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Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Conference room paper submitted by the Republic of Korea

The Delegation of the Republic of Korea proposes the following elements, which it deems important in considering recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Non-proliferation and Safeguards (NPT Article II)

1. The NPT should remain the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and that the regime should be strengthened and improved.
2. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as laid out in Article II of the Treaty is a fundamental pillar of the NPT regime. This objective should be achieved, and all States Parties should comply with their obligations under the Treaty in this regard. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will not only enhance regional and international peace and security, but also help to realize the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Universal adherence to the NPT is a core element in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. As such, it is closely related to the achievement of non-proliferation objectives.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system is a fundamental underpinning of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its institutional and technical capabilities to detect non-compliance make it the first line of defence against proliferation. As such, it fosters confidence in the compliance of States Parties with their non-proliferation obligations, which is a prerequisite for unimpeded international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, recent experience has made it

evident that the right under Article IV of the Treaty to develop complete nuclear fuel cycles, including uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel, can be misused to produce fissile material with which to develop nuclear weapons.

4. As a remedy for this situation, there is currently no better tool than the early universalization of the Additional Protocol, which would greatly enhance the IAEA's inspection and verification capabilities. Universalization of the Additional Protocol would also enhance confidence in the compliance of States Parties with their non-proliferation obligations. Those States Parties that have not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol should do so without further delay.
5. Revelations of covert nuclear weapons programs and of the existence of an extensive nuclear procurement network awakened the international community to the real danger of nuclear terrorism carried out by a coalition of nuclear peddlers and terrorists. This has strengthened the conviction that the international community needs not only to strengthen existing export control regimes such as Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee, but also to develop new, innovative supplementary measures for export control.
6. The international community should make a concerted effort to control the recently discovered threat of illicit brokering in nuclear materials and nuclear-related technology. As part of this effort, the international seminar on brokering held in Seoul, Republic of Korea, in March 2007 provided an opportunity to take stock of national and international responses to the proliferation threat posed by illicit brokering activities.
7. All states must commit themselves to implementing measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery. In this regard, United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 and the activities of the 1540 Committee play an important role in dealing with the illicit trafficking of WMDs and related materials by or to non-state actors.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (NPT Article IV)

8. The inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV of the Treaty should be respected. But the exercise of the right should be conditioned upon compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards obligations under Articles II and III. Proper safeguards should be established against the possible abuse of this right by potential proliferators.
9. The promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy also entails addressing public concerns about the safety and security of nuclear power. In this regard, there has been important progress in the establishment of global norms and standards governing nuclear safety and security, particularly the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

10. The IAEA has an important role to play in expanding technical cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the developing world.
11. In view of the acute proliferation danger associated with sensitive fuel-cycle technologies and facilities, it is necessary to control their transfer, particularly to states of proliferation concern or those states that have no legitimate need for such technologies and facilities in terms of economic feasibility or energy security. Ironclad guarantees of a secure fuel supply at a reasonable price should be provided to those countries that voluntarily forego the possession of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities. There is no inconsistency between tightened export controls on the sensitive fuel cycle and the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Nuclear Disarmament (NPT Article VI)

12. The disarmament obligations of nuclear weapon states, laid out in Article VI of the Treaty, are fundamental to the Treaty's full implementation. While significant progress has thus far been made in the reduction of nuclear arsenals, and there are commitments to further reductions under the Moscow Treaty, nuclear weapon states should continue to engage so as to make further cuts. All nuclear weapon states should take a proactive approach towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
13. Faithful implementation of the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference is important to achieving the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) should be commenced immediately, and both nuclear weapon states and non-NPT states should abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of an FMCT.
14. States still remaining outside the NPT should join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states without further delay. Non-States Parties are also urged to refrain from acts that are contrary to the objects and purposes of the NPT, including any nuclear test explosions or the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies.
15. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be brought into force without any further delay. States that have not yet ratified the Treaty, particularly those States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, should do so immediately. Meanwhile, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is important to maintain the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.