantially to the negotiation process.
India, 3 February
India supports the establishment of an Ad hoc committee on
FMCT
as part of the CD’s Programme of Work. India was one
of the original co-sponsors of UNGA
Resolution 48/75L, adopted in 1993 which envisaged FMCT
as a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation
in all its aspects. We believe the CD is the appropriate forum
for negotiating the FMCT.
India, 28 May
India supports the establishment of a Working Group to negotiate
anFMCT.
As a country possessing nuclear weapons we are willing to
conclude a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally
verifiable treaty banning the further production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
India, 29 May
India supports the establishment of a Working Group to negotiate
anFMCT
as part of the CD’s Programme of Work. India was one
of the original co-sponsors of the UNGA
resolution 48/75/L adopted in 1993 on FMCT. The mandate
for the proposed treaty was explicitly reflected in the 1993
UNGA Resolution and reconfirmed by the Shannon
Report contained in CD/1299. The scope of such a treaty
would focus on the future production of fissile materials
for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We
are committed to participating constructively in the FMCT
negotiations in the CD.
Iran, 11 June
Iran once again re-emphasizes that an FMCT
- which is to ban fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes
- should not be turned into an instrument in the area of non-proliferation.
We will never accept such an approach. The FMCT should be
a clear and meaningful step for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
in all its aspects. The FMCT should be a comprehensive, non-discriminatory,
internationally and effectively verifiable Treaty. Past production
and existing stocks as well as the future production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
must be covered under the scope of the Treaty.
Italy, 3 March
By stopping, through appropriate safeguards, all production
of weapons-grade fissile materials and encouraging the conversion
of their manufacturing plants to civil use, a FMCT
would drain way the supply of the main components of nuclear
warheads. A FMCT would make nuclear disarmament irreversible.
However, a viable FMCT needs reliable safeguards to prevent
illegal diversions of fissile materials, or use of civil installations
for military purposes. No treaty on disarmament can endure
without a credible and workable verification mechanism. This
is the only tool we have to remove the lurking temptations
of cheating.
Italy, 28 May
The FMCT
represents an essential element in moving forward international
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, for far too long
frozen by apparently irreconcilable political differences
and sterile disputes on procedural issues. FMCT is also the
natural complement for the new START Treaty being negotiated
by the United States and the Russian Federation and to renewed
efforts to achieve the formal entry into force of the CTBT.
Japan, 22 January
The CD must begin negotiations on an FMCT,
as it is the next logical step toward nuclear disarmament.
Japan, 26 May
Even if we commence negotiations on anFMCT
this year, their conclusions within the 2009 session cannot
be considered realistic. Even though Japan is ready to start
negotiations anytime, it may be an idea to agree this year
to a negotiating mandate and a work schedule for the sessions
from next year and beyond. What is important is to produce
and enter into force an FMCT as quickly as possible.
Malaysia, 11 June
The call to start negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other explosive devices is expressed in CD/1863
is timely, and constitutes one of the key steps towards nuclear
disarmament. Such a treaty is essential in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal.
Nigeria, 19 March
Two years ago, this day, when the Foreign Minister of my country
addressed this Forum, she laid out Nigeria’s support
for a Treaty banning the production of Fissile Material for
Nuclear Weapons or other Explosive Devices (FMCT), as practical
measure to achieve the twin goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.
Today, the Nigeria delegation looks forward to an early start
negotiations on an FMCT.
Norway, 17 February
The most efficient way to combat the specter of nuclear terrorism
would be the full implementation of an effectively verifiable
Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), combined with a CTBT
with robust verification mechanisms, and irreversible, verifiable
disarmament.
Pakistan, 12 February
Pakistan has remained consistent in its support for a verifiable
treaty and remains prepared to resume negotiations on the
basis of the Shannon
Mandate at the earliest. The issues of verification and
stocks have become vital for Pakistan in any negotiations
on a FMT.
Pakistan, 29 May
Pakistan has maintained a principled and consistent position
that the CD is the most appropriate and the most legitimate
forum for negotiations on an FMT on the basis of the Shannon
Report of 1995 as a part of the comprehensive and balanced
programme of work of the Conference.
A verifiable fissile material treaty covering stocks is a
sine qua non for the effective cessation of a nuclear arms
race. Such a treaty, once negotiated, would also strengthen
global as well as regional peace and stability. The issues
of verification and stocks have become vital for Pakistan
in any negotiations on a FMT because of the nuclear cooperation
arrangements in our neighborhood, without adequate international
safeguards. These have the potential for increasing fissile
material stocks that can be diverted towards weapons production
as was done in the past.
Pakistan, 4 June
Unless the equilibrium is re-established, the fashioning of
an appropriate FMT appears to be a difficult challenge. A
treaty which would merely legalize national moratoria of NWS
and freeze the asymmetries will undermine the international
community’s vision of a nuclear weapons free world as
well as Pakistan’s national security.
Republic of Korea, 27 January
The ROK supports the
CD/1840, finding it balanced and realistic, and recognizing
that the time is ripe for negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT.)
Russian Federation, 7 March
We are prepared to start negotiations on a treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes
(FMCT),
which would become an important milestone in the processes
of nuclear disarmament and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
Turkey, 12 March
Following an agreement on the Programme of Work, the CD could
start negotiations on an FMCT.
Turkey is of the opinion that a comprehensive and non-discriminatory
approach to FMCT negotiations should be adopted. We encourage
the Member States to show flexibility with regard to the modalities
of a mandate on FMCT, so that we can reach consensus in a
reasonable timeframe. We believe the commencement of negotiations
on FMCT and entry into force of the CTBT
could play a catalyst role for a successful outcome at the
NPT Review Conference.
Ukraine, 17 March
We believe that the adoption of an FMCT
will significantly enforce the current NPT regime. Banning
the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices will sharply limit the chances
of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists. Commencement
of negotiations without any preconditions on the FMCT should
be the first priority for the CD.
United Kingdom, 19 March
The first steps of which are to commence urgent negotiations
without preconditions on a
Fissile Material Cut off Treaty and for all States to
sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. States have national interest that capping
the production of weapon usable fissile material and outlawing
the testing of nuclear weapons are two powerful and achievable
goals that we believe are consistent with the long term needs
and interests of each State.
United Kingdom, 25 June
The FMCT
is together with the CTBT
one of the key building blocks towards that vision and therefore
we have looked very seriously indeed at it.
United States, 26 May
The Obama administration has made it clear that they expect
that this CD will resume its important contributions to international
disarmament, and most immediately, the negotiation of a FMCT.
The polestar is President Obama’s speech in Prague on
April 5th, when he announced, “the United States will
seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile
materials intended for use in nuclear weapons. As members
already know, this characterization of a verifiable FMCT marks
a significant gesture on the part of the US in its determination
to move the process forward. We are under no illusions that
negotiations of an FMCT will be quick or easy. It will take
the focused effort of all states in the CD to work through
the difficult issues that lie ahead.
Prevention
of an arms race in outer space
Bangladesh, 3
February
Outer space is the common heritage of humankind. It must be
used for peaceful purposes only. The CD must take on the issue
of adopting an international instrument for averting the weaponization
of space.
Canada, 26 March
The paper [Canada’s
Working Paper, “The Merits of Certain Draft Transparency
and Confidence Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for
Space Security”] argues that the CD should consider
security guarantees, such as a declaration of legal principles,
a code of conduct, or a treaty, that would (a) ban the placement
of weapons in space, (b) prohibit the use of satellites so
as to damage or destroy them, and (c) prohibit the use of
satellites themselves as weapons. Agreement on robust security
guarantees as a first step could help in laying the foundation
and building the momentum for future legal protections.
European Union, 12 February
(Read by the Czech Republic)
The EU favors the enhancement of the multilateral framework
concerning the preservation of a peaceful, safe and secure
environment in outer space and places great importance on
the relevant existing agreements and sees these as the basis
on which we should build. These agreements contribute to transparency
and are important confidence-building measures between space-faring
and non-space-faring nations.
The EU appreciates the efforts of the Russian Federation and
the People’s Republic of China to enhance international
space security and to put the subject on the agenda. Concerning
the draft treaty on the
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT),
the EU has already indicated that although it identifies itself
with the overall goal, further reflection is required on the
elements for an effective international treaty. The EU has
been preparing a draft proposal for an International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, aimed at increasing
the security of outer space activities. It is, however, not
a legally binding document, nor does it seek to replace initiatives
which work towards that aim.
Group of 21, 19 February (delivered by Bangladesh)
The Group emphasizes the necessity of further measure with
appropriate and effective provision for verification to prevent
an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Further, the
Group is deeply concerned over the negative implications of
the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense
systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies
capable of being deployed in outer space, which have, inter
alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international
climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and strengthening
of international security. The prevention of an arms race
in outer space has assumed greater urgency because of legitimate
concerns that existing legal instruments are inadequate to
deter further militarization of our space, or prevent its
weaponization. The Group welcomes the joint Russian-Chinese
initiative of a draft treaty on the
“Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,
the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objectives”
(PPWT), as it is a good basis for further discussions
toward adopting an international binding instrument.
India, 3 February
There is growing concern that current technological developments,
in particular related to ASAT, may impact negatively on the
present international legal framework on outer space. We,
therefore, support international efforts to reinforce safety
and security of space based assets ad to prevent the placement
of weapons in outer space.
Iran, 19 February
The current legal regime proves to be insufficient to prevent
an arms race in outer space. CD is also the appropriate body
to work in that regard. The draft treaty on PPWT
presented to the CD by China and Russia last year is a
step in the right direction that deserves further consideration.
Pakistan, 12 February
The existing legal regimes are not sufficient and adequate
to stem the induction of space weapons through surveillance
and verification. The time is ripe for negotiations on PAROS.
Russian Federation,
20 January
Ensuring security in space is a priority for Russia in the
CD. A year ago, on the 12th of February 2008, Russia, as cosponsor
with China, officially submitted for consideration by the
conference, here, a draft
treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in space
by preventing the use of force or the threat of the use of
force against space objects.
Russian Federation, 7
March
Preventing weaponization of outer space is of particular importance
among disarmament issues. When Russia and China introduced
a draft international Treaty on the Prevention
of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) at this
Conference last February, they felt that it was easier to
prevent weaponization of outer space than to get rid of new
stockpiles of weapons afterwards. Prevention of an arms race
in outer space will also contribute to making the strategic
situation predictable and preserving integrity of orbital
assets.
Turkey, 12 March
The proposal presented by the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China deserves careful consideration by the CD.
We are looking forward to receive the compilation of observations
on the draft
PPWT.
United States, 19 February
We have all noted with concern the collision last week between
the privately operated Iridium communications satellite and
the inactive Russian Cosmos satellite. As a leading space-faring
nation, the U.S. government takes these issues very seriously.
Last week’s collision underscore the increasingly congested
space environment. This collision emphasizes the vital importance
of international cooperation between governments and industry,
which is critical in the future to improve space safety. We
look forward to further productive discussions in the CD in
connection with outer space.
Nuclear disarmament
Australia, 20
January
Australia remains strongly committed to nuclear disarmament.
That was why Australian Prime Minister Rudd along with then
Japanese Prime Minister Aso decided to establish an International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
last year. The Commission will seek to break existing stalemates
and restate the case for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
in ways that are compelling for political decision makers.
Brazil, 4 August
The disappearance of nuclear weapons is the ultimate condition
to prevent the destruction of humankind. Notwithstanding,
the importance of bilateral negotiations, it is in this multilateral
forum that negotiations are supposed to generate the wide
political and legal basis to general and complete disarmament.
Current conditions are especially favorable to discussions
on the question of nuclear disarmament. This climate provides
a new impulse to the Conference and, on the same time, it
can be reinforced by our discussions in this sole multilateral
negotiating forum for disarmament.
China, 12 August
Unprecedented opportunities now exist in international nuclear
disarmament. The complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons and a nuclear-weapon-free world have become
widely embraced goals, and various initiatives on nuclear
disarmament have been proposed. We welcome these developments.
We believe that in order to achieve the compete prohibition
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons for a nuclear-weapon-free
world, the process of nuclear disarmament must be advanced
in real earnest.
DPRK, 29 May
It is our constant policy to achieve total and complete nuclear
disarmament and DPRK believes and hopes that those countries
that possess most of the nuclear weapons must take the lead
in the elimination of nuclear weapons. In fact, the nuclear
threat and proliferation comes from those weapons, particularly
on alert status.
Egypt, 17 February
Egypt fully associates itself with the statement made by Algeria
on behalf of the G-21 and believes nuclear disarmament must
remain the top priority of the CD. The devastating and destructive
nature of such weapons makes their complete and total elimination
a necessity for the very survival of our entire human race.
Egypt underscores that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
are interrelated and that effective efforts to address one
must necessarily address the other.
European Union,
20 January, (Delivered by the Czech Republic)
The European Union attaches great importance to the CD as
the single multilateral forum at the disposal of the international
community for global negotiations in the field of disarmament.
European Union, 12 February (Read by the Czech Republic)
The EU calls for progress in the current discussions between
the United States and Russia on the development of a legally
binding post-START arrangement, and an overall reduction in
the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with
Article
VI of the NPT, in particular the states that possess the
largest arsenals.
The EU also calls for the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons,
by those states that possess them, in heir general arms control
and disarmament process, with a view to the reduction and
elimination of these weapons.
Germany, 12 March
Although the threat of nuclear weapons may be less present
in the minds and media today than it was during the Cold War,
making progress in nuclear disarmament continues to be one
of the major challenges in the international community. We
cannot afford to be passive; we need renewed efforts towards
complete nuclear disarmament “Global
ZERO” as a rational, sustainable long-term solution
to ensure our security. The danger of terrorists putting their
hands on nuclear weapons and materials is growing and will
remain one of the major threats if no steps are taken to reduce
considerably the numbers of such weapons.
Group of 21, 12 February
(delivered by Algeria)
The Group reaffirms its readiness to start negotiations on
a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear
weapons convention.
India, 28 May
India attaches the highest priority to nuclear disarmament
and the elimination of nuclear weapons on a universal and
non-discriminatory basis. While disappointed that the CD has
not been able to launch negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament,
we believe the CD should continue to explore all possible
avenues to make progress so as to respond meaningfully to
growing international opinion in favor of a vision of a world
free of nuclear weapons.
India, 29 May
India attaches the highest priority to the goal of nuclear
disarmament. Speaking at the UNGA on 26 September 2008, our
Prime Minister reiterated India’s proposal for a Nuclear
Weapons Convention for banning the production, development,
stock piling and use of nuclear weapons and to provide for
their complete elimination within a specified time frame.
Indonesia, 22 May
It is important that efforts aimed at non-proliferation should
be mirrored by simultaneous efforts aimed at disarmament.
Otherwise such success will soon be doomed to failure since
there will be always a risk of proliferation as long as these
weapons continue to exist. Indeed, the existence of nuclear
weapons in the name of ones security is undermining the security
of others. As we have already given up our option to go nuclear,
it is therefore reasonable and justifiable for us to expect
those that possess these weapons to fulfill their obligations
in making concrete measures to eliminate them in an internationally
verifiable manner. As nuclear disarmament is the highest priority
on our agenda this treaty must serve as an instrument that
will ultimately lead to nuclear disarmament.
Iran, 19 February
The existence of nuclear weapons simply means that all states
will continue to live with a permanent sense of insecurity.
Along that line the primary goal for the CD should be to remove
this source of insecurity and to establish a world free of
nuclear weapons. In such circumstances we see no other issue
more urgent than nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in the
CD. Despite the obligations under Article
VI and undertakings by the NWS in 1995 and 2000, developments
in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising.
Failures towards achieving the goal of the complete nuclear
disarmament still threaten international peace and security.
Japan, 30 June
Japan, as the only country to have suffered nuclear bombings,
has consistently adhered to its three non-nuclear principles
and has demonstrated its strong resolve towards achieving
the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We submit every
year to the United Nations General Assembly a resolution on
the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which receives overwhelming
support among the UN Member States. We actively promote the
entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
What’s more, based upon our experiences, we encourage
disarmament and non-proliferation education to civil society,
particularly to the younger generation. Against this backdrop,
in April this year the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Hirofumi
Nakasone, presented 11 benchmarks that cover three fundamental
areas for advancing global nuclear disarmament and announced
Japan’s plan to host an international conference on
nuclear disarmament next year.
Japan is certain that the International Commission will strengthen
the recent positive movements in nuclear disarmament, and
we anticipate that the ICNND will submit a very useful report
soon after wrapping up its deliberations at the final meeting
in Hiroshima this October. We strongly hope that the outcomes
of the Commission’s work will contribute to the success
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Russian Federation,
20 January
Russia is committed to multilateralism for resolving issues
of nonproliferation, of arms control, of disarmament and confidence
building. We believe that we all must make more active use
of the potential of the CD for promoting and strengthening
a global regime for the nonproliferation of WMDs and disarmament.
The cornerstone of this architecture for us is the NPT, making
the NPT more effective, making it universal. New challenges
to the nuclear nonproliferation regime must be dealt with
on the basis of the NPT.
Russian Federation, 7 March
Progress towards “global
zero” can only be achieved through strengthened
strategic stability and strict adherence to the principle
of equal security for all. In its turn this suggests the need
to carry out a set of measures required for a sustainable
and consistent disarmament process. Among these measures are:
further advancement of nuclear disarmament by all NWS; prevention
of the weaponization of outer space; prevention of the operational
deployment of strategic offensive weapons equipped with conventional
warheads, i.e. the building of so-called, “compensatory”
potential; ensuring that states do not possess a “nuclear
upload potential”; prevention of states using NPT membership
to implement military nuclear programs; and ensuring the verifiable
cessation of conventional capabilities’ development
coupled with efforts to resolve other international issues,
including settlement of regional conflicts.
Secretary-General, 20 January
The Secretary General attaches great importance to the work
of the CD and to the wide-ranging efforts of Governments,
citizens' groups and activists throughout the world in the
area of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Secretary General
remains committed to using every opportunity, in his meetings
with government leaders and his outreach to civil society,
to forge partnerships and mobilize action.
Secretary-General, 19 May
A fresh multilateral approach is needed in disarmament and
non-proliferation more than ever. Last year, I presented my
Five-Point
Proposal to revitalize the disarmament agenda. I am encouraged
that my proposal has been widely recognized. I welcome the
many recent developments, statements, and initiatives that
can help to translate my proposals into real progress. A renewed
focus on disarmament and non-proliferation will benefit international
security and stability. It can also produce considerable dividends
for peace and developments. The world is enduring a deep economic
and financial crisis. By accelerating disarmament, we can
liberate resources that we need to combat climate change,
address food insecurity and achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.
Turkey, 20 January
Turkey supports global disarmament and all the efforts towards
sustaining international security through arms control, non-proliferation
and disarmament. We are party to all international non-proliferation
instruments and export control regimes, thus support the universalization
and effective implementation of these instruments.
Ukraine, 17 March
Ukraine welcomes a number of recent important disarmament
initiatives, such as “Five-Point
Proposal” by UN SG Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, EU proposals
on nuclear disarmament as well as valuable input from nuclear
weapons states and civil society groups. We are particularly
pleased to see the call of the UNSG to resume bilateral negotiations
between the US and Russia, aimed at deep and verifiable reductions
of their respective arsenals. The progress on nuclear disarmament
is as essential to win the struggle against non-proliferation
as ever. There can be no progress in combating nuclear proliferation
without tangible steps in nuclear disarmament and vice versa.
United Kingdom, 4 August
I would like to take this opportunity to share with colleagues
a recent UK initiative related to the NPT. On July 16, my
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced the UK Government’s
‘Road to 2010’ plan. Our ‘Road to 2010’
plan sets out a phased approach that will enable progress
on non-proliferation and multilateral disarmament. The first
stage is improving transparency of current weapons capabilities
as we seek greater control to prevent expansion. The second
is verifiable multilateral reductions in arsenals. And the
final stage is to create the security conditions to overcome
the technical and political challenges of a world free from
all nuclear weapons. We are calling on international partners
to work with us to establish nuclear security as a fourth
pillar of the international nuclear framework – alongside
non-proliferation, disarmament and access to civil nuclear
power.
Negative security
assurnaces
Bangladesh, 3
February
The non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT have a legitimate
right to receive an unconditional assurance from the nuclear
weapons states that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against them. It is critically important to develop
a legally binding framework for providing such assurances.
Group of 21,
12 February (delivered by Algeria)
The G-21 suggests the negotiation of a universal, unconditional
and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
as a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament.
Group of 21, 19
February (delivered by Bangladesh)
Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early
agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding
instrument to assure non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument
should be clear, credible without any ambiguity, and should
respond to the concerns of all the parties. The Group remains
extremely concerned with strategic defense doctrines, which
not only set rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international
security based on promoting and developing military alliance’s
nuclear deterrence policies. The group reiterates the in the
context of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs), it is essential
that nuclear weapons state (NWS) should provide unconditional
assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
to all States of the zones.
India, 3 February
The CD can make a meaningful contribution by undertaking negotiations
of an appropriate agreement in an Ad hoc Committee on negative
security assurances. India has espoused a policy of no first
use and non-use against non-nuclear States and is prepared
to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.
Iran, 19 February
Pending the total elimination of these inhumane weapons, efforts
for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally
binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons
states should be pursued as a matter of priority.
Italy, 3 March
The other useful tools in order to give renewed relevance
to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
are the Negative Security Assurances. The topic was discussed
and appeared in the final documents of the 1995
and 2000
NPT Review Conferences. Regrettably, NSAs do not appear in
the final document of the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Pakistan, 12 February
The nuclear weapons states have a major responsibility to
assure non-nuclear weapons states that nuclear weapons would
not be used against them. Since such statements have been
made in the Security Council by the nuclear weapons states,
there is no reason why these commitments cannot be transformed
into a legally binding instrument.
Pakistan, 4 June
We believe that an international legally binding instrument
providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons
states would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against them
and thus reduce the salience of these weapons in the security
doctrines of nuclear weapons states. This will serve as the
first building block in the future global nuclear disarmament
architecture. Turkey, 12 March
We regard the issue of negative security assurances (NSA)
as firmly anchored in the NPT regime. The 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference noted the unanimously adopted
UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), as well as
the declarations of the nuclear weapons states concerning
both negative and positive security assurances. The 2000 NPT
Review Conference Final
Document also made specific references to the issue. The
Conference agreed that legally binding security assurances
by the five nuclear weapons states to the non-nuclear weapons
states parties to the NPT, strengthen the non-proliferation
regime.
Ukraine, 17 March
Ukraine believes that legally binding security assurances
by the nuclear weapons states to the non-nuclear weapons states
parties to the NPT will significantly strengthen the nuclear
non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives
for pursuing nuclear capabilities. We strongly encourage the
NWS to reconfirm their commitments laid out in the relevant
UNSC Resolutions.
Programme
of Work
Australia, 26 May
Australia, in its national capacity, fully supports CD/1863
and looks forward to its early adoption.
Austria, 22 January
The CD could benefit from a fruitful and regular exchange
with disarmament NGOs. The longstanding Austrian efforts in
the area of disarmament and non-proliferation have demonstrated
time and again the importance of cooperation between governments,
parliaments and civil society in international relations.
Austria, 31 August
The time has been quickly running out and the window of opportunity
to achieve a consensual approach, on how to implement the
POW three months after it has been adopted, is closing. I
sincerely want to thank all who have participated in these
efforts to bring about consensus. These efforts, as you know,
have led to CD/1870
revision 2, which has been circulated on Thursday and on which
we were supposed to take a decision this morning. With that
in mind and against this background, it is with serious regret
that I have to inform the Conference that consensus on the
modalities for implementation on CD/1864
still eludes us. I do hope that the Conference will be able
to adopt a report by Thursday September 17.
Brazil, 22 May
Brazil offers its support to the adoption of a programme of
work, along the proposals made by you, in document CD/1863.
Mr. President in order to get consensus, a proposal has not
to correspond fully to each one’s positions. You know
that the ambitions of Brazil go beyond the limits that we
have been accepting in a realistic and a pragmatic way. Your
proposal keeps it self within these boundaries. My delegation,
for example, let it be known that it considers, the issue
of negative security assurance by means of a legally binding
instrument as right for negotiations. My delegation favors
the negotiations of a treaty to prohibit the placement of
weapons in outer space. It is true that your proposal does
not fulfill those expectations, however it does not preclude
them. My delegation will certainly pursue those aims in the
respective subsidiary bodies. It is of the outmost important
that the Conference on Disarmament resume its active negotiating
role.
Brazil, 4 August
In the view of the Delegation of Brazil, the arrangements
necessary for putting into practice the Program of Work should
be completed in the course of the current month of August
in order to be reflected in the CD’s Report to the General
Assembly.
Brazil, 20 August
There remains the fact that we could not adopt a decision
allowing the implementation of the program of work contained
in document CD/1864, adopted by consensus on March 29th. My
interpretation of that fact is that not all member states
are ready to accept a decision on the implementation unless
it includes a number of precautions that, in the view of many,
could put the CD in a straightjacket and severely limit the
prospects of it making progress.
Bulgaria, 28 May
The argument of Bulgaria to support CD/1863
is twofold. First, Bulgaria has always sought to play a constructive
role in this body and has supported every major initiative
designed to overcome the deadlock in the Conference. The merit
of the draft decision itself is the other reason for our support.
Our delegation finds it a well-balanced compromise that reflects
efforts from previous years to narrow down the differences
on a program of work. To our view, this document has the capacity
to prompt consensus among member states and provide basis
for the CD to resume its substantial work.
Canada, 26 March
It is my pleasure today to present a twelve-page Background
Paper [CD/1865] entitled: “Getting
the Conference on Disarmament Back to Substantive Work: Food
for Thought.” This text does not pretend to offer
any one solution for the CD. Rather, it is hoped that this
paper will promote understanding and dialogue among CD members,
and help the CD find its way progressively and positively
through the current impasse and to a resumption of its substantive
work.
Canada, 26 May
We have carefully considered the newly tabled draft decision
CD/1863
and feel that this is a balanced compromise. I should emphasize
that it is a compromise. Canada can support the draft decision
as the basis for work in the Conference on Disarmament. We
hope other delegations will approach this document with the
same constructive spirit of compromise in order for the Conference
on Disarmament to reach a consensus and resume its substantive
negotiation on work.
Canada, 25 August
Our collective work and interests would, in Canada’s
view, most appropriately employ CD/1864
as the cornerstone to guide our deliberations on the subsequent
document which sets our Program of Work into action. To assert
that the CD’s agreed Programme of Work, CD/1864, should
closely guide our hand on the implementation decision is to
say that Canada believes the Conference should remain faithful
to the text of CD/1864 – which was itself a compromise,
consensus decision. Many delegates might have wished that
CD/1864 contained other elements. But all members of this
Conference agreed to it on May 29, and it now stands as our
collective reference document. Let us all recall that CD/1864
set out the work that we agreed should be accomplished. The
Program of Work did not, however, characterize how much progress
should be achieved, or how the outcomes among the four core
areas should be balanced. CD/1864 did not address such things
because progress and outcomes on different issues are by their
very nature, unpredictable.
In deciding to adopt CD/1864 the Conference also opted not
to use the word ‘principle’ anywhere in the text
– the Program of Work simply refers to the Rules of
Procedure of the Conference. Matters of ‘principle’
and their possible interpretations maybe be different among
the many delegations that sit in this chamber. All these qualifying
words – outcomes, progress, balance, principle –
do not serve the Conference well when found in a procedural,
implementation document. Canada was therefore very pleased
to support CD/1870
Rev.1 as our implementation document for the Program of
Work because it too does not condition the conduct of our
work to words with varying interpretations. Nonetheless, in
the spirit of flexibility and consensus, Canada could also
support the subsequent revisions proposed by your predecessor
as President. Canada urges the Conference to be mindful of
our agreed text, CD/1864, and that we base our efforts on
it in order to implement our work. In our view, those that
cannot live with CD/1870
Rev. 1, or the President’s subsequent circulated
drafts, are calling into question their commitment to the
Program of Work which they themselves agreed.
CD President, Algeria,
22 May
Now it is clear that at this stage it is still early days
and we do not have a consensus. We do not expect on the first
meeting after the presentation of a document like CD/1863,
for anybody or any regional group to announce consensus. It
would be useful for Member States who would like to give us
some signals or suggestions to do so. Or they may do so of
course on next Tuesday, or next Thursday, or on any time in
the future. I do not anticipate that there is a time limit
for the exercise – you know that we have been engaged
in this exercise for twelve years, I hope that we don’t
go through another twelve years before we come to a close.
CD President, Argentina,
25 June
From those consultations [in the month of June] has arisen
a Draft calendar of activities to be found in document CD/1866,
which will enable the Conference on disarmament to immediately
commence the substantive work up to the end of its sessions
for 2009. Within the limited time remaining this schedule
provides further possibility of addressing the tasks of each
working group and the special coordinators in a serious and
comprehensive way, in line with their respective mandates
as spelled out in Document CD/1864.
Likewise, each topic also has a time allotted to it in a balanced
manner and I understand that it is satisfactory in that respect
to all the Members of the Conference on Disarmament.
CD President, Argentina, 25 June
Document
CD/1864 does indicate the path to be followed as it were.
And the first step on that path would be to establish the
Subsidiary Bodies and the Special Coordinator, consisting
of the appointment of their officials and their officers.
Proposal CD/1867
points in that direction. Once we are in a position to adopt
that Decision, we will be able to set out the structure of
our work. And it is in that context that the schedule activities
were wished and discussed among all the Members of the Conference.
Document CD/1866
provides us with an idea of the sequence of activities to
be performed. Accordingly, I think that this provides us with
a picture and a perspective of the matters set out earlier
in document CD/1864.
CD President, Australia, 30 June
Now some Delegations have raised legitimate concerns about
the Draft Decisions in CD/1866
and CD/1867
and I am continuing to consult with Delegations to address
these concerns. I appreciate too that some Delegations have
yet to receive instructions from Capitals. In this context
I should like also to emphasize, as set out clearly in CD/1864
and the Programme of Work, that Decisions on the appointment
of the Chairs and Special Coordinators and on the Calendar
are for 2009 only. The 2010 Conference on Disarmament will
need to take its own Decision on a Programme of Work, on Subsidiary
Bodies, who will chair them and on the Calendar of Activities.
CD President, Australia, 2 July
I have been consulting many Delegations on the Draft Decisions
CD/1867 rev. 1 on the draft scheduled on activities and CD/1867
on the appointments of the Chairs and Special Coordinators.
It is clear that it remains a few issues of concern to some
Delegations, as we indeed have heard this morning that will
need to be addressed before we can put these decisions for
adoption.
China, 25 June
CD/1867
talks about the implementation of CD/1864.
I would like to know whether the
CD/1866 also falls into this sphere. Putting it in different
words, let me say, the contents of CD/1866,
I would like to know whether it also falls into the framework
of the implementation of CD/1864?
Because one Draft talks about the implementation of CD/1864
and the other one does not. Well it is not clear what
kind of implementation it will be involved in. However, this
is only something technical I think. So I do not know Mr.
President, do you have any special considerations on this
arrangement? Is it true that both Drafts can be combined into
one draft so that everybody knows that they talk about the
implementation of CD/1864?
China, 2 July
Some delegations have some misunderstandings of China's position.
That China is only concerned with the work of the 2009 Conference
on Disarmament. As a matter of fact this is not the case,
we're concerned not only with the work for the 2009. Actually
concerning these existing two Documents, we have no major
substantive difficulty with that. What we are concerned with
are the long-term term issues. That is: How to lay a good
and reliable foundation for the future substantive work. Around
the issues which are being avoided: if we don’t discuss
them now, we will not discuss them in the future. Some Countries
have this kind of argument. With these two Documents as guidance
for our possible work, we can avoid disputes and safe time
to build up to our substantive work as soon as possible. That
is all I wanted to say. I understand the good intention of
this position, yet sometimes time cannot be saved; otherwise
it can be very dangerous. These two Documents may be able
to solve the issues of the Conference of 2009, but they cannot
solve the long term issues.
Colombia, 26 May
Colombia supports this proposed Programme of Work, CD/1863,
although it does not fully reflect what we would desire on
relevant items. In its current form it is a balanced proposal,
which could be equally satisfactory, or unsatisfactory to
everybody which we think is the key to any consensus. We should
be aware that it is essential that this proposal be supported
and put an end to the stagnation that has paralyzed this forum
for the last 12 years.
DPRK, 29 May
We have followed deeply the discussions of the Draft Discussion
(CD/1863)
and the development of atmosphere in the CD. DPRK has been
always constructive in the approach to the CD and it is fully
cooperating with the Group of 21. It is from this constructive
spirit and from the constant position for the total elimination
of nuclear weapons forced by those countries, which possess
most of the weapons that the DPRK decided to support the Draft
Decision
CD/1863, in order to start substantial work without delay.
Egypt, 20 January
Egypt fully supports the adoption of a Programme of Work by
consensus that would establish ad hoc committees as negotiating
subsidiary bodies of the Conference for the four core issues:
Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs),
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
European Union, 22 May
(Delivered by the Czech Republic)
The European Union thanks you, Mr. President, and the other
P6 Members for the document CD/1863,
entitled Draft Decision for the establishment of a Programme
of Work for the 2009 session. We welcome the ongoing P6 consultations
with all delegations. The EU hopes that all CD members will
respond positively to your proposal. You can count on our
support in taking your efforts forward. We urge all CD members
to seize this moment and to get the CD back to substantive
work.
European Union, 10
August (Delivered by Sweden)
It is therefore with deep regret that I today take the floor
on behalf of the European Union to express our profound disappointment
over the latest developments, or rather lack of developments,
in the CD. The Programme of Work in CD/1864
was an important breakthrough after more than a decade of
stalemate in the CD. World leaders welcomed the results of
our efforts, based on the assumption that the CD would begin
implementing the agreed programme of work without any further
delay. The period of procedural maneuvers to prevent progress
on substance was over. So we all thought.
We have now less that 6 weeks left to show the world that
the CD is able to at least start implementing the 2009 Programme
of Work. Let me assure you that the European Union and its
member states are ready.
Germany, 12 March
Germany has been working consistently on the adoption of a
Programme of Work and has continuously demonstrated its flexibility.
We have supported the so-called A5-Proposal
of 5 September 2003, the L.1-Document
in 2007 and continue to fully support the March 2008 Proposal
for a Program of Work, contained in document CD/1840.
We are ready to continue this proven flexibility in order
to overcome the deadlock in the CD and hope for equal flexibility
by all members to join support for – or at least not
stand in the way of – the adoption of a Programme of
Work on the basis of the CD/1840
proposal.
We believe that the Programme of Work is not an end in itself
but just a tool that should enable the CD to fulfill its functions
and we all would serve the international community much better
by actually investing our energy into substantive work on
the relevant issues, including negotiations where appropriate,
rather than having protracted debates on mostly formal procedural
issues.
Germany, 26 May
Germany has been working consistently on the adoption of the
Programme of Work and has continuously demonstrated its flexibility.
We have supported the so called A-5
proposals of September 2003, the L-1
document in 2007 and the March 2008 proposal for a Programme
of Work contained in document CD/1840.
We are ready to continue this proven flexibility in order
to overcome the deadlock in the CD and hope for equal flexibility
by all members of the CD with regards to the Programme of
Work. In this spirit we fully support the P-6 proposal for
a draft decision for the establishment of a Programme of Work
for the 2009 session contained in document CD/1863.
Germany, 6 August
We are figuratively speaking only a few centimeters away from
starting this important substantial work this year. Procedural
matters should no longer prevent us from doing so. Therefore
I urge all delegations to show utmost flexibility and not
object to the adoption of the draft procedural decision on
the implementation of our Programme of Work as contained in
document CD/1870/Rev.1.
Group of 21, 12 February
(delivered by Algeria)
The G-21 calls for renewed efforts to resolve the current
impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament, particularly in
the adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of
work of the CD.
Hungary, 26 May
I would like to assure you Mr. President, and the other P-6
Presidencies, of my delegation’s full support in your
consequent effort to guide the voice of this Conference to
be able to adopt the Programme of Work based on the document
CD/1863.
India, 3 February
India supports the establishment of an Ad hoc committee on
FMCT as part of the CD’s Programme of Work.
India, 28 May
India will not stand in the way of the adoption of the draft
decision contained in CD/1863.
We reserve the right to make remarks on substantive elements
of the Programme of Work after its formal adoption by the
Conference.
Indonesia, 22 May
My delegation supports the initiative taken by the President
in proposing a draft decision for the establishment of a programme
of work, CD/1863.
We are convinced that the draft is crafted based on a number
of past proposals, statements as well as inputs from various
parties through intensive consultations. My delegation therefore
considers the proposal to be a good compromise package, which
can be a starting point for our work in the very near future.
We support the package, which in particular includes the start
of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
on the basis of document CD/1299
of 24 March 1995, and the mandate contained therein.
Iran, 19 February
These four core issues already recognized by the CD are equally
important. The CD should not prioritize one issue at the cost
of others. In providing any program of work the CD should
pay careful attention not to follow the same path which takes
us nowhere.
Iraq, 28 May
We fully support the Draft Decision (CD/1863),
because it constitutes at this stage a reasonable balance
and a compromise that cover the concerns of Member States.
We hope that this would be real departing point in the adoption
of the CD Programme of Work, so that the conference would
be saved from the stalemate, which it witnessed for not such
a short period of time to embark on serious realistic negotiations
on the content of the Decision which reflect the interest
of the Member States of the CD.
Ireland, 28 May
My country sees in document CD/1863
a realistic, practical proposal capable of finally breaking
the stalemate and getting this Conference back to substantive
work. While it is unlikely that any delegation will be completely
satisfied with it from a strictly national point of view,
we must all bear in mind our shared responsibility to ensure
that this Conference begins again to do the work for which
it was established. It is for this reason that my delegation
is happy to inform you of our support for the proposal contained
in document CD/1863.
Ireland, 2 July
Ireland is also a [non-nuclear weapons state which is not
under any “nuclear umbrella”], while we would
not presume to speak for such states, they can all speak for
themselves, I just wanted to comment a little bit on that
passage of the Ambassador’s
statement [Pakistan]. We do not seek any special treatment
in procedural matters. In procedural matters, as we see it,
all States, members of this Conference should be on an equal
basis. Also, if the remark is intended to refer to the issue
of the position of the working group chairs and special coordinators,
we would see their roles as being to work in the interest
of the Conference as a whole and not of course to protect
their interests.
Israel, 22 May
I would like just to put on record that on the 25th of March
my delegation requested a meeting with the President of the
Conference on Disarmament and up to now, almost two months
later; we did not get any reply for our request. So, just
to put on record, that our delegation was not consulted on
CD/1863.
Italy, 28 May
My country considers your draft program of work for the CD,
formulated by you with the support of the other P6, a finely
balanced compromise document, containing all the necessary
elements to finally break the decade-long deadlock that has
so far, regrettably, characterize this body. It provides,
among other things, for the start of negotiations on a verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Italy can endorse
CD/1863
and the program of work therein.
Japan, 22 January
Japan could support focused thematic debates on the four core
issues [of Nuclear Disarmament, a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and the Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Spaces (PAROS)] in informal meetings
and the allocation of relevant space for member states to
have the possibility to address other issues relevant to the
CD. Japan is convinced that CD/1840
is the best possible compromise for this year’s session,
but is open to the document being revised further.
Japan, 26 May
The key difference in our opinion between documents CD/1840
and CD/1863
is that FMCT negotiations under the former are to be conducted
without any preconditions, while the latter aims to negotiate
a verifiable FMCT. Effective verification may indeed present
difficult technical issues. Nevertheless, Japan’s position
has been consistent on this issue and we have submitted a
working paper suggesting possible ways for verification in
an FMCT (CD/1774). In our view, CD/1863
is a comprehensive and balanced since it allows for the substantive
discussion of the three other core issues in subsidiary bodies
with a focus on the possibility of their future negotiation.
Japan, 10 August
We adopted CD/1864
by consensus in May. It means that our consensus is the implement
the program of work before the end of this session. But it
has been put in danger by a few continuous interventions.
If the interventions contain a good reason for discussion,
we can and we have to solve the deadlock quickly through consultation.
But it seems to be not the case with us now. We should now
realize that this unusual situation is endangering the CD’s
principle of consensus itself.
Malaysia, 11 June
We underline that the other core issues, namely, Nuclear Disarmament,
Negative Security Assurances, and the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) are of equal importance. On the
principle of equitable geographic representation and rotation,
my delegation is of the view that this could be worked out
in tandem and carefully with the distribution of work among
different group systems. With respect to the balance allocation
of time, we are committed to a balance schedule that would
ensure that the working groups of all the four core issues
will be dealt in a fair manner as well as the work of coordinators
on other specific issues.
Malaysia 30 June
The Malaysian Delegation is encouraged that the Draft Decision
CD/1866
successfully outlines in a practical manner the schedule of
activities for the meetings of the four working groups and
the special coordinators and has the balance needed. We view
CD/1866
as the necessary prescription to allow the CD to begin substantive
work, preparatory work such as on Mandates, Terms of Reference,
future scheduling and others.
Given the limited time left,
CD/1866 would allow us to commence practical work this
year and further work for next year. Subsequently, my Delegation
is pleased that CD/1867
reflects the equitable regional distribution in the appointment
of Chairs and Special Coordinators. In this regard, we would
like to express our appreciation to the Delegations’
staff which have come forward as the potential to Chair the
four Working Groups, as well as carry out the task of the
three Special Coordinators, as reflected in Draft Decision
CD/1867.
Malaysia is convinced that both Draft Decisions, CD/1866
and CD/1867,
are the workable means to move for ward which we fully endorse.
Malaysia, 20 August
In our statement of the 30 June 2009, we expressed our support
towards CD/1866/Rev1
and CD/1867
as we were convinced that both decisions are the means
to move forward. In this regard, my delegation naturally supports
draft decision CD/1870.Rev1.
We believe that draft decision CD/1870.Rev1 contains all the
necessary elements needed. It provides clarity and encapsulates
much of the understanding that many have to enable the Conference
to implement the programme of work.
Mexico, 28 May
We were very pleased to hear widespread support for CD/1863,
containing a Programme of Work for this forum for 2009. My
delegation would like to add its support to this document.
We think it is a realistic proposal and are convinced that
it could contribute to overcome the paralysis, which has bedeviled
the deliberations of this Conference over the last few years.
My delegation feels it is very important that the Programme
of Work, contained in document CD/1863,
takes into account a number of proposals made since 1999,
and should include in the agenda views and proposals put forward
by States or to be put forward by States. It should take on
board elements raised in prior discussions. That it should
consider establishing a working group to begin negotiations
on legally binding documents to prohibit the production of
fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive
nuclear devices on the basis of document TD/1299
of March 1995. Which contains the Shannon
report and mandate, which my delegation believes is an
important reference for discussions on this matter, without
diminishing the importance of other proposals and with also
a view to initiating negotiations on any other item of the
agenda in the future.
Mexico, 26 June
Mexico is quite prepared to adopt the documents CD/1866
and CD/1867
and we are quite prepared to continue to support you Sir and
the other presidents for 2009 in taking decisive steps towards
the fulfillment of our shared objective: a world free from
nuclear weapons.
Mexico, 2 July
My Delegation sincerely hopes that the positive climate will
solve the adoption of the Programme of Work and will quickly
be reflected in the adoption of CD/1866
rev 1. and CD/1867.
Morocco, 29 May
We believe CD/1863
is out of phase with new nuclear disarmament and security
measures and it does not reflect the G-21 position of principle
which is in favor of a Programme of Work for the CD which
is balanced and which would set up working groups with negotiating
mandates on the four pillars of nuclear disarmament, FMCT,
PAROS and NSA. All it does is to establish negotiating group
on verifiable FMCT and Working Groups for in depth discussion
on the other items on the agenda of the Conference. In other
words, what the CD has been doing for the last 14 years, rather
than being the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament
and an independent body.
New Zealand, 4 August
We urge all delegations now to show flexibility and support
the framework to implement CD/1864.
For New Zealand, the negotiations on a treaty prohibiting
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons will
be a key focus. But we will also engage substantively on the
other issues contained in CD/1864
and which are also significant for global security. New Zealand
will be actively engaged in the working group on nuclear disarmament.
We look forward to fruitful and productive exchanges on negative
security assurances and remain interested in the discussion
on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well
as on other items on the CD’s agenda.
Nigeria, 19 March
Nigeria supports the P6 initiative in CD/1840,
as before it with CD/2007/L.I.
In CD/2007/CRP.5
and CD/2007/CRP.6,
respectively, reflects our careful assessment that theses
efforts provide realistic bases for the CD to overcome its
long-standing difficulties.
Nigeria, 26 May
It would be hard for Nigeria to celebrate CD/1863
as the silver bullet to the many challenging tasks before
this forum. A major source of our disappointment is the low
priority CD attaches to negative security assurances. Despite
these shortcomings, Nigeria is happy to support the proposals
in CD/1863
in the hope that it would allow the CD to move in its work.
Norway, 26 May
We consider CD/1863
a balanced compromise, and urge all to show the necessary
flexibility so that we now finally may break the deadlock
in the CD and start substantive work.
Pakistan, 12 February
There is consensus in the Conference that the four core issues
– nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances
(NSAs), prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
and the fissile materials treaty (FMT) – constitute
a delicate balance. Neither is more important nor riper than
other for negotiations. Any proposal on the CD’s Programme
of Work must maintain this delicate balance while keeping
in view that the C is not a debating society but a negotiating
forum. The end objective of any deliberations in the CD should
be the negotiating of a legally binding treaty.
Pakistan, 22 May
Mr. President my delegation welcomes your efforts and the
efforts of your p6 colleagues to evolve document CD/1863.
This is a finely balance document and my delegation can support
the initiation of work in the CD on its basis.
Pakistan, 29 May
CD/1863
is not a perfect document. Pakistan has jointed the consensus
on it reflects a compromise that enables us to break the impasse
in the Conference.
The next logical step is to lay out the foundation of our
work and prepare well for our deliberations. The programme
of work envisages establishment of four Working Groups on
the four core issues – nuclear disarmament, fissile
material treaty (FMT), prevention of an arms race in outer
space (PAROS) and negative security assurances (NSAs) –
under agenda items 1, 3 and 4, and appointment of three Special
Coordinators under agenda items 5, 6 and 7. The allocation
of time for the four Working Groups should be balanced so
that the progress on each issue is ensured. The appointment
of Chairs of the Working Groups should respect the principle
of equal geographical representation. Transparency and inclusiveness
should be the guiding principles of this process.
Pakistan, 25 June
Mr. President, we understand that consultations are underway
on these documents and that you have formally presented now
containing CD/1866
and CD/1867.
We will continue to constructively engage in this process
to reach a consensus as early as possible.
Pakistan, 2 July
After 10 long years, the Conference has adopted its programme
of work which envisages working groups on 4 core issues –
nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, outerspace
and a fissile material treaty. All four issues are equally
important and progress in the form of legally binding instruments
is the way forward. The next step is to decide on the Chairs
of the Working Groups and Special Coordinators and to finalize
the calendar of activities for the remaining part of the 2009
session.
In this regard a number of delegations, including Pakistan,
have made proposals…among these is the suggestion that
the special security interests of the non-nuclear weapons
states that do not belong to a military alliance nor enjoy
a security umbrella deserve special consideration –
even in procedural matters, so that they are better placed
to protect their interests. If there are cogent reasons to
the contrary, we would like to hear them.
Pakistan, 20 August
On 10 august 2009 Pakistan circulated its proposals with regards
to CD/1870
Rev.1 to the CD members to convey our views in a transparent
manner in order to move the CD's work forward. This was a
clear demonstration of our constructive approach and our commitment
which remains undiminished. That remains our official and
formal stance.
Peru, 22 May
Peru, Mr. President, thinks that although CD/1863
does not cover the full ambitions that we had for this document,
we think that it is a good and balanced basis to start the
substantive work of this august body, after more than ten
years.
Poland, 22 May
Poland welcomes the draft decision on the Programme of Work
of the CD contained in the document CD/1863.
We firmly believe that this document is a result of careful
considerations and constitutes balanced compromise.
Republic of Korea, 27 January
The ROK supports the CD/1840,
finding it balanced and realistic…
Republic of Korea, 26 May
My delegation is pleased to express its support for the CD/1863.
We believe the CD/1863
embodies a balanced and realistic approach to the seven agenda
items of the Conference, in particular the four core issues,
for which my delegation has been among the strong advocates.
Republic of Korea, 2
July
Indeed, it is true that CD/1866rev1
and CD/1867
contain some points of ambiguity, however in a real world
where the CD is going to take off ground we find it will be
much inevitable maintain constructive ambiguity for some time
to come. As for Document CD/1867,
on the list of Chairs and Special Coordinators, my delegation
has no reservations at all. However we wish to share our understanding
with other CD Members, that nothing in the Rules of Procedure
of the CD will preclude any Member of the CD from serving
as Chairs or Special Coordinators of Subsidiary Bodies on
whatever grounds. This counts for all CD Members in that respect,
as long as they are chosen by the rule of consensus of the
CD.
Romania, 26 June
On behalf of the Eastern European Group we would like to express
our support for the two documents [CD/1866
and CD/1867]
you have presented. Our Group is ready to support these papers
and to remain engaged in a constructive continuation of the
work here to support any developments which would help us
push things forward in this endeavour.
Russian Federation, 29 May
President, thanks to your enthusiasm, your diplomatic skills
and your intuition, in close cooperation with your colleagues
in the P-6 in the Conference 2009, we have managed to generate
a proposal on a work programme which is under the number CD/1863.
We very much hope that this figure will be a propitious one
and will bring about the long awaited breakthrough in the
renewal of the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament.
Senegal, 22 May
From the point of view of my delegation, CD/1863
is a balanced and realistic proposal. In fact, it does seem
to contain the necessary elements to start in depth work on
the essential elements in our agenda, With regard to fissile
materials, we welcome the fact that the mandate for negotiations
that is proposed is a multilateral and internationally verifiable
agreement on the basis of CD/1299.
On the basis of nuclear disarmament, which for us is of the
greatest national priority, we welcome the fact that the work
that CD/1863
would in fact allow an exchange of views on practical measures
with regard to progressive and practical measures to reduce
nuclear weapons with a view to completely eliminating them-
including approaches to a multi-lateral agreement. We believe
it is very positive that the working group that you’re
proposing to establish would allow us to ensure Negative Security
Assurances without limitation. These issues are extremely
important for us. On the Negative Security Assurances, we
welcome the fact that the issue of possible negotiation of
a legally binding instrument is contemplated in the framework
of the working group that you are proposing to establish.
Slovakia, 26 May
I do not intend to echo many reasons why CD/1863
deserves to achieve consensus among the CD members as we have
already heard them from a number of speakers so far. Let me
in this respect express the support of Slovakia for its content,
both in substantive and procedural terms, only by recalling
the wise words of the former UN Secretary-General who in June
2006 said, “the hour is late and the choice is clear.”
South Africa, 22 May
In the view of my delegation the introduction of CD/1863
is purely a logical follow-up to the Presidential non-paper
that you circulated to CD members on 26 March of this year.
My delegation views it as a product of compromise that also
reflects past efforts to narrow down the differences on a
programme of work. In this regard, it would probably be fair
to say that some delegations, including my own, might ideally
wish to have seen the proposal strengthened in certain areas.
But this being said, Mr. President, my delegation nevertheless
believes that the draft decision contained in
CD/1863 represents a delicate compromise that deserves
the support of all members of this body.
Sweden, 26 June 2009
The Western Group is very much ready to accept the two documents
that you have proposed to us, that will take us to the next
stage of implementing our Work Programme. In the view of the
Western Group CD/1866
and CD/1867
is an acceptable basis to now implement our Work Programme.
Syria, 26 May
Some of the major positive aspects of your document, CD/1863
are that they are built ton important points-
1. Negotiations on FMCT would be a disarmament measure, and
not a non-proliferation measure only.
2. The creation of working groups as a new mechanism to launch
negotiations and abates are a good idea. It also goes along
with the rules of procedures of the CD.
3. Future negotiations on FMCT will be based on the Shannon
initiative the A5
initiative and the 2 were based on the principle of verification
and reduction of stocks.
4. The FMCT negotiations do not exclude the principle of elimination
of stocks. They also envisage the drafting of an international
legally binding instrument.
Like a number of other states members on the CD we had hoped
that the document would lay greater emphasis on the issue
of negative security assurances and PAROS. However, we all
know that reaching a comprehensive document that satisfies
the priorities and ambitions of 192 states is not possible.
Therefore Mr. President, the
delegation of my country supports CD/1863.
Tunisia, 22 May
Given the favor all impetus we have recorded over the last
years, as recorded by the Secretary General, my country is
fully supporting the CD/1863
and we would like to express the hope that consensus will
be a shored to have adopted.
Turkey, 26 May
Turkey has had the opportunity to contribute to these efforts
by presenting document “CD 1840” on behalf of
the P-6 last year. Indeed, the process that we have been engaging
ourselves includes, inter alia, A-5, L1, “CD 1840”
and now “CD/1863”.
Now this process ought to accelerate. Flexibility by all delegations
is required not only for reaching consensus on CD/1863,
but for the course of action that should follow it, as well.
This would mean bringing the CD back to its fundamental role
in promoting global peace and security.
Ukraine, 17 March
A year ago, the 2008 CD Presidents, including Ukraine, have
tabled the Proposal for the Programme of Work to the CD (CD/1840),
which is so far the most effective attempt to bridge the positions
of the CD membership. The outcome of informal discussions
this year confirmed that the content of the CD/1840
has not lost its relevance.
Ukraine, 29 May
Ukraine has already expressed its strong welcome and support
for the submitted on behalf of the P6, Draft Decision for
the establishment of a Program of Work (CD/1863).
Last year my country had the privilege to invest its efforts
in these activities by being one of the co-authors and promoters
of the CD/1840,
which, enriched with the most viable proposals, evolved into
CD/1863.
Ukraine shares the priorities of
CD/1863 and considers it to be not only a logical step
in the right direction, but a fresh and powerful impulse to
the momentum created in order to reach the consensus on the
Programme of Work. To our view, legally binding and verifiable
international treaty on fissile materials will significantly
strengthen NPT and CTBT
treaties and should be the first priority for the Conference
on Disarmament. Ukraine believes that the modifications done
in the CD/1863
reflect this idea and pave the way for the commencement of
FMCT negotiations.
United Kingdom, 2 July
The UK is fully committed to implementing the historic decision
that this Chamber took on the 29th of May this year; that
is to begin our Programme of Work.
United States, 26 May
We now have in front of us, in CD/1863,
a means by which those negotiations can begin, as well as
serious discussions on a range of other disarmament matters
that reflect the ongoing concerns of CD members. From our
point of view, while we supported the approach outlined in
CD/1840
– and, if pressed, would prefer the clarity of its wording
– I recognize that this current text reflects the considerable
effort exerted by the P6 to produce an evolved and finely
balanced document which now has a solid prospect of achieving
full consensus. It is evident; however, that we are not quite
there as yet as under the fundamental guarantee that protects
the security interests of every member in this chamber, full
and complete consensus is required. But we are close, and
I am gratified to state that the United States is prepared
to join that consensus as soon as it is reached, under the
existing text.
United States, 2 July
We join the many delegations who call for rapid agreement
on the draft texts CD/1866
Rev. 1 and CD/1867
in order to meet our common goals and obligations.
Venezuela, 18 June
Our delegations were very glad at the recent adoption of the
Programme of Work, contained in Document
CD/1863, which will enable the Conference on Disarmament
to assume its rightful role as the sole multilateral negotiating
forum for nuclear disarmament.
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